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Title: "The Polish Constitutions of 1947 and 1952: 
A Historical Study in Constitutional lav.". 
The post-war evolution of the constitution of Poland as 
well as several other Central and East European countries is 
characterised by a marked departure from the national tra-
ditions towards a form of Government known as the "People's 
Democracy".This state of affairs resulted from the interplay 
of alliances during the last war and the political expansion 
of Soviet Russia. 
Notwithstanding the treaty obligations and declarations 
such as the celebrated Atlantic Charter,the Western Allies, 
in face of protests bv the Polish Government in Exile,agreed 
on an arbitrary fixing of the Polish-Russian frontier along 
the lines of Soviet demands,and the abrogation of the existing 
Polish constitution.Parallel to this reversal of the inter-
national situation developed the Soviet-sponsored nucleus of 
the post-war Polish political rägime.Upon the advance of the 
Red Army this body established itself on Polish soil and was 
recognised by the "Grand Alliance" as the basis of the Polish 
Provisional Government. 
Before achieving this position the Soviet-sponsored rägime 
effected a considerable amount of "legislation", which purported 
to preclude any other body from attaining power,and determined 
the future constitution to be based on Harxism-Leninism-
Stalinism.General Elections were delayed for two :'ears,but 
they did not bring any change in the regime.In such conditions 
the Constitution of 1947 was.nothing else but an interim 
measure designed to serve as a device to facilitate transition 
from the parliamentary "capitalist" state into the "socialist" 
state as understood in Soviet Russia.For this purpose the 
whole authority of the state became concentrated in an unpre-
cedented body - the Council of State,Parliament declined and -4 • • — 
the position of the individual became circumscribed by the 
ideas of the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat". 
The Constitution of 1952,modelled on the pattern of the 
Soviet Constitution of 1936,transferred the point of gravity 
fx*om the Council of State onto the Government and proclaimed 
a "State of People's Democracy governed by the working people 
of towns and villages". 
The Polish"People*s Democracy only during its infancy 
showed signs of originality,the later development faithfully 
following the pattern of the Soviet state evolved during the 
Stalinist era.The doctrine of the People's Democracy as well 
as its practical features represent,therefore,an application 
ox tne Stalinist Marxism on the institutions of the former 
Republic of Poland. 
Introduction^ 
The study of a constitution is interesting not only from 
the point of view of the actual working of the given political 
system,but also from the point of view of its origin and the 
contribution it brings to the general and fascinating knowledge 
of the ways in which communities and states are governed. 
Broadly speaking new states spring up either from revolutions 
or peaceful emancipation,and constitutions of independent states 
are formed either in a revolutionary or evolutionary fashion. 
When an amendment occurs in a constitution the reason is 
usuall?/ obvious though the motive of such change is not nece-
ssarily the yardstick of progress.In most cases,however,the 
community,if a free agent of its own destiny,is animated by the 
idea of finding a more expedient and consequently more adequate 
form of government.Historical experience and the force of national 
tradition are the main factors in the evolution of a constitution, 
whereas revolutionary changes largely depend on hazard and co-
incidence. In the former case a certain sequence of development 
can usually be traced,but the latter are apt to produce curious 
and quite unpredictable phenomena. 
The post-war development of the constitution in Poland and 
several other Central and East European countries does not fit 
into any typical scheme,out falls into its own distinctive cate-
gory. There was no revolution in Poland and 3'et the "revolutionary 
changes" marked a complete break away from the past and ran coun-
ter to national tradition.The course of development is,however, 
predictable, aiming distinctly at an imitation of the system 
obtaining in Soviet Russia. 
In this process the Constitutions of 1947 and 1952 represent 
the most important stages,though each of them is only a reca-
pitulation of prior development,and a transitorj*- measure.Toge-
ther with other statutes they form the legal substance of the 
system of government which under the popular name of "People's 
Democracy" emerged from the chaos of World War II and was di-
ffused throughout Central and Eastern Europe.Owing to their 
nature and purpose the Constitutions of 1947 and 1952 must be 
studied in conjunction with the political,economic and social 
phenomena to which they owe their existence,because if considered 
as isolated topics of Constitutional Law their study would 
produce a very incomplete picture. 
For the sake of convenience,and in keeping with the spirit 
of the present constitution (which expressly adopted the term 
"People's Democracy" and invested it with a legal meaning of 
comparatively narrow significance) we shall refer to the system 
of government discussed in this work as the People's Democracy. 
By studying the Polish People's Democracy we gain not only 
an illustration of the post-war development of the constitution 
in Poland,but also an insight into the pattern of political 
changes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The system of People's Democracy revealed remarkable dynamism 
in the course of its development,but 'so far does not appear to 
have achieved a totally crystaüJised form.Y/e shall follow it from 
its early infancy,through its preparatory and formulatory period 
to find it finally in the present stage of growth and modifi-»--
cations.Accordingly the work is divided into four parts: 
The first part comprises a historical introduction necessary 
to portray the general background,and the second part tells the 
story of its origin.It is thought necessary and of great impor-
tance to make a detailed study of the genesis of the system 
because the People's Democracy is a direct outcome of historical 
events of an international character,and the binding force of 
the positive lav/ appears to be rooted in the cleavage of the 
external position of Poland,notably her relation to Soviet Russia. 
The third part illustrates the preparatory and formulatory period 
of which the Constitutions of 1947 and 1952 form the backbone. 
The last part gives a glance at the working of the system and 
some of its characteristic features. 
.Material available for the present study is not abundant. 
-There are very few English publications on the subject and none 
concerned with the legal aspect of the People's Democracy.In 
sketching the story of the system we are able to find assistance 
in historical testimony borne by people who were directly engaged 
in the process of its creation.They come from different quarters 
and in their joint evidence we hope to present, as accurate as 
possible an account of events. 
In studying the legislative foundation of the system we shall 
rely on the official publication of statutes and decrees as well 
as on the authoritative pronouncements emanating from official 
sources.Official sources,of course,mean the persons occupying 
responsible .and leading positions as well as government controlled 
writings.The Journal of Laws will provide the authentic texts 
of laws,whereas periodicals,such as "None Drogi" (corresponding 
to the Russian "Komunist") and "Panstwo i Pr^wo" (corresponding 
to the Russian "Sowietskoje Gosudarstwo i Prawo") supply valuable 
information on matters of doctrine and extra-juridical aspects 
of the polity. 
We shall also take into account the decisions of the Supreme 
Court,though owing to the r61e of the- Judiciary in the system of 
the People's Democracy,the Records .of the Supreme Court are scanty 
in volume and limited in scope. Owing to the fact that the 
x "New Ways" xx "State and Law" 
bulk of the Criminal Law has been entrusted to the Military 
Tribunals,whose records are unavailable,we have to miss the 
judicial interpretation of several statutes and decrees of 
vital importance from the point of view of Constitutional 
Law and rely on the Press and Radio when referring to political 
trials. 
This work does not aspire to be a text-book on the Constitu-
tional Law of the Poland of today,but an attempt at projecting 
in historical perspective the present trend of development in 
this field.In general it purports to deal with the aggregate of 
political laws which in their totality make up the constitution 
of the country.In particular it is intended to discuss the 
Constitutions of 1947 and 1952 which are the stepping stones 
of the present political system. 
We must bear in mind that the People's Democracy represents 
a different set of political ideas from those obtaining in the 
West.Encroaching upon that foreign land we must realise that 
due attention must be paid to the views propounded there,and 
consequently that the scope of discussion ought to be adapted 
not to a narrow purely legalistic approach to the constitution, 
but to that Eastern reality, whose Constitutional Law embraces 
quite a wide range of subjects.In deciding,therefore,which 
questions are directly connected with the main theme,apart from 
the formal letter of the Constitution-charter,we have to pay 
heed to the nature of the system we are about to study. 
A difficulty lies in the controversial character of the 
subject-matter of the discussion.The propagators of the People's 
Democracy claim the novelty and superiority of that system over 
the traditional conception of Democracy; their opponents,on the 
other hand,flatly reject these claims.Since the laws can speak 
for themselves there is no need for one to subscribe to either 
side,their provisions being the best illustration of the system. 
The question of evaluation of merits and demerits of a polity 
must be left to the individual,for what is "good" to A,need not 
necessarily be "good" to B.The same applies to the moral and 
ethical side of legislation.A Western reader should,however,be 
on his guard whilst drawing "favourable or unfavourable" conclu-
sions fi-om the principles of the Peoples Democracy exposed here, 
because what appears "favourable or unfavourable" to him need 
not necessarily be so for the founders and propagators of that 
system. 
Another difficulty lies in the fact that the system of the 
People's Democracy is rather young and that it was born and now 
grows before our very eyes.Whereas events of the distant past 
can be viewed dispassionately a similar attitude is rarely applied 
to the present day realities which,therefore,lack the soothing 
effects of time.The present writer realises this fact,and being 
convinced upon the historical evidence accessible to a student 
that the source of the post-war Polish constitution lies outside 
the general will of the Polish nation,proposes to devote a consi-
derable part of this work to the study of the genesis of the 
Polish People's Democracy. 
The aims of this work,therefore,is : 
a) to-discuss the influence of historical events,and social, 
economic and political factors on the formation of the 
present constitution of Poland; 
b) to discuss the elements of the system of government defined 
as "People's Democracy" and search for analogy in other 
polities; 
c) to study the influence of the system of the "People's 
Democracy" on the working of the machinery of the state 
and the position of the individual. 
The purpose of this work is to make a modest contribution 
towards the knowledge of Constitutional Law of Poland and to 
give an account of the changes that occured in her legal system 
since the fateful month of September,1939,disturbed the peaceful 
development of the Polish nation.This modest contribution,it 
is hoped,might help to fill the gap in several works on the 
present political situation in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Part I. Polish Constitutions prior to Second World War. 
Chapter 1. Polish Traditions. 
History and The Law of the Constitution develops along with 
Constitution.j^g-jjQpy the state and there is always a close 
connection between the historical events beaming on the life of 
the organised community and the form and character of the orga-
nisation itself.One can indeed say on the one hand that the inter-
dependence of matters of history and Constitutional Law are of 
vital historical importance,and on the other hand that these 
changes are,if not directly caused,at least greatly influenced 
by the course.of history. 
The historical review we are .going to make,though only frag-
mentary, seems helpful for the purpose of grasping the whole 
subject in all its complexity and peculiarity and to-explain the 
repercussions of the past as well as the force of-tradition that 
becomes a driving factor in the formation of a polity. 
The Royal Nearly a thousand years have elapsed since the 
Republic.siavonic tribes living between the Baltic and the Car-
pathians,in the basins of the .Vistula' and Oder rivers organised 
themselves into the state of Poland.In its early history that 
state was ruled by an absolute,hereditary monarchy which in the 
course of time became circumscribed and elective., 
Poland.achieved the peak of her power during the XVIth and 
XVIIth centuries when stretching from .the. Baltic to the Black 
Sea she was one of,the.principal states in Europe.Though nominally 
a monarchy,her constitution bore republican features and her 
institutions a distinct indigenous character. 
Kings were- elected by acclamation of the, assembled gentry 
x If the vote was divided the candidates-had to fight out the 
issue. 
(who usually appeared "viritim"),vassals,and the representatives 
of the chapters and burghs.After 1573 as a part of the coronation 
oath they had to swear to honour the so called "Pacta Conventa", 
vvhich may be described as the constitution of the country at 
the. time of the given election.The "Pacta Conventa^previously 
prepared by the Diet before each new election,defined the funda-
mental laws of the realm and specified the obligations ofuthe 
King.This was of a contractual nature and a breach by the King 
would invoke the "articulus de non praestanda oboedientia" with 
the effect of freeing the nation from its allegiance. 
Ancient Poland was a class .society,the gentry being the ruling 
class.No feudal system,however,developed,and the gentry among 
themselves were equals before the law,no matter the distinctions 
of Y7ealth or office.The Diet evolved from a national representa-
tion of all classes into a parliament of the gentry.Unanimity 
was the cardinal rule,of the procedure,and a dissenting vote 
could frustrate the whole work of the Diet and terminate its 
session.To obliterate the rule of the "liberum veto1,'which became 
rather oppressive,Diets used to resolve to act as "Confederations", 
that is assemblies where the majority vote obtained. 
The second part of the XVIIth century saw the beginning of 
the period of decline.Countless wars with Sweden and Russia 
together with Tartar and Turkish invasions,weakened the kingdom 
that used to pride itself on being the "rampart of Christianity" 
and the defender of Europe from Asiatic invasions.A short spell 
of regeneration under John Sobieski gave way to the rule of the 
Saxon Kings who with the aid of Russian force of arms were in-
stalled on the Polish throne. 
In the Saxon period Poland ceased to be a power and became 
totally dependent on the mercy of her neighbours,which in the 
period of Polish decline,grew into powerful,militaristic,abso-
lute states.The Russian army was stationed in Poland and th§ 
actual rule of the country was in the hands of Russian ambassa-
dors. Uonsequently on the death of Augustus III (1763),the former 
favourite of Catherine II of Russia,Stanislas Augustus Poniatowski 
became King of Poland. 
During his reign considerable reconstruction ensued and 
attempts were made to reform the political and social system. 
But reforms,for obvious reasons,were efficiently opposed by 
Poland's neighbours who did not hesitate to use intimidation 
or even force to annihilate theS. 
A handful of patriots organised themselves into the so called 
"Confederation of Ba?"(Bar is a town in eastern Poland) designed 
to shake off the Russian domination,but after two years struggle 
(1768-1770) it was crushed by the Russians.Two years later (1772) 
the three powers Austria,Prussia and Russia agreed to partition 
Poland.This first partition was followed by a rebirth of the 
national spirit and serious attempts to remedy the past.Those 
efforts were crowned Ьз^  the reforms of the "Great Parliament" 
which sat from 1783 to 1792 and voted the Constitution of May 3, 
1791; which was thought to give a new foundation for a modern 
state.The promulgation of the Constitution provoked another 
Russian intervention and a struggle ensued,followed by the second 
partition. 
The second partition brought the nation to arms and besides 
the gentry,townsmen and peasants rallied together in this last 
act of desperation.This national insurrection led by Thaddeus 
KosciuI2$o was crushed by a concerted action of Prussian and 
Russian armies and was inevitably followed by the third and 
final partition. 
x One Russian Ambassador already in 1767 had two bishops,a sena-
tor and a deputy arrested and deported to Russia, 
xx One of the leaders Cfasimir Pulaski fell a hero of the American 
War of Independence, 
xxx Distinguished as a general in the American War of Independence. 
May Constitution. The Constitution of May 3,1791 abolished 
the institution of free election and made the throne hereditary. 
The position of the King was clearly defined: He sat in the Exe-
cutive as the ex-officio member of the Ministry,had a vote in 
the Senate and the Courts administered justice in his name.The 
King in his private capacity stood above the ordinary law of the 
land and was immune from the jurisdiction of his courts.In his 
official capacity "he could do no wrong" and was not responsible 
for the acts of the state.Consequently every official act requi-
red a ministerial assent of a responsible Minister. 
The Executive consisted of the King and his Council.The 
Council was composed of the Primate (as the principal dignitary 
of the Church and Chairman of the Commission of Rational Educa-
tion),five Ministers,the Heir to the throne,and the Speaker of 
the Diet (the latter two without right to vote).Ministers were 
appointed* by the King for two years from a larger body of- sixteen 
members.Resolutions of the- Council were not binding on the King, 
who was free to act,provided he received the assent of the Mi-
nister' concerned.Disputes between the King and his Council were 
to be decided-by the Diet convened for that particular purpose. 
Ministers were constitutionally responsible for all executive 
acts performed in the name of the King and assented to by them. 
For breaches of the Constitution they were liable to be tried 
by the Court of»the Diet.They were also responsible to the Diet 
and could be dismissed from office by a two thirds majority on 
a joint sitting of both chambers of the Diet. 
The legislative power was vested in the "aasernbled estates", 
i.e. the Diet consisting of the Senate and the Chamber of Depu-
ties. The King sat in the Senate together with 132 Senators.The 
Chamber of Deputies consisted of 204 representatives of.the 
Dietines (i.e.local assemblies of the gentry) and twenty one 
representatives of the burghs.Both chambers had' equal status 
and when sitting.in joint sessions were considered one for the 
purpose of a division.Senators were appointed by the -King whilst 
the Deputies were chosen by the Dietines and burghs respectively, 
and could be recalled by them. 
The "liberum veto" was abolished and the principle of majority 
vote introduced.The Senate had a suspensive veto operating until 
the nest session which power could be exercised only by a corres-
ponding majority vote. 
The Judiciary was made independent both of the Crown and the 
Legislative,only the prerogative of mercy (not extending over the 
"crimina stat§i") remaining in the King. 
The Constitution of 1791 was a synthesis of traditional insti-
tutions, contemporary political doctrMi and certain elements of 
the English system of government.In England the sovereignty of 
the people had been established a century before when the abso-
lute tendencies of Stuarts sent one of them to the scaffold and 
another one into exile; but"people" hardly meant the whole popu-
lation. The ICing did not rule and the hereditary throne could well 
be described as maintained by the "will of the People",even though, 
in actual fact,the reign of George III in reaction to the French 
Revolution much resembled that of Charl£§x¥.The position of the 
Polish King was similar,though he had no royal prerogative - that 
"residue of the former arbitrary power which has not been eaten 
away in the course of time" - and his powere and functions were 
defined by the letter of the Constitution.The English doctrine 
of the "King in Parliament" hardly applied to Poland where the 
King only sat in the Senate and voted.He had no legislative veto 
and could not influence the course of the enactment of the laws 
x If a bill was passed by say 2/3 majority it could be vetoed 
in the Senate by not -leas than 2/3 majority, 
xx e.g.treason,public violence,crimes against the person of the 
King,the Diet and Dietines. 
xxx Rousseau's theories of the sovereignty of the people and 
-social contract^Montesquieu's - doctrine of the separation 
of powers. 
xxxx W.I.Jennings,The Law of the Constitution,London,1943,p.24 
by dissolution of Parliament prorogation or affecting the compo-
sition of either Chamber.Nor could he legislate by "Proclamation" 
or "Order in Council" as did his English counterpart. 
In the English system there was' no- clear cut separation of 
pov/ers,the Executive being closely linked with the Legislative, 
and the Legislative exercising judicial functions both at first 
instance and by way of appeal. 
In the Polish Diet not all classes were represented,the repre-
sentation of the people under the English, system being wider, 
though the reform of the. franchise had yet to vvait for nearly 
fifty year!. 
The importance of the Constitution of 1791 lies not in its 
value as a piece of legislation but in the moral power it in-
spired for generations.As a law it died a natural death on the 
destruction of the Polish state; as a. swan song of the Polish 
state it•survived .up to our time and made a.tradition of its 
own.Being a fairly modern reform the Constitution was thought 
to infuse new blood into the dying body of'the Royal Republic 
and save the nation from foreign domination.The three, flanked 
assault that destroyed it and enälaved Poland for over a century 
seemed to confirm the belief that national revival was imminent. 
A child of. Rationalism,the Constitution represented a victory 
of pure reason over the forces of reaction,and in the field of 
political reforms corresponded to the destruction of the Bas-
tille. It failed to abolish "fee class distinction and sweep away 
-fee social injustice as did the French Revolution,but it brought 
to an end the апсвеп regime without bloodshed or ruin. 
Though Romanticism elevated it' onto a pedestal of national 
pietism,the Constitution of Kay 3,1791,or rather its posthumous 
influence,considerably contributed to an idealistic approach 
towards law and state, 
x Representation of the People Act,1832 
Struggle for The partitions effected only a physical divi-
Independence.3iQn Q f ро1апй.Кодс1и32ко's insurrection (1794), 
primarily a peasants' movement,and Dabrowski's Legions,formed 
in Italy (1797)»represent the continuity of the struggle for 
independence.Though Napoleon disappointed the Poles by creating 
the Duchy of Warsaw (1807) instead of restoring the country a 
Polish army-fought his wars to the bitter enS. 
Created by the Congress of Vienna,the "Congress Kingdom',' a 
quasi-independent state under a Russian protectorate,existed 
only until the national rising of 1830-31 when even that fiction' 
of a Polish state disappeared. 
The "Spring of Nations" inspired insurrections against Austrian 
(1846) and Prussian(1848) rule,but a large-scale rising (1863-65) 
proved another failure. 
Finally World War I brought about the liberation of Poland 
and the reatoration of an independent republic. 
The struggle for independence greatly influenced the growth 
of political ideas,but its foremost effect was'to regard the 
question of constitution as secondary to the effort ± of regaining 
independence.Thus we see the Poles in revolutionary movements 
and fighting for freedom all over Europe in the illusory belief 
that a struggle for "your freedom" was identical in effect to 
the fight for "our freedom". 
The1idealism of the struggle for independence was considerably 
enhanced by Romanticism which,in the' field of politics,proclaimed 
freedom of peoples within a brotherhood of nations as well as 
liberty and4equality of individuals. 
The development of political ideas owes a great deal to the 
political emigration - an aftermath of the 1830 rising.In western 
Europe,particularly in France,representatives of all- classes and 
vocations gathered and organised political activities prohibited 
at home. 
x The Napoleonic legend,particularly Dabrowski's Legions,resemble 
the fiasco of Polish efforts during World War II. 
The "Right" (called "Whites") was headed by Prince Adam 
Czartoryski,a diplomat and statesman,and the uncrowned King of 
Poland.His party (also known as "Hotel Lambert" party) consisted 
chiefly of representatives of the gentry and was monarchical in 
outlook.Their plan was to use the personal influence of their 
leader and wait for a major European war through which they hoped 
to regain independence by means of foreign assistance.The Crimean 
War proved the futility of their plans and expectations.In matters 
of future government the "Whites" intended to continue the tra-
dition of the Constitution of 1791 and proposed to base their 
X i/A. 
policy on the following principled: equality of all before law; 
freedom of all persons,religions and thought; guarantee of private 
property; absolute ownership of peasants' land,subject to vested 
rights; unity and efficiency of government. 
The "Left" (called "Reds") consisted of several factions, 
among whom the radicals gained predominance.The most distinguished 
leader of the "Left" was Joachim Lelewel,a historian of interna-
tional repute who directly opposed Czartoryski's ideas of diplo-
matic intervention and foreign help.Lelewel believed only in a 
total uprising of the masses previously emancipated,and condemned 
those who squandered their lives in foreign service hoping against 
hope that the liberation of Poland would be the fruit of their 
personal sacrificii.In his international programme,he appealed 
to nations for brotherhood and solidarity with the Polish struggle 
for independence,His chief enemy waa absolutism and consequently 
he advocated unification of the German peoples,abolition of 
absolutism in Germany ,and the rule of the German people.His 
vision of a future Poland was a democracy based on the rule of 
the people and full social reform. 
x quot.by W.Feldman,bzieje Polskiej .tlysli Politycznej ,p.l86 
xx J.Lelewel,Histoire de Pologne,Paris,1844,vol.I.p.386-7 
The "Young Poland" (another faction of the "Left") was a 
revolutionary moveftent,its chief object being the liberation of 
Poland within the wholesale liberation of all oppressed nations. 
Their national programme was,therefore,neither elaborated in 
detail,nor capable of strict definition.Being a part of an inter-
national movement the"Young Poland" favoured federalism. 
In contrast to the general and rather intangible ideas of 
the "Young"Poland" the "Democratic Society" brought forward a 
definite national programme.In their lengthy manifesto of 1836х 
they proclaimed the sovereignty of the people and a democratic 
government,which government,by today's standards,would fit into 
the conception of a modern welfare state. 
On the extreme "Left" was the so called "Grudziadz Communi^ jf" -
an organisation formed in England of former insurgents (mostly 
peasants and workers) of the 1830 rising.In their proclamatf^S 
of 1835 savouring of extreme socialism they demanded social 
reorganisation of the country,abolition of private property 
and industrial monopolies. 
Though the "Great Emigration" did not live to see the dawn 
of independence,it kepi alive the spirit of fighting Poland 
and manifested abroad the desirevof national freedom.The idealis-
tic picture of the Polish "pilgrim of freedom",as portrayed by 
romantic poetry,must,however,have-reflected a rather queer, 
Quixotic look in the realistic mirror of western mentality.He 
did not achieve his aims,but only scars in foreign wars and. a 
reputation of being an adventurer,who,for the magic word "freedom" 
would go to the1end of ^he world fighting anyone,for anybody's 
cause,even against his own interest. 
This reputation probably saddled the Polish nation with tutors 
and arbitrary advisers,the result of the political tutelage during 
the last war-beinfl particularly disastrous. 
x quot.in The Democratic Heritage of Poland,London,1944,p.49-53 
xxThe name is derived from that of the fortress in which they 
were kept. 
xxx quot.in The Democratic Heritage of Poland,p.54-55 
At home political activities in which the emigration was 
avidly engaged were for obvious reasons prohibited.Moreover, 
movements embracing the whole nation were for some time prevented 
because of the three-fold division of the country.Insurrections 
proved a failure and the only way dictated by realism was to 
take advantage of the Parliamentarian!sm that was beginning to 
develop in the occupying powers.Having their own deputies the 
Poles could expect a certain measure of defence,strive for auto-
nomy and hope for achieving independence at the opportune moment. 
The romantic era had to give way to a positivist policy which 
can be summarised in the follov»ing few words : Education,Eman-
cipation, Economic Reconstruction and Democratisation of the 
masses. 
The second part of the XlXth century gave birth,to political 
parties extending over the whole country and aiming at a collec-
tive effort to regain independence.Owing to lack of space only 
the two most important,the Socialist Party and the National Party 
will be briefly considered. 
The Polish Socialist Party was founded in 1882 under the name 
"Proletariat" on the lines of the Marxist theory and practice 
of the Russian revolutionary movement "Narodnaya Wol£".Notwith-
standing condemnation of extremist measures by the Positivists, 
revolutionary ideas were always popular with certain sections 
of the community,especially as foreign leaders of the proletariat 
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were not unsympathetic to the Polish question. 
The "Proletariat" became virtually suffocated in consequence 
of the trial of its leaders by a tsarist court in 1885,but 
revived later and emerged during the Organisational Congress 
in Paris (1892) as the Polish Socialist Party with a definite 
programme of further action. 
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The political programmü of the Socialist Party aimed at the 
creation of an "independent democratic Republic" organised as 
a federation embracing territories and peoples prior to the 
1772 partition,and ensuring by its constitution a republicaü 
rule by the people,equality and enjoyment of basic rights,popular 
election of judges and state officials,and so forth.The economic-
programme envisaged progressive labour legislation,a welfare state 
and gradual nationalisation of land,industry and transport. 
Socialism was intrinsically international and,therefore',un-
comfortable for nationalists.This fact coupled with German influ-
ences within the Socialist international movement caused a split 
in the Polish Socialist Party.The man who led the'secession under 
the name of "Revolutionary Faction" was Joseph Pilsudski. 
Joseph Pilsudski (1867-1935) started his political career within 
the socialist .ranks,but Socialism v/as for him nothing but a form 
of rebellion able to destroy tsardom and liberate oppressed nations. 
He v/as a revolutionist who believed in revolution and,therefore, 
was opposed to any movement aiming at autonomy or hoping to achieve 
independence by evolution.In his reasoning Russia was the chief 
enemy of Poland;Russia also,owing to her internal weakness,could 
be destroyed by revolution in the easiest way.Seing an opportune 
moment for action during the 1905 revolution (which followed upon 
the Russian defeat by Japan) Pilsudski. went to Tokio to plead for 
Japanese help to organise an uprising in Poland.His mission failM. 
During World War I Pilsudski organised "Legions" under-Austrian 
tutelage and led them against Russia.On the resurrection of Poland 
he was appointed to the office of the "Head of the State" and as 
such led the nation through the stormy days of the Polish-Soviet 
war. 
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Pilsudski's vision of Poland was that of a federal statl 
within the 1772 frontiers,protected from the east by means of 
federalism.His scheme,not particularly popular in Ро1аЙ&, did 
not materialize and Poland vas rest>red as a unitary state. 
The National-Democratic Party developed from the "Liga Polska" 
(Polish League)founded by John Poplawski in 1886 and was reorga-
nised in 1893-into the "Liga Narodowa" (National League).Originally 
embracing only the Austrian occupation it spread all over the 
country and under the leadership of Roman Dmowski became one of 
the chief political parties in Poland. 
Roman Dmowski (1864-1939) believed in evolution,and in the 
evolution of modern states he saw,as he did in the aftermath of 
a major war,the advent of the restoration of PolIM.For him the 
question of Poland was a matter of international concern and as 
such Poland's independence was inevitable. 
As an evolutionist Dmowski loathed revolutionary methods and 
as a nationalist positively disliked the idea of building the 
new Poland on the Socialist lines of the day.In his opiffiRfä the 
conception of the new Polish state must result from a realistic 
assessment of the actual strength of the Polish nation,of the 
country's geographical situation,as well as its internal position 
at the time of rebirth.He thought»therefore,that the elaboration 
of the constitution must be postponed until independence was 
Contrary to Pilsudski's plans Dmowski wanted the Prussian 
and Austrian section of Poland to be the basis of the new 5Ш87 
His arguments were historical and ethnical:"this is the cradle 
of the ancient kingdom of the Piasts,and there the undisputably 
Polish population is most dense".Such a plan,he argued,could 
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count on the support of Russia,no longer an ally of the Central 
Powers.He proposed,therefore,to link the Polish cause with the 
Franco-Russian alliance and persuade the Russians that in case 
of a Russo-German war Poles would actively support them* 
To further his plan Dmowski became a member of the Russian 
Dama,and to revive the Polish question abroad he published a 
book in 1908 : "La Question Polonaise".During his tour abroad he 
was able to notice that in the West no one was interested in the 
Polish question,and no one knew anything about if? Furthermore, 
certain writers as I4ge in France and Korfill_in Britain,had 
already done considerable damage by picturing Poland in false 
col£5?s and the British Foreign-Office was constantly supplied 
with false reports on PoiMif.For this state of affairs he blamed 
the underestimation of the position of Poland by western poli-
tfiüSs and the efforts of international Jewry hostile to the 
Polish §ause? 
In Augus^l&owski became the'Chairman of a "Polish National 
Committee" organised in Paris with the purpose of presenting 
the Polish cause to the Western Allies,supervising the Polish 
Army in the western front and organising a consular protection 
over Polish nationals.He led the Polish Delegation at the Peace 
Conference where,owing chiefly to the strangely hostile attitude 
of Lloyd Se^Jf^Cwhom Dmowski called "indefatigable enemy of 
Poland"),the western frontier of Poland was settled to his dis-
satisfaction^ 
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Neither the conception of a "Piast Poland11 (Dmowski) nor the 
idea of a "Jagiellon Poland" (Pilsudski) materialised and Poland 
emerged as a result of bargain and compromise between the Big 
Powers with strangely shaped frontiersflarge number of national 
minorities and precarious economic prospects. 
The period of the struggle for independence was rich in 
political ideas and abundant in programmes.Its achievement lay 
in the democratisation of Polish political thought,its failure 
in the lack of a concrete proposal of a new constitution to meet 
satisfactorily the demands of the time and provide a good start 
for the period of independence.Thus in the period to come ,the 
Poles,whilst consolidating their state liberated after so long 
a century of bondage and after so much sacrifice,were still 
looking for an adequate form of government and could not entirely 
agree among themselves as to which one to adopt.It was only in 
the sphere of industrial and social legislation that some pro-
grammes found their realisation. 
Chapter 2.The Failure of the Parliamentary System. 
At the close of the first World War both the Western Allies 
and the Central Powers proclaimed the independence of Poland. 
On the Armistice Day there were in Poland two authorities which 
could be described as "governments" : the Regency Council estab-
lished by the Central Powers and the "provisional Government" 
composed of different political parties formed in Lublin by a 
socialist,Ignace Daszynski.The latter issued a Manifest^ on 
November 7,1918 proclaiming a "Polish People's Republic" and 
setting forth the principles of the future constitution.The 
Regency Council offered Pilsudski the office of the Head of the 
State under strict understanding that this office was only 
transitory and that he would pass it into the hands of the 
National Assembly when constituted.The "Provisionsl Government" 
also recognised this arrangement.Pilsudski called upon Daszynski 
to form a government,but another socialist Jedrzej Moraczewski 
succeeded in doing so when Daszynski failed. 
The government was organised by Pilsudski's decrees of Novem-
be 14,and November 22,1918 and its primary object was to arrange 
General Elections.Elections on the principles of "general,equal, 
secret,and proportional suffrage,suffrage withoui distinction of 
sex" took place on January 26,1919 and a National Assembly* 
consisting of 415 members and composed of sixteen different 
parties (including a Jewish and a German party having eight and 
ten members respectively) was in office already by February 1919. 
Little Constitution. Pending the enactment of the Constitution 
the so-called "Little Constitution" was voted to serve as an 
interim measure. 
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Under its authority the Administration consisted of the Natio-
nal Assembly (called the Legislative Sejm),the Head of the State, 
and the Cabinet.lt recognised the sovereignty of the people 
exercised by the Legislative Sejm,whose principal function was 
to see that a Constitution was enacted. In the meantime the Sejm 
was to legislate,and to control the Executive. 
2he Head of the State was acknowledged as the chief of the 
Executive,a presidential office without constitutional authority. 
As such he represented the state,appointed the Cabinet,and exec-
uted resolutions of the Sejm in civil and military matters.lt 
was purposely provided that "resolutions",not only "laws" were 
binding upon him,the Sejm making it clear,that the Head of the 
State was subordinated to all its orders. 
Every official act of the Head of the State had to receive the 
assent of the Minister concerned,and his appointment of Ministers 
the direct approval of the Sejm. 
The Little Constitution would have required a great deal of 
interpretation had that interim statute lasted long,but it served 
its purpose during the Soviet-Polish war,and in the meantime the 
Constitution of 1921 was prepared. 
The Constitution By the Constitution of 1921 Poland became 
of March 17,1921. , n. ... _ .. . n , . . 1 a republic with a President elected for seven 
years and a bi-cameral Parliament elected for five years.A "general, 
secret,direct,equal,and proportional" suffrage was enjoyed by 
every citizen of either sex if twenty one years of age and not 
incapacitated for insanity or severe crimes defined by the Electo-
ral Law. 
The general principles on which the Constitution was built 
may be summarised as follows: sovereignty of the people,prepon-
derance of the lower chamber of Parliament (Sejm),liberal concep-
tion of the state,and extensive guarantee of individual rights. 
The legislative power was exercised solely by the Parliament, 
the President and Ministers having only the limited power of 
delegated legislation.The two chambers of Parliament»however, 
were not equal,the Sejm enjoying real preponderance over the 
Senate in every respect.The legislative initiative resided with 
the Sejm and Government and the Senate was not able to propose 
directly any bill.The Senate could only sug§st amendments to 
bills but had no veto,and in practice it could only suspend a 
bill for sixty days.The question of the dissolution of Parliament 
came before the Senate only if such dissolution was proposed by 
the President.This lack of balance between the two chambers was 
Y 
due to the opposition of a certain section of the community to a 
bi-cameral Parliament and an idea of the ancient Sejm deeply 
rooted in the nation. 
There was no room for "judicial legislation" and the Courts 
had to function according to statutes constituting them and decide 
cases according to law.Courts could not question the validity of 
duly promulgated laws and they were not called upon to decide 
whether a statute was "constitutional" or not,as is the case 
under federal constitutions. 
The Sejm and the Senate jointly elected the President and in 
the case of a presidential vacancy his office was exercised by 
the Speaker of the Sejm.Presidential powers were very limited 
and they may be summarised in two functions : "to represent,and 
to officiate".The President was nominally the head of the Execut-
ive and Commander of the Armed Forces,but the latter function had 
only a symbolical meaning since in the case of war he could not 
assume the actual command.He was not responsible for his official 
acts,but in practice his powers were limited to the signing of 
documents together with a responsible t!inister.The President had 
no personal legislative authority,except the power to issue 
executive decreed based on statutory authorisation.He could effect 
x M.Niedzialkowski,Przeciw Senatowi,Warsaw,1920,pp.13 and 16 
dissolution of Parliament,but only vyith the assent of three 
fifths of the statutory strength of the Senate.He had no legis-
lative veto and his only function was to promulgate and publish 
enacted laws. 
The Executive had no control over the Judiciary.The President, 
though exercising the prerogative of mercy,could not influence 
the course of justice or reverse sentences of Courts.Judges were 
indeed nominated by the President,but they were independent in 
their office and could only be removed by Court order or legis-
lation. Thus independence of Courts was secured,but it could be 
curtailed by adequate legislation,that is to say,on the instance 
of the Sejm. 
On the whole a general division of powers existed,but only 
the Judiciary was distinctly separated from the Executive and 
Legislative.The actual master was the Sejm as the representative 
of the nation according to the principle of Art.2 of the Consti-
tution that the" sovereign power resides with the nation". 
The Constitution declared in its preamble a continuity of 
the tradition of the Constitution of May 3,1791>thus stressing 
the moral and legal importance of the latter.Both charters re-
veal certain affinities.The principle of the sovereignty of the 
nation led in both Constitutions to the parliamentary rule exer-
cised by the Sejm with the difference that the powers of the two 
chambers were balanced under the May Constitution.Both Consti-
tutions followed the doctrine of separation of powers,the March 
Constitution deviating in favour of the Legislative.In each case 
no responsibility for official acts was attached to the head of 
the Executive,but Ministers could more easily be dismissed under 
the March Constitution.By extraordinary coincidence both Consti-
tutions endowed the head of the state with little power,yet the 
intention of the makers of the May Constitution was to strenghten 
x A simple majority vote in the Sejm sufficed,a 2/3 majority 
of both chambers necessary under the May Constitution. 
the position of the King ,whereas the leading motive behind the 
March Constitution was to make the President a mere figurehead. 
Whilst the May Constitution was under the influence of the 
English system ,the March Constitution v/as,to a great extent, 
modelled upon the French Constitution of 1875,witnout,however, 
taking into account the conventions,practices,and experience of 
the Third Republic. 
The March Constitution may be classed without exaggeration 
as being modern,progressive,and truly democratic.lt proved, 
however,a failure.Elaborated by University Professors it was 
doctrinaire,idealistic,and unadjusted to the real state of the 
Polish community of 1921. 
Several compromises between political parties knocked the 
Constitution off the balance that v/as indispensable for a "har-
monious and efficient working of the machinery of state.Such v/as 
the compromise on the organisation of Parliament and status of 
its chambers which inevitably led to uni-cameral rule and what 
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was termed as the "byzantinism" of the Sejm and "sejmo-crafcy'.1 
The multifarious party system provided a fertile soil for 
demagogy and prevented formation of any kind of sound opposition 
in the sense of a parliamentary necessity.In this system opposi-
tions shifted and parties changed their allegiance almost over-
night from support to the obstruction of the government,and 
coalitions were formed which completely altered the structure 
of Parliament.This permanent political crisis resulted in a 
situation whereby from November 18,1918 to,May 15,1926 twelve 
different persons held the office of the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and fourteen different governments were formed, 
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And yet stability of government was the prime necessity for 
the state where everything had to be built anew and where the 
chaos caused by over a century of division and,ultimately, war 
began to lift its head.The Constitution rcas unable to give the 
country a solid basis for stability of gevernraent and formation 
of policies. 
Another compromise,that on the presidential office,proved 
equally disadvantageous.The Constitution made the President a 
mere figurehead unable to use the authority one would expect of 
this office,for the benefit of the country.But the original sin 
lay in the fact that the motive behind the framing of the pre-
sidential powers was to prevent Joseph Pilsudski,the "Head of 
the State" when the Constitution was made and a potential presi-
dent,from acquiring too much powe?. This was conceded even by 
one of the most fervent opponent of Pilsudski,who nevertheless 
saw the necessity of strengthening the Executive.Pilsudski would 
not accept the presidential office offered to him under the March 
Constitution not only because of its low status,but also because 
it would separate him from the Army(Art.46 of the Constitution). 
He preferred,therefore,to,decline the offer and retire to private 
life,but in May 1926 he came back in his old revolutionary 
fashion to seize the full power by a coup d'£tat. 
Coup d'ätat Early in 1926 Pilsudski attacked the Constitution 
of May,1926.severa2 times in the Press accusing it of being the 
chief cause of political chaos.In May,after three йауз fighting 
and with only a handful of military,he overpowered the capital 
and forced the President and the Government to resign.In the new 
Government he contented himself with the post of Minister of War 
and the control of the -army. 
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The presidency becoming vacant parliament was convened and 
Pilsudski elected.he declined the nomination and ^gnace-Moscicki 
was subsequently chosen. 
The immediate consequence of the coup d'etat was the amend-
ment of the Constitution by the Xaw of August 2,1926 with the 
object of giving more power to the Executive.Accordingly the 
President received the power to dissolve the Parliament on the 
request of the Government,and was authorised to legislate by 
decrees in cases of national emergency and during the absence of 
Parliament.Such legislation,however,could not contradict the 
Constitution and became null if not submitted to the Sejm within 
fourteen days of its first sitting.The Government became endowed 
with considerable powers in matters concerning the enactment 
of the budget. 
In point of theory the former "parliamentary system" became 
transformed into the "presidential system".In point of fact, 
however,the actual distribution of functions at the top of the 
state machinery underwent a drastic change,and the "Minister of 
War" in subsequent Cabinets concentrated the whole of'the exe-
cutive power in his hands;though chiefly concerned with foreign 
policy and the development of the Army.Therefore Joseph PiL-
sudski,whilst living in the shadows and avoiding publicity and 
not nominally a dictator became,in this way,the autocratic 
ruler of Poland. 
After Pilsudski's coup d'etat there was no 'purge',or'liqui-
dation' of opponents as one would expect of a perfect dictator-
ship. The Government did not incur 'responsibility' for firing 
at the victorious revolutionaries; the Parliäment was not dis-
banded but carried on Its functions as usual until its term 
expired. 
Pilsudski had no political party of his own in the Parliament 
at the time of his coup d^tat and not even in the subsequent 
Sejm did his supporters achieve a majority; it was only in 1930 
that the "Non-Party Bloc of Co-operation with the Government" 
attained a formal majority. 
Pilsudski enjoyed great popularity but had also to face a 
considerable opposition.Unlike other 'dictators' he neither 
developed his own propaganda nor suppressed the Press.He was not 
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a demagogue or orator.Relying mostly on military men his methods 
bore military features making for him more foes than supporters, 
yet a strong Executive can always pride itself on efficiency and 
achievements in every field; therefore,in post-May Poland,there 
were many people who recognised the benefits if not the necessity 
for Government with the strong arm.On the other hand the opposition 
did not refrain from showing its dissatisfaction and even open 
hostility. 
Several writers openly denounced the 'dictatorship' and in 
strong terms advocated its abolition.The Sejm itself set its face 
against it in the "Czechowicz affair",when the Finance Minister 
Gabriel Czechowicz was brought before the Tribunal of State, 
indicted at the instance of the Sejm for spending public funds 
without parliamentary authorisation.Though the whole affair came 
to nothing it was an indictment of the r£gime of the day. 
But the most daring act of the opposition was the Six-Party 
Congress held in Cracow on June 29,1930, demanding in menacing 
teMi a change of the rögime and resignation of the President. 
The reaction of the Government was to arrest the leaders of the 
opp£i££ion,keep them in custody in the military fortress of Brest 
and put them on trial for sedition.The Brest affair was primarily 
of a political character and aimed,it appears,at thwarting the 
opposition during the impending General Elections,and criminal 
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charges in open court were preferred to justify the unlawful 
imprisonment in a military fortress. 
In the meantime Elections took place and a majority was 
achieved by the Government supporters.This was the first Govern-
ment majority since the coup d^tat,but some foreign writers 
charge the Government of the day with "irregularities" in con-
ducting the Election!. 
The Brest affair casts a dark shadow on the system of govern-
ment, and if there is any doubt as to the correct classification of 
that system the name of Brest outweighs the balance for the auto-
cratic rule of Marshal Pilsudski.But to be objective and to do 
justice to facts one has to concede that the peculiar kind of 
•dictatorship' practised by Joseph Pilsudski neither concentrated 
all three powers,that is the Legislative,Executive,and Judiciary 
in his hands,nor liquidated the opposition by silencing effectively 
their voice on the model of classic dictators. 
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Chapter 3. The Constitution of April 23,1935. 
Ifev; Elections,held in the shadon of the Brest affair,brought 
victory to the Government Party which in the Sejmx received 
247 seats out of the total 444,but still did not achieve the 
two thirds majority necessary to change the Constitution if the 
remaining Parties united against it. 
Discussions on а пет/ Constitution began in 1931,but they 
proved abortive,because the conception of an authoritarian 
state in which the power would be concentrated in the hands 
of the President»advocated by the Government,was unacceptable 
to the Opposition.The Opposition,on the other hand,did not 
bring any proposals of their own and remained stbictly on the 
defensive. 
The "Constitutional Theses",as the proposed draft was called, 
accepted in the committee stage in January 1934,was tabled for 
debate,but in wholesale protest the Opposition walked out 
leaving only one Member as observer.In the absence of the 
Opposition the "Theses" were voted and carried with one dissen-
ting vo^e.The proposal so enacted was passed in the Senate where 
the Government Party had a two thirds majority. 
In the final voting in the S'ejm, where the proposal was returned 
from the Senate with certain amendments,it was carried by 260 
against 139 vo?ei on March 23,1935.The new Constitution was 
promulgated by the President on April 23,1935,hence it is usually 
referred to as the April Constitution. 
It was said that the Constitution "was put through by a Ш ? 
while the Opposition,contending that in their absence no debate 
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on the "Constitutional Theses" should have taken place,called 
it 'irregular', and some writers in post-war Poland made it 
'illegal',because it was voted in the contravention of the 
Rules of the Se^S which required a fifteen days interval between 
motion and debate.The charge of 'illegality' was refuted by 
Professor Stronski,the dissenting Opposition Deputy in the vote 
on the "Constitutional Theses", who pointed out that the idea of 
'illegality' was invented by the so called "National Committee 
of Liberation" (created in Moscow during the war) in order to 
pass over the awkward fact of the existence of a constitutional 
Polish Government in Lon&§S. 
It appears that the argument of 'illegality' cannot be sus-
tained either on legal or parliamentary grounds.The Sejm was 
the master of its own procedure and before the division it 
overruled formal objections of the Opposition Deputy.On the other 
hand,no experienced parliamentarian would contend that measures 
taken in his absence ought to be null and void.The Constitution 
would not have been passed at that occasion had the Opposition 
remained in the Chamber and not relied on a "nihil sine nobis" 
expectation. 
Theory of State. The April Constitution was ana attempt at 
finding a middle way between the liberal and totalitarian con-
ception of state.The state as the "common good of all citizens" 
(Art.l.al.l) was no longer a mere form of organisation of the 
community,it became the community itself transformed into a 
distinct machinery,into an organism of its own.We have here a 
universal conception of state as something pervading all spheres 
of life and being in itself the highest ideal.The legal expression 
of this conception of state identifies the'state'with the 'legal 
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order'.The 'state1 appears,thus as a creation of law and a pro-
duct of purely legalistic consideration of the political orga-
nisation of the society.There is a metaphysical element in this 
formulation of the theory of state since the 'legal order' implies 
onl^n^nand existence of a law-making body,and on the other,it 
lays down foundations of its activities. 
In the March Constitution the nation was the 'sovereign' and 
the source of all law and state authority.The 'state',on the other 
hand,appeared only as a legal form of the organisation of the 
nation.Historically this conception of state seems to have deilved 
from the ideas of the French Revolution when the 'people' des-
troyed the ancien regime in the form of an absolute state,decla-
red itself to be the subject of supreme authority and commenced 
a new era of the 'rule of the people by the people for the people' 
in a republican form of state organisation.The April Constitution 
was born when another theory was more fashionable and virtually 
superseded the old one rejecting it as fictitious.In France 
Maurice Hauriou and Leon Duguit,in Austria Hans Helsen,in Poland 
Y/.J.Jaworski rejected the old theory and expounded the new theory 
of state,which considered the state as a 'legal order'.This 
theory put the state on an objective basis and made it simply 
a reality that exists on its own and acts by its organs.Hence 
the object of the state in the April Constitution was not to 
cater for the welfare of individuals leaving them to their own 
fate,but to cater for the whole community as a unit,composed of 
individuals,all striving for"one common good" - the interest of 
the state»identical with 'interests of individuals'. 
This theory of state affected,of course,the constitutional 
position of the citizen.Whereas the arch Constitution favoured 
the individual,the April Constitution favoured the society.Thus 
the individual was no longer regarded as a 'separate entity', 
but became a 'member' of the community-state and so subordinated 
to the will of the community-state.The community-state indeed 
guaranteed him development of his personal values as well as 
personal freedoms,but warned him at the same time that the 
•common good1 may limit these rights (Art.5).The community-
state resolved to rely on the individual stating that the 'pro-
ductivity of the individual is the basis of the development of 
the com.nunity',but this statement only emphasised the idea of 
a social function of the individual. 
The April Constitution may be classed as "etatistic",that is, 
allowing the state to take precedence before the citizen.Another 
characteristic feature was the announcement of the formation 
of an "elite" foretold by Art.7,since the degree of influence 
on public affairs was to be measured by 'effort and merits' of 
the citizen made for the 'common good'. 
Division The April Constitution renounced the doctrine of 
of Povers. =—1 the separation of powers and solved the problem of 
of the organisation of the state on the basis of the indivisi-
bility of the authority of the state and a concentration of 
its powers.Hence,in theory,we have the conception of an 'indi-
visible authority of the state' and of 'divisibility of functions' 
x t 
of the state.In pracice,on the other hand,the indivisible autho-
rity of the state was entrusted to the -^resident of the Republic 
(Art.2 ,al.4) and the divisible functions of the state to various 
organs of the state (Art. 3,al.l)/separated from each other,but 
at the same time placed under the authority of the President. 
The position of the President was unique : he was the head 
of the state (Art.2,al.l) knd supervisor of all organs Of the 
state (Art.3,al.l).The President was not the chief of the Admi-
nistration ,as is the case in the united States of Ame££ca, 
he did not govern,or rule by means of a Government subordinated 
to him,but his function was to coordinate the тлогк of the various 
xW.Makowslci,Wspolczesne Zagadnienia Ustrojowe го1ski,Warsaw,1937 
p.78 
xx cf.C.B.Swisher,American Constitutional Development,New York, 
1943,p.37 et seq. 
organs of the state and control their activities.He was not 
authorised to interfere with the technical work assigned by the 
Constitution to each organ,but was expected to use the authority 
of his office for the purpose of moral leadership and,if necessary, 
arbitration.Hence his chief duty: "to cater for the interest of 
the state,its defence and international position" (Art.2,al.3). 
.dy the provision of Art. 13 the President was given certain _ 
personal prerogatives.These powers touched the Legislative,since 
he could dissolve the Parliament as well as affect the composition 
of the Senate by appointing one third(of its strength at each 
Election; they touched the Executive,since he could recommend 
a candidate to succeed him in office,appoint and dismiss the 
Prime Minister,and indict Ministers before the Tribunal of State; 
they touched the Judiciary,since he appointed the First President 
of the Supreme Court as well as ordinary Judges,and had a pre-
rogative of mercy;they touched the question of the financial 
control as well as the organisation of the Armed Forces,since he 
appointed and could dismiss the Chairman of the Supreme Chamber 
of State Control,and the Commanders of the Armed Forces.The 
personal element in exercising the presidential prerogatives 
was emphasised by the provision of Art.14,al.2 which stated 
that no ministerial assent was required for acts executed under 
the authority of Art.13,whereas all other official acts of the 
President had to be assented to by the Prime Xuinister and the 
Minister concerned. 
The Legislative. The legislative function was assigned to the 
Sejm,whereas the Senate only examined the bills passed by the 
Sejm (Art.31).The Senate could not initiate legislation,but 
could reject or amend any bill passed by the Sejm (Art.46).The 
final decision on the destiny of bills so amended or rejected 
was,however,in the hands of the Sejm .(Arts.53 and 54). 
The President had a suspensive veto operating until the next 
session with regard to all statutes and the right to promulgate 
them (Art.54). 
A great deal of legislation could be effected by the President 
of his own right,He could legislate by decrees,his decrees 
ranking equal to Acts of Parliament,by the authority of the 
Constitution as well as by special statutory authority.The pre-
sidential initiative to amend the Constitution was privileged 
as compared with the initiative of the Sejm or Cabinet,he could 
veto an amendment passed by the Sejm (this veto would suspend 
the amendment for the duration of the given Parliament) and 
even dissolve both Chambers if the same amendment was passed 
again. 
The Cabinet had the power to initiate legislation,including 
the amendment of the Constitution,and in certain questions,such 
as the budget,conscription,and ratification of treaties,the 
initiative exclusively belonged to the Cabinet (Art.50)1/ 
The Executive. The Constitution,rejecting the doctrine of the 
separation of powers rejected as well the conception of the 
Executive in the broad meaning of this term.In the narrow mean-
ing of the Executive we have the Government (i.e.the Catonet) 
as an 'organ of the state',besides the President as the head 
of the state and supreme authority over all organs. 
The responsibility of Ministers was threefold: 
a)political (to the President - Art.23 ); 
b)constitutional (before the Tribunal of State on impeachment -
Art.30); and . 
c)parliamentary (to the Sejm primarily and Sejm and Senate 
secondarily - Art.29). 
Ministers were responsible politically to the President, 
himself responsible to "God and History for the destiny of the 
state" (Art.2,al.2). The President was not responsible in law 
for his official acts,but those acts were divided into two 
classes: those requiring assent of the Prime Minister and 
the Minister concerned,and acts authorised by the presidential 
prerogative (Art.13) which did not require any assent.In other 
words the Prime Minister and Ministers took responsibility for 
all acts of the President,except those authorised by ArtJL3. 
For the latteronlv the President was responsible to "God and 
History",that is,not responsible'in law! By the wording of Art. 
28,the Prime Minister and Ministers were politically responsible 
to the President,that is,for their own acts and acts of the 
President they assented to.In other words they were responsible 
to a person not responsible 'in law',even for his own acts.If 
one considers the responsibility to "God and History" to be 
'no responsibility' and excludes the responsibility to another 
person,he may contend that politically the Ministers were 'not 
responsible'. This seams to be the attitude of Prof. Komarniclci, 
in whose opinion the Constitution introduced the principle of 
non-responsibility of Government,that is,a rule of authority, 
not a rule of law.With due respect to Prof.Komarnicki,it seems 
that his opinion is too extreme.Besides the 'political' respon-
sibility of one person to another there was also the constitu-
tional and parliamentary responsibility of Ministers,that is, 
they were under the control of the Sejm and consequently they 
could be always forced to resign or even brought before the 
Tribunal of State at the instance of the Sejm with the consent 
of the Senate. 
The Judiciary. The Judiciary was organised on the principles 
of the March Constitution,that is,independent of the Government 
and the law-making bodies.The extensive legislative powers 
entrusted to the President did not affect the Judiciary,but 
x Komarnicki,op.cit.p.33 
his prerogative of mercy allowed the President to pardon,mitigate 
or even abrogate effects of a conviction otherwise untouchable 
by other organs of the state. 
The Armed Forces. The Armed Forces regarded as another organ 
of the state,were separated from the political element and 
subordinated to the authority of the President.Whereas the March 
Constitution put the Military under the control of the Sejm, 
the April Constitution put it under the command of the President, 
or a Commander in Chief responsible directly to the President. 
This separation degenerated later in practice into a sort of 
'duality of authorities' : the civil,exercised by the President, 
and the military authority,exercised by the Commander in Chief? 
Electoral Law. The Electoral Law of July 8,1935 represented 
a considerable departure from the principles of Electoral Law 
Announced by the March Constitution.The election of the Sejm 
followed a different procedure from the election of the Senate, 
and the number of Deputies as well as the Senators was reduced. 
The candidates for Deputies were nominated by the "District 
Assemblies" (Zgromadzenia Okregowe) corisistng of thö Returning 
Officer for the given constituency and delegates of: 
a) territorial self-government (i.e.communes,towns,district 
assemblies); 
b) economic self-government (i.e.chambers of commerce and trade, 
agricultural committees,guilds and syndicates); and 
c) professional organisations (i.e.medical associations,lav 
chambers,universities,trade unions). 
Besides candidates nominated by the "District Assemblies" 
candidates could be proposed directly by the electorate,but in 
such case 500 supporting signatures were required for nomination. 
As we can see the party element became excluded and elections 
tended to be not for "professional politicians" but for repre-
sentatives of the cross-section of the community.The new system 
x cf Circular of Prime Minister of June 13,1936 declaring the 
Commander in Chief second only to President. 
was a reaction against the former party system,where nominsaons 
were effected at the instance of political parties,and it con-
formed with the idea of "direct contact with the electorate" 
and abolition of the "party rule" propounded by critics of the 
old system.It was further a consequence of the idea of social 
solidarity expounded by the Constitution and advocated by Valery 
Slawek,one of those who inspired the April Constitution and the 
Electoral Law of 1935-Slawek,leader of the Government Party, 
dissolved his party on October 30,1935,faithfully following 
his theory. 
Whereas the election of the Sejm was conducted upon the 
"general,secret,equal and direct" suffrage,the Senators were1 
elected indirectly through "Electoral Colleges"(two thirds of 
the total strength of the Senate) and appointed by the President 
(one third of the total).The right to vote for Senators was 
reserved for three groups of citizens who distinguished them-
selves by : 
a) merits (holders of highest military and civil decorations); 
b) education (minimum the matriculation standard); and 
c) public confidence (people elcted to leading positions in 
the territorial self-government units,trade,commerce,agri-
cultural »professional and similar organisations). 
Therefore qualified electors chose among themselves delegates 
to "Electoral Colleges" where ultimatly Senators were elected. 
The idea of an "elite" propounded by Art.7 of the Constitution 
was so realised by the Electoral Law.Consequently the Sejm was 
meant to be a representation of the country and the Senate an 
"elite" of the nation,chosen by specially qualified citizens. 
The electoral system of 1935 v/as severely criticized and even 
Valery Slawek admitted its failure three years after its intro-
duction. 
x Mackiewicz,op.cit.p.273 
The reaction of public opinion to the April Constitution 
was divided.Besides the enthusiasts there was a strong feeling 
that the new system should have a trial to prove its merits 
and shortcomings in practice,and,of course,a^considex'able section 
of the community openly opposed it.The Electoral Law certainly 
was rejected by the public and the Elections of 1935 prove it 
by the unusually poor attendance at the polls? 
An interesting document to illustrate the attitude of an 
opposition was a memorandum of the Polish Labour Movement of 
November 13,1937 urging the President of the Republic to effect 
change of the Electoral ^aw and order new Elections. 
In the face of international crisis that was feared in Poland 
already in 1937 the question of the defence of the country 
superseded all other problems.The Elections of 1938 brought 
over two thirds of the electorate to the pol^s and the Government 
appeal för a National Defence Fund was met with a spontaneous 
response of the public. 
It is a matter of opinion whether the Constitution of 1935 
was a short shot in "democracy" as much as its predecessor was 
a long one.In all probability the ensuing development would have 
tempered the extremism of the presidential system had not the 
war intervened. 
x *'iala estimated 46'6jS attendance,Rose 45# and. Schmitt 46'5% 
B.Schmitt,Poland (a collective publication),New York,"1945, p. 1^2 
xx Rose,op.cit,p.201'.- 2/3 of the .electorate,' v ' .nu." 
3chmitt,op.citrp.'146 - б4'5'(5& . 
Part II. Genesis_of_the_^People^s_DemocracY. 
Chapter 4. Constitutional "Vacuum" (1939-1945) 
The clue to the formation of the present political system 
in Poland lies in the history of World War II.The question of 
how the ideas of a "People's Democracy" became the victorious 
political force in Central and Eastern Europe may be adequately 
answered by a study of historical events,in the course of which 
the small states of Central and Eastern Europe lost their inde-
pendence and found themselves in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
Why this had to happen still remains an enigma.One thing,however, 
is certain : those states had practically no chance to influence 
the decisions taken for them by the Big Powers. 
In order to trace the genesis of the People's Democracy in 
Poland we have to study,therefore,the course of the war and its 
influence on the fate of Poland. 
German Aggression» The German assault of Poland in 1939 was 
the last link in the chain of aggression which started with the 
unpunished occupation of the Ruhr,the forcible"Anschluss" of 
Austria and the fall of Czechoslovakia.The proven pattern of 
conquest waa acoordingly applied to her: First a persuasion 
to take part in a crusade against Soviet Russil or to remain 
neutral in the case of war in the wi^t,then "modest demands" 
and finally threats and violence.(In the meantime,to prove 
that words mean business,a small scale grab was executed by 
the capture of the Memel on March 21,1939.) The "modest demands? 
preceded by and accompanied with violent anti-Polish propaganda, 
x The Polish.White Book (Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Official 
Documents,1933-1939)»No.48,p.53jalso French Yellow Book,no.124 
The Speeches of Adolf Hitler(1922-1939),vol.III.edited by 
N.Baynes,New York,1942,о.1561-1566 
xx S.Mackiewicz,Colonel Beck and His Policy,London,1944,p.139 
comprised in general terms the return of the free city of Dan-
zig to the Reich and readjustments of the frontier to repair 
the "Versailles injustice". 
Messages of the Pope,the President of the United States and 
the King of Belgium asking the parties in dispute to refrain 
from usin^ force were the last voices appealing for peace before 
the guns started to speak.Poland replied with readiness to ne-
gotiatf, Germany with an ultimatum.This ultimatum,however,was 
never communicated directly to the Polish Government,but was 
put before the British Ambassador in Berlin and broadcast through 
the German radf$. The ultimatum, consisting of sixteen paragrafi-Я 
was to be unreservedly accepted and a plenipotentiary sent 
within twent four hours to sign it,as previously did Dr.Schusch-
nigg and President Hacha.The last effort of the Polish Ambassa-
dor to talk with the Reich's Minister of Foreign Affairs was 
fruitless,since the former did not come as the plenipotentiary 
to accept the d£§$£te.At dawn on September 1,1939 World War II 
started and night fell upon Poland. 
Polish Alliances. From an early beginning of her restoration 
Poland was allied with France,her historical and natural friend. 
The Franco-Polish Treaty of February 19,1921 provided for mutual 
assistance and co-operation in case of aggression against one 
of the contracting parties.lt was further amplified by the 
Military Convention of May 19^^55 in which each party engaged 
to start military operations in three days from the mobilisation 
and launch a major offensive within fifteen days,in case of 
German attack against the other, 
x Polish White Book,No.88,p.98 
cf.Hansard,House of Commons,vol.351,cols.111-112 
xx J.Beck,Dernier Rapport,Neuchätel,1952,p.216 * 
cf.Hansard,House of Commons,vol.351,col.126-138;and House 
of Lords,vol.114.col.913-922. 
xxx full text see Polish White Book,No.113,p.120 et seq. 
Sir N.Henderson,Deux Ans avec Hitler,Paris,1940,p.340 et seq. 
xxxx Polish White Book,No.112,p.119;Henderson,ibid.p.293 et seq. 
xxxxx Beck,op.cit.p.345-6 
The British-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance was the 
result of the political situation that ensued after Munich.Poland 
always was,and still remains ,terra incognita for the British 
people;the statement of the British Prime Minister in the House 
of Commons on March 31,193§ was,therefore,of great historical 
importance,a " milestone in British history" as described later 
by Mr.Churchiff (as he then was).The British guarantee,opposed by 
XXX xxxx 
by Lloyd George and unfavourably received by THe Times,drew in 
fact that distant country of Poland into the British orbit and 
made it a forepost of the anti-German alliance.Although there was xxxxx 
some apprehension in the House of Commons as to whether Britain 
could gain anything from her alliance with Poland,later history 
proved that Britain was not to be the loser. 
The Agreement of Mutual Assistance consisted of a Treaty and 
a secret protocol attached thereto.The contracting parties entered 
thereby into a pact of mutual assistance coming into operation 
automatically if one of them was attacked,and pledged themselves 
to respect each other's interests whilst dealing with other powers. 
Poland was also allied with Rumania and Hungary.With Soviet-
Russia Poland had a Non-Aggression Pact signed, in 1932 and still 
in force.Good relations were emphasised during the visit to Warsaw 
of Mr. Potemkin, the Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs 
on May 10, 1939» who stated that in the event of an armed conflict 
between Poland and Germany, Soviet Russia would adopt " une 
attitude bienveillante" towards Mr.Stalin's speech 
of March 1939 seemed to confirm this policy ("... we stand 
for the support of nations which are the victims 
x Hansard,House of Commons,vol.345,cols.2415-2417 
xx ibid.vol.354,col.2432 et seq; xxx ibid.vol.34*7,cols. 1317-1822 
cf.W.P.and Zelda K.Coates,Six Centuries of Russo-Polish Relations, 
London,1948,p.131 
xxxx The Times of April 1,1939 
xxxxx Hansard,vol.346,cols.13,59-61,105-106,113-114,129-130, 
137-138 (cf Speech of Mr.McGovern on April 13,1939) 
xxxxxx Beck,op.cit.pp.201 and 322 
of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their 
countr$n;.•). 
•Three,days after Poland was attacked Great Britain and 
France declared war on Germany,but neither of them rendered 
any assistance (the fo&rty aeroplanes Britain originally 
sönt to ^ oland were eold en route to Turkey). 
Soviet Attack. On the 17th day of fighting.the Soviet armies 
in great numbers entered Polish territory.One of the contem-
porary publicists counted as many as six treaties that were 
violated by this act of aggressforL 
Partition The fifth partition of Poland took,place in 
of Poland. 1 9 g 9 > T h e German-Soviet Pact of August 2 3 w a s 
a prelude and preliminary to the final division ofjspoils 
arranged in the agreement of September 28,1939 whilst Poles 
were still fffSffng. Poland became divided between Germany 
and Soviet Russia,the line of division running chiefly along 
the celebrated "Curzon SSÜe?* 
Contrary to the accepted principles of "International Law" 
that the belligerent parties are in temporary occupation of 
conquered territories until the peace settlement,both Germany 
and Soviet Russia considered their 'settlement• as final and 
began to re-organiseithe occupied territories in their parti-
cular fashion.As far as they were concerned ^oland ceased to 
exist (..."Uothing is left of that ugly offspring of the Ver-
sailles Treaty"... - Mr.Molotov on October 31,1939 in his 
speech to the Supreme 
^he legal position was undoubtedly that of an "occupatio 
bellica" and consequently the provisions of Art.4-3 of the IVth 
x quot.in Hansard,House of Commons,vol.351,cols.3-16,28-41 
xx Beck,op.cit.p.209 
xxx S.Mackiewicz,Lata Nadziei (1939-1946),London,1946,p.43 
xxxx Beck,ibid.p.348 
xxxxx HiLaeuen,Polnisches Zwischenspiel,Berlin,1940,p.333 
xxxxxx Line of demarcation suggested by. the.Conference of Spa 
during the Soviet-Polish war (1919-1920). 
xxxxxxx full text,A.S.Cardwell,Poland and Russia,New York,1944, 
/p. 223 
Convention of the Hague of October 18,1907 should have been 
observed by the occupying powers.Accordingly "occupatio bellica" 
does not constitute a title to the acquisition of territory 
as would be the case of ,,debellatio".The war was still on and 
Poland continued to be a belligerent state with a Government 
and Army in exile.This being so the occupying powers should 
have considered themselves in temporary de facto dominion over 
the conquered territories and consequently incompetent to exer-
cise sovereign powers such as legislation designed to supersede 
the existing laws or effect incorporations.This theory was re-
cognised by a German expert in International Law,butidenied 
in practice by both German and Soviet authorities. 
German occupation. As far as Germany wae concerned Poland 
ceased to exist at the moment the Führer gave the invasion 
order to his armies.Accordingly territorial changes were imme-
diately arranged and a specially prepared administrative appa-
ratus was introduced following the advance,of the military 
operations.According to a carefully prepared planiPoland was 
to be gradually absorbed into the Reich and germanised.The 
effectiveness of this plan,set in motion with the usual German 
efficiency,seemed quite certain since all available means in-
cluding the indefatigable Gestapo and SS,as well as special 
"Germanisation Commissars" were at hand. 
The western territories of Poland were annexed by decree 
of the Führer on October 10,1939 and became part of the Reich 
as the so called "eingegliederte Ostgebiete".They constituted 
30,8j5 of the pre-war territory of Poland and comprised a popu-
lation of twelve millions .that is one third of the whole pre-war 
x K.Strupp,Wörterbuch des Völkerrecht,vol.2.p.158:"Der Okkupant 
darf die ihm zustehende Rechtssetzungsbefugnis nicht dazu 
missbrauchen,um durch Einführung grundstürzender Neuerungen 
seine politische Pläne bezüglich des besetzten Gebietes so 
zu verwirklichen wie wenn er dortselbst bereits Gebietsherr ware" 
xx Upper Silesia,Pomerania,£osnania and the Ciechanow district. 
population of Poland.To all intents and purposes the incorpo-
rated territories became German territory and their administra-
tion was organised on the German pattern.The remaining part of 
Poland,that is the central part of the country,apparently not 
prepared yet for incorporation,received a special status 
("Generalgouvernement") and was to be for the time being in 
Hitler's own words the "Heimstätte des polnischen Volkes".Upon 
the conquest of the eastern part of Poland during the German-
Soviet war in 1941 "territories annexed in 1939 by Soviet Russia 
came also under German administration.Thus we have three cate-
gories of Polish territory under German rule : the incorporated 
territories (Ostgebiete),the Generalgouvernement and eastern 
Poland. 
The intrusion of German law began as early as the invasion 
since from the beginning of the war German commanders in the 
fields used to 'legislate* by orders and German military courts 
were in full operation applying,of course,German law and proce-T dure. As soon as the conquest was completed detailed legislation 
XX 
methodically set up the machinery of germanisation.Most legis-
lation of the Reich applied,however,to the "eingegliederte 
Gebiete" only,whereas in the Generalgouvernement Dr.Hans~Fra2k 
was the legislator.Though originally the Polish law was to re-
main in force in so far as it did not stand in the way of 
German administraffon,the legislation in practice aimed at the 
assimilation of suitable elements and the destruction of all 
signs of Polish life and culture( On May 14,1940 the Ostdeu -
tscher Beobachter of Poznan w£o££:.."We do not admit the right 
of the"Poles to life in any form"...Similar ideas were uttered 
x By order of the Commander in Chief of September 5,1939 
xx full texts see The Black Book of Poland,published in London 
by the Polish Ministry of Information,p.539 et seq. 
xxx Convicted in the Nuremberg Trial and executed, 
xxxx Führer's decree of October 10,1939 and Frank's decree 
of October 26,1939,Art.8 
xxxxx quot.by S.Mikolajсzyk,Pattern of Soviet Domination, 
London,1948,p.16. » 
by Greiser and Förster,the notorious Gauleiters of Warthegau 
and Danzig.Greise? so expressed the German policy;.."God helped 
us to conquer the Polish nation,which must now be destroyed; 
no Poles must have the right to own any land or house in-Poland. 
In ten years the fields of Poland will be heavy with stacked 
wheat and rye,raised and harvested by Germans,but not a Pole 
will remain"...and Förstf? seconded him :.."It will be my 
glorious task in the next few years to obliterate all that 
speaks of Poland,whatever it may be"...). 
To execute this policy first certain laws regarding citizen-r 
ship were made,then all kind of legislation followed,thus using 
the 1аи as an effective instrument of genocide.Law ceased to be 
a set of objective rules and became a code of instructions in 
the service of germanisation.lt must be borne in mind that 
only the citizens of the Reich (Reichsbürger) enjoyed full 
civic and political rights,whereas the remaining inhabitants 
of Hitler's empire were divided into different classes having 
different status.This classification was made according to the 
assessment of their respective chance of eligibility for the 
"Reichsbürgerschaft".By the decree of the Minister of Interior 
of November 25,1939 the following groups of inhabitants of 
Poland were made German citizens : 
a) those who until September 1.J939 were citizens of the 
free city of Danzng; 
b) those who until October 26,1939 were Polish citizens and 
lived either in Germany proper or the incorporated 
territories; and 
c) those stateless persons who after having-lost their Polish 
к citizenship lived in Germany proper or the incorporated 
territories. 
The said decree distinguished between the "deutsche Volks-
zugehörige" and "deutsche Volksdeutsche".Both classes were 
x quot,by Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.16 
xx quot.in Europe under the Nazi Scourge (The Times),London, 
(Reprint of Articles),p.3 
"citizens" (Staatsangehörige),but the former comprised 'Germans' 
of German and foreign nationality,whereas the latter embraced 
only 'Germans' of foreign nationality.This distinction,artifi-
cial and confusing as it was,is a result of the German population 
policy and conforms to the ideas of German nationality by 
"blood" and "citizenship".The immediate consequence of this 
policy was the decree of Kay 4»1940 introducing compulsory 
military service for the male population of the incorporated 
territories.Accordingly Poles,now made 'Germans' could find 
themselves in German uniform as tools of the German conquest. 
The reaction to this decree was strong and consequently the 
population of concentration camps greatly increased as well 
as the resistance movement. 
Another step in the process of selection of nationalities 
was the order of the Ministry of the Interior of Novemebr 14, 
1940 which aimed at finding out who was not a Pole".Accordingly 
persons of non Polish nationality were to form a class of their 
own and "those Poles who for centuries were under the influence 
of German culture"were no longer to be considered Polish na-
tionals. As a result of this policy the population became arti-
ficially divided into three groups: 
1)'Germans1 (by the decree of November 25,1939); 
2)'non-Poles'(by the order of November 14,1940); and 
3) Poles (a group comprising the rest of the population). 
The matter was finally settled by the "Verordnung über die 
deutsche Volksliste and die deutsche Staatsangehörigkeit" of 
March 4,194f.According to Greiser's interpretation of this 
decree the population was classed as follow!: 
x Decree about the German'national list1 and the German 
citizenship. 
xx Greiser's interpretation was generally accepted in practice-
K.M.Pospieszalski.Polska pod Niemieckim Prawem (1939-1945), 
Ziemie Zachodnie,Poznan,1946,p.48 
list A : active Germans, 
list В passive Germans, 
list С persons of'German origin*capable of being restored 
to füll German status, 
list D persons of 'German origin' who became 'assimilated' 
in the Polish surroundings,but were not actively 
anti-German, 
list E persons of 'German origin' who became'assibilated" 
in the Polish surroundings and were actively 
engaged in anti-German activities. 
According to Greiser lists A and В were to become the privi-
leged citizens (Reichsbürger),whereas list С was to receive 
ordinary citizenship.In fact people classed as belonging to 
А,В and С groups received notification of being entered on the 
list of the German nationality (Ausweise der deutschen Volks-
liste) , whereas people classed as D and E received no such noti-
fication.Persons of class E were considered potential enemies; 
they had,therefore,to apply for being entered on a list above E, 
otherwise by the confidential order of the decree of March 13, 
1941 they were condemned to be kept in concentration camps, 
should the authorities think fit to exercise this powert 
A further developmeS^ of the scheme produced a division of 
of the population into citizens and serfs.The division reflected 
on all spheres of life and went even as far as to invalidate 
marriages between members of these two groups.Furthermore to 
execute a policy of depopulation the minimum marriage age for 
Poles was raised to 25 years for men and 22 for women (decree 
of the Minister of the Interior of May 4,1943)»later increased 
to 28 for men and 25 for women (decree of January 10,1944). 
x Vertrauliche Information Nr.51/42,Beitrag 680:.."Deutsch-
stämmige, die ihre Eintragung in"die deutsche Volksliste nicht 
fristgemäss beantragen,werden in Schutz genommen und in ein 
Konzentrazionslager überführt,um zu verhindern,dass sie sich 
weiterhin für das Polentum einsetzen"..full text see Pospie-
szalski,op.cit.p.53 
xx Zwölfte Verordnung zum Reichsbürgergesetz,April 25,1943 
The system of"national lists" was a part of the general germa-
nisation scheme and as such applied only to Polish and Danzig 
population,excluding thereby Jews and Gypsies,who had to have 
no place under the sun. 
Detailed regulations with regard to thecpersonal status of, 
the conquered people were implemented by corresponding regula-
tions with regard to their property.By the decree of September 
17,1940 Jews and absent persons were automatically deprived of 
any property.Persons who did not acquire citizenship by operation 
of the decrees on nationality were liable to have their pro-
perty seized,confiscated and administered by specially appointed 
commissars.This rule was strict and obligatory.in respect of 
Jews and absent persons,it was facultative and discretionary 
in respect of the rest of the population.Here again we have 
a logical application of the nationality policy: those who 
have no chance to live,have no need of property,those who have 
a limited right to live may enjoy possession of their property 
within the discretion of the authorities and as far as the 
interests of the Reich allowed.To temper the order with mercy 
the decree generously allowed persons whose property was seized 
to keep personal belongings and money up to 1000 Marks. 
The confiscation of property had usually a sequel either in 
imprisonment or deportation to the General gouvernement.Depor-
tations duly supervised by the SS and the "Commissars for Ger-
manisation",were organised according to set principles (usually 
within 24 hours and the personal luggage allowed to be taken 
did not exceed 50 lbs.). 
The classification of the population also conditioned the 
right to work.Accordingly for the professions and administration 
only "citizens" were eligible;consequently no Pole could work 
as medical practitioner,dentist,lawyer etc in the incorporated 
territories.Non-Germans were thus reduced to the position of 
manual workers for the benefit of the "Herrenvolk".But that was 
not alljthey had to be completely distinguishedkpoles deported 
for forcible labour to Germany proper (usually collected in 
organised manhunts) had to wear the letter "P" on a yellow 2" 
square background as specified by the Police Order of March 8, 
x 
1940 and were subject to curfew regulations. 
A special order of January 8,1940, established lower rates 
of pay for Poles employed in agriculture,whereas generally the 
lowest rates were given to Polish employees.Though obliged to 
pay social services contributions Poles were deprived of their 
benefits.Even maternity grants and protection of youth and 
expectant mothers were denied to Polish nationals by the law 
of May 17,1942.Poles were only paid for actual work days (no 
pay for holidays or days free of workjno pay for extra hours 
or bonuses).They were deprived of sickness benefit and in case 
of unemployment received benefits only at the discretion of 
local authorities (decree of December 22,1941). 
Though receiving lower rates of pay Poles were subject to 
higher taxation.A special tax,the so called "Sozialausgleichs-
abgabe" - a levy for "social equation" - as it was called to 
express the contempt and scorn bestowed on its bearers,amoHting 
to an extra of the statutory income tax,was imposed by 
orders of the Finance Minister of February 10,1940 and August5, 
1940.They received no allowances for children nor did they 
receive the same family rebates as their German masters.In the 
incorporated territories Germans were free of stamp duties on 
the acquisition of immovables,the Poles,however,had to pay 
full stamp duties. 
Also the Judiciary was in the scrvice of the administration 
and germanisation apparatus.In civil as well as in criminal 
matters Germans enjoyed privileges whenever a party to the 
litigation was Polish.In case of litigation between a German 
x Pospieszalski,op.cit.p.113 
and a Polish party the instance court was-bound to seek the 
direction* of the President of a higher court (the Oberlandes-
gerichtspräsident was the competent authority) before the pro-
eeedings began.In case of doubt whether the verdict might have 
to be given in favour of the Polish party or be contrary to 
the German national policy,the matter could not be proceeded 
with.The Gauleiters or district governors opinions were 
equally conclusive and binding upon the courts. 
The interpretation and application of the law had to follow 
the German raison and statutes could be considerably 
departed from if this was required to fall in line with the 
oppVtunistic approach to the administration of justice. 
This opportunistic principle applied in criminal matters as 
well.As already mentioned the German Criminal Law was introduced 
by the Army already at the beginning of the war.Formally this 
was done (or rather,recognised) by the decree of June 6,1940. 
The said decree,however,introduced special provisions with 
regard to Poles.Accordingly they could be prosecuted in course 
of a retrospective.application of the German law (e.g.for acts 
which were not crimes when committed) and they were subject 
to the death sentence for offences which were not capital crimes 
in case of German nationals.In this way,for instance,capital 
punishment could be meted out against Poles in cases of mere 
assaults against German officials,police,party men or even 
ordinary Germans. 
The decree of December 4»1941 made the Criminal Law still 
more severe in case of Poles and Jews.Accordingly Poles and 
Jews were subject to capital, punishment (or in trifling cases;, 
to long term imprisonment): 
s-li&w öl «July 15,1941 
xx..."Der Richter muss auch von positiven Vorschriften abweichen 
wenn die Interessen des Aufbaues der Ostgebiete es erfor-
x derlich machen"... - § 4,0strechtspflege Verordnung, 
September 25,1941 
a) if by hateful or seditious activity they manifested a 
hostile attitude towards Germans; 
b) if they expressed themselves unfavourably about Germans 
("deutschfeindliche Ajeusserungen macherV); 
c) if they destroyed or damaged posters or notices put up 
by German authorities; 
d) if they tended to diminish the esteem or interests of the 
Reich or the German nation by any land of activity. 
In the case of Poles and Jews the German law did not protect 
juveniles,but trlted them alike adults and with the same severity. 
Poles and Jews were not treated as parties in judicial pro-
ceedings,but only as objects of prosecution;their evidence was 
not taken under oat5 and the whole mockery of administering 
justice was conducted on the principles of opportunism and 
personal discretion of judges and prosecutors ("nach pflicht-
gemässem Ermessen"). 
Whereas the incorporated territories were blessed with all 
sorts of detailed laws and„regulations emanating from the Füh-
rer himself (the principal source of law in Nazi Germany) and 
his Ministers,the General gouvernement was entirely entrusted 
to the care of its master of life and death,Dr.Hans Frank.This 
part of Poland was designed to house the expelled,provide slave 
labour for the Reich and serve as a country of colonisation 
and exploitation.Frank distinguished himself by an extraordinary 
zeal in his role of the bloody satrap of Poland and the chief 
executor of the germanisation scheme.Being an orderly German 
and also a lawyer Frank used,to clothe in a legal form the or-
ders of the policy he personified.But his conception of.law was 
quite peculiar:.."Law is all that which serves the Gernan people. 
Illegality is all that which is harmful to that peopff"... 
xDecree of January 31,1942 
xx quot.in The German New Order in Poland,Documentary publi-
cation of Polish Ministry of Information,London,1942,p.8 
Already in January 1946 he authorised confiscation of private 
property "if the public interest,and more particularly the de-
fence of the Reich or the affirmation of the German domination 
demands it".The exploitation equal to a colonial system of the 
harshest type was ordered by his circular of January 25,1940f 
all schemes of recruitment of forced labour,religious perse-
cution, national oppression,destruction of the intellectual 
classes,mass executions,mass destruction of human life,and 
similar devices were carefully prepared and put into operation 
with skill,precision and efficiency. 
Frank's criminal legislation bore the stigma of death.His 
decree of October 2,1943 announced that : "all persons who 
intending to interfere with,or halt the German work of recon-
struction, break the laws are liable to-capital punishment.Those 
who aid and abet are liable to the same punishment as the actual 
wrongdoer and an attempted act is punishable in the same degree 
as the crime committed". 
It is needless to repeat the principles on which laws were 
administered by courts and administrative authorities.Cases 
were tried summarily by the Police Courts ( Standsgerichte 
der Sicherheitspolizei ) consisting of an officer of the SS, 
the local commandant of the Security Police and two members 
of the Security Police. Sentences were carried out immediately. 
One can easily imagine the German rule in Poland in the light 
of those few examples of the German legislation mentioned above. 
Obviously,therefore the Polish Underground State vigorously 
opposed the German tyranny,and besides striving for revival of 
the national rule,built up effective counter-measures. 
x The Black Book of Poland,op.cit.p.271 
xx by order of Goering,full text see 
The Black Book of Poland,p.278. 
Soviet Occupation. Soviet Russia,unlike Germany,annexed the 
whoie territory of Poland received under the German-Soviet 
treaty,with the exception of the Vilno district which was 
handed over to Lithuania in order to be swallowed later together 
with Lithuania proper. 
Elections were swiftly organised in the occupied territory 
and conducted with the usual Soviet efficiency under the super-
vision of the omnipotent N.K.V.D. and army authorities.The 
Elections were ordered at a short notice by the Commander in 
Chief of the Soviet Army of Occupation to take place on October 
22,1939.The country was divided into two provinces Western 
Ukraine and Western Byelorussia,each having a "People's 
Assembly".The constituencies elected one representative each , 
but there was only one candidate nominated by the Soviet autho-
rities and that candidate had to be chosen? No lists of candi-
dates were published,but it is commonly known that among can-
didates were well known political personages,such as Mr.Molotov, 
Marshal Voroshilov and others.The voting was compulsory and 
consisted in throwing the ballot paper into the bo^hs.If one 
wanted to vote against the candidate on his ballot paper he 
had to cross it in view of the officials supervising the voting. 
According to official figures 93# of the electorate went to 
polls in Western Ukraine and 91# votes were cast for the Soviet 
candidates.In Western Byelorussia the respective figures were 
97# and 91$? So ended the "capitalist-bourgeois exploitation" 
of Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia.By casting their 
votes for Soviet candidates the population "liberated from 
the Polish yoke" manifested its enthusiastic approval of what 
had happened.Hardly a different effect could be expected in the 
circumstances and there is no wonder that assemblies so elected 
in their only session unanimously requested incorporation into 
the U.S.S.R. 
x for a vivid account of these elections see: 
The Dark Side of the Moon,London,1946,p.46 et seq 
xx Schmitt,op.cit.p.441 
Sovietisation of life began and collectivisation of land 
immediately followed.Expropriations and deportations marked 
the beginning of this new era together with political indoctri-
nation and the vigorous activities of the "League of the Godless". 
By virtue of a decree of the Supreme Soviet of November 29, 
1939,issued on the authority of the law of nationality of 
August 19,1939 all inhabitants of the incorporated territories 
who were present there on 1st and 2nd September 1939 became 
automatically citizens of Soviet Russia.Consequently a cons-
cription of Poles into the Red Army began as early as the 
autumn of that same yea?. 
To all intents and purposes the incorporated territories 
became Russian and the Polish population was subjected to the 
methods and designs of Soviet policy.Within two years,of the 
Russian occupation some 1,5 millions, apart from the prisoners 
XX 
of war, were deported to the distant parts of the Soviet empire. 
Those who survived and managed to reach the free world bear 
testimony of horror and tribulatioSi. 
Notwithstanding the differences cn method and technique both 
Germany and Russia aimed at the destruction of the Polish inde-
pendent state and the assimilation of its population previously 
purged from patriotic elements.In the field of law their domi-
nion completely obliterate«/ not only the Polish constitution 
but also the whole legal system of the Polish state.From their 
point of view they simply introduced their law and institutions, 
from the Polish point of view they merely caused a "constitu-
tional vacuum" in Poland. 
x R.Umiastowski,Russia and the Polish Republic (191&-1941), 
London,1944,p.221-228; and 
B.Kusnierz,Stalin and the Poles,London,1949,p.56 
xx According to official figures there were some 181.ooo pri-
soners of war. 
xxx J.CzapslcL,The Inhuman Land,London, 1951 
G.Grudzinski-Herling,A World Apart,London,1952 
T.Wittlin,A Reluctant Traveller in Russia,London,1952 
Constitutional When the Soviet troops marched into Poland 
ygcuum. ^kg presiclent and the Government left the country-
hoping to continue the struggle in exile at the side of Poland's 
AlliesTThey went to Rumania,another Polish ally,where they 
became interned contrary to previous arrangements.In the course 
of time some members of the Polish Executive managed to leave 
Rumania,and those who did not,were later handed over into 
German handle 
The military operations both against German and Russian 
armies became pointless and virtually impossible since the last 
strategic position,that is the defence of the Carpathian strong-
hold backed by the Allies' supplies through Rumania,was unten-
able. 
With the military collapse the state administration was 
also destroyed and Poland became a conquered country.The autho-
rity of the Polish state was thus temporarily destroyed and 
the existing legal order superseded by the de facto rule of 
the occupation authorities. 
A constitutional vacuum ensued since the constitution of 
Poland was put out of operation in consequence of the collapse 
of the Polish state and the new rule forced upon the country. 
Theтsovereignty of Poland became de facto annihilated by the 
"coup de force".The legal position,on the other hand,had to 
receive international recognition since the German-Soviet 
agreement of August 23,and September 28,1939 could not be con-
sidered as having legal force. 
'Legally',though under temporary occupation,Poland did not 
cease to esist and as such she was recognised as a 'sovereign' 
belligerent state, 
x Beck,op.cit.p.243 
xx Such e.g.was the fate of Joseph Beck,the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs who died in 1944 in German hands. 
Sovereignty means the political independence of a state 
vis a vis its neighbours and the whole community of nations. 
The conception of sovereignty is an absolute one,that is to say, 
a state can only be sovereign or not sovereign.Sovereignty has 
a negative and a positive aspect.The former implies that a 
sovereign state is immune from any foreign influence on the 
course of its internal or external affairs.This immunity is 
absolute and a state is no longer sovereign if it has to yield 
to foreign demands to change its internal or external policy. 
The sovereignty is not,however,impaired in case of international 
agreements where a state voluntarily undertakes obligations 
and fulfilXs them of its own accord.The positive aspect of 
sovereignty means that a state is entirely free to shape its 
internal or external policy.This freedom is absolute,subject 
to ethical restrictions and the principles of International 
Law and requirements of good relations with other members of 
the Comaity of Nations.lt consists of the unity and integrity 
of the state's legal system.The 'unity' of a legal system does 
not mean that certain branches of law (e.g.Civil Law) must be 
uniform all over the country - it means 'unity' in the sense 
that there is one 'Constitution' (either unitary or federal) 
in force within the political frontiers of the state and that 
the organs of the state and their functions are founded and 
based on that •Constitution';in other words,that there is one 
'Constitutional Law' and that the authority of the state ie 
derived from that law.The 'integrity' of a legal system means 
that it forms the 'integral' or total binding force within the 
political frontiers to the exclusion of any other force of 
legal character; in other words,there is no foreign element 
taking commands from abroad in the sum total of the rules of 
law binding upon the territory.Immunities,e.g.to foreign amba-
ssadors, or foreign trade organisations,do not impair the unity 
and integrity of a legal system,because they only exist by ex-
press concession and may be withdrawn at any time. 
Sovereignty means power or 'authority' over certain terri-
tory and population.In a politically independent state this 
authority acts directly and immediately - this implies co-
existence and co-operation of the elements of the state (that 
is,people,territory and authority).In certain circumstances , 
such as temporary occupation by a foreign power,those elements 
are divorced and the legitimate authority is separated from 
the people and territory.lt can,therefore,act only indirectly, 
and as long as it can rest on a legal basis of the Constitution 
and rely on the allegiance of the people to that Constitution. 
Such was the situation of Poland occupied in 1939 by Germany 
and Soviet Russia: her sovereignty could not be directly exer-
cised on her territory and her Constitution was banned.But 
abroad,there was her Executive and there were her Allies in 
war against Germany.Poland's sovereignty may thus be deemed 
in temporary abeyance as far as the territory was concerned, 
but still effective in the international sphere and with regard 
to her people. 
The constitutional vacuum that ensued after the September 
defeat was filled by the two elements: 
1)the constitutional representation abroad,and 
2)the "Underground State". 
Government The Constitution of April 23,1935 contained 
in exile. 
adequate provisions to meet the contingency.Articles 
13 and 24 of the Constitution authorised the President to appoint 
his successor in case of war and so to transfer his office on 
to another person in case of his incapacity to perform his 
duties.The President and Government were interned in Rumania 
and so incapable of continuing their work.The President then 
resigned and by his decree of September 30,1939 appointed 
Ladislas RaczkiewicS to be his successor.The latter was in 
x Died in Britain on June 6,1947 
France at that time and there the nucleus of the Government 
in Exile formed.The new President accepted the resignation of 
the Prime Minister and Commander in Chief»interned in Rumania, 
and appointed new persons to these offices. 
One of the first official acts of the new President was the 
dissolution of the Parliament and creation of a National Council 
to act in its stead.After the collapse of the state machinery 
it became obvious that the existing Parliament could not be 
convened or function as previously.The National Council was a 
body of distinguished men representing major political parties 
and designed to act as a substitute for Parliament. 
Thus the political representation of Poland consisted of the 
President»Government and a National Council.This representation 
was based on the Constitution and constituted continuation of 
the state authority and its legitimate organs.Poland was then 
in a happy position having a Government instead of a sort of 
"National or Liberation Committee".That Government enjoyed the 
full status of an allied power both as a belligerent state and 
in the sphere of international treaties.Its original seat was 
Paris,but in November 1939 it moved to Angers,where by generosity 
of the French Government it was provided with a territorial 
immunity.This gesture,symbolical though it was,in fact supplied 
the Polish Government in Exile with 'territory'.thus uniting 
the elements of a sovereign state.The sovereignty was never 
questioned and throughout the whole war,Poland was represented 
by her constitutional government,until July 1945 when the prin-
cipal Allies withdrew their recognition. 
The political system,as practised prior to the war,then 
underwent important changes.After consultations with the prin-
cipal political parties the President in his broadcast to the 
nation on November 30,1939 declared that henceforth the presi-
dential prerogatives authorised by the Constitution would be 
xThere are still states (Spain,Eire»Lebanon,Cuba and Vatican) 
which recognise the "Government in Exile" as the Government of 
Poland. 
exercised in close consultation with the Prime Minister.This 
declaration was made binding also on his successor General 
Casimir Soenkowskf.This declaration was the outcome of the 
so called Paris AgreemMt between the principal political 
parties on the banner of application of the provisions of the 
Constitution in matters where the President could act without 
ministerial assefi^ .In itself it constituted a practice or 
convention of the Constitution and meant a considerable depar-
ture from the letter of the Constitution.Its value consisted 
in the abrogation of the ultra-presidential system of the Con-
stitution and the restoration of the broken threads between 
action and responsibility in matters of state of the highest 
importance.In form it cannot be considered an amendSÜS^ of the 
Constitution since it only purported to define the manner of 
exercising powers within the personal discretion of the Presi-
dent. As a convention of the Constitution it was as strong as 
the authority of constitutional practices,which are created 
in the course of the application of a statute and correspond 
to the requirements of the changes in life and circumstances. 
The Government of General Ladislas Siko?Hf was a coalition 
Government consisting of members of the four principal parties, 
which traditionally controlledrPolish political tSougM.Its 
primary aim was to restore the fighting forces following upon 
the pledges of the Prime M^nfl^e?. 
The plan of forming a Polish Army in Prance was discussed 
already in the spring 1939 and preparations were made during 
the war in Poland.(.14 wanted to get you over to France and 
x Forced to resign under British pressure in 1944; 
xx November 1939 
xxx cf pp.28 and 29 ante 
xxxx sic Stronski,The Two Constitutions,op.cit.p.8-12 
contra Mackiewicz,Lata Nadziei,op.cit.p.30 
xxxxx Killed in an aeroplane crash at Gibraltar on July,4,1943 
xxxxxx Peasant Party,National Party,Socialist Party,Christian 
Labour Party 
xxxxxxx Sir W.Churchill,The Second World War,London,1948,vol.I, 
/p.505 
there to organise the Polish Army.My idea was that the Polish 
soldier should continue to take part in the war and that the 
Polish Army should represent Poland and her vital interests", 
said Marshal Smigly-Rydz,the Commander in Chief of the Polish 
Army,in his last Order of the Day on September 18,1939,orde-
ring his defeated.troops to go to Hungary and Rumania and there-
from to proceed to Prance.) Accordingly already in the early 
stages of the war Polish troops took part in the Norwegian 
and North African campai&s as well as in France'n1940.The Polish 
Navy and Air Force operated chiefly under British command.To-day 
one can easily criticise the Government's decision of sending 
"for your and our freedom" the Polish troops into a lost battle 
with the consequential destruction of this ill-equipped army of 
60.000 gathered together with such difficulty at the time when 
France was nearly forced to capitulate and wiser allies took 
effective steps to go their Dunkirk way,but this was apparently 
the spirit of the Franco-Polish alliance,as understood on the 
Polish side.To-day one can easily deride the Government's policy 
and belief that the destiny of Poland was to be decided on 
battlefields. 
Among other activities of the Government»besides attending 
to current business,was the preparation of the new system of 
government to be introduced to the liberated country and the 
planning of a Central European Federation.The result of the 
former was the Declaration of Augmst 30,1944 which laid down 
the basic principles of the deliberations for the post-war 
Constitution,and the outcome of the latter was the approach 
to Czechoslovakia.At the outbreak of the war the international 
position of Czechoslovakia was far worse than that of Poland. 
The Czechoslovak leaders,forming no constitutional government, 
x quot.by W.Jedrzejewiсz,Poland in the British Parliament 
(1939-1945),New York,1946,vol.I,p.26 420 
found themselves rather isolated and had to strive for recog-
nition as representative of their country.In such circumstances 
"they gladly accepted the Polish initiative of forming a federa-
tion extended to them in October 1940.Discussion on this subject 
was concluded in 1942 and a common declaration was issued on 
January 23,1942,to the effect'that both countries ahall consti-
tute a union aiming at a federation.The idea,plausible in it-
self and useful,weakened in the course of time,when on ^ St 
account of the Czech leanings to Soviet Russia,the two Govern-
ments became estranged and finally the federation died a natu-
ral death when the Czechoslovak leaders decided to return to 
Prague via Moscow.The idea/however,may revive one day,especially 
as both countries are now in the same boat since the coup d'ötat 
of 1948 which turned Czechoslovakia into another People's De-
mocracy. 
The National ouncil was created by the presidential decree 
of December 9,1939 to act during the war in a consultative 
and deliberative capacity for the President and Government. 
Besides that it was a special duty of the Council to tackle 
the problem of the future Constitution and the Electoral Law 
and prepare proposals in those matters.Originally the Council 
was to consist of at least 12 and at most 24 members,but bp 
the decree of January 15,1942, its strength was raised to a 
minimum of 22 and maximum of 32 members.The members were to be 
appointed and discharged in specified circumstances by the Pre-
sident on the advice of the Prime Minister.Any discharge had 
to be confirmed by the Council as a whole.The Council itself 
chose its Chairman and officers (the first Chairman was Ignace 
Paderewski and acting vice Chairman Stanislas Mikolajczyk,the 
Prime Minister after Sikorski's death),and had the power of 
defining its internal constitution.The resolutions of the Coun-
cil were passed by a simple majority in the presence of at 
least two thirds of its statutory number. 
Underground elThe continuation.of the Government abroad 
s"ta"te>was comparatively easy,whereas the question of 
of the restoration of the state authorities under occupation 
presented far more difficulties.lt must be borne in mind that 
the state administration was literally smashed by the occu-
pying powers and replaced by institutions of their own.If any 
institutions of political character opposed to the rule of 
foreign powers were to function they had to be created under-
ground and remain secret.Thus the organisation of an "Under-
ground State" took some time to shape and could by no means 
be perfect.Its very existence is a proof of the undaunted 
spirit of the nation,and its adherence to its own authorities 
and institutions.It is a flat denial of the widespread nonsense 
that"the Poles are not capable of governing themselves".The 
development of the Underground State would make the subject 
of a fascinating study; here it will be only briefly sketched. 
It appears that the creation of an"Underground State"owed 
a lot to the idea of a "Secret>Army".The resistance did not 
end with the military victory of the German-Soviet armies and 
the destruction of the Polish army.The war ended so rapidly 
that several regular units together with their equipment re-
mained intact and isolated in consequence of the rapid deve-
lopment of the Blitzkrieg.Modern warfare,conducted chiefly by 
mechanical»means,aims at a quick destruction of the main forces 
of the enemy and a paralysis of the centres of his life and 
resources.7/hen the victorious army in aaswift movement sweeps 
over a country it is bound to leave whole sectors untouched 
and small units of the opponents intact.It remains only with 
them to surrender or continue a war on their own.The geogra-
phical conditions and the attitude of the population contribute 
a great deal to guerilla warfare,besides the spirit of men. 
All those elements were present in Poland after the September 
disaster.The cruelties of the occupation was another factor 
driving people into the forests.Guerilla operations lasted for 
a while after the collapse of the main forces of the Polish 
army,hut with the consolidation of the occupation forces they 
ceased to have any prospect of success.The idea was taken over 
by political conspirators and members of the army. 
Whereas the army provided trained military leaders the poli-
tical parties greatly contributed towards the organisation of 
the rank and file.Initially all major parties had ,so to speak, 
their own armed units.Such were the W.R.N.of the Socialist 
Party,W.I.N.of the National Party and the Peasants Batallions 
of the Peasant Party. 
The resistance movement operated originally on a local scale, 
later it developed into a powerful machinery covering the whole 
country.Two incentives formed the origin of the secret Home 
Army ("Armia Krajowa") : the evolution of the local resistance 
cells and the direction from abroad.The former was the result 
of the natural development of the situation at home,the latter 
came from abroad as one of the activities of the Government in 
Exile. 
Even to-day some self-styled "experts on guerilla warfare" 
think that in case of a military conflict between the West and 
East it will be enough to herald the magic word "freedom" to 
all so-called "satellite countries"»parachute some arms and 
supplies and send liaison officers and those countries will 
immediately rise in arms.This is an absurd opinion.Besides 
organisation,there must be an ideology and unbroken contact 
between those who take upon themselves the enormous odds of 
a guerilla warfare and those who act as their legitimate re-
presentatives and authorities in the common service of the 
same goal.In other words,there must be a political direction 
and a firm conviction in its purpose. 
The Government in Exile engaged in the struggle for the 
political independence of Poland and concerned chiefly with 
the restoration of the fighting forces did not underestimate 
the importance of the home front.The first task,of course,was 
the co-ordination of the efforts of the various resistance 
cells that had naturally arisen,and the creation of a policy. 
With the organisation of the military machinery tasks and 
duties arise which require the co-existence of civil authori-
ties. In other words,besides purely executive machinery,there 
must be institutions of deliberative,advisory and directory 
character.Further development makes other requirements urgent 
and so arise the needs of propaganda,education and judicial 
institutions. 
Thus the origins of the Home Army and the Underground State 
go back as far as the beginning of the resistance movement, 
that is closely following upon the defeat in September 1939. 
One was interdependent on the other and both worked closely 
together in common effort with the Government in Exile.The 
story of the Secret Army is an epic of its own* here we are 
concerned only with the development of the Underground State. 
The statutory authority for the final shape of the organi-
sation of the Underground State was the presidential decree 
of September 1,19^5. This decree, recognised the evolution and 
laid down principles of the administration in the territories 
of Poland then under .the German rule,each of which had a differ-
ent sta£ul. The Head of the Underground Government was a Dele— 
xxxx gate of the Government in Exile (resident in Poland) with the 
rank of deputy Prime Minister of the Government in London and 
as the acting-Prime Minister in Poland.Under his control as the 
x details see T.Bor-Komorowski,The Secret Army,London,1950 
xx full text see Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.306 
xxx see pp.38 and 39 ante 
xxxx The first Delegate Prof.Piekalkiewicz was murdered by the 
Germans and his successor J.Jankowski kidnapped b-^  the 
Russians in 1945-
head of the Executive was the "Government" consisting of seventeen 
departments,and the whole administrative apparatus,some 30.000 
personf. 
The original "Directorate of Civil Action" controlling the civil 
side of the resistance was amalgamated on August 3,1943 with the 
"Directorate of Armed Resistance" of the Home Army into one orga-
nisation, and, with the exception of military matters which fell 
within the competence of the Commander of the Home Army,subordina-
ted to the Delegate.The Home Army was under the direct command of 
the C-in-C- in London,co-operating through his chief of staff with 
the Allied Chiefs of Staff.The Home Army,broadly speaking,had an 
independent status and only in matters of general policy was su-
bordinated to the civil (or political) authoritiel. 
In the course of time an "Underground Parliament" developed. 
Here again the origins of the Underground Parliament rested on the 
evolution of the local forces and the creative function of the ne-
cessary organs of state.The destruction of the state apparatus did 
not annihilate the political forces that existed in the form of 
political parties.They soon revived their activities and being 
traditionally concerned first with the struggle for independence, 
then with the organisation of the state,they concentrated their 
efforts on resistance work.At a later stage,when co-ordination 
advanced,a need for the political representation of the whole 
nation was felt,and the legitimate channels thereof were,of course, 
the political parties.When the executive authorities were developed 
a deliberative and consultative body was needed not only to repre-
sent the nation,but also to give weight of authority to the deci-
sions of the organs of the resistance and control their action. 
The origins of the Underground Parliament go back to the 
"Committee of Political Co-ordination" founded in January 1940 
by the four ma.jor parties: the Socialist Party represented by 
x H.Weber,Piec Lat Walki Narodu Polskiego,London,1945,p.40 
xx Komorowski,op.cit.p.41 
jr ТУ 
C.Puzak, the Peasant Party by S.Korbonski, the National Party 
by A.Debffi and the Christian Labour Party,.by F.KwiecinsS^ 
This Committee functioned as a body co-ordinating the activi-
ties of the parties it represented until 1943 when it became 
more; homogeneous.It took then the name of the "Political Home 
Representation" and resolved to act as a "Parliament'4 In the 
Declaration of August 1 5 Т Ш .the above mentioned parlfctes 
defined their policy and objectives.They agreed to co-operate 
at home in the common effort to shake off the occupation,to 
support the Government in Exile,and work on a joint programme 
of activity for the duration of the war and afterwards,They 
pledged themselves to fight for a "free and independent" Poland 
in close co-operation with the constitutional authorities 
abroad,and with regard to the future,they agreed to act as 
"Parliament" during the transitory period,that is from the 
moment of the liberation until a new National Assembly was 
elected. 
A few months later the "political Home Representation" was 
joined by three other organiü&o&s and as the "Council of 
National Unity" it was enlarged to include in addition to the 
representatives of those seven parties also a representative 
of the clergy.A full programme was published on March 15,1944, 
under the title "For What the Polish Nation Fights".This pro-
gramme once more emphasised the support of the nation for the 
constitutional Government in Exile and briefed that Government 
to stand firm on the question of the frontier with Soviet Russia, 
namely to defend the status quo as defined by the Treaty of 
giga.In matters of the future Constitution the Declaration of 
x One of the 16 underground leaders tried by the Moscow Court 
in 1945,died in prison,see p.105 and 112 
xx lives now in the West 
xxx and acxxx both executed by the Germans 
xxxxx full text,Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.297 at seq. 
xxxxxx-"Democratic Society",'"Raclawice", "Ojczyzna". 
March 15,1944, resolved to maintain the Constitution of 1935 
but effect its amendment by the first post-war Parliament, 
chosen on the basis of a new Electoral Law,in the sense of 
curtailing the extremes of the president£jial system and resto-
ring the parliamentary rule. 
Another important feature of the Underground State was its 
Judiciary.The Underground Courts developed together with other 
institutions.The resistance movement had two principal aims: 
to fight the occupant and to preserve the national ideology 
and.the faith in the resurrection of Poland.Underground Courts, 
observing all formalities of normal courts of law and adminis-
tering Polish criminal law and procedure proved themselves to 
be a useful and important organ'of the Underground State.The 
German terror and oppression raged throughout the countryjit 
was thus the function of the Underground Courts to curb the 
criminal activities of certain Germans who excelled themselves 
in their bloody offices.When a German was singled out for his 
special zeal in the abuse of his position or was responsible 
for murders,a prosecution was initiated against him in the 
Underground Court.The first step waa a warning issued to him 
on a special form bidding him to discontinue the criminal abuse 
of his powers under pains of a court proceeding against him . 
If this was ineffective the nest step was a formal notification 
( a sort of a writ) where his crimes were specified in detail 
and informing him that criminal proceedings according to the 
Polish law were in progress.The Court then sat and after formal 
hearing (the defendant was,of course,absent) pronounced their 
sentence,which was delivered to the accused by post.If the 
sentence was death the accused was informed of this'and was 
presented with a list of persons already executed.The execution 
T was carried out by orders of the "Directorate of the Home Army", 
x According to statistics 1181 such sentences were carried out 
before the beginning of 1944,including 28 dignitaries,among 
whom was Kutschera the chief;of the Gestapo in Warsaw, 
Komorowski,op.cit.p.l57; and H.Weber,Piec Lat Walki Narodu 
Polskiego,London,1945 > p.44 
This method had a tremendous psychological effect and proved to 
be very useful. 
With regard to Polish nationals the Underground Courts acted 
whenever there was evidence of misbehaviour.The trial was arran-
ged in the presence of the accused,usually in the place of his 
abode.He could defend himself and dispute the accuracy of the 
charge.If found guilty,the accused was reprimanded,or his name 
was published in the Underground Press; death sentences were 
very rare. 
The Underground State organised schools of all kinds under 
its supervision and developed powerful propaganda and press 
centres.The idea was to preserve the spirit of the nation, 
continue education which had been brought to a standstill by 
the war and occupation and to inform the citizen of the true 
world situation.Thus the German propaganda was effectively 
checked and news circulated all through the country. 
The Home Army,as previously mentioned,wa3 the organ of the 
state and an effective weapon in the hands of the Executive. 
The command became centralised by the presidential decree of 
September 1,1942 and the whole apparatus built up by General 
Grot-RowecSi covered the whole territory (except the Communist 
People's Army which did not submit to the Commander of the Home 
Army).The main tasks of the Home Army was the collection and 
xx 
despatch of information,rescue of prisoners,sabotage,counter-
terror and open military operations.At the beginning of 1944 
the numbers of the Home Army were well over a quarter of million XXX men.A mobilisation system kept either in readiness,or in 
reserve,trained men and made possible several large scale 
operations in which enemy units of considerable strength were 
x Captured by the Germans on June 30,1943,shot in August 1944; 
succeeded by General Bor-Komorowski,Komorowski,op.cit.p.384 
xx e.g.plans of German assault against Russia,Sir W.Churchill, 
Memoirs,vo^5•p.348; 
rocket-propelled weapons,Komorowski,ibid.p.151; and Churchill, 
vol.5.p.207-8;cf.B.Newman,They Saved London,London,1952 
xxx Komorowski,ibid.p.143 - 380,000 men. 
engaged.This compelled Germany to keep in Poland several divi-
sions instead of using them in other theatres of war.The last 
effort of the Home Army was the tragic rising of Warsaw (August 1-
-October 6,1944) when the Soviet Armies reached the Vistula 
and liberation seemed near. 
We exclude foTpm the present discussion the Communist con-
trolled organisation which far from co-operating with the Under-
ground State developed into a rival body and ultimately,with 
the Russian help superseded the Constitutional Authorities? 
This abridged sketch of the organisation of the Underground 
State illustrates the situation under the German occupation 
and proves how efficiently the constitutional vacuum was reduced 
to the very minimum.The Underground State represents not only 
the idea of one whole country unaffected by the German-*-Soviet 
partition of 1939,but also the proof of the existence of a legal 
continuity of the Polish state and its sovereignty,exercised 
at home as well as abroad.Only an external intervention recog-
nised by the world could destroy the dominion of the Polish 
people over their territory and impose upon them an alien form 
of government. 
x see p.94 et seq 
Chapter 5- Influence of International Relations on the 
Formation of the Post-War Polish Constitution. 
The post-war political system of Poland owes a great deal to 
certain international decisions,which decisions can well be 
summarised by the saying: "all about Poland without Poland". 
It may appear paradoxical that the shaping of the constitution 
of a sovereign state could depend so much on international re-
lations. Moreover, in the light of what has been previously said 
x 
on 'sovereignty1,it might be inferred that a state nominally 
sovereign may for certain purposes be treated as a vassal state. 
We prefer to stick to the absolute conception of severeignty, 
even though studying the events of the last war one can easily 
convince oneself of the curious position of Poland,which for 
the purposes of her war obligations and treaties was recognised 
as a sovereign state,but in matters of her external and even 
internal .policy was considerably limited in her freedom of action. 
After the collapse of France,Poland having her sovereign 
Government installed in London came under the British tutelage 
discharged personally by the British Prime Minister.lt was 
most unfortunate that the interests of Poland did not always 
correspond to British national interests and that the views 
of Polish leaders on what was vital for Poland were not reci-
procated by the leaders of the Grand Alliance. 
A review of international relations,taken in certain stages, 
will illustrate the influence of external factors on the for-
mation of the post-war political system in Poland. 
x see pp.51 and 52 ante 
xx see p.69 
September 17,1939- As defined by the London Convention"for 
J u l y ?0,1941,the definition of aggression of July 3,1933, ini-
tiated by-Mr.Litvinov (then Soviet Commissar for Eoreign Affairs), 
the Soviet assault against Poland on September 17,1939,undoubt-
edly constituted an act of aggression.Thus Poland was at war 
with Soviet Russia.Poland's Ambassadors in London and Paris 
gave effect to* this fact handing to the respective Governments 
an identical Note^'which recited the course of events and re-
minded her Allies that the Polish Government would call upon 
them'to fulfill their treaty obligations. 
The Soviet aggression was condem&fd in the free world and 
the British Prime Minister in the House of Commons refuted argu-
ments sought to justify the Soviet attafiE.In view of the British 
obligations towards Poland the situation was very delicate.No 
one of good sense would then have suggested a declaration of 
war on Russia,but in view of this experience it would have been 
only wise to adopt, caution and vigilance wbilst dealing with 
Russia in the future. 
The British-Polish Agreement of Mutual Assistance-of 
was clearly directed against German aggression,but the Guarantee 
of March 31,1939,as well as the provisions of Art.7 and of the 
Secret Protocol of the Agreement may be fairly construed as 
safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
contracting parties with regard to powers other than Germany. 
Anyway both the legal and moral obligations of the contracting 
parties at. least implied that they would so shape their policy 
as to do no harm to the other contracting party.But even this. 
very minimum' was not accorded to Poland,though a good start was 
x Polish White 'Book,op.cit.No.177 p.190 
xx. cf .broadcast by Sir W.Churchill ori,'0ctober l,193e and Hansard 
House of Commons,vol.351,cols.1855-1912; see also Hansard 
House of Lords,vol.114,cols.1559-1566 
xxx Mr.Chamberlain,Hansard,vol.351,col.976 
xxxx see p.36 ante 
made by Sir Winston Churchill*(seconded by Viscount Halifa^f 
when he became Prime Minister:.."we do not propose to recognize 
any territorial changes which take place during the war,unless 
they take place with the free concent and good will of the 
parties concerned". 
In matters relating to Poland the British Government spoke 
with four different voices: one sentimental to the members of 
the Polish fighting for^ü,promising them the fulfilment of 
their "heart's desire";another suave (sometimes sharp) to the 
Polish Government assuring it nevertheless that there was no 
reason for worry because the"cause of Poland was in good hands";, 
a third,evasive and contradictory^to the British Parliament; 
and the fourth voice at the conference tables,compromising and 
indifferent to promises and obligations. 
The voice of America was equally deceptive.President Roose-
velt's "Poland is the inspiration of the world",his pre-election 
utterance« designed to catch the votes of American citizens of 
Polish extrac^foS and the sublime ideas of the Atlantic Charter 
were soon forgotten whenever the Big Three sat at the conference 
tables. 
Only the voice of Russia was clear and unambiguous: her agg-
ression in 1939,her territorial demands and conduct throughout 
the war simply aimed at the destruction of Polish sovereignty. 
But wishful thinkers did not want to see it,moreover they strongly 
relented Polish representations to that effect.They brusquely 
brushed aside anxious voices about the future of Poland as well 
as of the Central and Eastern Europe and conveniently charged 
xxxxxx the Polish Government with sowing distrust among the Allies. 
x Hansard,House of Commons,vol-365,colAO 
xx Hansard,House of Lords,vol.117,col365 
xxx cf It Speaks for Itself»published by the Polish Forces Press 
Bureau,London,1946 
xxxx as he himself intimated,see 
A.Bliss-Lane,I Saw,Freedom Betrayed,London,1949,p.38-9 
W.Chamberlin,The European Cockpit,New York,1947,p.257-8 
xxxxx cf discussions in the House of Commons on Polish Press 
xxxxxx W.P.and Z.Coates,op.cit.p.l45 
The Soviet-Polish dispute originated in the Soviet-German 
co-operation in liquidating Poland in 193$ and later revolved 
ostensibly around the question of the Soviet-Polish frontier, 
whereas in fact Poland's independence was at stake. 
Britain took on the burdensome task of mediation, trying at 
the same time to bring Russia into the alliance against Germany. 
Only the unexpected invasion of Russia on June 22,1941, brought 
the mediation near completion and effected the automatic inclu-
sion of Russia into the alliance. 
The day after the German assault on Russia General Sikorski, 
the Polish Prime Minister,in his.broadcast to Poland offered 
resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Government 
ander the following conditions:declaration of Russia of the 
annulment of her 1939 treaties with Germany; recognition of the 
Treaty of Riga of March 18, 19 Щ recognition of the Non-aggression 
Pact of July 25,1932, and the Convention for the Definition of 
Aggression signed in London on July 3,1933» and release of Poles 
from prisons and forced labour camps. 
The British mediatory efforts indeed scored a success when 
the Maisky-Sikorski AgreeSeSf was signed in London on July 30,1941» 
and the Soviet Government agreed to resume diplomatic relations, 
consented to the formation of a Polish Army in Russia,granted 
amnesty to Polish prisoners and declared null and void the Soviet-
German treaties of 1939» 
Mr.Eden announcing the good news in the House of Commons added: 
..."I also desire to assure you that H.M.Government do not re-
cognize any territorial changes which have been effected in 
Poland since August .. 
x see p.37 ante 
xx Sir V/.Churchill,Memoirs,vol.III.p.348 et seq; 
xxx This Treaty settled the Polish-Soviet frontier. 
xxxx full text,Soviet Foreign Policy during the Patriotic War, 
Documents translated by A.Rothstein,London,1946,vol.I,p.81 
xxxxx Hansard,vol.373,cols.1502-1504 
A sigh of relief went through Parliament and the British 
Press as the feud seemed to be terminated and full ^operation 
of«Russia assured without harming Poland. 
In Polish circles,however,the reaction was quite different. 
First of^all the mode, in which the Agreement was made was in-
consistent with the Constitution of Poland since Art.12 (g) 
of the Constitution provided that all international treaties 
were to be concluded by the President of the Republic.Secondly 
the ambiguous terms allowing various interpretations of the 
provisions of the Agreement caused considerable anxiety as to 
v/heth^ er the Russians actually meant to recognize the status 
quo ante,or. only in face of the German aggression concluded a 
treaty to further their own temporary interests.Consequently 
three prominent members of the Polish Cabinet resigned and the 
Prime Minister who had acted unconstitutionally would have had 
to go asiwell,butfor the intervention of the-British Government 
who insisted upon his remaining in office. 
July 30,1941- Within a short time*the Polish anxieties proved 
April 2^i19^2.,sub3-tan-tiated, since before the ink on the Agreement 
dried-there were already two quite differing interpretations of 
its terms.The Poles maintained that the Agreement recognized the 
status quo ante with regard to the frontier and' that the principle• 
pacta sunt servanda should obtain.The Russians,on the other hand, 
insisted that the question of the frontier was still open to 
discussion and that pacts should be interpreted in the Russian 
way.Thus the Agreement became practically-reduced to a nullity]a 
The British Press adopted the Russian interpretation.Moreover, 
already in July and August 1941 The Timü put forward an'inge-
nious theory that in the future "the leadership in Eastern Europe 
x Mackiewicz,Lata Nadziei,op.cit.p.116 
xx The Times,July 14 and August 1,1941.The same idea was advocated 
in a book of Sir Edward Grigg,British Foreign Policy,London, 
/1944,p.66 
must fall either in Russian or German hands" and in a friendly-
way advised the Poles to chain themselves to the Russian chariot, 
authoritatively adding that "Russia can afford to be generous". 
It is needless to comment upon this gratuitous advice,except 
that to the Poles fighting for independence & Russian as well 
as "fetae German "leadership" was tantamount to political slavery. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the Maisky-Sikorski Agree-
ment that the German-Soviet partition of Poland was null and 
void,and General Sikorski1s cordial reception at the Kremlin, 
the Soviet Government in its Note of December 1,1941, to the 
Polish Ambassador declared that territorieseacquired by Russia 
In 1939 were considered part of the Soviet Union. 
Furthermore during the very viisit of the Polish Prime1 Minister 
in Moscow (December 1941) the so. called "Polish Union of Patriots1,1 
sponsored'by Russia, (which later aspired to rivalry,,with the 
Constitutional Government) was,called into being,thus reminding 
the Polish'Government that any displeasure of .the Kremlin may 
result in'an 'appointment of another "Government". 
Nothing could be done in London to intervene on behalf of. 
Polish interests,because any.reaction to .the Soviet arbitrary, 
and by no means friendly,activities was .brushed aside as likely 
to disturb "Allied Unity".In fact no independent policy of the 
•sovereign' Polish Government was conceivable if it might have 
caused displeasure in Moscow.In the meantime, the Soviet Govern-
ment engaged in a vigorous diplomatic campaign to gain support 
for their territorial demands,the enormous war effort of Russia 
being their principal trump card. 
All this was going on in the atmosphere of the lofty slogans 
of the Atlantic Charter signed in London by Russia together with 
other allied Governments on September 24,1941.One has,however, 
to give credit to the Russians for their frankness and sincerity 
displayed on the occasion of signing the,Charter by Mr.Maisky. 
x Mikolajczyk,op.cit.pp.26 and 27 
In his lengthy declaration* he set forth the ideas of his Go-
vernment to the effect that they would interpret strictly the 
letter of the Charter in the case of other signatories,but re-» 
serve complete freedom of action in matters touching,what they 
consider,vital to Soviet interests. 
The Soviet pressure on the British Government-.to recognize 
formally the Soviet annexation of half Poland was at first met 
with resolute opposition.On the occasion of Mr.Eden's visit to 
Moscow in December 194f* he was confronted with official demands 
to that effect.These demands were later renewed at the occasion 
of the signing of the British-Soviet Pact of 1942,and again 
refused? Yet a misplaced optimism of the British^rime Minister 
and the pro-Soviet bias in the British mediation were well recor-
ded in Sir Winston's Memofrl3^..."We could not force our new 
and sorely threatened ally to abandon,even on paper,regions on 
her frontiers which she had regarded for generations as vital 
to her security...We had the invidious responsibility of re-
commending General Sikorski to rely on Soviet good faith in the 
future settlement of Russian-Polish relations,and not to insist 
at this moment on any written guarantees for the future"...). 
One can only wonder why the Soviet territorial demands,which 
in effect,were nothing else but a continuation of the imperialist u 
policy of Peter the Great and Catherine II throughout the XVIIIth 
century had to be met with such a sympathetic recognition from 
H.M.Government in the face of the British obligations towards 
Poland and the well known warS&g*: 
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; 
Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island; 
Who rules the World Island commands the World." 
x cf D.Dallin,Russia and Post-War Europe,p.136-141 
xx Sir Winston Churchill^Memoirs,vol.Ill,p.558 and vol.IV,p.292 
•E.Stettinius,Roosevelt and4the Russians,1950,p.18 
C.Wilmot,The Struggle for Europe,London,1952,p.710 
xxx Sir Winston Churchill,Memoirs,vol.Iv,p.296 
J.Ciechanowski,Defeat in Victory,London,1948,pp.105 and 111 
xxxx vol.Ill,p.349 xxxxx H.Mackinder,Democratic Ideals and Realities,ed.1942,pp.70S105 
The Soviet giant could by no means consider itself to be 
threatened in any way by the Polish dwarf,the disputed territory 
was,therefore,in common sense not vital to Russian security, 
but it was vital to the promotion of the "World Revolution", 
the first step of which was the subjugation of Poland.The theory 
of the German bogey seems unfounded as well since an indepen-
dent Poland would constitute a wall between Russia and the 
West and thus provide a better security than common frontier 
with Germany.On the other hand,only complete domination of the 
whole continent would give relative security against real or 
imaginary foes of Russia. 
The Russians knew very well that no patriotic independent 
Polish Government was in a position to renounce 48# of Polish 
territory acquired in the circumstances of the German-Soviet 
concerted aggression;therefore to further their aims they were 
determined to press the issue and were only too glad to find 
sympathisers in the Western protectors of Poland.They artfully 
pressed to decide the matter whilst German guns were heard in 
Moscow instead of deferring it to the post-war peace conference 
as suggested by the Poles and originally seconded by BritaSi. 
Their move proved a masterpiece of diplomatic psychology and 
gave Russia the advantage of winning war and peace as well. 
The Soviet-Polish war friendship did not last long.An 
opportunity to sever diplomatic relations with the London Go-
vernment presented itself in the early 1943 following upon 
the Katyn af f af??Kat jin,another example of genocide,was one of 
the most unsavoury affairs of the last war, remaining untouched 
even by the Nuremberg Tribunal. 
x see p. 90 
xx Sir Winston Churchill,Memoirs,vol.Ill,pp.349 and 558 
xxxMletails see. J.Mackiewicz,The Katyn Wood Murders,London,1951 
(an important chapter is missing from the English publication 
of Mr.Mackiewicz*s work) 
On April 13,1943 the German radio broadcast a discovery by 
the German Army of some five thousand Polish corpses in mass 
graves in Katyn woods.The Polish Government decided to appeal 
to the International Red Cross for an.impartial examination 
of the German revelations which,in disclaiming responsibility, 
had accused Soviet Russia of the crime.The Soviet reaction 
to this was a Note stating that they considered the Polish 
request to the International Red Cross to be a serious breach 
of Polish good will and promptly announced severance of diplo-
matic relations with the Polish Government. 
The stand taken then by British public opinion gave another 
blow to the already fading sovereignty of the Polish Government 
in Exile,which losing their popularity could not count even on 
sympathy when the fate of Poland came to be decided in their 
xx 
absence.The British Press openly declared their bias. 
The TiMf announced that in the dispute over the responsi-
bility for the Katyn massacre the German sources could not be 
relied on; The Daily TelefM^h decided this was a case of Poles 
exploiting a situation for the purpose of furthering their own 
territorial ambitions,and several speculations of.the Evening 
StaMSFJ and the News Chro^fcfe deserve being quoted to illus-
trate their strange^reafoSing. Thus in the opinion of the Bri-
tish Press quoted above,a sovereign allied Government ought 
not to inquire into the cause of the massacre of several thou-
sands of their nationals but should accept like Gospel the 
vague statement of one of the two possible culprits. 
The prevailing opinion of the British Press announcing that 
x Mr.Molotov's Note of 25.4.1943,full text,Rothstein,op.cit.p.202 
xx "The British are pro-Russian.even more than the Americans"' 
wrote the New York Tribune on April 27,1943 
xxx April 28,1943; .xxxx April 27,1943 
xxxxx April 24,1943; xxxxxx April 27,1943 
xxxxxxx for a more sober attitude cf Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
April 28,1943 
the Poles "fell into Goebbels1 trap" made them responsible for 
the breach in "Allied Unity" and envisaged a reconstruction of the 
Polish Government to get rid of the "anti-Russian elements".On the 
other hand it was rightly pointed out at some occasions that the 
Katyn affair only provided the match to the fire of friction in 
which the question of the territory was the main fSf .One should 
add that besides the fdjrntier the question of sovereignty of the 
Polish Government was involved since the Poles were not only shoutei 
down in the name of "Allied Unity",but also forewarned of future 
events affecting their Government and Constitution. 
The House of Commons was similarly disp£f£5.Though much restraint 
was shown at that time on the question of the Soviet-Polish dis-
pute, drastic action aiming at the suppression of the Polish Press 
for daring to suppose that Soviet Russia might have something to 
do with the massacre,was advocated. 
April 25,1943- From the date of the breach of Soviet-Polish 
August 2,1945» relations events swiftly moved towards the thwar-
ting of the authority of the Polish Constitutional Government and 
the establishment of the People's Democracy in its stead.The Go-
vernment in Exile,excluded from any talks on the future of Poland, 
ceased thereby to be the stumbling block and so the Big Three 
smoothly agreed to solve the Polish problem according to Soviet 
plans. 
The care of the interests of Poland was then taken over by 
the British Government which was still trying to mediate and 
which brought considerable pressure on the "reluctant Poles" to 
yield to Soviet demands.The technique adopted by Sir Winston 
x Daily Herald 20.4.1943;News Chronicle 20.4.1943;Times 28.4.1943 
xx Manchester Guardian 28.4.1943; Daily Express 28.4.1943 
xxx Daily Telegraph 27.4.1943Manchester .Guardian 27.4.1943; 
Daily Mail 28.4.1943; Times-28.4.1943 
xxxx cf comments on writings by Kme Wasilwska in Russian Press: 
Daily Express 29.4.1943; News Chronicle 29.4.1943;N.Y.Times 29-4.43 
xxxxx A small group of M.P.s led by Sir D.Savory excepted 
xxxxxx Hansard vol.389,cols.30-32;col.150;vol.390,cols.194-5 
Churchilf aimed at making them accept,of their own will,the 
Soviet conditions of co-operation.Undoubtedly the British Go-
vernment w a s i n qUi-fce a difficult position, primarily because 
it desired full co-operation with Soviet Russia even at the 
expense of minor allies and because the President of the United 
States favoured in effect the Soviet proposals. 
The decisions at Moscow (1943)-and Teheran (1943) doomed -
the future of Poland as an independent,sovereign country since 
the Soviet plan received there the approval of the Grand Alliance. 
The Moscow Conference softened British resistance and prepared 
an adequate psychological atmosphere for the Teheran talks. 
Before the Teheran gathering the Polish Prime Ministe?*,invited 
to Washington,saw the British Foreign Minister and in a semi-
official discussion.was bluntly told that Poland must sign off 
part of her territory to Ruüfa. Fearing that in the forthcoming 
Coference decisions might be taken to that effect and to avert 
the disaster,he in vain>tried to gain.access to the British 
Prime Minif£e£, who,however,consulted Dr.Benes on the Polish 
question and on "what the Russians would do for P^fa^!'. 
The Declaration of December .1,1943, following upon the Teheran 
Conference, was beautifully framed,but in slogan-like terms it 
only restated the old chants that have already faded away in 
practice.The bare truth of the then undisclosed agreement on. 
world-wide strategy meant a division of the globe into spheres 
of influence - a dangerous precedent announcing a verdict, of 
death for small states and sowing seeds of - future antagonism 
between the mighty.As far as Poland was concerned,the line of 
Soviet occupation was to run through her teiFlFftoify and she had 
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xx Mr.S.Mikolajczyk who succeeded Gen.öiicorsja. on July 14,1943 
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to come under the Soviet aegis after the cession of half of her 
territory to Russia. 
The idea of abandoning Eastern Europe to Russian domination 
seems to have been endorsed then by the American policyj since 
Mr.Sumner Welles wrote: "T&e Soviet Government is as legitima-
tely entitled to promote a regional system of Eastern Europe , 
composed of co-operative and well-disposed independent govern-
ments among the countries adjacent to Russia,as.the U.S. has 
been justified in promoting an inter-American system of twenty-
one sovereign American republics". 
On January 20,1944,the British Prime Minister granted an 
audience to his Polish counterpart and told him that the east-
ern frontier of post-war Poland must run along the so called 
Curzon LiSi.Commenting on Britain's obligations towards Poland 
he stated thatiby the Agreement of 1939 Britain undertook to 
defend Poland against Germany but did not intend to fight for 
Poland-against Russia,as,if the Polish requests to refrain 
from arbitrary decisions with regard to the territory of Poland 
really amounted to 'a demand of declaration of war on Soviet 
Russia. 
A'month later (on February 22,1944),in the House of Commons 
XXX 
Sir Winston so endeavoured to explain away his policy:.."We 
ourselves have never in the past guaranteed on behalf of H.M. 
Government any particular frontier of Poland.We did not approve 
of the Polish occupation of Vilno.The British view in 1919 
stands expressed in the so-called Curzon Line,which attempted 
to deal,at any rate partially,with the problem...I cannot,feel 
that the Russian demand for reassurance about her Western 
frontiers^goes beyond the limits of what is reasonable and 
..just",.. 
x The Time for Decision,London} 1944,p.*257 xx Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.56 
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In the light of former statement!,treaties and guarantees, 
in the light of the lofty slogans of the Atlantic Charter and 
the Teheran Declaration these words sound at least odd,especially 
as on January 26,1944>Mr.Eden in the House of Commons onee more 
emphasised His Majesty's Government's adherence to the Atlantic 
Charter and the former statements with regard to PolaM. 
The Soviet-Polish frontier was not settled in 1919 but at 
the Peace of Riga by negotiations between the two coun-
tries,Poland taking far less of the territory offered to her 
by LfSfS,and in fact occupied at that time by her army which 
had defeated the Red Army at Warsaw and driven it back to Russia. 
The frontier had been approved and ratified by the Ambassadors' 
Conference in Paris (March §23),Lord Hardinge having signed 
on behalf of Britain.Now,twenty one years later Sir Winston 
У 
decided that the approval of the Ambassadors' Conference was 
null and the British signature void and set out to correst the 
historical error.Guided by "what is reasonable and just",and 
forgetting what he himself had written on the sulagecH^ he did 
what no Government of Poland could do without assent of Polish 
Parliament: sign away 48$ of Poland's territory,and thinking 
that he was merely dealing in'foreign land he bartered the 
sovereignty of Poland,because this was what was actually at 
stake. 
Protests of the. Polish Foreign Office in the British Foreign 
Office (Note of February 24,1944) as well as previous Notes 
to the British and the United States Government were without 
effect.The anxiety of the Polish Prime Minister was readily 
smoothed by Sir Winston's alsuMnce:.. "Don' t worry Poland will, 
x see pp.67 and 68 ante 
xx Hansard,House of-Commons,vol.396,col.663-4 
xxx text of the Treaty see Polish White Book,no.148,pp.162-165 
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emerge from this war strong and independent".Equallyvreassu-
ring was-President RooseveltT.."I'll see that Poland does not 
come out of this war injured".This was said well after he had 
put his-signature to the Teheran terms,but before the presi-
dential election took place. 
Whilst in Washington Mr.Mikolajczyk v/as unofficially app-
roached to renew diplomatic relations with Moscow,but the pre-
liminary condition,as later confirmed by the Soviet Ambassador 
Mr.Lebiedov in his Note of June*23,1944,could not be accepted 
by any-free government.The Kremlin was ready to resume talks 
but first certain members of the Government in Exile as well 
as the President-had to be deposed.In other words,having ensured a 
the partition of Poland the Soviet Government now wanted reor-
ganisation of the Polish Government so as to have*there only 
men of their ch§f$e.So the hitlerite tac?f§I to be twilling 
to negotiate if there was a Polish Government which was pre-
pared to be reasonable" were adopted by the Russians.There is 
no need to stress how grave was such a'»demand and that it had 
to be answered in the negative. 
Ther Polish Government,always, confronted .with accomplished 
facts and decisions taken in its absence,seeing how ineffective 
were in practice the assurances of its Allies,sought a compro-
mise by asking that definitive settlement of frontiers be post-
poned until the end of the war,and that the boundary demanded 
by-Russia be regarded in the meantime as a temporary demarcation 
line,and by requesting the British and U.S.Governments to lend 
their good offices towards an honourable agreement.The reaction 
of the Polish fighting forces (many Poles,now in exile,had their 
x_Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.66 
xxcPresident Raczkiewicz,Generals Sosnkowski (C.in C.{ and 
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homes and families in the disputed territories) to the writing 
on the wall made visible by this development of the interna-
tional situation cannot be adequately summarised in terms of 
a bitter resentment,but protests resulted only in a drastic 
action of the British Government,an example of which was the" 
suppression of the paper "Wiadomosci Polskii". 
On July 30,1944, Mr.Mikolajczyk arrived in Moscow hopeful 
of some kind of accord,unaware that in the meantime Mr.Stalin 
made an agreement with his agents now transformed into the 
"Polish Committee of National Liberatffn",who entered Polish 
soil witji the advancing Soviet armies,installed themselves in 
Chelm and later transferred their seat to Lublin.Under this 
agreement the Lublin Committee was granted administration of 
the territories recaptured by the Red Army.(The Army of Mar-
shal Rokosso$U£y advanced as far as to the suburbs of Warsaw.) 
Logically,therefore,Mr.Stalin told the Polish Prime Minister 
that in addition to renouncing the eastern half of Poland his 
Government must now come to an-agreement with the Lublin 
Committee. 
Upon his return to London Mr.Mikolajczyk worked out with 
his colleges a pfan of reconstruction of the Constitutional 
Government on a broader coalition basis including now the 
Communist representatives of the Lublin Committee and recog-
nising the Communist Party (officially the Workers Party 
created •'under Soviet auspices in 1942) as one of the five 
major political parties from which new Government would be 
drawn.This plan approved by the British Government was sent 
to Moscow,only to be passed to the Lublin Committee and to 
remain unanswered. 
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During his second visit to Moscow (October 1944) Mr.&iko-
lajczyk had an opportunity of meeting together Messrs Stalin, 
Churchill,Molotov,Eden and Harriman and learning from this 
congregation the truth about the Teheran decision so far offi-
cially kept from him* In a dramatic scene he indignantly re-
jected the arbitrary decision with regard to the eastern fron-
tier, incurring thereby the wrath of Mr.Stalin and the rebuff 
of his protector Sir Winston Churchill.The Anglo-Soviet Commu-
xx 
п1диё on the sojourn of Sir Winston and Mr.Eden in Moscow was, 
however,full of deceptive optimism:.."Important progress was 
made towards the solution of the Polish question which was 
closely discussed between the Soviet and British Government. 
They had consultations both with the Prime Minister and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Government in London 
and with the President of the National Cou££fl of Poland and 
and the Cltirman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation 
:at Lublin.These discussions have notably narrowed the diffe-
rences and dispelled mis-conceptions"... 
This Communiquö indicates that»the Soviet point of view 
prevailed and indeed this may be inferred for Sir Winston's 
account before the House of Commons,that Poland's frontier was 
to run along the Curzon Line and a new Government capable of 
being approved by Russia was to be established. 
On November 24,1944 Mr.Mikolajczyk resigned his office and 
the first task of his successor Mr.T.Arciszewski,the Nestor 
of the Polish Socialists,was to seek agreement with Moscow. 
But the Kremlin saw no need for further discussions.Instead, 
it recognised on January 5Д945 the Lublin Committee (which on 
x Mikplajczyk,op.cit.p.l07 . 
xx text see Rothstein,op.cit.p.162 
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December 31,1944 proclaimed itself the "Provisional Government 
of Liberated Democratic Poland") äs the Government of Poland. 
The protest of the Constitutional Government against this action 
was only a voice crying in the wilderness. 
Then came the Yalta disaster.The last effort of. the Consti-
tutional Government before the Yalta Conference was the Memo-
randum of January 22,1945 addressed to the Big Three (and igno-
red by them) in which it requested that the question' of terri-
torial changes be deferred until hostilities were over 'and that-
no puppet government be recognised. 
The Yalta .Conference,in the opinion prevailing at present, 
was nothing else but a gathering, worthy of another witch supper 
of Munich.This time Kussia Has the dominating power and the 
proceedings took place in an atmosphere of* complacency and 
compliance to Russian dictation.Those who attended it record 
xx 
some resistance to Soviet demands, but with regard До Poland' 
they are unable to prove that anything inconsistent with the 
original Soviet proposals went through.Apparently the British 
and Americans, disagreeing between themsefves on many points, 
finally accepted the settlement of the Polish question accor-
ding to the Stalinist blueprint.One has,however,to give credit 
to Sir Winston,who in distinction to President Roosevelt,made 
the last effort to champion the lost Polish cause.President 
Roosevelt's rather queer attitude towards Polish.constitutional 
problems, so 'greatly affected 'by the Yalta decisions,was. recorded 
by his Secretary of who wrote that:., "the President did , 
not attach importance to the continuity or legality of any- tt 
Polish Government,since he felt that for some years there had 
x text see-Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.332 et4 seq. 
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been in reality no Polish Government11.. .This can only be attri-
buted to the peculiar personality of the American President in 
whom the Poles in vain expected to find another Woodrow Wilson. 
The Crimea Declaration of February 12,1945 is an interesting 
document recording noble ideas and jeopardising in advance 
their enforcement.Of special interest here are points 5 and 6 
of the Declaration: 
Point 5:"Declaration on Liberated Europe" - consisted of a 
restatement of the Atlantic Charter principle on self-govern-
ment and pledge of the Three Powers to facilitate restoration 
of order and democratic institutions in Europe. 
Point 6:"Poland",reads as follows: 
"A new situation has been created in Poland as a result 
of her complete liberation by the Red Army.This calls for 
the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which 
can be more broadly based then was possible before the recent 
liberation of Western1 Poland.The Provisional Government which 
is now functioning in Poland,should therefore be reorganised 
on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democra-
tic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.This new 
Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Go-
vernment of National Unity. 
"Mr.Molotov,Mr.Harriman,and Sir A.Clark Kerr are authorized 
as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow 
with members of the present Provisional Government and with 
other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, 
with a view to the reorganisation of the present Government 
along the above lines. 
"The Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall 
be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections 
as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and 
secret ballot.In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi 
parties shall have the right to put forward candidates. 
"The Three Heads of Governments consider that the eastern 
frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line,with digre-
ssions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres 
in favour of Poland.They recognise that Poland must receive 
substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. 
They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional 
Government of National Unity should be sought in due course 
on the extent of these accessions,and that the final delimi-
tations of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter 
await the peace conference". 
No comment seems necessary on Point No.5 of the Declaration. 
It was a programme,a fair statement of good principles,but 
doomed to frustration from its very inception since the Atlan-
tic Charter has already been trampled under foot.Furthermore 
it concerned mostly countries situated in the Soviet sphere 
of influence which,therefore,either completely disappeared 
(e.g.Baltic States) or were in process of being turned into 
"People's Democracies" (Austria excepted simply because she 
happened to be under the Four Powers occupation at the time 
of the reconstruction of her government). 
The Declaration on Poland,on the other hand,contained start-
ling inaccuracies and false conclusions drawn from non-existent 
premises.Let us briefly examine its provisions : 
1. It is incorrect to say that a new situation arose since 
Poland was completely liberated by the Red Army - The fact 
that the Red Army (supplied with allied equippment and indi- if 
rectly assisted by the Polish Home Army) happened to drive 
the Germans out of Poland in a concerted action of all Allies 
(including Poland) neither constituted them sole liberators 
nor authorised Soviet Russia to receive special concessions 
with regard to Poland,just as Poland could not aspire to te-
rritorial benefits because her forces took part in liberating 
other countries or in the Battle of Britain.No new situation 
has been created thereby,unless the Red Army was to be consi-
dered conqueror and Soviet Russia had to receive a reward at 
Poland's expense for defending herself against German invasion 
in 1941. 
2. It is difficult to see why the presence of the Soviet 
Army should call for the formation of a "Provisional Govern-
ment" - Throughout the war,in the allied camp there functioned 
the Polish Constitutional Government and at home,there was a 
political state organisation,which,if respected,would have 
co-operated with the Red Army.Their existence was not symbolic, 
but real,and their sovereignty was never officially questioned. 
They represented the fighting Poland and their record cannot 
be impeached even by the vilest tongues.Now,when the war was 
nearly won the Grand Alliance decided to ignore these facts 
and forgo the legal continuity of the Polish State. 
3. The "Provisional Government" established under the auspices 
of Soviet Russia was to be recognised as the basis of the fu-
ture government.Thus the native element of a sovereign state 
embodied in its Constitution had to be superseded by a foreign 
offspring naturally subservient to its creator.The Declaration 
said that this "Provisional Government" was already functio-
ning in Poland;in fact,it was imported with the Red Army and 
if it did any administration during the operations of the 
Red Army it was due to the arrangements made with Soviet 
Russia in so much as a principal instructs his agent to carry 
out certain duties. 
4. The Declaration constituted a Commission of Messrs Molotov, 
Harriman and Sir A.Clark Kerr and authorized them to supervise 
the reorganisation of the Soviet sponsored "Provisional Go-
vernment". It instructed them to regard this "Provisional Go-
vernment" as the nucleus of the new government,which other 
Poles,within their discretion .could be invited to join.In 
fact,the said Commission became invested thereby with a state 
authority,contrary to the Polish Constitutional Law and all 
pledges including the celebrated Atlantic Charter (Art.2) ex-
pressly referred to in Point No.5 of the Declaration.And so, 
notwithstanding her independent status as sovereign state and 
ally,Poland was put under a sort of "Regency Council",where 
the leading röle was assigned to the Soviet representative. 
In point of fact the Commission,in the course of its activities, 
was virtually dominated by its Soviet Chairman who always ma-
naged to get his plans through. 
5. To embellish the grim reality the Declaration spoke of "free 
and unfettered" elections to be held soon by the "Provisional 
Government".In the circumstances of Russian military occupation 
of Poland and a Soviet-sponaöred Government,the prospect of"free 
and unfettered" elections could have only an empty sound to gull 
public opinion in Britain and the United States where people 
might believe that if they,by their votes,put into power and 
dismiss their administration the same must follow in a country 
occupied by a foreign power anxious to establish a system of 
government on its own pattern.One would,indeed,have to be either 
ovej?eptimistic or conveniently ignorant of the conditions nece-
ssary for free elections to suppose that this illusory power 
of the Polish electorate to decide the issue could exist at all. 
We must not forget-that at stake"* vab, not the question of vhich 
political party would hold the reins (as is the case in free 
and democratic countries ), but whether Poland would have an 
indigenous form of government1 and retain independent status. 
If the Big Three really wanted to supersede the Constitu-
tional Authorities and create in their stead something new and 
original,but fair and truly national,they would have to organise 
x Stettinius,op.cit.p.275; Lane,op.cit.p.57 et seq. 
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a truly international (not Soviet) system of control and super-
vision supported by military contingents of the principal Allies 
(not only the Red Army),effect resettlement of millions of 
displaced persons and political refugees,bring home members 
of the Polish armed forces serving abroad and facilitate a 
democratic electoral campaign.Only in such conditions would 
the tutelage produce satisfactory results and ensure fair com-
petition of the national political forces,whereas in the terms 
of the Declaration the tutelage prejudiced the issue ab initio 
and robbed the Polish people of the last chance of having a 
say in thi^ er most vital question. 
6. The Declaration accorded the right to put forward candidates 
to "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties" - It would be help-
ful if the Yalta signatories indicated what they actually had 
in mind and which parties,in their opinion,were "pro-Nazi or 
anti-democratic".It was well known that of all German-occupied 
countries only Poland produced no Quisling and that the Polish 
nation suffered incomparably more than all other conquered 
nations,chiefly because there was no national collaboration 
with the enemy.It remains a puzzle for an average Pole which 
of the parties organised in the Underground Parliament or re^ 
presented in the Government in Exile were supposed to be pro-
Nazi or insufficiently "democratic",and if so why,furthermore 
which "democratic" principles were to constitute the test J 
Mr.Stalin's or somebody else's. 
7. The organisation of the elections was entrusted to the no-
minees of Mr.Stalin,the man who never lost any elections but 
always won 99% of votes,and they were to decide who was allowed 
to stand for election and who was to be disfranchised.Thus the 
election,of which so much was expected,was doomed to be 4 bogus 
or an election h la Stalin. 
x nearly six million Polish citizens were liquidated by the 
Germans. 
The Yalta Agreement seems to have satisfied the British 
and American leaders.Sir Winston Churchill having discharged 
the burden of Polish tutelage placed his faith in the Soviet 
leaders who succeeded him in this task:.."I feel also that 
their word is their bond,I know of no Government which stands 
to its obligations even in its own despite,more solidly than 
the Russian Soviet Government.I absolutely decline to embark 
here on a discussion about Russian good wilJ"...Only a few 
months later his opinion completely chan but by then 
Europe was already divided. 
President Roosevelt in his report to a joint session of 
Congress on March 1,1945 declared:.."I am convinced that the 
Agreement on Poland,under the circumstances,is the most hope-
ful agreement possible for a free»independent and prosperous 
Polish State"...Soon,however,his optimism withered away.On 
March he cabled to Sir Winston over "his anxiety and 
concern at the way the Soviet attitude had changed since Yalta", 
and on April 1,1945 he sent a message to Mr.Stalin expressing 
disappointment at"the lack of progress made in carrying out 
the political decisions we reached at Yalta,particularly those 
relating to the Polish question"... 
The British Press was jubilant because the danger of dis-
agreement between the principal Allies seemed averted.But in 
the vigilant Parliament anxiety was voiced by the following 
amendment (moved by Mr.Kenneth Petherick,seconded by Sir Ar-
chibald Southby) to the motion approving the decisions of the 
Yalta Conference:.."Remembering that Great Britain took up 
arms in a war of which the immediate cause was the defence of 
x Hansard,House of Commons,vol408,col|284 
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Poland against German aggression and in which the overriding 
motive was the prevention of the domination by a strong of its 
weaker neighbours,(the House) regrets the decision to transfer 
to another power the territory of an ally contrary to treaty 
and to Art.2 of the Atlantic Charte?"...The amendment was de-
feated by a crushing majority (396 to 25 votes),but it remains' 
on the record as a symbolical gesture and proof of understanding 
of the real meaning and importance of the Crimea capitulation. 
Naturally enough Poles could not share the unwarranted joy 
over the decisions reached at Yalta.Even when the grim news 
transpired they were still required to continue fighting though 
the cause for which they stood throughout the war was so care-
lessly mismanaged.Only when hostilities were over were they 
told to go. 
As far as Poland was concerned Yalta marked the last stage 
in the liquidation of her political independence and Constitu-
tional Authdrities.In the field of international politics it 
constituted nothing new,but a result of the Anglo-American 
policy of appeasing Soviet Russia at the expense of a defence-
less ally.The world did not benefit by it and the "prospect of 
a lasting peace was not thereby strengthened.The Grand Alliance 
won the war alright,but failed to free the world from the fear 
of another war.As a matter of fact the tension in Europe has 
developed since into a cold war and in the Far East into a 
shooting war.The European mosaic of national states lost its 
balance and a new Russian empire emerged from the smoke screen 
of long winded slogans and inspiring declarations. 
It seems that the arbitrary decisions taken in the absence 
of the powers affected by them,the staggering difference 
between the idealistic wordings of declarations and the reality, 
failure to respect one's own pledges and disregard of others'. 
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right to decide their own fate,are the main reasons why. the 
labours of the Grand Alliance so miserably failed.The task 
undertaken by the three great men seems to exceed the purview 
of a single individual and the triumvirate,as in the past,pro-
duced single domination.Humanity lost by the absence of a large 
council and wide discussions leading to considered^ decisions, 
whereas the power which dominated the triumvirate scored con-
siderable gains in advancing its policy-r 
x 
In a recently published brilliant exposition of the activi-
ties of the Grand Alliance there appears a tendency to assess 
the amount of the respective responsibility of Sir Winston 
Churchill and President Roosevelt for being outsmarted by Mr. 
Stalin.In the case of Poland,as far as it was possible to as-
certain by the present writer,this responsibility seems to be 
equally shared since it appears,fair to attribute the question 
of the eastern frontier to Sir Winsen, and the question of 
superseding the Constitution to President Rooseveft.From a 
purely Polish point of view individual responsibility is not 
of great importance,all that matters is that the protectors of 
Poland had their own conception of what she needed and that 
they were determined to make the "Poles happy" even against 
their will.In consequence Poland became a state on wheels and 
a vassal of Soviet Russia.Her new Government,therefore,by ne-
cessity received the imprint of a derivative manufacture,which 
is an inevitable characteristic of political slavery. 
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Chapter 6. Destruction of the Underground State and 
Elimination of Constitutional Authorities. 
The process of the destruction of the Underground State ran 
parallel to the elimination of the Constitutional Authorities 
and was carefully timed with the Soviet moves in the international 
arena.Before we follow its course it seems useful to make a 
historical digression. 
Russian Policy. No matter what the motives and ultimate end 
of Soviet policy its effect with regard to Poland was no different 
from the expansionist policy of the imperialist Russia and the 
method of annexation and establishment of subservient governments 
was simply an imitation of the tsars.Whereas in the past the sub-
jugation of Poland was equivalent to the first stage of the con-
quest of the heartland of Europe,it appears nowadays to an impor-
tant step in the fulfilment of the revolutionary mission of the 
Soviet State. 
"In the West the fortunes of the world revolution are at stake"-
exclaimed General Tukhachevsky the leader of the Soviet offensive 
in July 1920 - "and over the, corpse of Poland lies the way to 
world conflagration".Lenin confirmed this theory saying that "had 
Poland become sovietised,the system of the Versailles Treaty 
would have been destroyed likewise" 
The scheme,notwithstanding the indirect support by the Spa 
Conference and Lloyd George's mediatioS,failed at the gates of 
Warsaw in 1920 and Poland was saved. Marshal Shaposhniicov commenting 
on the Soviet defeat blamed the "insufficient revolutionizing of 
Poland which did not warrant an offensive against that country". 
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The position during the second World War was entirely di-
fferent since there was no desperate need for an internal re-
volution. The revolutionary idea,however,was nurtured by the 
Polish Communist Party,which reviving from lethargy,constitu-
ted what one may call the indigenous element in the act of the 
introduction of the People's Democracy. 
Polish Communist Party. The Polish Communist Party was crea-
ted in Warsaw in December 1918 under the name of "Workers' 
Party".Ideologically it was much under the influence of what 
was then called "LuxemburgisS" (i.e.ideas of Rosa Luxemburg 
opposed to Lenin's philosophy) and only in 1923 did it adopt 
Lenin's leadership, and changed its name to "Polish Communist 
Party"(K.P.P.). 
During the Soviet-Polish war (1919-1920^ the Soviet armies 
on their advance into Poland brought with them a "Provisional 
Revolutionary Committee" headed by Felix DzierzynfS}, "the 
scourging sword of revolution and terror of international 
bourgeoJfie",which Committee installed itself in Bialystok 
and in its Manifesto of July 20,1920 urged the "workers and 
peasants to revolutionize".The "Workers' Party" anticipating 
the victory of the Red Army set itself forth to organise 
"Councils of Workers Deliktes" on the pattern of the Soviets, 
but the Polish workers and peasants instead of "revolutionizing" 
successfully set their face against the Russian invasion. 
Thus the Communists suffered their first defeat at the hands 
of the proletariat.Yet peculiarly enough they claim now to have 
had as many as 23 deputies in the Polish Sejm of 1926,though 
they admit that out of that number only six deputies represented 
x T.Daniszewski,Droga Walki K.P.P.,Nowe Drogi,Warsaw,1948, 
No.12,p.127 
xx Daniszewski,ibid.p.l28 
xxx the founder of the G.P.U.(forerunner of the N.K. V.D.) 
xxxx from a resolution of the Polish Communist Party on the 25th 
anniversary of his death,Nowe Drogi,1951,No.3,p.13 
xxxxx A.Zawadzki,Istota i Rola Rad Narodowych,Nowe Drogi,1950 
/No.2,p.108 
the K.P.?. whilst the rest came from allied parties such as 
the Ukrainian Selrob ( four ),Byelo-Russian Hromada (six) and 
the Independent Peasant Party (seven). 
A contemporary official writer complains about sectarianiüS 
within the K.P.P. as well as socialist influenced.Another one 
brings a vote of thanks to Mr.Stalin for his personal inter-
vention and "ideological rectification" of the Ж An attempt 
of the K.P.P.to amalgamate with the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) 
failed in 1937,the latter refusing co-operation on account of 
the K.P.P. being an "agency of Rufsia". 
The membership of the K.P.P. never exceeded ,moreover 
owing to its foreign allegiance and anti-religious philosophy 
it could not count on support in Poland,a predominantly catho-
lic and rather nationalist country.The K.P.P.,however,claims 
certain successes in fomenting strikes and promoting distur-
bances? Notwithstanding Mr.Stalin's personal attention to the 
K.P.P. and the purge of Trotskyites the K.P.P. was dissolved 
in 1938 by the Comintern,its actual master and source of autho-
rity, the official reasons being "Trotskyism and infiltration 
of Pilsudsia^lPmen". 
It is rather strange that the K.P.P. was left dead during 
the Soviet occupation of 1939-1941 and was called to life as 
the "Workers' Party" only as late as January 1942.Apparently 
it was not needed until then.Yet to fill the gap the present 
leaders of Poland pretend that in spite of its dissolution the 
K.P.P?led the nation in the struggle against Fascism and Hitle-
x Daniszewski,op.cit.p.136; xx Daniszewski,ibid.p.l40 
xxx Daniszewski,ibid,p.131; 
xxxx R.Zambrowski,Stalinowska Nauka,Nowe Drogi, 1949,No.6,p.150 
xxxxx Daniszewski,ibid.p.141;xxxxxx Daniszewski,ibid.p.148 
comparative figures:Hungary (30,000),Czechoslovakia(80,000) 
xxxxxxx Daniszewski,ibid.pp.137-139 and p.142,also 
B.Bierut,Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R.Warsaw,1952,pp.28,29 
xxxxxxxx Daniszewski,ibid.p.146,Bierut,ibid.p.31 
xxxxxxxxx Bierut,ibid.p.31 
"Union of Polish The Soviet policy of weakening the po-
Patriots" in Moscow. ... „ .. _ , . . rt . _ .. , . 
sition of the Polish Constitutional Autho-
rities with the purpose of liquidating them was well synchro-
nised with gradual steps towards the formation of Soviet-sub-
servient ,pseudo-Polish authorities.The first move in this di-
rection was the formation of the "Union of-Polish Patriots" 
in December 1941 which coincided with the official visit of 
General Sikorski to the Kremlin. 
At the head of that organisation stood a woman,Polish by 
birth, Mme Wanda Wasilewska,a communist writer,a colonel in 
the Red Army,a member of the Supreme Soviet,married at that 
time to Mr.Korneytchuk,a Minister in the Ukrainian Soviet 
Republic.A well known admirer of Soviet Russia,she and her 
husband played a prominent part in conducting an anti~Polish 
propaganda.The latter^ writings in the "Radianska Ukraina" 
published in February 1943 provoked an exchange of Notes 
between the Polish and Soviet Governments on the question of 
propaganda relating to the eastern frontie$? 
Already in 1940 the Soviet Government tried to organise 
within the Red Army units of the Polish Army from prisoners 
of war,but this idea failed for lack of supp§$t.The scheme 
revived upon the severance of diplomatic relations in 1943 
and the remaining Р о Ш х were incorporated into the so called 
Kosciuszko Division placed under the political authority of 
the Union of Patriots.Thus the Polish Government and Army 
in Exile acquired opposite numbers under the Russian mantle. 
In 1943 the Union of Patriots gained more ground and 
came to dispose of a powerful propaganda apparatus,including 
x The Daily Telegraph,April?8,1943 
xx text of two Polish Notes,Mikolajczyk,op.cit.pp.292-293 
cf extracts from the Pravda,Rothstein,op.cit.pp.264-268 
xxx Kusnierz,op.cit.p.106-107 
xxxx out of some 1,8 million of deportees and prisoners of war 
about 125,000 were evacuated to the Middle East 
the Kosciuszko broadcasting station behind the Soviet lines. 
Defamatory attacs of the Patriots were directed against the 
Home Army which was accused of "inactivity" (notwithstanding 
the great help rendered to the Soviet armies both in information 
about movements of German troops transmitted through LondoS 
and sabotage of German supplies and communication lines) and 
against*the leaders of the Underground State,who were charged 
with a "passive policy".This was the harbinger of future events, 
the most important of which was the march of the Red Army towards 
the Polish frontier. 
"Workers' Party". The revival of the Polish Communist Party 
was the first step towards the creation of a rival organisation 
to the Underground State.In January 1942 the so-called "Polish 
Workers' Party" (P.P.R.) was established to resume the traditions 
of the K.P.P. under direction of the Soviet authorities. 
The P.P.R. accepted Marxism-Leninifnt as its ideological basis 
and started forming armed units (the so-called "People's Guards") YYT 
with the help of Colonel Glebov of the Red Army. The P.P.R. 
accentuated the class character of its activities and in its 
programme "For What We Fight" declared that it stood for a 
"People's Poland ruled by the prole£a$?at".The first diversionary 
action of the P.P.R. with regard to the Home Army was the creation 
of its own subsidiary formations such as the R.JR^^o.to attract 
the left-wing socialists and the Wola Ludu ("Will of the People") 
to draw radical elements away from the "Peasant BS£?affons" 
controlled by the Peasant Party. 
In the course of negotiations with the Communist Group the 
Home Army was told of the two conditions under which the former 
x Sir W.Churchill,Memoirs,vol.III.p.348 
xx Bierut,op.cit.p.34 
xxx Komorowski,op.cit.p.122 
xxxx Bierut,op.cit.p.35 
xxxxx "R.P.P.S." = "Workers' Polish Socialist Party" 
xxxxxx Bierut,op.cit.p.36 
was ready to co-operate.They were: repudiation of the 1935 
Constitution by both the Home Army and the Government of the 
Underground State and the immediate commencement of an open 
war against the Germans.To neither of those conditions could 
the responsible leaders of the Underground State agree.The 
former meant breaking away from the Constitutional Government 
to whom the Home Authorities were loyal and the latter meant 
self-destruction,because the situation in 1943 was not yet 
ripe for a general risi&f.In reply the Home Authorities urged 
the Communist Group to submit themselves to the Constitutional 
Government and to declare openly whether they constituted a 
patriotic Polish resistance movement or simply a foreign 
agency directed from abroad and disloyal to the Polish state. 
Apart from isolated skirmishes no civil war ensued between 
the Home Army and the People's Guards as was the case in Yugo-
slavia. Moreover it is difficult to ascertain the actual strength 
of the People's Guards (official sources are silent on this 
subject) before they became amalgamated with the Polish Army 
under Soviet Command into the so-called "People's Army" in 1944. 
TTT 
The available official figures show the total strength of 
the whole Communist movement at the beginning of 1945 to be 
about 20,000,this including about 8,000 men arriving in Poland 
with the advancing Red Army.We can,therefore,safely assume that 
the Communist People's Guards totalled not more than 12,000 men 
(provided,of course,that every member of the P.P.R. was also 
a soldier).This figure,as compared with the strength of the 
Home 5ri5y (380;000 in 1944) »virtually excluded the possibility 
of a civil war.Whereas the actual struggle for power took place 
x Komorowski,op.cit.128 
xx Even a year later when the Red Army was at the gates of 
Warsaw the rising was completely liquidated by the Germans, 
xxx A.Alster and J.Andrzejewski,W Sprawie Skladu^Socjalnego P.Z.P.R 
Nowe Drogi,1951,No.l.p.235 
xxxx see p.63 ante 
in -the political field,the extermination of what had been left 
of the Home Army after the Warsaw rising was initiated by the 
Soviet partisans and the Red Army and completed by the"Provi-
sional Government of National Unity." 
The Communist Home Communist activities were intensified by 
National C o u n c i l . , ^ , _., _ .. , 
the end of 1943 as a consequence of the im-
provement of the situation on the Russian front.At that time 
a reorganisation of their armed units took place and the poli-
tical direction was taken over by Kr.Bierut who became Chairman 
of their "Home National Council" (K.R.N.) created on December 131» 
1943 and designed to be the rival body to the Underground Par-
liament. This coincided with the Teheran Conference,where Mr. 
Stalin was given a free hand in Eastern and Central Europe, 
and with the crossing of the Polish frontier by the advance 
units of the Red Army. 
The struggle for the Constitution then became acute since 
the Communist Group in December 1943 openly denounced their 
loyalty to the Constitution of 1935.This was reiterated at the 
first session of their "Home National Council" on January 1, 
1944 when a resolution was passed to the effect that in as 
much as the Constitution was repudiated because of its "tota-
litarian character" the Government in Exile,being based on 
that Constitution,was no longer recognised eithe?. 
The logic of the situation was plain.Denouncing the Consti-
tution and the Constitutional Government the Communist Group 
combatted at the same time the Underground State which was 
based on the Constitution and loyal to the Government in Exile. 
If they managed to destroy the legal basis of the Home insti-
tutions they would contribute to the creation of a constitu-
tional vacuum and prepare favourable ground for putting them-
selves into power.In the absence of Home authorities the*ad-
ministration of the territories re-conquered by the Red Army 
x see p.75-76 ante 
xx I Posiedzenie Plenarne K.R.N.p.39 
would readily pass into their hands as organised representatives 
of the Kremlin ideology. 
The reaction of the Underground State against the resolution 
of the K.R.N.was expressed in a joint declaration of 23 poli-
tical organisations in January 1944 branding the P.P.R.with 
pro-Soviet tendencies and anti-Polish activities.The P.P.R. 
was thus condemned as a "foreign agency" and exposed as a x 
"fictitious body" designed to pave the way for Soviet domination. 
Plight of the Upon the advance of the Red Army the question 
Home Army-of ц ^ д ^ co-operation with its units became of 
prime importance for the Home Army.Anticipating this necessity, 
and anxious about the evolution of the situation,the Prime Mi-
nister already in October 1943 approached Mr.Eden with the in-
tention of resuming diplomatic relations with the Soviet Govern-
ment and arranging this important matter with the Soviet command. 
The British Foreign Office then communicated the following reply 
of the Soviet Government: 
"...The Soviet Government would be willing to discuss the 
renewal of diplomatic relations,but only with such a Polish 
Government as would be favourably disposed towards the Soviet 
Union.Neither the Polish Government in London nor the Commander 
in Chief»General Sosnkowski,fulfils that condition..." 
Thus the attempt at finding a platform of co-operation was 
subjected to an unacceptable condition,because if accepted it 
would only prejudice the struggle for Poland's independence 
and replace the Constitutional Authorities by Soviet nominees. 
Nevertheless orders from London were issued to the Home 
Army in October to enter into liaison and co-operate with 
the advancing units of the Red Army.The Civil Authorities were 
xWeber,op.cit.p.44 
xx quot.by Komorowski,op.cit.p.179 
xxx cf broadcast of Mr.Mikolajczyk,January 5,1944,full text 
see Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.305 
Strategicus,A Short History of the Second World War,London, 
1950,p.231 
similarly instructed and the Commander of the Home Army ordered 
his troops to avoid friction with Soviet partisans and to est-
ablish contact with the O.C.s of the Red Army. 
The results of this decision were deplorable.General Bor-
Komorowski,the Commander of the Home Army,recorded in his book 
several cases of appalling consequences to his units seeking 
YY 
co-operation with the Soviet partisan groups or the Red Army. 
In Volynia,e.g.several commanders of the Home Army units and 
their, staffs were murdered by Soviet paAsans as soon as the 
common operation was complfted.The prospects of co-operation 
with-the Red Army, were more promising,but always,whenever the 
operation was concluded,the commanders of the Home Army units 
and their accompanying officers would be invited to meet the 
Russian commandant and invariably never returned from such 
interviews,thereupon their men wereidisarmed and detaineRP^ 
The Russian tactics were to use the Home Army for the purpose 
of common action against the enemy,then arrest the leaders, 
disarm the men and enlist them into the Polish Army under 
the Soviet coSMnd,whereas those who were reluctant to join 
were deported .This method,no matter its moral tur-
pitude, was an effective means of decimating the strength of 
the Home Army and undermining thejconfidence of its members 
in their leaders and the Civil Authorities who were responsible 
for the political direction of the resistance.At the same time 
the exposure of this method is a serious indictment of Soviet 
Russia which stopped short of no means to promote her political 
designs. 
x Komorowski,op.cit.p.178 
xx there are similar allegations against the Home Army.cf Trial 
of Sixteen,The Times,19.6.1945 
xxx Komorowski,ibid.pp.183,188 
xxxx Komorowski,ibid;pp.186,188,194,195,197 
xxxxx Komorowski,ibid.p.198 
xxxxxx some 50,000 were deported at that time,Kusnierz, p.211 
Whilst this was going on in the front,the Kosciuszko broad-
casting station appealed to the Home Army for co-operation with 
the Red Army and insisted on an open rising to give hand to the 
x 
approaching Red Army units.Simultaneously the Soviet propaganda 
apparatus did its best to discredit both the Home Army and the 
political Authorities accusing them of inactivity and even 
collaboration with the enemy.This produced a highly confusing 
picture of the real situation since the Soviet propaganda had 
quite a strong hold and a warm reception abroad.Even during 
the Warsaw rising the British Daily Worker reflecting faith-
fully the Soviet news announced on August 7,1944 that the rising 
was a humbug,and a result of imagination of the "Polish emigr£ 
circles in Loncfo§? 
Moscow Talks. In this atmosphere the Polish Prime Minister 
was invited to Moscow only to be told by Mr.Stalin that he 
had just concluded an agreement with the Communist Group,under 
which they received administrative authority over Poland's 
territory snatched from the German hands by the Red Army,and 
that this Group was considered to form the future government 
of PofiSid.Mr.Mikolajczyk was then referred to the Communist 
representatives present in Moscow,who on thi€r arrival were 
greeted with the honours customarily gifcen to a government, xxxxx 
whereas the Prime Minister was received like a private person. 
There he learned that Mr.Bierut was predestined to become 
the President of Poland and even got a tentative offer from 
the latter to become Prime Minister under his presfcfeScy. In 
the new government 14 Ministries were to go to Mr.Bierut's 
associates and only four to persons accepted by them and 
x Scaevola,A Study in Forgery,London,1946,p.41 
Y.Gluckstein,Stalin's Satellites in Europe,London,1952,p.144 
xx An English writer went even as far as to describe the Home 
Army as "fascists"!- D.Warriner,Revolutions in Eastern 
Europe,london,1950,p.6 
xxx Hansard,House of Commons, vol403., cols. 233,234 
xxxx Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.80 
xxxxx Rothstein,op.cit.pp.98-100,140,142,152 
xxxxxx Mikolajczyk,ibid.p.84 
representing non-communist parties.Upon his rejoinder that an 
agreement must be reached with the Underground Parliament to 
solve the problem in a constitutional manner he was bluntly told 
by Mr.Bierut:.."If you want to go to Poland as a friend,in com-
plete agreement with us,we will accept you.If you attempt to 
go as Prime Minister of the Polish Government which is no longer 
recognised by the U.S.S.R.,we'll arrest you"... 
The situation was clear : whilst the Soviet army overlooking 
the Vistula passively watched the agony of the rising in Warsaw 
in which the cream of the Home Army was destrovfd,the Prime 
Minister was told that the future of his Government had already 
been decided in Moscow and that new authorities outside the 
Constitution were being established under Soviet patronage.In 
fact such authorities had already been nominated before Mr.Mi-
kolajczyk arrived in Moscow. 
Committee of On July 2i,1944 the Communist "Home National 
Liberation. Council" under the chairmanship of Mr.Bierut passed 
a resolution creating the ."Polish Committee of National Libe-
ration" as the ."interim executive authority to direct the struggle 
for independence and restore the Polish statf". 
This Committee consisted of fifteen persons (including Mme 
Wasilewska) and was organised on the pattern of a government 
(functions were distributed as to government departments).The 
personal composition of this body leaves no doubt about its nature 
since the resolution frankly stated that the "Home National Coun-
cil "appointed "leaders of the underground movement as well as 
activists from among Poles settled in Russia" to the Committee, 
x Kikolajczyk,op.cit.p.65 
xx Even the enegetic efforts of Sir Winston Churchill and Presi-
dent Roosevelt to persuade the Soviet Government to help orga-
nise a shuttle service in aid of the insurgents were without 
effect and no allied planes were allowed to land on territory 
occupied by the Red Army, 
xxx full text,Systematyczny Przeglad Ustawodawstwa Polski 
Odrodzonej,Warsaw,1946,pp.3 and 4 
Communist Manifesto. The Committee promptly proclaimed a Ma-
Y 
nifestoto the nation.This lengthy document contained startling 
statements: The nation was told that"it (i.e. the nation) has 
created its representation,its underground parliament,namely 
the K.R.N, consisting of democratic parties,such as the Peasant 
Party,the Democratic Party,the Workers' Party and others" and 
that "Polish organisations abroad submitted to the K.R.N., 
which is the only legal source of authority in Poland".The 
nation was further told that the "Emigre Government in London 
and its Delegate in Poland were self-appointed,illegal autho-
rities, because they derived their existence from the illegal 
Constitution of 1935". 
The Committee declared its adherence to the Constitution of 
1921 and proclaimed that both "K.R.N, and the Committee act 
on the basis of that Constitution - the only binding and legal 
ConstitutionJ'and pledged itself to obey the Constitution of 1921 
until the "new National Assembly elected by a general,direct, 
equal,secret and proportional suffrage passes a new Constitution" 
On the question of the frontier with Soviet Russia the Ma-
nifesto discreetly but vaguely stated that the "new boundary 
must be the line of good neighbourly relations and that it will 
be settled in an amicable agreement with Russia . 
The Manifesto announced that the Committee was going to take 
over the administration of territories liberated by the Red 
Army and added that "in these territories no other administra-
tive authority can exist".This was clearly an allusion to the 
Underground State now scheduled to be wiped out with the help 
of the Red Army. 
The Committee-ordered the creation of provincial,district 
and communal "National Councils"»through whom it proposed to 
act,thus replacing the territorial self-government system by 
an organised party element.In consequence of this step the 
x full text,Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.pp.5-10 (The word "communist" cannot be found in the Manifesto.) 
the. Central Administration would.gain control of local affairs 
on purely political linef.It ordered the dissolution of the 
police and the creation in its stead of a Militia to act under 
authority of those Councils.The abolition of. the institution of 
the national police force paved thus the way for the formation 
of a political militia,which in turn became the creative force 
for the political (so called security) police in the hands of 
the Executive. 
The Committee solemnly proclaimed the restoration of "all 
democratic freedom,equality of citizens without distinction of 
race,religion and nationality,freedom of political and profe-
ssional activities as well as freedom of the Press and conscience", 
but sternly added that "those freedoms could not serve the enemies 
of democracy" and warned the nation that "fascist organisations 
will be ruthlessly exterminated".Who constituted that fascist 
xx 
bogey was later answered in practice. 
The Committee promised an agricultural reform,restoration 
of private property and distribution of land to the small-holders. 
All citizens who found themselves abroad were promised assis-
tance for their repatriation,"the hitlerite agents and-those 
responsible for the September 1939 defeat excepted".No rules of 
classification were added,hence practically anyone within the 
purview of the Committee's propaganda machine could to his sur-
prise find himself in this category of outlawff 
Memorandum of the When Mr.^ikolajczyk went to Moscow in Government in Exile. . + i n* * j • т j a. j 
August 1944 the dice was already cast and 
only an internationa recognition of the de facto situation was 
sought by the Kremlin. In the circumstances a kemoraMum of the 
London Government(aggped-upon withithe Home authorities) proposing 
x cf the Communist Manifesto of July 2o,1920,p.91 ante 
xx see p.119-122 
xxx e.g.according to the "Sovietjflfar News"of January. 8,1945,the 
Government in Exile was a "flunkey of Hitlerite Germany, 
cf Hansard,House of Coipmons,vol.407,col.l36 
xxxx full text,Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.328 et seq. 
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a basis for understanding and co-operation with Soviet Russia 
with a view to forming the new Government was only a belated 
attempt,which notwithstanding its British and Americal support 
was turned by Moscow over to the Lublin Committee and naturally 
was accorded no reply. 
The Memorandum of August 30,1944 provided for a new Polish 
Government based on equal representation of five parties in-
cluding the four traditional national partiis and the Communist 
Party sponsored by Russia.Representatives of these five parties 
when assembled in Warsaw would hominate their candidates for 
ministerial offices and the President upon motion of the Prime 
Minister would appoint a new Government.The programme of this 
new Government had to include: 
1.resumption of diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia; 
2.conclusion of a pact of friendship with Russia; 
3.organisation of general election of the National Assembly 
to work out a new constitution,on the authority of which 
a new President would be elected; 
4.convention of a National Council of representatives of those 
five parties to act inAfadvisory capacity until a new Parlia-
ment was elected; and 
5.settlement of the Polish-Russian frontier by the new 
National Assembly. 
The Memorandum,standing on the principle of the legal con-
tinuity of the Polish state and insisting on a constitutional 
solution of the problems of a new government and frontiers,did 
not fit into the Soviet scheme with regard to Poland.It had, 
therefore,to be rejected.Soviet leaders having already their 
"Committee of Liberation" had no need for further discussions 
and as far as they were concerned the matter was settled. 
x Peasant Party,National Party,Socialist Party,Christian 
Labour Party 
Lublin Proclamation. On December. 31Д944 the Committee of Li-
beration proclaimed itself the "Provisional Government of Libe-
rated Democratic Poland" and established its seat in Lublin. 
Lublin had a symbolical significance bringing back the memory 
of the first national government proclaimed under Socialist lead 
in November 191§ »though the Committee of Liberation had its 
true forerunner in the Bialystok "Revolutionary Committee" of 
19?$. 
The Lublin Committee was recognised by Soviet Russia in 
January 1945 as the "Provisional Government of Poland".Thus 
coming to the Crimea Conference Mr.Stalin was already equipped 
with a Polish Government of his own creation,and without diff-
iculty pressed his point through,having that Government recognised 
by the co-signatories as the basis of the future political 
system of Poland. 
The rest of our story is of comparatively small importance 
since it relates the inevitable,final destruction of the 
Underground State and the coup de grace given to the Government 
in Exile. 
Invitation to Moscow. The bulk of the Home Army was destroyed 
during the 63 days of fighting in Warsaw; the destruction of the 
Underground State soon followed.In the spring of 1945 leaders 
of the Underground State were approached by high-ranking Red 
Army officers with a view to meeting the Soviet authorities 
in Moscow, to implement the provisions of the Yalta Agreement 
to "invite the democratic leaders of Poland to form the "Pro-
visional Government of National Unf^". They were offered safe 
conduct to Russia and promised facilities to contact the London 
Government. . 
x see p.15-ante 
xx see p.91 ante 
xxx see p. 82-ante 
On March 17,1945 the deputy Prime Minister J.Jankowski (the 
Delegate of the Government in Exile and acting Prime Minister 
of the Underground State),the Speaker of the Underground Par-
liament K.Puzak and Col.S.Okulicki the last Commander of the 
Home Army met Col.Pimonov,a representative of Col-Gen.Ivanov 
of the Red Army in the suburbs of Warsaw.From this meeting 
they did not return.The next day 13 other prominent members 
of the Underground were invited for a meeting and failed to 
return as well.Protests of the London Government remained un-
answered and the mystery of the sixteen Underground leaders 
was unsolved until May 4,1945 when at San Francisco Mr.Molotov 
admitted their arrest.His admission was followed the next day 
by an official comment of the Agency Tass,that the arrested 
men were guilty of "diversionary tactics in the rear of the 
Red A r m y a n d were to be put on trial before a Soviet Court. 
The arrest of the sixteen deprived the Underground State 
of its most important leaders and announced an era of ruthless 
persecution and extermination of all signs of Constitutional 
Authorities.lt was in fact the end of the Underground State. 
The kidnapping of those men,who in Mr.Eden's w o M s "main-
tained an excellent record of resistance against the Germans 
throughout the war,and most of whom were just the type who 
should,in our view,have been consulted about the new National 
Government in Poland",was timed to coincide with the vital 
discussions which according to the Yalta Agreement were to 
lead to the formation of the new Government of Poland. 
The two remaining Yalta signatories protested against this 
outrage vigorously,but without effect,the imprisoned men being 
neither allowed to take part in the discussions,nor released, 
x cf verbatim report of the trial published by the Publishing 
House of the People's Commissariat of Justice of the U.S.S.R. 
Moscow 1945 
xx quot.by Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.126 
Moreover the Soviet leaders were adamant in their choice of 
men eligible for the Polish Government.The Commission of-Three, 
dominated by its Soviet Chairman,laboured in a complete dead-
lock until it finally yielded to Soviet dictation at the in-
stance of Mr.Harry Hopkins,a special envoy of President Truman. 
As a result of this compromise the new Government "on a broad 
democratic basis" was to consist primarily of the Soviet-style 
democrats grouped in the Lublin Committee (now self-appointed 
Provisional Government) to whom might be added some of the four 
invited "London Poles" and perhaps some other non-communist 
leaders resident in Poland. 
The status of Poland with regard to Russia became defined 
by a treaty between the Soviet Government and their agents in 
Poland.Already on April 21,19^5,that is before the formation 
of the Yalta Government of National Unity,a Soviet-Polish treaty 
of friendship ,mutual assistance and post-war co-operation was 
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signed by Mr.Stalin and Mr.Bierut.The importance of this treaty 
was that without parliamentary sanction it accepted the arbitrary 
settlement of the frontier and formally recognised the subjection 
of Poland to Soviet Russia.Apart from the fact that the body 
who negotiated it on behalf of Poland could not be deemed to 
have a treaty making power,its occufence constituted a simple 
copy of the tactics employed by Catherine II after the second 
partition in ."She was firmly determined to rivet her 
claims upon what was left of the unhappy Republic doomed not 
only to cede more than half of the national territory,but also 
to sign a bond of servitude (the treaty of friendship),surren-
dering what remained to guardianship and the scarcely disguised 
domination of Russia"... 
x Of those only Mr.Mikolajczyk and Mr.Stanczyk were for a short 
time members of the Government, 
xx Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.p.81$ 
xxx In Mr.Mikolaj czyk's words "this was a case of a Russian 
leader making a treaty with a Russian citizen who was posing 
as a Pole",Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.127 
xxxx R.Lord,The Second Partition of Poland,pp.454,458,461 
The Last Days of the With the Kremlin boosting their proteges , 
Government in Exile. , . . , , ,, . „, ,. 
who in turn vaunted their "democratic qua-
lities", the struggle for the independence of Poland became con-
cealed from the eyes of the Western Allies who»applying a false 
analogy to their own peace-time domestic political wrangles, 
saw only a contest between "two Polish parties,each trying to 
establish itself in Warsaw".Whilst sympathising with the Go-
vernment in Exile ,which stood with them all through the war, 
they were apt to underestimate the real issue and were inclined 
to support the views of their gallant and powerful ally,Soviet 
Russia,interested "only in having a friendly government in 
Poland".Whereas grave constitutional issues were at stake the 
Soviet-Polish friction was frequently oversimplified and reduced 
to a mere contest of personalities.Thinking that the Consti-
tution of 1935 prevented agreement they argued that by throwing 
it overboard the London Poles might safely return home and 
there embark on the contest for power in the forthcoming 
elections. 
Debates in the British House of Commons are particularly 
interesting ,since in several discussions of Polish problems 
some MembeM indulged in authoritative classifications of the 
"democratic qualifications'not only of the Polish Constitution, 
or the pre-war rögime,but also the Government in Exile,and in 
those speculations they sought to solve the difficulty of re-
conciling the Soviet and Polish views.For most of them there 
was a purely personal contest between the imaginary "reaction-
ary forces" grouped in London under the mantle of the 1935 
Constitution and the "new leaders" begotten of a Moscow inspi-
ration.They demanded "statesmanship" of the RYgTfr emig^ Poles 
x cf H.Seton-Watson,The East European Revolution,London,1952, 
and The Economist,March 15,1952,p.653 /p.156 
xx On the other hand the Lublin Committee was occasionally 
described as bogus (Hansard,vol.406,cols.1509,1515,1524) 
and the "Soviet War News" rebuked for abusing the Polish 
Government (Hansard,vol.407,col.136) 
that "statesmanship" being submission to Moscow,and were 
greatly annoyed at having found no enthusiastic response among 
the London Poles.Even appeasementf^advocated by the British 
Prime Minister,was only an illusory scheme based on an un-
warranted belief that the right way to Warsaw was the return 
via Moscow.This,to Sir Winston Churchill,would have meant cas-
ting aside some "reactionaries" and joining the Kremlin's no-
minees on the basis of the Curzon Line.In such a fusion he saw 
the solution of the problem and resenting the fact that his 
advice was not immediately followed,he cast the blame for 
failures on the London Government. 
Eor the London Poles the situation appeared more complex 
than for their British friends,and their fears of Russian do-
mination made them suspicious of the Russian insistence on the 
arbitrary fixing of the frontier and composition of the Polish 
"sovereign" Government.Mindful of the task imposed on them 
by their Constitution and desirous of preserving sovereignty 
they were sluggish in fitting themselves into the Soviet pattern 
and slow in catching up with the progress of Soviet demands, 
thus incurring a jibe of the"New Statesman and the Nation" 
that "they were always one river^too late". 
Eor them there was no return to free Warsaw via Moscow,for 
such a decision would йеап the end of the vision of a "free 
and independent Poland".The sad fate of Czechoslovakia and her 
leaders Edward Benes and JohnfMasaryk,who were always praised 
for their "realism" and given as example to the Polish "roman-
tics", and who embarked on that dangerous though apparently 
easiest road,should give an answer to all speculations on this 
subject. 
x Hansard,House of Commons,vol404,cols.494-5 and vol.408,col.1282 
xx August 16,1947 
It is difficult to see whether the British Government had 
a clear picture of the Polish situation notwithstanding the 
fact that all through the war they kept the destiny of Poland 
in their hands and were determined to carry on in their fashion 
to the bitter end.They knew that their policy did not satisfy 
their protög£s,the London Poles,of whom Sir Winston Churchill 
sarcastically said that nothing would ever satisfy them,and 
they must have realised as well (at least at a later period 
of the war) the danger of playing with the fire of Soviet dip-
lomacy with regard to Poland.Yet they preferred to rely on 
verbal acrobatics and hoping for the best,rather than the safer 
method of using the prestige of Britain,and the weight of the 
British part in the war, to pursue a policy formulated on the 
principles for which Britain took up arms. 
Having put their signature to the Yalta Agreement,which in 
clear terms recognised the Lublin Committee as the basis of the 
future Government of PolaM,they declared only a few days later, 
through the Foreign Secretary,Mr.EdeS? that: 
..."The British Government have in no case recognised the Lublin 
Committee.They have no intention of recognising it.They do not 
regard it as representative of Poland at all and when Mr.Chur-
chill and myself met representatives of this Committee in Mos-
cow, the members of the Committee did not make at all a favour-
able impression on us..." 
Nevertheless on July 6,1945 the House of Common's welcomed 
the establishment of the Polish Provisional Government of which 
two-thirds were Lublin men.By midnightof,July 5,the Government 
in Exile ceased to be recognised. 
x Sir Winston Churchill,Memoirs,vol.V,p.357 , 
xx see pp.82 and 84 ante 
xxx Hansard,House of Commons,vol.408,col.1669 
Chapter 7.Establishment of the People's Democracy. 
MoscoY/ Talks. Whilst the sixteen Underground leaders were 
awaiting trial by a Soviet Military Court deliberations on 
the formation of the Provisional Government of National Unity 
took place in Moscow.The stage was set in a masterly fashion: 
The Soviet-sponsored Provisional Government,strongly repres-
ented in the Moscow talks acted in Poland;those who should 
have sat at the table were in a Russian gaol,and the Commiss-
ion of Three to direct the proceedings was Soviet dominated. 
Among the Polish participants in the deliberations the 
chances were unevenly balanced in. favour of the Lublin Poles, 
v/ho actually decided whom to invite from the other side.Owing 
to their numerical superiority they could easily outvote their 
opponents and put themselves into key positions of the interim 
administration.After much bargaining an agreement was reached 
on the principles of the Provisional Government,the chief 
points of which were: 
Art.1.All parties entering the coalition have full freedom 
of organisational work,freedom of assembly,press,and propag-
anda. 
Important decisions are to be arrived at by means of an under-
standing,not by a majority vote.The basic foreign policy is 
friendship,co-operation,and alliance with democratic states, 
especially with the Soviet Union,Great Bsitain,France,and 
friendship with the United States of America.At the same time 
it is based on a Slavonic and Anti-German front,having espec-
ially in view an alliance with Czechoslovakia. 
Elections to the Sejm,on the basis of universal,equal,direct 
and secret ballot will be made as soon as possible,possibly 
before the end of 1945» 
x full text see Mikolajczk,op.cit.pp.141-142 
Ill 
An amnesty is declared for political prisoners,except national 
traitors who collaborated with the German invaders. 
The Red Army,as well as other civilian,party,and security 
organs of foreign powers will be evacuated. 
Art.2.the Peasant Party's participation in the Government 
should be at least one-third,its candidates to be designated 
by its competent authorities. 
The National Council will be enlarged and the Peasant Party 
will participate in it in the ratio mentioned above.Vincent 
WitolPSffill be first vice-President of the National Council 
and Professor Stanislas Grabsif^its third vice-President. 
Six members of the Peasant Party will hold Cabinet posts. 
The presidency of the Supreme Chamber of State Control will 
be awarded to the Peasant Party. 
The Peasant Party will provide under-secretaries in Cabinet 
posts in the ratio of one third. 
The Peasant Party will receive an allotment of paper for party 
publications. 
From this declaration we can see that the Communist Group 
managed to maintain a lead at this important juncture.The 
Constitution became thus finally superseded and replaced by 
a vague agreement between the Communist Group sitting firmly 
in the saddle and Mr. Mikolajczyk on behalf of the Peasant 
Party.Institutions established by the Communists became the 
basis of the administration in which the Peasant Party could 
at best count on only one-third influence.There is no mention 
of the other political parties which traditionally controlled 
Polish political life.Thus the first round of the internal 
struggle was won by the Soviet-sponsored Communist Group, 
victory in the external contest being already scasecured for 
them by Russia. 
x This is the communist K.R.N.,which,now enlarged by members of 
the Peasant Party was to function as"Temporary Parliament" 
xx Founder of the Peasant Party,who declined to co-operate, 
xxx a "London" Pole. 
The Committee of Three accepted the agreement and the Pro-
visional Government was promptly recognised by the Allies.In 
the meantime a well staged trial of the Sixteen took place. 
The Military Collegium of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court found 
twelve of them guilty of anti-Soviet activities and sentenced 
them to terms of imprisonment ranging from four months to ten 
yearl.Only one of them,Mr.Z.Stypulkowski,who conducted his 
own defence throughout the trial,managed subsequently to reach 
XX 
the free world.His book on the "Invitation to Moscow", setting 
out in detail all what happened at that time is a serious in-
dictment of Soviet policy towards Poland and Russia's fcöle in 
the destruction of Polish sovereignty. 
Potsdam Conference. At Potsdam the Big Three took "note with 
pleasure of the agreement among representative Poles from Po-
land and abroad which has made possible the formation,in accor-
dance with the decision reached at the Crimea Conference,of a 
Polish Government of National Unity recognised by the Three 
Powers".They further reminded the Polish Government of their 
pledge to hold free and unfettered elections at the earliest 
possible date and expressed hope that repatriation of Poles 
from abroad will be facilitated and that those who return 
"shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same 
basis as all Polish citize^I." 
In matters of reparations the Potsdam Declaration stated 
that "the U. S. S.R.undertEikes to settle the reparation claims 
of Poland from its own share of reparations". 
Thus the Big Three took care to express hope that no dis-htho crimination would be made at home against those Poles through-
out the war had risked their lives in the service for Poland 
x Though most sentences should have by now expired there is no 
news of the men,except that Casimir Puzak,the socialist 
Speaker of the Underground Parliament had died in prison, 
xx Z.Stypulkowski,Invitation to Moscow,London,1951 
xxx text of the Declaration on Poland,Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.337 
xxxx Service abroad under orders of the Government in Exile was 
considered almost a crime by the Communists. 
and the allied cause.There is no need to say how these Poles 
received this statement.The decision on reparations,on the 
other hand,put Poland under the economic supervision of Soviet 
Russia. 
The Big Three gave Poland administration of the German terri-
tory east of the Oder and Western Neiese rivers as compensation 
for the territory lost to the benefit of Russia.This matter 
was to be definitively settled later,but Poland was immediately 
to receive a part of the Soviet zone of occupation along with 
some parts of East Prussia,which in the main fell into the 
Soviet lap.Therefore in matters of territorial re-adjustments 
the Potsdam decision gave the impression that only Soviet Russia 
was the champion of Polish interests,whereas other Allies,by 
their hesitation wanted to keep the pistol of future German 
revindications at the Polish head. 
At Home. At home the process of the imposition of the Communist 
rdgime was making steady progress.Already when the personal 
composition of the ."Provisional Government of National Unity" 
was announced on June 2,1945,it was evident that it was domi-
nated by the Lublin Poles.Out of 21 ministerial posts 14 were 
awarded to them,but to the list previously agreed at Moscow 
two new ministries иеге added with Lublin men at thie head. 
Thus the promised one third Peasant Party share dwindled away. 
The process of watering down the influence of the Peasant Party 
within the Government was facilitated by the fact that the 
arrangement of business within the authority of a given depart-
ment was in the hands of the key men (that is the Lublin Poles) 
who took care to leave in the purview of their Peasant Party 
colleagues only nominal posts without real powers or extensive 
functions allocated to their departments.Therefore«when another 
x A startling example of the economic exploitation of Poland by 
Soviet Russia is given by Mr.Mikolajczyk in his account of the 
Soviet-Polish Trade Treaty of Asgradc June 7,1945« 
see Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.157 et seq. and also 
Gluckstein,op.cit.pp.61and 62 
ministry was created for the "Regained Territories" most of 
the business,hitherto under the authority of Mr:Kiernik,the 
Peasant Party Minister of Public Administration,was transferred 
to the new department,and the Ministry was thereby practically 
reduced to a registry of deaths,births and marriages. 
Amnesty. On the occiasion of the anniversary of the creation 
of the Communist Committee of National Liberation a general 
amnesty,extending also to the ex-members of the Home Army,who 
were treated as outlaws by the new r£gime,was proclaimed on 
August 2,1945? The amnesty had mainly a political significance 
and purported to grant a reprieve for acts made crimes under 
xx 
the legislation of the Lublin Administration before the Yalta 
Conference elevated it to the position of a Provisional Govern-r 
ment. 
Under the decree of October 30, Ш on the "Protection of 
the State",Arts.1 and 8,membership of organisations aiming at 
"suppression of the democratic system of the Polish State",or 
organisations "aiming at crimes or designed to remain secret" 
was illegal and entailed the punishment of imprisonment or 
death meted out by Military Courts under the authority of the 
Lublin Committee.By Art.4 of the same decree persons who were 
in possession of arms or ammunition were equally liable to the 
punishment by death or imprisonment.People possessing or making 
use of wireless apparatus incurred the same punishment (Art.6). 
Imprisonment or death awaited also those found guilty of"obs-
tructing the administration or sabotaging the military effort 
of the Red Army or Polish units under its command" (Art.5). 
This decree must be construed as a political weapon in the 
hands of the Lublin Committee ready to be employed against any 
x By the law of July 22,1945 the 22nd of July became 
a National Holiday, 
xx In particular decrees of October 25,1944 J October 30,1944; 
November 20,1944;December 12,1944;and the new Code of 
Military Law of ..September 23,1944. 
xxx füll text,Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.pp.181-184 
rival body,notably the Underground State and the Home Army. 
It was the Communist Group which appointed itself to be the 
"lawful authorities" and it arrogated to itself the monopoly 
of "democracy".The Home Army,as well as the institutions of 
the Underground State opposing the designs of the Communist 
Group,naturally incurred their wrath and consequently,apart 
from being besmirched as "anti-democratic",became subject to 
criminal "legislation" and persecution as soon as the advance 
of the Red Army made possible the execution of the decrees of 
the Lublin Committee.Suffering at the hands of the Soviet 
partisans and the Red Army,members of the Home Army were then 
subjected to an extermination policy by the ostensible "Polish" 
authorities. 
The amnesty decreed of August 2,1945 applied only to the 
rank and file of the Home Army.Leaders were expressly excepted 
by the provision of Art.7,§ 1.Apart from the patent injustice 
of this highly unfair "amnesty" the responsibility for the 
patriotic stand of the Ho'me Army was now placed on its officers, 
probably to placate the rest and to break the solidarity 
between the leaders and the led.The Home Army,however,was 
disbanded earlier ( by the decree of the Government in Exile 
of February 7,1945 ) and its members went out into the open, 
most of them to suffer discrimination notwithstanding the 
generosity of the amnesty decree. 
The Opposition. Apart from people to whom Communism was re-
pulsive on ethical,religious or other grounds,the subsisting 
elements of the Underground State and Home Army were in natural 
opposition to the new regime.The "amnesty" discussed above 
could not solve the problem of armed resistance,which was 
x The Polish Radio announced on August 18,1945 that 1692 
persons were put on trial in Warsaw for political reasons, 
see Hansard,House of Commons,vol.413,col.1124 and debateJt 
on conditions in Poland Hansard,vol.413,col.1099 et seq; 
vol.408,cols.643-4,1334-5,1434,2000-2001. 
taken up in certain areas notwithstanding the decree disbanding 
the Home Army and the hopelesness of any action of this sort. 
The Government confirmed open warfare with three underground 
groups,operating particularly in central Poland and announ^eS 
that between January and "July 1946 some 1735 "terrorists" were 
killed and another 10,000 arrested,the Government losing 1051 
men.The presence of Russian troops as late as the summer of 
1947 and the continued activities of the HussfaÄ N. К.V.D.cer-
tainly left no doubt that the regime was controlled and supp-
orted by Russia,and this fact caused clashes between Poles 
and the Red Army troops as well as open anti-Government de-
monstrations. 
Political opposition,as far as can be ascertained from scanty 
reports of main political trials and mass arrests,was unsuccess-
ful and virtually impossible,since it was construed as a crime 
of anti-Government activities.On those occasions the Е Й Й Р * 
were blamed for the political unrest,thus being credited with 
an influence at home they probably themselves never claimed to 
command to that extent.The true position seems to be that the 
Soviet-sponsored r£gime could by no means count on popularity 
with the general public and that the average citizen was in a 
serious dilemma as to where his allegiance lay.In such conditions 
the Peasant Party,though participating in the Administration, 
was looked upon as the only force able to counteract the en-
suing introduction of the Soviet type of state and to restore 
parliamentary government.The Peasant Party consequently received 
support from all anti-Communist quarters,and on that support 
x Manchester Guardian,9«8.1946;xx The New York Times,25.11.1946 
xxx Daily Mail,17,6.1946; 
xxxx admitted by the Minister of Public Security,see 
The New York Times ,22.7.1946 
xxxxx Manchester Guardian,1.4.1946; Times,13.6.1947 
xxxxxx cf demonstrations in Cracow in May 1946 where Russian 
tanks were used to disperse the crowds,New York Herald 
Tribune,8.5.1946 and 11.5.1946. 
xxxxxxxcf Manchester Guardian,8.8.1945:•"the irreconcilablee 
here are aiming at preventing the political situation from 
achieving any kind of stability"... 
they calculated (and miscalculated) their chances of winning 
the General Elections and ousting the communist r£gime.Soon, 
however,from an unequal partner in the Administration the Pea-
sant Party stepped into opposition and before the Elections 
came,had to face an alternative of submission to the ^gime 
or gradual extinction. 
Destruction of Once put into the saddle the next step of the 
the Opposltlon'Communlst G r o u p t0 s e i z e f u l l p0Wer and establish 
a "dictatorship of the people" was the destruction of any oppo-
sition "legal or illegal".Their task was comparatively easy. 
Backed by Soviet friendship (units of the Red Army,apart from 
occupying East Germany,were stationed in Poland) they had.in 
their hands the Executive (that is the Central Administration 
and Local Councils),they dominated the Legislative (i.e.the 
"Temporary Parliament",as agreed in'Mosco$), they had an Army 
commanded chiefly buiRussian officers and the Security Police 
as well as a Propaganda Ministry.The Judiciary-was already re-
organised to suit the political cha^fis. The only task was to 
'prepare' the General Elections as pledged at Yalta,and secure 
victory at the polls.In doing this they did not hesitate to 
stop short of intimidation and physical violfS^e. 
The preparation* for the Elections,which at Yalta seemed 
possible within a montS,and in Moscow were planned to take 
place before the end о Ш took,however,nearly two years.Those 
two years became a purgatory for the Polish people - an indis-
pensable stage in the growth of the People's Democracy on a 
difficult ground.The delay in the Elections,and the sharp 
x Lane,op.cit.p.163jcf Hansard,House(of Commons,vol.419,cols. 
1332-1337 
xx see pp.110 and lllj see xxx see p,. 162 et seq . i 
xxxx cf Hansard,House of Commons,vol.410,coll384-
xxxxx Lane,op.cit.p.115; Byrne s,op.cit.p.31;Stettinuis,op.cit.p.20i 
xxxxxx see p.110 ante 
practices preceding them,can only be explained by*the deter-
mination of the ^gime to avoid a result similar to that ex-
perienced in Hungar^ during the elections of 1945 when the 
Communist Party polled anly a fraction of the votes (17/6). 
The terro? was particularly directed against the Peasant 
Party which constituted the backbone of the "legal" opposition. 
Mr.Mikolajсzyk,ex-Premier of the Government in Exile who upon 
the death of Vincent Witos,the founder and leader of the Pea-
sant movement,became the Chairman of the Party,presents a hair-
raising record of atrocities committed by order of the Communist 
authorities to thrust the Peasant Party out.of their wfy?x 
The Moscow Agreement of July existed only on paper 
because when the "Temporary Parliament" was called the Peasant 
Party was given only 30 seats instead of 145 seats as was then 
agreed.The Peasant Party,therefore,boycotted the first session. 
For the next session (December 1945 and January 1946) the 
Peasant Party was offered 52 seats and this time they decided 
to attend,at least to let their voices be heard in protest 
against the totalitarian system established in Poland. 
The Peasant Party put up a hard fight in spite of the fact 
that their offices and. printing establishments were frequently 
raided and several district chairmen muMereS. In their Congress 
of January 1946 they demanded the abolition of the Ministries 
of Security and Propaganda,the restoration of independent courts 
and the abolition of the Military Tribunals employed by the 
Administration for political reasons. 
x see F.Nagy,The Struggle behind, the Iron Curtain,New York,1948 
xx c'f protests by Mr.Byrnes at political murders and activity 
of the Security Police,New York Times(1*.2.1946) and The 
Daily Telegraph (1.2.1946) 
xxx see Hansard,House of Commons,vol.416,col.2755»vol.418,cols. 
142-143;vol.419.cols.1243-4;vol.421,cols.2-3;vol.423,col.299; 
vol.424,col.665;vol.425,col.366;vol.427,col.1249 et seq. 
vol.430,cols.498 and 1235. 
xxxx Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.l62 et seq;xxxxx see pp.llo and 111 
xxxxxx Duchess.of Atholl,Polish Elections:The Background,London, 
1946,p.7; and cf Hansard,House of Commons,vol.418,cols. 
142-3.vol.419,cols.1243-4jvol.421,cols.2-3;vol.425col.366 
These demands caused,however,another wave of terror.Moreover, 
in view of the impending Elections (the Peasant Party wanted 
to force the Government to hold them before the end of. July 
1946) the Peasant Party was informed that it must either join 
the Government Bloc by March 1.1946 or await total destruction. 
In April 1946 two further measures were applied to secure 
the hold of the rdgime.First was the Referendum to avoid of 
postpone General Elections,second the expansion of the Security 
Police by another selected 120,000 militia men.This was the 
biith of the O.R.M.O.or the"Voluntary Reserve of the Citizens' 
Militia" designed to fight the Underground as well as the Pea-
sant Party branded with subversive activities.The pre-Election 
campaign developed into what was called "a class str2üle",in 
which some 350,000 members of the Communist Workers' Party 
toob?1 active part,and some 50,000 of them fought in the ranks 
of the O.R^Ö. 
Referendum. The Referendum took place on June 30,1946.In view 
of the innocent and unimportant questions put before the nation, 
one can only infer that it was staged for collateral purposes. 
The three questions were: 
1.Are you in favour of the abolition of the Senate ? 
2.Are you for making permanent,through the future Constitution , 
the economic system instituted by the land reform and nationa-
lisation of the basic industries with maintenance of the rights 
of private enterprise ? 
3.Аге you for the Polish Western frontiers as fixed on the 
Baltic and on the Oder and Neisse ? 
Only the first question had a constitutional significance 
and a controversial character since the question of a uni-or 
x Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.170 
xx R.Zambrowski,Stalinowska Nauka о Sojuszu Robotniczo-Chlopskim, 
Howe' Drogi,Warsaw,1949,No.6,p.128 
xxx Zambrowski,ibid.p.128 
xxxx Figures given by B.3ierut,Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R. 
Warsaw,1952,p.40 
bi-cameral Parliament was always considered a matter of opinion. 
A positive answer,however,would give the Government a free hand 
si^ ce they might interpret it,as they did,as authorisation to 
abolish forthwith the Senate,which under the Constitution of 
1921 took part both in legislation and the election of the Pre-
sident. The remaining two questions were not controversial and 
actually had no political meaning,except perhaps to give a vote 
of confidence to the Government's policy with regard to the re-
gained Western territories and the promised programme of just 
legislation. 
The Peasant Party decided to instruct its members to vote in 
the negative for the first question.The atmosphere of the Re-
ferendum was far from being propitious to manifesting freely 
one's own ideas since the Government was determined to obtain 
'yes' answers to all three questions and duly applied their 
propaganda and means of compulsion" 
Official figures in reply to the first question were pub-
lished as 32?6 No's and $8% Ayes,thus showing a victory for the 
Government.In fact there is ample evidence of irregularities 
which took place and the Governmant machine was charged before 
foreign correspondents with direct fraud,the true figures being 
according to Mr.Mikolajczyk 83,5456 No's and only 16,46$ Ayeff 
thus showing the reverse of the official figures. 
The Peasant Party and its leaders incurred,of course,the whole 
wrath of the Government controlled Press and were described as 
"anti-democrats and traitors".The Referendum,though showing no 
useful purpose apart from feeding the foreign Press with news of 
some "voting" in Poland,was actually a test of strength and 
efficiency of the Government machine before a major battle -
the General Elections. 
x cf p.17 ante 
xx cf Lane,op.cit.p.153 et seq 
xxx Mikolajczyk,pp.183.and 184;similar figures Kusnierx,op.cit. 
p.256 
General Elections. The situation in Poland began to disquieten 
the-Western Yalta signatories.The promised "free and unfettered 
elections" on^which they staked their illusory hopes were not 
forthcoming.Sharp Notes of the British and American Governments 
were sent to Warsaw in August 1946 expressing concern.about the 
"irregularities" of the Referendum and the "oppressive acts 
which prevent normal democratic activity".In reply the Warsaw 
Government sent a rebuff protesting against "this infringement 
of Poland's sovereign rights" and accusing them of "interference 
with Poland's internal affairs". 
Preparations for the Elections went on to the accompaniment 
of abuse mounted by the Government controlled Press agitating 
against the opposition and denouncing them as "traitors and 
anti-democrats".The unfortunate' wording of the Yalta Declaration 
that "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right 
to take part in the'Elections and put forward candidates"tserved 
as ammunition in this well organised opposition-killing,pre-
Election campaign.Consequently practically everybody who was 
not arpersonargrata to the Soviet-style democrats could be 
(and actually was) stigmatised as "anti-democrat and pro-Nazi".-
The opposition papers,especially the organ of the Peasant Party 
"Gazeta Ludowa" was subjected to censorship and suffered in the 
allocation of paper. 
The most important move in staging the Elections was the 
organisation of a Government Bloc.This measure aimed at deciding 
the issue before the actual voting took place.Of course,only 
the "democratic parties" (i.e.those approved by the Government) 
could put forward candidates;Now thejr were invited to join the 
Bloc which would allocate them their number of seats in the -
future Parliament;The Peasant Party was told that if they joined 
they would receive 25% of^seats,and if ,they did not only 10$; 
x Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.190 
the actual numerical vote would thus be without importance. 
If this had happened,Communists and their associates would have 
received 75$ of seats,whereas the opposition would be granted 
only 25$.One can easily imagine what kind of Parliamnt it was to 
be if this was arranged before the citizens went to the polls. 
Whilst the Peasant Party was invited to join the Bloc the 
Christian Labour Party was by a simple process wiped out of the 
political scene. Its Chairman was replaced by a Government man 
and a motion of expulsion was tabled against membersfrolding 
mandates in the "Temporary Parliament".In face of the Government's 
overwhelming majority and having no hope of saving their seats, 
they walked out of the Chamber. 
The new Electoral Law was superficially based on the Constitu-
tion of 1921,which provided for"universa!,equal,direct,secret and 
proportional suffrage".The new Parliament was to consist of 444 
members,372 members to be chosen from 52 constituencies and the 
remainder $72) from the so-called "State List".State List candida-
tes needed the signature of 500 registered voters to become eli-
gible, other candidates needed.100 supporting signatures. 
The most important flaw in the Electoral Law was in the provision 
with regard to eligibility (Art.2).It debarred from voting and 
standing for election all those "under accusation of being in 
contact with the Underground,or having gained material profit from 
collaboration with the Germans during occupation". 
The Government-appointed Election Commissars could,therefore, 
exclude practically everyone who was a member (or reputed member), 
or was connected with resistance,or the Home Army as well as those 
who earned their livelihood in any work under German authori-
ties, mere accusation being a sufficient ground for disquali-
fication. Though the regime professed their adherence to 
x Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p.195 
•the Constitution of 1921, Art. 12 of that Constitution was grossly 
violated,and the question of electoral rights was left to the 
discretion of Government appointed officials who,on the basis 
of the elastic and vague provisions of the Electoral Law,were 
to be guided by political,not legal principles.Accordingly the 
Government Press and Radio accused the Peasant Party of contacts 
xx 
with the Underground and Mr.Radkiewicz,the Minister of Security 
and chief of the rdgime's N.K.V.D.system,suspended on June 6, 
1946 four branches of the,Peasant Party whomhe chrged with 
collaboration with the W.I.N, and N. Ш . 
The geography of the Elections was also arranged in favour 
of the r£gime,since in certain districts 20,000 votes sufficed, 
to secure a seat ,whei?eas in other constituencies even as many 
as 120,000 votes were nieSed. 
The attempt to organise an all-partyksupervision of the 
Elections w^s turned down by the Communist dominated "Temporary 
Parli^me^i". 
The Peasant Party decided not to -join the Government Bloc 
and continued the contest on its own,As a reaction the Communist 
terror concentrated on the Party.A list of 26 protests against 
this $er£o$,constituting a'heavy indictment of the Government 
methods,placed before the "Temporary Parliament"'was ignored. 
Mr.Mikolajczyk then appealed directly to and when 
this was without effect to the remaining signatories of the 
Yalta Declaration (December 1946).He revealed that,as of De-
cember 1,1946, 670 members of Peasant -Party local executive 
committees,147 members of-district committees,7 members of 
provincial committees,22 members of the Supreme Council of the 
x By Art.12 a citizen could be disfranchised only by a .court 
sentence,grave crimes enumerated in the old Electoral "Law 
being the reason for disqualification. / 
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Party and thousands of ordinary members were imprisoned.These 
facts naturally weakened the forces of the opposition. 
To add some spice to the monotonous process of pre^Election 
oppression some trials were arranged.on great publicity lines 
chiefly to implicate not only the Peasant Party and the Under-
ground, but also the United States and Great Britain.First of 
them was the trial of Mme Dmochowska,an employee of the U.S. 
Embassy on charge of havong attempted to smuggle out of the 
country the murderers of the General Secretary of the Peasant 
Party Boleslas ScibiorüE, murdered in fact by, the Security Police 
on December 5,l§ff. Then Baczak and Grocholski were tried and 
sentenced to death for passing secret information to the British 
Ambassador. Baczak was a member of the Peasant Party Youth orga-r 
nisation "Wici" and Count Grocholski a personal friend of the 
British Ambassador Mr.Cavendish-Bentinck; the former was exe-
cuted for "revealing to the Ambassador details of the •Polish-
Soviet Trade Agreement",the latter for "acting as a liaison 
officer between the British Embassy and the Underground".The 
third trial of Col.Rzepec2£? was directed against the already 
disbanded Home Army,which was accused of "persisting in fighting 
the Provisional Government".In the fourth trial on the eve of 
the ElectfoSf Col.Lipinski was accused of "carrying a letter 
to Mr.^ikolajczyk advising him to boycott the Elections". 
In the meantime the Central Electoral Commission under the -
chairmanship of Mr.Bzowski began its work.The communist chairman 
appointed chairmen of the District Electoral Commissions and 
their deputies,who in turn appointed 5200 Local Electoral 
x Altogether some 100,000 persons were imprisoned and some 200 
members of the Peasant Party murdered,Kusnierz,op.cit.p.257. 
xx Mikolajczyk,op.cit.pp.166 and 203;cf The Times,6.11.1946 
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xxxx New York,Times,February 4,1947 
xxxxx The Scotsman",January 9,1947 
Commission chairmen and ah equal number of deputies.To secure 
their supervision the communist-controlled Presidiums of the 
National Councils then appointed three members and three depu-
ties in each Constituency and every local Commission.Where they 
did not hold a sufficient majority they first effected expulsion 
of the non-communist members of the National Council and then 
duly appointed their nomineef. 
The Electoral Law provided only ten days for 'the submission 
of lists of candidates and those had to be supplied with signed 
statements and details of the candidate's past.The*Commissions 
were empowered to strike out the names of candidates and annul 
the signatures if they thought the candidates or their sponsors 
were not eligible under the elastic provisions of the Electoral 
Law.The effect of this manipulation of the Electoral Law was 
that in eleven out of 52 Constituencies candidates of the Pea-
sant Party were excluded,a total of about two million electors 
were struck of the registers and 246 candidates from the Electo-
ral Lists.The annulment of lists of candidates in 76 districts 
with a decided opposition majority gravely prejudiced the result 
of those "free and unfettered elections". 
To confuse the issue the regime created at the last moment 
another party which run under the name of the "Polish Peasant 
Party - New Liberatfoft" (the name of the genuine Peasant Party 
was the "Polish Peasant Party") and entered outside the Govern-
ment Bloc.Besides that another "Peasant Party" (so called "People's 
Party") appeared on the lists as well,this being already a mem-
ber of the Government Bloc. 
In this turmoil the genuine Peasant Party fought against 
enormous odds.but were confident of securing a substantial number 
x This was the case in Poznan province, 
xx Figures from Kusnierz,op.cit.p.258 
xxx A false "Socialist Party" was also created by the r£gime, 
see Lane,op.cit.p.71 
of seats.To prevent further intimidation their lists of candi-
dates were withheld,to be delivered to the 52 Constituency 
Commissions at the last moment.The Peasant Party members of 
the "Temporary Parliament",protected by their immunity,were to 
be used to deliver the lists,but even this immunity was not 
honoured and four of them were arrested. 
Even the Army was employed in the pre-Election campaign on 
behalf of the regime.Its Chief of Staff ( a Russian general 
named Korczyc ) issued sin orde^ to "form and train Defence 
and Propaganda Units to fight the Peasant Party".He instructed* 
the Army to organise mass-meeting and attack the Peasant Party 
along the following lines:"..members do not pay taxes or offer 
public rehabilitation servicesythey support the Underground 
gangs;they soon will be liquidated by the Government"...Dis-
cussions had to be kept hostile to the Peasant Party and any-
body "asking undesirable questions" or defending the Peasant 
Party had to be shouted dovm as an "instigator,provocateur 
and hostile towards the Government and the State". 
In such conditions the rägime could not possibly lose the 
Elections and from the account of what happened on the polling 
day (January 1 9 o n e can only infer that the result of 
the masquerade organised two years after the Yalta Conference 
had no bearing upon the actual.situation. 
Foreign correspondents anticipating the result already at 
the beginning of January 1947 announced that the Elections 
would constitute a mere formality (Miss Marguerite Higg^ns 
on January 2,194$ in her dispatch from Cracow to the New York 
Herald Tribune:.."The outcome is being decided now.To ensure 
its victory,the left-wing bloc in the government is conducting 
x Mikolajczyk,op.cit.p. 
xx Mikolajczyk,ibid.full text of the order,pp.542-344 
xxx Mikolajczyk,ibid,p.219 et seq 
xxxx quot.bv H.Chamberlin,The European Cockpit,New York,1947, 
/p.266 
mass-arrests,disfranchising opposition voters and arranging in 
many places for evasion of the secret ballot provisions"...and 
Mr.Sydney Grusoft so cabled on January 3 from Warsaw to theNew 
York Times:"..Mass-arrests of members of the Polish Opposition 
party,intimidation of anyone and everyone who might be unwilling 
to accept Communist leadership and the ban on the candidacy of 
some Opposition leaders have reached such a point that voting 
on January 19,will be meaningless..." The British Daily Tele-
graph and Daily Herald correspondents also reported several 
cases of physical violence and intimidation.). 
A British enthusiast of the People's Democracy though ad-
mitting terrorism at Electio^f and disfranchisement of the 
Peasant Party candidates in several constituencies,comes,how-
ever,to a startling conclusion that "it is impossible to tell 
how far the election was fair or иП£а1г". The learned lady 
further adds that "...in reality,of course,the elections had 
to be won,if the country was to exist"..,quoting Mr.GomufM, 
that in case of victory by the Peasant Party the country would 
be plunged into chaos and this would cause Soviet intervention. 
Miss Warriner apparently mistakes Poland for' the Communist 
clique,who had to win the Elections or go back wherefrom they 
came.Whether their victory was necessary for the "existence 
of the country" is very doubtful.There is,however,a good reason 
to suppose that the country would have been plunged in a civil 
war if by some miracle the Peasant Party had been allowed to 
win at the polls.The r£gime having at hand the Security Police 
of a considerable strength trained and commanded by the N. K. V.D., 
as well as the Army under Soviet command,would certainly not 
x Quot.by Chamberlin,op.cit.p.266 
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xxxxx then one of the leaders of the Polish People's Democracy 
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have abided by the decision at the polls,No.direct Soviet in-
tervention would have been necessary,Unless Generalissimo Stalin 
had allowed his troops stationed in Poland and East Germany to 
be used for a speedy restoration of the communist rule. 
History may not repeat itself,but the situation of 1947 
greatly resembled that of 1793 when a Russian-sponsored regime 
x 
was established in Poland under the patronage of Catherine II. 
The signatories of the Yalta Declaration took cognizance 
XX 
of the facts.Notes from the United States and Great Britain 
declared that those countries did not consider the conditions 
of Yalta to be fulfilled and the Elections of January 19,1947 
to be a true reflection of the will of the Polish people.Soviet 
Russia,knowing the results long beforehand and having a different 
conception of elections,was the only unsurprised and satisfied 
signatory of the famous Yalta' Declaration which indeed intro-
duced a new order in Central and Eastern Europe. 
For Poland the Electio&I were of little importance,her fate 
having been decided elsewhere.The date of January 19,1947 marks, 
however,the final establishment of the communist regime.It is 
also the closing date of a period of the external consolidation 
of the People's Democracy. 
x cf Lord,op.cit.pp454,458,461 
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xxx According to official figures the Government Bloc received 
3®L seats,a group of splinter parties collaborating with the 
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Chapter 8. Foreign and Indigenous Elements in the Introduction 
of the People's Democracy into Poland. 
Vienna and Yalta. To complete the story of the genesis of the 
Polish People's Democracy let us weigh up the various factors 
which contributed towards the creation of the system.As one can 
see from the foregoing pages the foreign element exerted an over-
whelming influence all through the process of the elimination of 
the Constitutional Authorities and introduction of the new ^gime. 
In this respect relevant international decisions can well be com-
pared with the Congress of Vienna (1814-1815)»which in the history 
of Poland bears the name of the fourth partition.Though the result 
of Vienna and Yalta was more or less indentical -Russian domination 
over a mutilated Poland - there are some salient points to note. 
The Congress of Vienna gathered to put Europe in order after 
Napoleon's eclipse,Yalta was a war-time conference with a purpose 
of giving the finishing touches to the machinery of victory and 
bringing peace to the troubled world after the Axis had been 
broken.In both cases the subject of Poland occupied quite a sub-
stantial part of the time-table.Yet in 1814 Poland was an "enemy 
state" whereas in 1945 she happened to be one of the earliest 
allies on the victorious side.In neither case were Poles repre-
sented: at Vienna Viscount Castlereagh objected to Count Czarto-
ryski advising the Tsar on Polish questions and at Teheran Sir 
Winston Churchiff suggested to Mr.Stalin that Poles ought to be 
excluded from the discussions.(If Mr.Stalin disagreed a thorny 
question would have arisen as to which"Poles" to invite,since he 
did not want to have anything to do with the Constitutional Govern-
ment. ) At the Vienna Congress Poland had no treaty with Britain 
but had the warm support of the British people,during the second 
x C.Webster,The Congress of Vienna (1814-15),London,1934,p.58 
xx Sir W.Churchill,Memoirs,vol.V.p.319-20 
World War there was a bilateral treaty in force and British 
public opinion swayed in favour of Russia.Castlereagh only 
vaguely desired the independence of Poland and wanted to appear 
as little responsible as possible for Polish partitions,Sir 
Winston was a champion (in his particular way) of what he used 
to call a "strong and independent Poland",but,much to Polish be-
wilderment »insisted on arbitrary fixing of Poland's frontier 
which incidentally tallied with Russian demands.In constitutional 
matters Castlereagh was not concerned with the system,but in a 
Russian-sponsored constitution he saw an instrument of domination. 
Sir Winston,on the other hand,seems to have ignored the signifi-
cance of a national constitution,readily agreed on Soviet "leader-
ship" on the continent and fallen for the prerogative of a big 
power to select "friendly governments" for its small neighbours. 
Castlereagh in discussions on Poland had to deal with three 
powers each trying to enhance its position at the expense of 
Polish territory.Sir Winston had to cope only with Soviet demands, 
but had at his side a very dubious asset in the person of Presi-
dent Roosevelt,who favoured Stalinist plans and sometimes (which 
makes sad reading to-day) used his wit to amuse Marshal Stalin 
at the expense of his British colleague. 
In the second World War conferences,as much as in Vieftrfafa 
powerful trump card in the Russian hand was the fact of their 
military occupation of Poland,and in each case they used it 
accordingly. 
Agreement in Vienna on Poland served the purpose of bargaining 
for compromise with regard to Sa^^y,similarly from 1943 to 1945 
every loss suffered by the Polish nation facilitated cordial 
co-operation of the Big Three in other matters. 
x Webster,op.cit.pp.99 and 120; xx Webster,ibid.p.79 
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Polish Contribution. Contrary totAvtar-time belief indulged in 
in certain quarterf that the only salutary way to save Polish 
independence was to pursue an opportunistic policy, a compromise, 
if achieved between the Constitutional Government and the ruler 
of"Russia,would have produced even in the best conditions a 
replica of the Rumanian situation.To come to terms even with 
the "most reactionary and capitalist" ^gime is not repugnant 
to the tactics of Marxism-Leninism as expotded and applied by 
the late Joseph Stalin,the "contradictions" faced by such a 
rdgime only precipitating the inevitable - the proletarian re-
volution. Had, therefore, the London Poles followed the salutary 
advice they were urged to accept,they would have only made their 
own ropes.Since they refused to co-operate on the terms dicta-
ted by Marshal Stalin the r61e of the architects of the new 
reality had to be undertaken by persons trained for "revolution" 
and those willing to take the chance in the ensuing opportunity. 
i/ia 
Since it is difficult to speak of national allegiance in case 
of a militant member of the Communist Party,the Polish indige-
nous contribution is comparatively small,in fact,it may be 
quite fairly assessed by a glimpse at some of the founders of 
the post-war r£gime. 
The leader of the Communist movement from 1942 onwards has 
been Mr.Boleslas Bierut,born in 1892 in Lublin as Boleslas 
Krasnodebski.(His present name "Bierut" is derived from aliases 
"Bienkowski" and"Rutkowski",previously used in the capacity 
of a Kremlin agent in PolaM.) An avowed communist from his 
early youth Mr.Bierut received his political education in Moscow, 
was active in Poland between the two wars,jailed for activities 
prejudicial to the eafety of the state,and as a Soviet citizen 
exchanged for a Polish prisoner.According to his official 
biography Mr.Bierut travelled widely abroad,studying languages 
x see-pp. 107-109 ante 
xx M.Ebon,World Communism Today,New York,1948,p.52-3 
and economics and suffered imprisonment for his anti-fascist 
convictions;according to the pre-war Polish Minister of Foreign 
Affaf^s he also directed the Polish section of the Comintern 
in Prague, contributing through its activities to the state of 
permanent friction between Poland and Czechoslovakia.He became 
the Chairman of the Communist "Home National Council" created 
on December 31,1943,was the President of Poland until the Con-r 
stitution of 195Л and henceforth is the Prime Minister. 
Mr.Ladislas Gomulka (born in 1905) distinguished himself 
between the two wars as a communist agitator in the oil district. 
Wounded in 1932 during a skirmish with the police,he was later 
convicted for conspiracy against the state,but transferred to 
Russia on exchange of political prisoners between the two coun-
tries. He secretly returned to Poland in 1936,was caught by the 
police and imprisoned.Released on the outbreak of the war he 
quickly rose in the ranks of the Workers' Party of which he 
became General Secretary.In the post-war ^gime Mr.Goibulka 
occupied the post of vice-Premier,Minister of Regained Terri-
tories and Secretary to the Cominform until deposed in 1948 
XXX 
and imprisoned by his own colleagues. 
In the People's Guards prominence was achieved by Mr.Marian 
Spychalski (born in 1906),an architect by profession who rose 
to the rank of general and became vice-Minister of Defence. 
Deposed after the Gomulka schism he is still in gaol,making 
occasional appearances as prosecution witness in political 
tffiffe. 
The command of the Army was originally given to Michal Rola-
Zymierski,recte Lyzwinski (born in 1590) an ex-general of Pil-
sudski's Army whose career began in Pilsudski's Legions was 
x The International Who's Who,1952,London,p.33 
xx Beck,op.cit.p.52 
xxx see p. 216 
xxxx cf The Times,August 3,1951 
interrupted by dismissal in 1927 upon conviction for bribery? 
Appointed Marshal on May 3,1945 he was the Minister of Defence 
and C.in C. until replaced in autumn 1949 by the Russian Mar-
shal Rokossovsky. 
Mr.Edward Osobka-Morawski (born in 1909) earned his living 
before the war as clerk and rent collector.He joined the Socia-
list Party in 1930 but achieved no position of importance.During 
the war he was active in organising the R.P.P.S. formed in 1943 
as a rival organisation to the Socialist Party (P.P.S.).To the 
general surprise he emerged in 1944 as the "socialist" Chairman 
of the Committee of Liberation and became Prime Minister in 
the Provisional Government of National Unity.After the Elections 
of 1947 Mr.ßorawski was given the post of the Minister of Public 
Administration,but being a mere figurehead he simply faded away 
into oblivion. 
Mr.Joseph Cyrankiewicz (born in 1911) was a law student before 
the war.During the war he was active in the Socialist W.R.N, 
but in 1941 was captured by the Germans and kept in a concen-
tration camp until the war ended.He was a Minister without Port-
folio in the Provisional Government and took over the premier-
ship in 1947 which office he held until 1952.After the reshuffle 
necessitated by the new Constitution Mr.Cyrankiewicz became one 
of the eight vice-Premiers in Mr.Bierut's government. 
Jacob Berman (bom in 1901) received his political education 
in the Moscow People's Military Political Academy.An exponent 
of the Stalinist military doctrine Mr.Berman published in 1928 
in Russian a treatise on the strategy of the Communist Party 
and before the war he served as a link between the Red Army 
and the Military Section of the Bolshevik Party on the one hand 
and the Polish Communist Party on the other.In the Provisional 
Government he occupied the post of Under-Secretary of State 
x sentence published in the "Rzeczpospolita" (No.247 ) of 
September 6,1927-
for Foreign Affairs.On the reconstruction of the Government 
in 1947 Mr.Berman became Under-Secretary of State in the Pre-
mier's office and responsible for the work of the Ministry of 
Propaganda when its jurisdiction was transferred to the Premier's 
office.Mr.Berman is known as the "emftinence grise" of the rögime, 
occupies the key position in the inner circle of the Government 
(the so called Presidium of the Government) and enjoys a repu-
tation of great authority on Marxism-Leninism. 
The Ministry of Public Security was from the very beginning 
of the rägime in the hands of Mr.Stanislas Radkiewicz (born in 
1903)»Before the war he was active in the communist youth orga-
nisation,was sentenced to four years imprisonment in 1927 for 
anti-state activities and fin 1932 went to Russia.The. subsequent 
period of nine years of his life remains obscure,but Mr.Radkie-
wicz was known in 1941 as holding a commission in the N. K.V.B. 
During the formation of Polish units in Russia under tfee commu-
nist controj) Mr.Radkiewicz reappeared as a colonel charged with 
political education in one of the artillery regiments and later 
entered the political scene in the röle he still plays. 
The economic dictator of Poland Mr.Hilaire Mine (bom in 1903) 
studied law and economics in Poland and France.In 1928 he was 
expelled from France as an undesirable alien and subsequently 
worked in T/arsaw as a statistician.He was an active communist 
before the war,and during the war was for some time lecturer in 
the Russian University of Samarkand.He appeared in the Polish 
Army as a political officer in the rank of lieut-col.and in the 
Committee of Liberation took charge of the economic section. 
At present he is vice-Premier and head of the economic section 
of the Government comprising several Ministries and the Planning 
Commission. 
Foreign affairs were during the epoch of the Provisional Go-
vernment in the hands of Mr.Vincent Rzymowski (born in 1893) 
a writer and journalist,expelled from the Polish Academy of Li-
terature in 1937 for plagiarising Bertrand Russell.In 1947 he 
was succeeded by Mr.Sigismund Modzelewski (recte Fischaupt,born 
in 1900) who like Mr.Mine studied and developed communist acti-
vities in Poland and France and during the war was a political 
officer in Russia. 
The present Minister of Foreign Affairs is Mr.Stanislas 
Sfcrzeszewski (born in 1901)»formerly Minister of Education.Before 
the war he was a school master-and in 1937 became assistant 
lecturer in Cracow University.During the war he was in Russia 
where he joined the Committee of Patriots. 
An important personality in the Foreign Office was Mr.Victor 
Grosz (recte Isaac Medres,born in 1900) who acted as the Press 
dictator of Poland before he became Ambassador in-Prague.Though 
he never served in the Army Mr.Grosz appeared first as colonel 
in the Army in Russia and in 1945 arrived in London as. ä general 
with the mission of bringing home the Polish Army from abroad. 
The Ministry of Justice has been from the beginning under 
the control of Mr.Henry Swiatkowski (born in 1896).A barrister 
before the war he joined the Socialist Party in 1923 and was 
elected to Parliament in 1928 and 1930.Under his guidance the 
Administration of Justice has been undergoing a Radical change. 
The office of the Speaker of the first post-war Sejm (1947-
1952) was occupied by Mr.Ladislas Kowalski (born in 1894). 
Active in the Communist Party he endeavoured on his return from 
Moscow in 1924 to organise an "Independent Pe'asant Party",but 
since that party was banned he had to content himself with his 
•former activities.Under the auspices of the Liberation Committee 
Mr.Kowalski's ambitions succeeded and he formed a new Peasant asa Party}rival to the genuine Peasant Party headed by Mr.Mikolajczyk. 
-The deputy-Speaker was Mr.Roman Zambrowski (recte Nusbaum, 
born in 1909),who.in his early youth started his communist 
apprenticeship and consequently fell in collision with the po-
lice. Nothing is known about him during the 1931-1941 period,but 
he held a commission in the Red Army from 1941 to 1943.Trans-
ferred to the Polish units in 1943 Mr.Zambrowski became their 
chief political officer. 
Another important personality was Mr.Edvra.rd Ochab (born in 
1905),whose ascendancy in the ^gime became particularly marked 
within the last years.A communist,trained in Moscow from 1932 
to 1936,he spent much of his time in gaol before the war.He was 
a political officer during the war and has recently been promoted 
to the rank of general.Appointed to various functions,including 
the post of vice-Minister of Defence,Mr.Ochab has particular 
merits in reorganising the Party (of which he is now General 
Secretary) and strengthening the party discipline. 
The leading personalities of the rögime with few exceptions 
graduated from the ranks of the Communist Party,went through a 
period of subversive activities,completed their training in 
Soviet Russia and emerged from obscurity as "leaders" of the 
nation.Comparatively young they tasted the hardship of imprison-
ment and endured the lot °f being hunted as secret agents of 
a foreign power.Their ideology as well as their allegiance to 
Soviet Russia is beyond question since to those two factors they 
owe their elevatio^. Looking at their social and professional 
background one can see only in isolated cases (e.g.Gomulka) a 
real "proletarian" among them,the majority being professional 
"revolutionaries" and frustrated members of the intelligentsia. 
Theories. The study of the conditions in which the present 
^gime became established seems to point inevitably to imposition 
of the sytem of People's Democracy as an incident to the con-
quest of Poland by the Red Army and the result of the diplomacy 
of the late Joseph Stalin.There was no revolution in the accepted 
x Several distinguished Polish communists were liquidated in 
Russia during the great Trotskyite purges. 
sense of the word meaning a rebellion or deposition by force 
of the existing rägime,not even a,serious clash between the two 
opposing native forces.Though the changes in the way of life 
that followed the seizure of power by the Communists bear "re-
volutionary" features (violence,complete transformation of all 
aspects of life,arbitrariness of the Executive and the like, ,they 
are only characteristic of the method adopted after the change 
of the political system was completed.The present rulers of 
Poland do not claim to have won their positions at. the barri-
cades at the head of the revolted proletarian masses; they do 
not claim to have worked their way through by. means of parlia-
mentary procedure,as sometimes alleged by certain speakers in 
Britain who maintain that they have been "put into power by the 
people".On the contrary,whilst paying their customary homages 
to Soviet Russia and her genial leader Joseph Stalin,they frankly 
admit that only by means of the machinery of^he Soviet assis-
tance was it possible to establish the system of People's Demo-
cracy. Though the imposition took a peculiar form in that it re-
sulted from international decisions,the theory of imposition 
was subtly stated in the preamble to the Constitution of 1952 
in following words:.."the history-making victory of the Soviet 
Union over fascism liberated Poland,enabled the Polish working 
people to seize power and created the conditions for national 
regeneration within new,just frontiers". 
x Bierut,Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R.pp.38,39,46,47,51,52,53 
J.Cyrankiewicz,ibid.pp.72,81,107 
Ideological Declaration of the United Party,ibid.pp.l35 and 133 
F.Fiedler,Uwagi w Sprawie Powstania i Rozwoju Panstwa Demo-
kracji Ludowej w Polsce,Nowe Drogi,Warsaw,1950,No.2,p.128 
M.Spychalski,0 Jednosci Tradycji Zjednoczonej Partii, 
Nowe Drogi,1948,No.12,p.40 
R.Zambrowski,op.cit.p.123 
A.Zawadzki,Rola Zwiazkow Zawodowych,1Jowe Drogi,1949,No.3,p.XXVII 
cf also Russian writers:N.Farbierow*,0 Charakterze Panstwa Demo-
cracji Ludowej,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.3,p-159;A.Sobolew,Demokracja 
Ludowa jako Forma Politycznej Organizacji Panstwa,Nowe Drogi, 
1951,No.5,p.89-90 
In contrast to the theory of imposition we have for the sake 
of comparison to quote other theories.A distinguished American 
writer in a provoking book seems to ascribe the genesis of the 
Polish People's Democracy to a fusion of the "London Government 
HC 
with the Lublin Government"(..."Finally the two were merged on 
June 28,1945 into what was called the Polish Provisional Govern-
ment". ..). Commenting on the organisation of the state he asserts 
that..."only the Communists were thoroughly trained and efficient" 
and assumes that..."people turned to them out of despair and 
idealism"...Since the book was the result of a few weeks journey 
through Central and Eastern Europe it would be charitable not 
to make any comment. 
Out of British publications three books are of particular in-
terest here."The East European Revolution",by Prof.H.Seton-Watson 
appears unassailable,whereas to the remaining two,"Revolution in 
Eastern Europe",by Dr.D.Warriner and "Central and South East 
I Europe(1945-48)" edited by Prof.R.Betts one can lodge objections 
\of serious inaccuracies and irrational rationalism.Both the latter 
publications seem to advocate (though by no means in certain terms) 
what one might call a theory of "reaction against the pre-war 
regimes".Miss Warriner writes that since 1945 there has been a 
revolution in Eastern Europe against "bad Government and German 
domination,against nationalism and economic stagnation".This 
attempt at classifying history into "bad and good things" Miss 
Warriner amplifies by a sweeping statement that "East Europe was 
fascist ruled" and that the "fascist regime of Poland was headed 
by M£ic". A few pages later »however, we are told that the "govern-
ment of Poland was a semi-fascist military dictatorship",which 
does not seem to be quite the same,but the learned writer does not 
trouble herself to substantiate those rather unwarranted statements 
x J.Gunther,Behind Europe's Curtain,London,1949,p.251 
xx ibid.p.254; xxx D.Warriner,Revolution in Eastern Europe, 
London,1950,p.XIII; xxxx ibid.p.IX 
Speaking of the genesis of the post-war systems Miss Warriner 
writes that..."as the Red Army advanced in 1944-45 the existing 
fascist governments were overthrown and their place was taken 
by National Front Governments,representing the Communist,Socia-
list,Peasant and Liberal Partiel".Again it would be useful to 
know by whom (if so) were those governments overthrown,and how 
far the learned writer went to study the composition of what 
she calles "National Front Governments". 
' Professor Betti-whilst speaking of revolutions states that 
the "Red Army had to bring to.Poland-new government because 
Poland was destituted of any government".This benevolent act og 
of the Red Army implies,of course,a complete constitutional va-
cuum, which, however, was not the case. 
To debunk the theory of revolution or reaction against the 
"bad past" it is sufficient to quote the highest authority on 
the Polish People's Democracy,Mr.Bierfrt,who expressly disclaimed 
its genesis by revolution. 
Economic and Had a revolution taken place the economic 
Social factors. s o c i a l factors might have'determined the 
form of government,which was by no means predictable in.1944-45. 
arid need not necessarily have followed the footsteps of the Bol-
shevik Revolution. 
The Versailles Poland,in Lord Keynes' opinion was an "economic 
impossibffity" faced with impending bankruptcy.The reconstruction 
and consolidation of the country exploited by three foreign 
powers for more than a century and devastated by war which 
started in 1914 and ended only in 1920 was not a task for one 
generation.Poland,the ancient Baltic power,had to build her own 
x Warriner,op.cit.p.1 , 
xx R.Betts,Central and South East Europe(1945-48),London^l950, 
, xxx Bierut,op.cit.p.52 /p.204 
v xxxx J.M.Keynes,The Economic.Consequences of the Peace,1919, 
vol.I.p.75 
xxxxx Keynes,ibid.vol.tt.p.231 
artificial port having the burden of the Danzig anomaly on her 
shoulders and in the north her possessions narrowed to a corri-
dor of the Vistula.Economic problems,the chief of.which was 
industrialisation of this predominantly agricultural country, 
were tackled as soon as stabilisation was achieved.By the scheme 
of 1936 a central industrial area covering one sixth of the 
country and embracing one seventh of its population v/as begun, 
further plans going as far as drainage of the Pripet Marshes. 
Due to this progress the index of industrial production rose 
in the period from 1936 to Kay 1939 from 94 to 125,8. 
The unification of a country divided by partitions into three 
separate sections presented ai other problem ofamixed political, 
economic and social character.The Versailles decisions coupled 
with the failure of the Polish plans for a federation paved the 
way for a national state burdened with minorities and tied down 
by the Minorities Convention.The Convention,(which,however,did 
not apply to Germany),was nowhere observed,but proved a propi-
cious ground for friction and meddling with foreign home affairs. 
Je^f and Ukrainians were the largest minorities in Poland, 
the former notwithstanding their clamours abroad that the treat-
ment they received stopped short only of mass murder,within 
twenty years almost doubled their numbers (about 2,7 million 
in 1921,against 4,1 million in 1939)/ swarming into Poland from 
the neighbouring countries.A Polish plan to settle part of them 
in Madagal§ir failed for lack of international support.Ukrai-
nians, after their co-opeM£?on with Pilsudski to form an inde-
pendent Ukraine federated with Poland had proved a fiasco,were 
torn between German promises to render assistance in forming a 
free Ukraine,and communist agitations.On the other hand the 
x F.Zweig,Poland between Two Wars,London,1944,p.80 
/xxf3eck,op.cit.p.140 
«XXX' Jews were engaged mainly in free professions and commerce 
and trade.Jewish farmers or labourers were a great rarity, 
cf W.Kamieniecki,Les Minoritäs Nationales en Pologne,1929,p.l40 
xxxx due to the victory of Bolshevism in Russia the plan failed 
Polish policy of assimilation only led to .frictions and dissatis-
faction. That state of affairs produced riots and terrorist acti-
vities which culminated in the assassination in 1934 of Minister 
Pieracki and Deputy Holowko and caused a military pacification 
of certain areas.Poland failed to solve her minorities problem 
and the ancient rule "gente Ruthenus,natione Polonus" was not 
restored to its original meaning. 
According to the statistics of 1931 the gainfully occupied 
population was divided into agriculture (64,9$)»mining and in-
dustry (15,1$),commerce and insurance (2,1$)»other occupations 
totalling 13,1$.A characteristic feature was a relatively small 
proportion of wage-earners as compared with the class of emp-
loyers and independent workers.The so-called "industrial prole-
tariat" was not numerous whereas the peasantry constituted the 
bulk of the population.The agrarian reform,initiated already in 
1920,could only partially'solve the problem,the real answer 
being industrialisation of the country and shifting the surplus 
village population to new industries.This meant in practice 
building new factories and overcoming a certain opposition 
from the landthirsty peasant,since the prospect of migrating 
in order to becomearunskilled labourer hardly appealed to his 
conservatism and a sense of relative security afforded by the 
possession of land.Only a rägime like that in existence today 
which has seized total power both politically and economically, 
and whose conscience does not prevent it from applying drastic 
measures,is in a position to alter radically the social and eco-
nomic structure of the country. 
Pre-war Poland can pride herself on progressive industrial 
and social legislation which,however,made her a welfare state 
with the inevitable ätatistic outlook.The government achieved 
vast controls over the national economy facilitating central 
industrial planning.but at the same time curbing free enterprise 
x Zweig,op.cit.p.48 
and promoting direct ownership by: the state. 
The decline of parliamentary rule was to a great extent the 
result of economic difficulties in as much as the rise of Pil-
sudski's autocracy since 1930 coincided with the world slump. 
Pilsudski's rdgime (1926-1935) was based onv'i§«üsocialism min-
gled with a general tendency of reviving the tradition of Poland's 
grandeur.This together with the traditional respect for posse-
ihe 
ssion of land led to eulogy of the dashing qualities of the 
"szlachta",the chief support of the ancient kingdom,which fact 
was rather crudely interpreted by several foreign writers as' 
the "reactionary rule by the szlachta". 
An example of this free interpretation of Polish past and 
present history is the following passage by Prof.Betts:.."Gone 
is the ancient and dishonoured monopoly of wealth and power by 
the Szlachta and the land of Poland belongs to those who work 
it.The works of Marshals Pilsudski and Rydz-Smigly is rejected 
as decisively as that of the Szlachta,and here too a people 
whose whole history since the time of Boleslas of the Wry Mouth 
has been one long struggle with Russia has now adopted the ideo-xx 
logy of the Power which guarantees her new frontiers"... 
Had the communist conspiracy materialised into the seizure 
of power by means of revolution the economic and social condi-
tions of Poland would have probably contributed to the formation 
of the political rögime and certainly produced popular leaders. 
Since,however,this was not the case they can only be taken into 
account for theoretical and propaganda purposes.Experience during 
the last war proved that communists could successfully seize 
power only in countries where the machinery of state was des-
troyed by external causes and were only able to maintain power 
with the effective assistance of Soviet Ruf^a. 
x According to Zweig (op.cit.) already in 1927 about 12J5 of the 
national wealth was, in the hands of.the state, 
xx Betts,op.cit.p.197-8 
xxx Opinion expressed by J.Stalin in letter to Marshal Tito, 
cf The Daily Telegraph,July,25,1952(article by Mr.Padev) 
Origins of the People's Democracy in Other Countries. Comparing 
the origins of the People's Democracies (the Baltic States ex-
cepted) it is difficult to find the actual genesis of any two 
identical,though the effect and development seem everywhere the 
same* 
Of the countries concerned only Czechoslovakia and Rumania 
were left for a while under their former r€gimeS.Rumania changed 
her allegiance from Germany to Russia in August 1944 when King 
Michael caused the arrest of Prime Minister Antonescu and the 
appointment of Mr.Satanescu in his place.Subsequent governments 
changed under Russian pressure and the King was forced to abdicate 
in December 1947.Czechoslovakia in theory fell into communist 
hands by a coup d^tat staged in 1948,whereas in actual fact the 
communist rule was a result of the opportunistic policy of Dr. 
Benes and Jan Hasaryk,previously rewarded by Marshal Stalin with a 
three year tenure of office for their choice of going home via 
Moscow. 
Hungary was conquered by the Red Army,but no communist regime 
was first established.In the elections of 1945 communists received 
only 17$ of the votes,the Smallholders' Party under the leadership 
of Mr.Nagy achieving the majority (57$).The communists,however, 
gained predominance and in the 1947 elections emerged as the lar-
gest party.In Bulgaria the pro-German rägime collapsed in 1944 
with the approach of the Red Army.An attempt by Mr.Kuraviev to or-
ganise a moderate government failed since Russia declared war on 
Bulgaria and "conquered" the country,Bulgaria being for 24 hours at 
war both with Germany and Russia.Under the Red Army occupation a 
"Fatherland Front Government" dominated by communists was formed. 
Albania became a People's Democracy with the assistance of 
Yugoslavia whose Marshal Tito helped the communist Mr.Hoxha to 
seize Tirana and establish his government.The People's Democracy 
x Yugoslavia after her expulsion from the Cominform excepted. 
of East Germany was a direct result of the Soviet occupation. 
Yugoslavia and Poland bear a certain resemblance in so far 
as there developed there,during the war,two opposing camps.Yugo-
slavia fell into Marshal Tito's hands when the Allies decided 
to drop General Draga Michajlovich and the monarchy in favour 
of Marshal Tito supported by Russia.In distinction,however,to 
Poland Marshal Tito won his position in actual fight "S.nd managed 
to sway to his side a great part of the Yugoslav people.The 
Polish People's Democracy,on the other hand,was a direct result 
of international decisions and the conquest of the Red Army. 
Part III. L§gislative_Fqundation_qf_the_Peo^ 
Chapter 9. Early Legislation. 
The introduction of the People's Democracy into Poland was 
effected in two ways: firstly (external) through the process of 
international relations and the elimination of the Constitutional 
Authorities,and secondly (internal) through the process of "legis-
lation" which immediately became binding upon the advance of the 
Red Army. 
In this chapter we are going to deal with legislation made 
chiefly behind the Red Army lines by a small.body.of me5 at a 
time when the constitutional Government still functioned and 
enjoyed international recognition. 
From the point of view of the pre-war Polish Constitutional 
Law such "legislation" must be condemned as null and void.From 
the point of view of the general principles of Constitutional 
Law the matter seems controversial and therefore of theoretical 
interest.lt is obvious that since it was made by a body which 
finally seized power, and continues to hold office this "legis-
lation" could not,and indeed would not,be repudiated by that body 
as "unconstitutional". 
If the term "revolution" were the correct description of the 
process by which the change of the political system in Poland 
was effected,we could draw a parallel between the Communist Group 
and a revolutionary political faction.In such a case the "legis-
lation" of the Communist Group would resemble the pre-revolution 
"legislation" of the revolutionary faction.adopted after the 
x The Communist Home National Council (K.R.N.) consisted of 
30 persons,Kusnierz,op.cit.p.172;and Scaevola,op.cit.p.68 
successful revolution.In the meantime it would have to be re-
garded as the programme of the revolutionary faction and only 
an express adoption by the competent post-revolution authorities 
(i.e.a Dictator or Parliament) would elevate it to legislation 
proper and make it the law of the land.No revolution in the 
accepted meaning of this term took place in Poland,but neverthe-
less,though the Communist Group may be described for this purpose 
as a "revolutionary faction",their pre-revolution programme was 
never submitted to the nation,but was given the force and autho-
rity of normal legislation as if it had been passed by the con-
stitutional bodies in the form prescribed by the Constitution. 
The explanation of this somewhat peculiar situation lies in 
the fact that the Communist Group from the very moment of their 
self-appointment considered themselves the legitimate authorities 
and usurped dictatorial powers,which they effectively used to 
alter, the political and economic structure of Poland to suit 
their purposes.They printed their own "Journal of Laws" and this 
was deemed sufficient publication of their decrees notwithstan-
ding the fact that at that time they neither officiated in Polish 
territory nor considered themselves as yet "Parliament" and "Go-
vernment" of Poland.The Supreme Court whilst deciding the question 
the. 
of validity of the laws so enacted stood on the principle of the 
unbroken continuity of the Polish statf,and went even as far as 
to declare certain decrees binding from the date of their enact-
ment, in former German territories given to Poland under the Pots-
dam Agreement,in spitä of the fact that those decrees were never 
formally published in those territories and were made before the 
Potsdam Confere^f. 
x See Reports of Decisions of Supreme Court (Criminal Chamber), 
Warsaw,1945-451vols.I and II,cases No.35,43 
xx Reports,ibid.case No.43 
xxxvReports,ibid.cases No.51,52 ; and 
Reports,1947,vol.Ill,case No.72 
Besides that,bearing in mind the attitude of the Marxist phi-
losophy towards the state,llw,and constitutf&n,they considered 
legislation a mere instrument of class (or party) domination and 
really never bothered with the formal intricacies of the law. 
Therefore,before the Big Three decided in Yalta to recognize 
the Communist Grpup as the nucleus of the new Administration, 
the blueprint of the future Constitution was already prepared 
and its principles laid down in the form of laws and decrees. 
The hope of the Western signatories of the Yalta Agreement that 
Poland would be given a fresh start was thus illusory,since a 
considerable body of law manufactured by the Communist Group 
was even then in existence,this law,as we shall see later,pre-
judicing the constitutional issue in favour of the establishment 
of the People's Democracy. 
The fact that this legislation was not submitted to the nation 
either by means of a popular Ш or by parliamentary approval 
can'be accounted for by the purpose of this legislation,which 
was designed to bring into the country ready-made forms of go-
vernment and give legal powers into the hands of the Administra-
tion before this Administration itself was established and re-
cognised by the Powers.It presented the nation with accomplished 
facts and gave the imported Executive powers of compulsion 
backed by alleged statutes. 
The legislation we are about to review does not consist of 
statutes directly amending the existing Constitution.lt consists 
of laws and decrees which owing to their nature and purpose 
"bear upon the Constitution" by affecting individual rights,the 
relationship between the state and citizen and by bringing about 
x J.Stalin,Lenini sm,London,1940,p.32 
xx V.Lenin,The State and Revolution,p.85 
xxx J.Stalin,On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
(Polish edition),Moscow,$945,pp.13 and 18 
xxxx The Referendum of 1946 did not touch this question,see,p.119 
a reorganisation of the Administration. 
Those laws were enforced in practice,and therefore,no matter 
the theoretical considerations,they must be regarded as the for-
mal source of the People's Democracy and a part of the positive 
Constitutional Law.The legislator,in his own words* purported 
to act on the basis of the Constitution of 1921 revived for 
political reasons,yet,as we shall be able to see,the principles 
of that charter were hardly applied. 
Lav/ implies certain moral values which cannot be totally ig-
nored by a student of political systems.Since,however,a moral 
evaluation appears to be relative to the individual approach,the 
laws under present discussion will be left to speak for them-
selves. At this stage of the development of the system they bear 
witness to a definite legislative policy adequately explained 
by historical facts. 
Legislation The legislation of the K.R.N.(the Communist 
of the K'R»Nflome National Council) began with a resolution 
made by. that body at its first and organisational session held 
on December 31,19^5. Calling itself into being the K.R.N.claimed 
to represent the whole country.In this capacity of a "National 
Representation" it held itself authorised to "legislate,to re-
present the nation and to appoint the government". 
The first legislative act of the K.R.N.was the decree of 
January 1,1944, creating the "People'%s Army" under its own autho-
г щ .The purpose of this decree was the unification of the co-
mmunist partisan groups which recognised the K.R.N.(Art.3) and 
the incorporation into the "People's Army" of all Polish fighting 
forces serving abroad,notably Gen.Berling's Army under Soviet 
command,Gen.Anders' Army in the Middle East and the troops 
Stationed in Great Britain (Art. 7). 
xxseecthe Manifesto,p.101 ante 
xx attended by some 20 persons,Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.245 
xxx full text,Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.p.423-4 
Another decree of the same datl purported to organise the 
Supreme Command of the People's Army,consisting of three members 
(the Commander in Chief,his Chief of Staff and a representative 
of the K.R.N.). xx 
The third decree issued also on January 1,1944,gave the 
supreme command to "citizen "(an ex-general of Pilsudski's 
Army cashiered for brf§e?y). 
In point of fact these three decrees hardly reflected the 
claims of the Communist Group to have exercised leadership in 
the resistance work and to have played a prominent part in the 
fight against the GerMfis.lt took them over three years to band 
together and to issue a decree organising their units,whereas 
the Home Army existed practically from the very beginning of 
the war and was then well known for its exploits.They decided, 
however,to take control and command over the army abroad that 
had been gathered and organised with such effort by the Consti-
tutional Government.The appointment of "citizen Rola",far from 
facilitating the process of unification,caused natural resentment 
in the army abroad and contributed to the bitterness of the en-
suing struggle for power. 
Then there was a break in the legislative activity of the 
K.R.N, until July 21,1944,when two laws were promulgated.One of 
them appointed the "Polish Liberation Committee" and endowed it 
with unspecified executive powers,advi sing it to establish at 
once its provisional seat in the territory liberated by the Red 
Attached to this law was a М а Н Й Ш , whose principal point 
x full text,Systematyczriy Przeglad,op.cit.p.424 
xx full text,Systematyczny Przeglad,ibid.p.425 
xxx Nom de guerre "Rola" means "arable land"; see p.132-3 ante 
xxxx see p.133 ante 
xxxxx cf P.Jozwiak-Witold,Polska Partia Robotnicza w Walce 
о Wyzwolenie,Warsaw,1952 
xxxxxx Systematyczny Przeglad,ibid.p.3-4 
xxxxxxx see p.101 ante;full text,Systematyczny Przeglad,pp.5-10 
was the repudiation of the Constitution of 1955 and declaration 
of loyalty to the Constitution of 1921.The aim of the former 
was obviously to denounce the Constitutional Authorities; the 
purpose of the latter seems rather obscure.By the arbitrary 
abolition of the Constitution of 1935 the K.R.N, took a further 
step in self-promotion : first it made itself a legislative 
body and in the appenix to its law of July 21,1944 it promoted 
itself to a constituent body competent to decide which of the 
Constitutions should be in force.The Constitution of 1921 chosen 
as the "only democratic and legal constitution" was,after a 
short period of praisi,dropped because of its being "anti-de-
mo e r a t " 4 
Even if we for a moment assume for the sake of argument that 
the K.R.N.was a representative body,it is difficult to find a 
provision in the Constitution of 1921,which would authorise the 
existence of such a body,not to speak of its origin and personal 
composition.lt is stilltmore difficult to discover a foundation 
for its constituent power.The K.R.N, declaring its powers for 
obvious reasons made no direct reference to any particular pro-
vision of that Constitution,satisfying itself with restitution 
of that charter.This move,therefore,must be interpreted as an 
attempt to reintroduce a constitutional vacuum and to provide 
a legal facade for the attempt to seize power. 
Delegation of The K.R.N.promptly invested their nominees, 
Legislative Power.Committee of Liberation,with legislative 
power.The law of August 15, Ш gave that body the power to 
legislate by decrees in all matters where the Constitution of 
1921 required legislation by.statutes,that is Acts of Parliament. 
Only three questions did not fall under this power: ratification 
of t^eatiesf establishment of a Provisional Government and disso-
lution of the Committee.Such decrees,to become law,had to be 
x Peretiatkowicz,op.cit.p.3 
xx Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.106 
xxx full text,Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.p.lO-ll 
submitted to the Presidium of the K.R.^. for approval and be 
signed by the Chairman of the K.R.N, along with the Chairman 
of the Committee.They could be revoked by a simple majority 
of the K.R.N. 
After that date the K.R.N, seems to have ceased its legis-
lative activities and the power was then exercised by a still 
smaller body.The wide provision of the law of August 15,1944, 
gave a general law-making authority to the embryonic body of 
the future "Provisional Government of National Unity" imposed 
upon Poland by the Yalta dictation. 
There were,however,difficulties in practice: The law of 
August 15,1944 once more emphasised the binding force of the 
Constitution of 1921 and tended to ignore all other laws.To 
reduce the whole legal system to the Constitution alone proved 
absurd and consequently laws other than the Constitution proper 
had,by necessity,to be recognised ass well.The question of 
"validity" and "applicability" of statutes had to be left to 
the courts.Since the courts also were reorganised,their dis-
cretion in this respect would,of course,be exercised on the 
lines of opportunism.A harder nut to crack was the legislation 
based on the Constitution of 1935 which had been abolished by 
the K.R.N.It was very easy to abolish with one word the highly 
inconvenient charter,but again impracticable to do away with 
the laws made under its authority.One the other hand,some of 
those laws were not offensive at all to the new rägime and not 
x 
only could they tolerate them,but even needed them.A compromise 
was,therefore,suggested : the Constitution had definitely to go, 
but the remaining statutes should be allowed to stay,and whether 
they were binding or not would depend on the discretion of the 
authorities.In'the early practice of the Supreme Court,statutes, xx made under the Constitution of 1935»were recognised as valid 
x Systematyczny Przeglad,op.cit.p.12 
xx Reports,op.cit. 1947,vol.Ill,case No.60 
and the Legislative implicitly acknowledged this principle by 
repealing certain statutes and referring to others as binding 
in new legislation. 
The situation,however,was uncertain,producing confusion as 
to the "validity" and ''applicability" of the former law as well 
as a large.field for arbitrary action on the part of the regime, 
which,contrary to the accepted practice in states where the 
rule of law obtains,was in the position of deciding which of 
the existing statutes were "invalid",without abolishing them 
in the normal parliamentary procedure. 
National Councils. The 11th day of September 1944 gave birth 
to two laws: one on the "Organisation and Powers of National 
Councifl",and the other on "Powers of the Chairman of the 
The law on National Councils contained a preamble praising 
the nation for its struggle for freedom and referring to the 
July Manifesto,which announced the creation of the National 
Councils. 
Those Councils were to be organised in the whole territory 
of Poland,no matter whether liberated by the Red Army or still 
occupied by the enemy (Art.31).Their organisation was to follow 
the pre-war pattern of territorial administration.Thus we have: 
rural councils,urban councils,and provincial councils (the towns 
of Warsaw and Lodz constituting separate provinces for €his 
purpose).The K.R.N.was to act for the country as a whole in 
the capacity of a "Temporary Parliament". 
The law introduced a hierarchy of Councils (Art.2(1)),urban 
and rural Councils being subordinated to the district Councils, 
the district Councils to the provincial Councils and the latter 
x e.g.decree of December 4,1945 referring to the decree of the 
President of the Republic of June 26,1936. 
xx Dziennik Ustaw Rzeczypospolitej ^ olskiej (= Journal of Laws 
of the Republic of Poland) henceforth referred to as D.U.R.P. 
D.U.R.P.1944,No.5,sec. 22 
xxx D.U.R.P.1944,No.5,sec.23 
in turn to the K.R.N. (Art.21,§ l).To ensure discipline and con-
trol all lower Councils were obliged to submit to their superior 
Council a monthly report on their, activities (Art.22,§1),their 
chairmen being personally responsible for the execution of this 
duty.The provincial Councils in turn had to submit their reports 
to the K.R.N.,which generally supervised and directed the opera-
tion of the whole system. 
The law made sure that the personal composition of the Councils 
received a political imprint approved by the Committee of Libe-
ration since Art.3 provided that Councils were to be drawn from 
"all democratic organisations which submitted to the Committee 
and recognised as binding the Constitution of 1921". 
There was to be no election of the Councils,but appointment 
of delegates by organisations authorised to do so.Accordingly 
those organisations ("of political,economic and professional 
character",but unspecified by the law) sent äs delegates to the 
rural and urban Councils their members of a number agreed between 
their presidiums,who in turn were allowed to co-opt one sixth of 
their total numbed (Art.6,§§ 1 and 3).The rural and urban Councils 
delegated one member each of their presidiums to the district 
Council.Both district and provincial Councils were allowed to co-
opt members (up to one fifth in the district and one fourth in 
the provincial Councils). 
To ensure once more the desired personal selection of members 
of the various Councils Art.7,§ 2 debarred from selection as 
delegates all "those suspected of collaboration with the Germans 
or combatting the patriotic-democratic organisations".The reasons 
for disqualification remained general and unspecified,directed, 
however,clearly against all who were slow in submitting to the 
Committee of Liberation who arrogated to itself the monopoly 
x By Art.6,§l the strength of the rural and urban Councils ranged 
from 12 to 72 persons in proportion to the number of inhabitants 
in the given locality. 
of resistance,patriotism and democracy. 
The system of hierarchy and subordination of the Councils 
provided for the final check upon the qualities of their members, 
since Art.8 authorised the presidiums of the higher Councils 
to see that the lower ones were properly constituted and in 
case of any defect to dissolve them,such a dissolution annulling 
all previous acts of the Council so dissolved. 
The reorganised K.R.N.,representing the whole country and 
acting as the "Temporary Parliament",was to consist of the 
following groups of persons: 
a7 members of the original K.R.N., 
b) delegates of political,economic,professional and social orga-
nisations (not named specifically in the law), 
c) representatives of the provincial Councils, 
d) representatives of the organisation^ abroad,provided they 
had submitted themselves to the original K.R.N., 
e) members co-opted by the original K.R.N. 
The total strength of the new K.R.N, could not exceed 444 
members (the number of deputies in the lower House according 
to the Constitution of 1921)»members of group (b) not exceeding 
one fifth of the total. 
At the head of the K.R.N.was a Presidium consisting of five 
members chosen by the whole body (Art.13,§ 2),the Chairman and 
his two deputies assuming a status similar to the Speaker and 
deputy-Speakers of the Sejm (Art.14). 
The powers of the K.R.N, were very extensive (Art.26(1)). 
In addition to being a law-making body it was responsible for 
the budget and -fee economic planning,the army,control of the 
Executive,(i.e.the Committee of Liberation) and trade agreements. 
It could declare war and make peace,conclude pacts,declare a 
state of emergency and ratify international treaties creating 
x they were not specifically named 
obligations with regard to citizens and altering the frontiers 
of the state. 
The K.R.N, was to be convened every quarter (Art.18,§ 1), 
and when it was not in session its powers were delegated to 
its own Presidium (Art.26,§ 2).This system practically entrus-
ted to a body of five persons the full powers of state inherent 
in a sovereign Parliament.Since the K.R.N.was to be a body of 
only one political complexion,this delegation of powers consti-
tuted a system whereby a one party dictatorship was narrowed 
to a dictatorship of a few men.The K.R.N, as a body proved to 
have exercised little influence on the affairs of the state, 
the legislative power being delegated by the law of August 15, 
1944,to the Committee of Liberation and general powers to the 
Presidium headed by Mr.Bierut - the President designate of 
Poland. 
Acting as the "Temporary Parliament" its life was quite long 
owing to the fact that the General Elections were not forth-
coming. Its personal composition could have been changed if the 
Moscow Agree&fnt between Mr.Mikolajczyk on behalf of the Peasant 
Party and the Committee of Liberation had been honoured. 
The law on National Councils bristles with references to the 
Constitution of those references,however,constitute only 
copies of minor provisions of the Constitution and meaningless 
remarks stressing the adherence of its makers to that charter. 
The law,besides splitting the nation at the bottom into adhe-
rents of the communist ideology and its adversaries,besides 
giving political rights and privileges to the former,introduced 
a new system of regional administration and did away with the 
principle of election of the local and national representative 
bodies. 
x cf Soviet-Polish pact of April 21,1945,p.Ю6 ante 
xx see pp.110 and 111 ante 
xxx Arts.1,3,5,11,12,14,16,29 
In itself the system constituted nothing original,but was 
modelled upon the system of the Soviets with its one-party 
character,ostensible vesting of large powers in the organised 
party element,and delegation in fact of those powers to a small 
presidium.An important difference»however,was in the method of 
appointing members of various Councils,the Russian system being 
based on election.Historically it was a replica of the "Councils 
of Workers' Delegates" created in vain by the Provisional Re-
volutionary Committee" of 19§5. 
As far as the legislation is concerned,the law on the "Powers 
of the Chairman of the K.R.N? was only a supplement to the law 
on "National Councils" discussed above,but in the tactics of 
the imposition of the People's Democracy on Poland it constitu-
ted a political move of great significance.So a substantial 
portion of the personal element in the People's Democracy was 
smuggled in under the guise of a short statute.The much abused 
Constitution of 1921 had once more to serve as the Trojan Horse. 
The law of September 11,1944,gave the Chairman of the K.R.N, 
(now called "President of the K.R.N",because he was ex officio -
Chairman of its Presidium) all the rights of the Speaker of 
the Sejm (Art.1).This provision was quite innocuous in itself, 
repeating only the words of Art.14 of the law on National Coun-
cils, but there the tactical ruse lay.The Constitution of 1921 
(Art.40) provided that in case of death,resignation or inability 
to perform the presidential duties by the President of the Re-
public his office would devolve on the Speaker of the Sejm.The 
Communist Group maintained that everything except the Constitu-
tion of 1921 was null and void and ingeniously enough .proceeded 
to infer that the presidential office was vacant,because the 
President in exile was appointed on the authority of the Consti-
tution of 1935,now declared by them "illegal".Consequently they 
x cf Arts.2,3,30,48,49,94,97 of Russian Constitution of 1936 
xx see p.91 ante 
decided to fill the vacancy.Art.2 of the law of September 11,1944 
provided that the "President of the K.R.N." was to succeed as 
the President of the Republic,the presidential office being 
vacant. 
As the acting President the Chairman of the K.R.N, received 
the following powers:to promulgate laws and legislate by decrees, 
to be the supreme»commander of the army,to represent the state 
and receive and appoint diplomatic officers,to exercise the pre-
rogative of mercy,to conclude international treaties,to appoint 
judges,and to bestow orders and decorations. 
The law -came immediately into force and its execution was 
entrusted to the Chairman of the K.R.N.,that is Mr.Bierut,who 
thus became acting President of Poland. 
Having acquired a President and possessing its own Parliament 
only the appointment of a Government was necessary to complete 
the Administration in the hands of the Communist Group.The 
obvious choice for the latter function fell upon the Committee 
of Liberation which already by the law of August 15,1944,bad been 
given wide powers to legislate by-decrees.On its first anniver-
sary the K.R.N, converted its own Committee of Liberation into 
a Provisional Government. 
Let us examine now some of the decrees of the Committee of 
Liberation. 
Decrees on The Committee of Liberation,by its decree of 
Administration.21,194$,3prepared a scheme for the taking 
over of the general administration.Whilst retaining the pre-war 
administrative division of the country (that is,recognising the 
validity of the lawe of January 19,1928,and August 29,1936) the 
Committee took into its hands the question of appointing the 
.provincial and district governors.These nominated officials 
x by the law of December 31,1944,D,U.R.P.No.l9,sec.99 
xx D.U.R.P.No.2,sec.8 
became ex officio members of the provincial and district Coun-
cils (Arts.3 and g) appointed,as we have seen above,on account 
of purely political qualifications by bodies endowed with this 
power by the Committee.To ensure their proper functioning,those 
officials were subordinated in practice to the 'presidiums of 
their respective Councils (Arts.5 and 8),to whom they were ob-
liged to render periodical reports on their activities. 
The machinery of administration was designed to be also em-
ployed in the service of the official propaganda of the Committee. 
The decree of October 5,194* ,created provincial and district 
"agencies of culture and art" under the control of the provin-
cial and district administration.The purview of those agencies 
was very large as they were given control not only of the Press 
and Theatre,but even amateur choirs and musical bands (Art.3). 
These agencies became important channels through which official 
propaganda could be poured into the smallest cells of the commu-
nity and,at the same time,they ensured the hold of the admini-
stration on the cultural activities of the people.It is needless 
to add that this sphere of human interest received the careful 
attention of the Committee since from its very inception .it had 
as many as three Ministries concerned with it,the Ministry of 
Information and Propaganda,Culture and Art,and Education.Those 
three Ministries worked closely together and their organisation 
and business was subject to the early legislation of the Commit^ie. 
The net of the Ministry for Culture and Art agencies was 
later reinforced by corresponding branches of the Ministry of 
PropagaMi. The latter were to go even to the townships and villa-
ges (§3) where they organised their offices and activity centres. 
This organisation,technically directed by the officials of the 
public administrative service,was also put under the political 
supervision of the corresponding-Councils (§ 6). 
x D.U.R.P.No.7,sec.37 
xx Decrees of September 7,1944 and September 15,1944 
xxx by Order of the Minister of March 1,1945,D.U.R.P.No.7,sec.32 
This scheme of promoting culture and art,and informing and 
educating the public,reminds one of a totalitarian state and 
of the services those things render to the ideology of the state 
in Soviet Russia.Undoubtedly the .experience learned in Soviet 
Russia of drawing political advantages from this vast field of 
human interest found its way to Poland and contributed to the 
consolidation of the r£gime.The Committee's efforts reaped a 
rich harvest when the machine of the ^gime, centrally directed 
and covering the whole country,was put into motion during the 
Referendum and Election campaigS. 
It should be added here that,by the decree of November 22, 
l^f,the Committee made the Radio an institution of the state 
and as such under the direct supervision of the Ministry of 
Propaganda (Arts.4 and 5,as well as 6 and 7).The state-sponsored 
broadcasting service, having a monopoly of all transmissions,was 
thus to be used in the service of the state not only in an orga-
nisational and financial sense,but even in the choice of the 
subjects to be put on the air and materials on which particular 
transmission was to be prepared (Art.4). 
Security Police. The Committee of Liberation had powerful 
support from the Ministry of Public Secur££yfmanned chiefly by 
the members of the WOrkers^M^ty. In the mass of laws made by 
the Committee no organic statute of the Ministry of Public Se-
curity can be found.Obviously this was in the baggage train of 
the People's Democracy since the Security Police appeared on 
Polish soil in its finished form together with the vanguard of 
the new political system,and by its activity rather than publi-
cation of statutes,became a part of the reality of everyd^^^e. 
x cf M.Czanerle,Teatr Amatorski i jego Rola w Radzieckiej Twor-
czosci Kulturalnej,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.3,pp.204-215 
xx see^pp.120 and-121 ante; xxx D.U.R.P.No.13,sec.69 
xxxx M^Spychalski,0 Tradycjach Zjednoczonej Partii KLasy Ro-
bot niezej,Nowe Drogi,1948,No.10,p.73 
xxxxx Bierut,op.cit.p.39 
xxxxxx Allumore important legislative acts bear the signature 
of the Minister of Public Security. 
The Polish N. К.V.D.system was reinforced by a "Citizens' 
Militia" created by the decree of October 7,1944? Accordingly, 
the Militia became a "public - law formation of the Public Se-
curity" (Art.1).-This rather obscure statement conveys the idea 
that the ßilitia was meant to be a constitutional institution 
sanctioned by public law and as such a part of the Administration. 
xx 
With the abolition of the institution of the police the task 
of keeping order had to be entrusted to new bodies.The imported XXX 
Security Police Units,trained and commanded by the N.K.V.D., 
had to be expanded to suit the task that lay ahead.This was 
done by the creation of the Militia.The statutory purposes of 
the Citizens' Militia were threefold(Art.2) : 
a) to preserve public security,peace sind order, 
b) to investigate and prosecute crimes, 
c) to carry out orders of the administrative authorities, 
courts and public prosecutors. 
One would have expected a definition of the status,the rights 
and duties of the Militia to be circumscribed by the decree,but 
this was left entirely to the discretion of the Minister of 
Public Security (Art.6).Consequently a ministerial order was 
sufficient to constitute the Militia,decide upon its recruit-
ment and discipline,set up its internal organisation,and specify 
its purposes as well as rights and duties of its members.The 
decree did not limit or determine the strength of the Militia, 
this apparently also being left to the Minister. 
This decree,in fact,instituted the era of a police state by 
giving the Minister powers to constitute and organise his own 
force as he pleased.lt is needless to say how serious is such 
a general and extensive delegation of powers,especially as the 
x D.U.R.P.No.7,sec.33 
xx by the decree of August 15,1944,D.U.R.P.No.2,sec.6 
xxx In 1946 Mr.Radkiewicz admitted that the Russian N.K.V.D. 
still operated in Poland,see New York Times,July 22,1946 
order of the Minister would not only set up the organisation 
of the police force,but would also considerably affect the in-
dividual rights of the citixen.On the other hand,the Minister, 
having a disciplined and loyal police force of a considerable 
strength was liable to become the physical ruler of the country. 
In its finished form the system, of the Security Police 
consists of the : 
a) Security Office (U.B), 
b) Security Corps (K.B.W.), 
c) Citizens' Militia (M.O.), and 
d) Reserve of Citizens' Militia (O.R.M.O.) 
Security Offices are distributed over the whole country and 
their principal task is to prevent offences against the state. 
In this capacity they control public life and act as licensing 
authorities with regard to all public demonstrations. 
The Security CorpI,instituted as a "guarantee of political 
order and a practical safeguard against groups which bring 
chaos into the normal'course of public administration",is the 
main police force in the hands of the Minister.Centrally directed, 
it consists of several sections^the principal ones being the 
so called "Liquidation Squads" to take care of the elements 
hostile to the regime,"Frontier Guards" placed at the boundaries 
of the state,"Watch Detachments" to guard concentration camps 
and political prisons,"Special Squads" to guard state officials 
and the "Intelligence Service". 
The actual technical police work is assigned to the Citizens' 
Militia.The ORMO,on the other hand,created in 1946 to fight the 
Underground as well as the legitimate Peasant PaMy prior to 
the 1947 Elections,is considered at present a reserve of the 
Militia. 
x commanded originally by Russian General Kiniewicz 
xx From an Order of the Ministry of Public Security, 
xxx see p.119 ante 
Decrees on the For the period under present consideration the 
Judiciary.pre_war -ju(jicial system was accepted as a basis,and 
the changes that occui'ed were rather specific than general. 
The decree of November 4,194*, introduced one of the most 
important innovations.lt gave power to the Minister of Justice 
to set up courts and alter their jurisdiction as well as to 
remove and transfer judges against their will (Arts.l and 2). 
This short decree in effect shook the stability of the tenure 
of the judicial office so far secured by the ConstitutiOS,and 
made judges dependent upon the Minister. 
A further limitation of •fefae judicial independence together 
with an introduction of a political test for persons called to 
administer justice was imposed by Art.l of the decree of March 
14,f^*5.This decree in particular forbade judges to "take part 
in activities which might weaken the confidence in their im-
partiality or in their loyalty to the Constitution and the 
authorities of the democratic Polish state". 
In practice,the professional qualifications of the newly 
appointed judges were bound to be much below the accepted 
standards owing to the breakdown of education and professional 
training due to the war,as well as the mode of recruiting judges 
from politically reliable applicants.Moreover the Bench became 
packed with former judges of Military Courts,whose elevation 
to judgeship was due to their appointment by the military autho-
r i « 3 5 . 
By one of its early the Committee introduced trial 
by jury.The controversy whether an accused should be tried before 
a panel of qualified judges or before his equals giving their 
verdict upon their own judgment of fact and the direction of the 
x D.U.R.P.No.11,sec.58 
xx Constitution of 1921,Art.78; Constitution of 1935,Art.66 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.9,sec.46 amending Art.121 of the law of 14.4.1937 
xxxx Art.48 of the decree of 23.9.1944,D.U.R.P.No.6,sec.29 
xxxxx Decree of 15-8.1944,D.U.R.P.No.2,sec.7 
presiding judge on matters of law,was solved in pre-war Poland 
in favour of the former system.Both systems seem of equal value, 
provided,of course,the trial takes place before an impartial 
court and the sentence is given on the weight of evidence,ade-
quate means of defence being allowed.There seems,therefore,little 
purpose in the introduction of the jury system at this early 
stage,unless it was to serve also other purposes than the fur-
therance of justice. 
The decree of October 23,19$4 is very helpful in elucidating 
this point.The explanation lies in the provision of Arts.5 and 8 
which assigned the task of preparing the lists of jurors to the 
national Councils.Since the Councils were bodies of men of one 
political shade the system savoured of a political invasion of 
the administration of justice,bringing thereby the Judiciary 
close to the pattern of Soviet Justice. 
Special Courts. The judicial system was enriched by a decree 
of September 12, instituting Special Courts.Those courts, 
criminal in character,consisted of a professional judge and two 
lay assessors(Art.3).Judges of Special Courts were appointed at 
the instance of the Minister of Justice by the Presidium of the 
K.R.N.(Art.4,§ 1) and assessors were drawn from candidates sub-
mitted by the provincial Councils (§ 2). 
Special Courts sat first in the territories liberated by the 
Red Army,and later in the whole country.Their purpose,according 
to .the decree of August 31, 
i W f was to deal in a simplified and 
summary way v/ith the "fascist-hitlerite crii£S£Ifs". Their powers 
were extensive and their chief pronouncement was the sentence 
of death.Death was the punishment for all who : 
x D.U.R.P.No.9,sec.47 
xx see'pp.152-155 ante 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.4,sec.21 
xxxx D.U.R.P.No.4,sec.6 
xxxxx title of the decree 
a) collaborating with the Germans,took part in the killing or 
torturing of civilians or prisoners of war; 
b) denounced,or otherwise acted to the detriment of persons 
persecuted,or sought after,by the occupation authorities 
(Art.1,§ 1). 
Long term imprisonment was the punishment for tfeachery to 
the nation (Art.l,§ 2 and Art.2). 
In principle the trial was to be conducted according to the 
pre-war procedure,but the decree of September 12', 194$, provided 
for important exceptions.First of all the examination of the 
suspect by the examining magistrate was dispensed with (Art.8) 
and the investigation was left to the public prosecutor and 
the security police.No substantiation of the charge in the in-
dictment was required,a mere statement of crime for which the 
prisoner was arraigned being sufficient (Art.12).The trial took 
place 48 hours after the delivery of the indictment (the pri-
soner being already in gaol),the statutory seven days notice 
of the hearing being abolished.The sentence of the Special Court, 
delivered after a consultation between the judge and his asse-
ssors was final and irrevocabff (Art.18).Only in case of the 
death sentence could the condemned petition the Chairman of 
the K.R.N, for reprieve (Art.19). 
The decree of August 31,1944,in so far as the"traitors to 
the nation" were concerned,was supplemented by the decree of 
November 4, .Apart from incurring criminal liability under 
the former,under the latter decree all Polish citizens,who in-
the so called"GeneralgouverniSifrt" declared their affinity 
to the German nationality (Volkszugehörigkeit und Deutsch-
x D.U.R.P.No.4,sec.21 
xx For this reason cases decided by Special Courts had no chance 
of going to the Supreme Court and therefore no reports of 
trials by Special Courts are available, 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.11,sec.54 
xxxx see p.38 et seq 
stämmigkei^) or drew advantages from that status,were liable 
to be sent to concentration and forced labour camps for an un-
specified term.No classification was adduced and consequently 
in this hard and fast rule no distinction was made between the 
cases of those who volunteered and those who suffered compulsory 
enlistment on the so called "Volkslisten",the latter being much 
used by the occupation authorities. 
An important feature of this law were the powers given to 
the public prosecutor attached to the Special Court and to the 
security police.The former was authorised to order the arrest 
and detention in concentration camps of persons of the above 
description,and the security police were the executors of his 
orders (Art.2(1)).Only the Special Court,at the instance of the 
President of the District Special Court,could overrule the 
public prosecutor (Arts.2 and 5) and refer the case for revision 
before a court of two judges and three assessors.The power of 
the public prosecutor to send one without trial or assent of a 
court to a concentration aamp for an undefined period seems to 
contradict the idea and purpose of Special Courts.By this pro-
vision the public prosecutor was actually given the functions 
of the Special Court and the summary procedure became virtually 
reduced to the prosecutor's orders. 
Confiscation of property and deprivation of public and civic 
rights extending also to the members of the family of the 
"traitor" was consequential on his being sent to a concentra-
tion camp (Arts.3 and 4).The decree did not provide for resti-
tution of property in case of the order of the public prosecutor 
did it 
being overruled,nor mention^- any compensation for the harm 
suffered. 
x N.B.Polish law distinguished between "nationality" and 
"citizenship".One could be,therefore,a "German national" 
and a "Polish citizen" at the same time, 
xx see p.42 ante 
xxx Not to be confused with the presiding judge of a Special 
Court. 
Military Courts. In the .Polish People's Democracy the bulk of 
the criminal business seems to have been entrusted to the juris-
diction of Military Courts.At any rate this is true for trials 
which savour of a political object.Political trials even in 1952 
(that is to say at a time when the system may be considered 
firmly settled and consolidated) still take place before the 
Military Tribunalf. 
This system was provided for as early as September 23,1944j 
by the new c$$e of Criminal Military Law,and the df$?ee on the 
Constitution of Military Courts and Military Prosecutions,which 
abolished the law of September 29,1936,together with the pre-war g 
sytem of Military Law. 
By Art.6 of the decree on the Constitution of Military Courts 
they were given jurisdiction over : 
a) members of the armed forces in active service, 
b) persons liable to military and auxiliary service on mobilisation. 
c) prisoners of war and hostages,and 
d) other persons in cases specified by law. 
By Art.8 of the decree the Committee of Liberation authorised 
itself to extend,at the request of the Minister of Defence,the 
jurisdiction of Military Courts over persons subject to ordinary 
courts for crimes recognised by the Minister as "injurious to 
the defence of the state".This measure was to operate in case of 
war,mobilisation or whenever required for the defence reasons, 
thus giving a wide scope of discretion not only to the Executive, 
but also to the Military.In other words cases of common crimes , 
dealt with in the usual course of ordinary criminal courts,were 
to come under the jurisdiction of Military Tribunals whenever so 
desired by the Executive. 
x cf the trial of 8 persons on charge of murdering J.Martyka,an 
announcer of the Polish Radio.He was murdered on 9.9.1951» 
the accused were arrested shortly after the crime, bjrt their 
trial took place as late as September 1952. 
xx D.U.R.P.No.6,sec.27 xxx D.U.R.P.No.6,sec.29 
fhe provision of Art.11,which settled precedence between 
courts,was of prime importance from the point of view of Con-
stitutional Law.It established the superiority of the Military 
Courts over the Ordinary Courts since in conflicts of their 
respective jurisdictions a higher Military Court was to decide 
the issue. 
For the purpose of comparison,in Great Britain e.g.,the 
question of the applicability of the Military Law and of the 
jurisdiction of Military Courts is regarded as of such consti-
tutional importance that it cannot be left to the Executive. 
The principle of the superiority of general courts (ordinary 
courts of the land) over special courts (e.g.military courts) 
is considered a vital part of the Constitution and a necessary 
safeguard of the "rule of law" and the basic rights of the ci-
tizen. Consequently no civilian in the United Kingdom can be 
dragged before a Military Tribunal,nor can the jurisdiction of 
such a Tribunal be extended by a decree of the Government.Fur-
thermore, in no case can a Military Tribunal assert its superio-
rity over ordinary court in disputes over jurisdiction. 
If the Constitution had actually been respected,the provi-
Kave 
sions of Arts.8 and 11 could notybewput on the statute book 
because they were inconsistent with the principles of the Con-
stitution. But under the new conditions in which the Committee 
legislated,any law could be made,because the'Constitution itself 
was only used for specified purposes. 
The пет: code of Criminal Military Law was well adapted to 
serve its collateral purposes.There is no room here to discuss 
it in detail,but some provisions,especially those on crimes 
classified by the legislator as traasonab£e,are most instructive. 
Art.85 threatened with the death penalty or imprisonment 
from ten to fifteen years "all those who endeavour to deprive 
the Polish state of its independence or to tear away part of its 
x Chapter XVII of the code (Arts.85 - 105) 
territory". 
Art.86 provided for the punishment by death or long-term 
imprisonment of "all who attempt to overthrow by violence the 
established supreme authorities of the state or attempt to 
seize power",as well as those "who attempt to change the Con-
stitution by force". 
Articles 85 and 86 require,of course,a teleological inter-
pretation.For the purpose of these provisions the territorial 
frontiers of Poland of 1939 were obviously not those specified 
(although specified only in effect) by the Articles.Furthermore 
the Committee of Liberation as well as the K.R.N, would have to 
be recognised as the "established supreme authorities of the 
state" as early as September 24,1944,and the Constitution of 
1921 accepted as binding,otherwise the above Articles would 
only have had repercussions on themselves. 
A further measure protecting the above authorities was con-
tained in Art.93(§ 1), which made "attempts on the life of the 
representatives of the Polish state or Army,or the representa-
tives of friendly foreign states and armies" a crime punishable 
by death,and for"insulting" the persons mentioned in § 1 threa-
tened imprisonment for three years. 
The law of treason in every country aims at protecting the 
highest constitutional authorities,but is usually confined to 
the head of the state,attampts at the life of a Minister or 
Member of Parliament being a common crime.The founders of the 
e^op-le's Democracy considerably increased the number of persons 
protected by the law of treason to include even military persons 
of unspecified foreign countries. 
Arts.95,97 and 99 dealt with the propaganda noxious to the 
designs of the Committee.Accordingly,"whosoever publicly agi-
tated to overthrow,undermine or weaken the authority of the 
state or to commit crimes under Arts.85.,86,90,92,93»or approved 
of those crimes as well as whosoever made,disseminated or kept 
writings,prints or images instigating the commission of such 
crimes,was liable to imprisonment" (Art.95). 
Further,"whosoever,in order to weaken the national morale, 
disseminated news capable of this effect"(Art.97); and "whosoever, 
being a Polish citizen,disseminated abroad false news in order to 
harm the interests of the Polish state",was liable to imprison-
ment (Art.99). 
The Committee realized the importance of publications and 
decided to stamp out anything detrimental to their aims,instilling 
xx 
at the same time their own propaganda into every head.Thus an 
activity inclined to opposition-became for them'a "treasonable 
act",and publications showing displeasure at their seizing power, XXX 
or any atterances pointing to Soviet Russia as an enemy,were 
criminal offences to be dealt with by a Military Court under the 
broad authority of the new code of Military Law. 
Art.101 of the code aimed first of all at deterring the public 
from displaying their sentiments with regard to a "foreign state". 
It threatened with two years imprisonment everyone "who "in the 
territory of Poland insulted,defaced or removed the emblem or flag 
of a foreign state publicly exposed by its representatives". 
During the German and Soviet occupation one of the forms 
showing disapproval of the conquest was the disrespect by the 
public of the emblems and flags of the occupying powers.When the 
Red1 Army came for the second time bringing along a new occupation, 
the same reaction as before was likely to take place towards 
the signs of hammer and sickle. The Committee could not 
x e.g.The Supreme Court upheld a sentence of the court below for 
"disseminating during a public meeting news of a strike being 
suppressed by the police",Reports,op.cit.1948,vol.II,case No.54 
see also the'case of "whispering propaganda",Reports,op.cit. 
хя± 1948,vol.IV,case No.101 
xx see "pp.158 and'159 
xxx Supreme Court,Reports,op.cit.1950,vol.II.case No.23 
suffer this obvious sign of ingratitude and so made it a crime 
classified as treason by the code of Military Law. 
The law of treason was also to protect the friendship of 
the Committee with Soviet Russia,since "whosoever publicly agi-
tated against the alliance of -^ oland with a Aendly state,as 
well as made»disseminated or kept writings,prints or images to 
that effect,was liable to imprisonment or death penalty"(Art.102). 
A similar punishment would befall anyone "who undertook hostile 
activities against a friendly state with intent to cause a 
danger of war or breach of diplomatic relations with that state" 
(Art.102,§ 3). 
Soviet Russia was,of course,that unnamed "friendly state" -
a matter of serious controversy among the Poles. 
Art. 103, be sides "the usual ambiguity of terms, had to serve a 
dual purpose : to punish the associates of Hitlerite crimes as 
well as those who whatever reason became political opponents 
of the Communist Group who chose to contrast itself with the 
German oppressor and to be at the same time the only bearer of 
the national patriotic banner.It runs:" whosoever publicly rails 
at,insults or derides the political system of the Polish state, 
or approves of fascism,national socialism,hitlerite crimes or 
publicly instigates their commission or the introduction into 
Poland of the fascist or Nazi system,or whosoever organises or 
publicly agitates for setting up or associates himself with 
fascist or Nazi organisations is liable to the death penalty 
or imprisonment". 
The first clause of Art.103 was clearly designed to punish 
all those who,seeing the method of the introduction of the 
People's Democracy,spared no words of criticism or ridicule of 
the super-democratic facade of the communist dictatorship or 
of the communist conception of law and constitution, 
x cf Bierut,op.cit.p.33 et seq 
To "rail at,insult or deride" a political system seems quite 
a unique definition of a capital (and treasonable) crime.First 
of all,those three terms constituting the essence of the criminal 
act themselves need a definition to be understood by ordinary 
minds,secondly,they need at least a legislative qualification 
for the guidance of the court.If accepted in their popular mea-
ning those terms may mean anything ranging from a joke to a 
criticism,hardly justifying the extreme severity of the law. 
The second clause was typical of what may be called "witch-
hunting". In the official Moscow propaganda,endorsed by the 
Communist Group and puffed out to incredible dimensions,the 
Home Army,as well as the Constitutional Authorities were "fascist 
and pro-Nafi"and,farcically enough,those who against enormous 
odds fought from the very beginning against the German aggression 
XXX 
were described as "Hitlerite flunKeys" or eager to impose the 
Nazi system on Poland. 
The third clause was directed against the organisations 
actively opposed to the communist seizure of power.Hence every 
political party or resistance cell who denounced the Communist 
Group as a "fictitious body and foreign age?iOy"and set its face 
against communist domination was put on the black list of traitors. 
Threatened with death or imprisonment the members of such orga-
nisations had either to cease their activities and remain silent 
in perpetual fear,or join the Committee which presented them 
with new opportunities in the form of parties or organisations 
run by the Committee under their original rfaMl. 
As we can see from the above review of the most salient points 
of the law of treason incorporated in the code of Military Law, 
x cf Warriner,op.cit.p.6 
xx sss. that is from the time of Hitler-Stalin alliance 
xxx see Soviet News of January 8,1945 
xxxx see pp.94-5 and 97 ante 
xxxxx see pp.94 and 125 ante 
the legislative technique adopted by the Committee is charac-
terised by general terms inappropriate to a code of criminal 
law,ambiguous formulations of crimes and a mixture of self-pro-
tecting measures and witch-hunting phrases. 
Decree on the Defence Art.l of the decree on the Defence of 
of the State. t h e s t a t e o f October 30,194$ was designed 
against all political and resistance organisations (especially 
the Home Army) that were rivals of the Communist Group.In the 
words of the Article the Communist Group identified itself with 
the "democratic constitution of the Polish ötate" and threatened 
with death all would-be competitors in the contest for attaining 
power. 
Art.2 threatened with death or imprisonment "all opposing 
or impeding the Committee's plans of an agrarian refo£i§". 
Art.3 protected against violent assaults: the "officials of 
the central and regional administration and persons co-operating 
with them",the "units and members of the Polish or allied army", 
as well as "institutions and means of public or military commu-
nications". In other words any Pole having a brawl with a Red 
Army soldier in which the latter was punched about might,under 
the Committee's legislation,be sentenced to death by a Polish 
Military Court and instantly shot.The same could happen to any 
peasant defending his last cow from being requisitioned under 
orders of a village administration official 
Art.4 dealt with those "who manufactured,kept or dealt in 
arms or ammunition during the war without the authorization of 
the Committee".This measure was clearly designed against the 
Home Army which not only kept and used,but also manufactured 
its own war equipment,the task of disarming the Home Army being, 
x D.U.R.P.No.10,sec.50,cf the Bulgarian law of April 19,1946 
xx For details of the agrarian reform see p.191-2 
xxx cf decrees of 18.8.1944 (D.U.R.P.No.3,sec.9);and 22.8.1944 
(D.U.R.P.No.3,sec.10) authorising requisition of goods 
and agricultural produce. 
of course,one of the most important and difficult problems 
facing the Committee.lt is obvious that no Government could be 
expected to tolerate armed opposition,and that any measure for 
restoring peace and order would be justified in normal conditions. 
At the time,howeverthis decree was passed the Committee of 
Liberation was not a "government" (even they did not call them-
selves a government at that time) and the struggle against the 
x 
Germans continued.The Committee had then existed only four months 
and yet from behind the Red Army lines purported to introduce 
draconian measures against the organisations which led the struggle 
for independence already for four years. 
Art.5 was a measure against sabotage - this included "ren-
dering impossible,or hindering normal performance of the central 
and regional administration,of manufacturing establishments and 
public utility services".By this provision the Committee inten-
ded to secure proper functioning of its organs and introduced XX iff 
the death penalty for»industrial sabotage, taking example from 
Soviet Russia where such offences entail heavy punishment. 
Art.6 reintroduced the German-made law with regard to those 
"who without permission of the authorities manufactured,kept, 
acquired or disposed of wireless apparatus",thus preventing the 
unauthorized from listening to foreign news,or what would be 
still worse,transmitting abroad news from Poland. 
By Art.7 "influence by threat's or intimidation on the activi-
ties of the national Councils,the Committee of Liberation,the 
Courts,and the central and regional administration,as well as 
obstruction of the said authorities" entailed the penalty of 
death or imprisonment . 
Art.8 was again directed against the Home Army and resistance 
x called to existence on July 21,1944- the date of the decree 
was October 30,1944. 
xx cf .The Times of March 1,1948 reporting death sentence on 
manager,3-15 years imprisonment on 4 assistants for "economic 
sabotage of state marmalade factory". 
cells declaring illegal "any organisation which was designed to 
be,or remain secret to the Committee,or was made for illegal 
purpose",this purpose being,of course,political opposition to 
the Committee. 
The decree besides its draconian nature contained a very im-
portant measure bearing upon the Constitution.By Art.14 the 
provisions of Arts.85 - 89 and Arts.100 - 103 of the code of 
Criminal Military Law were made applicable to the civilian po-
pulation,and by Art.16 of the decree Military Courts were given 
jurisdiction to deal with cases prosecuted both under the decree 
and the code of Criminal Military Law.At 'the same time all in-
vestigation of the above crimes were entrusted to the security 
police and the military authorities (Art.16,§ 2),and the prose-
xx 
cutions left to the military prosecutors. 
Thus the country was put under Martial Law and arbitrary 
measures were introduced to wipe any possible opposition to the 
ingress of the People's Democracy. 
Art.18 made the decree law as from October 30,1944,but de-
clared its binding force as from August 15,1944 creating in this 
way another piece of retrospective criminal legislation. 
The decree of October 30,1944 was supposed to be a decree 
on the "Defence of the State",yet this title implying a certain 
type of crimes seems hardly justified by the context of the 
decree.The aim of a general extension of the Military Law over 
the whole population and to subject the citizen to the drastic 
methods of Military Courts (Arts.14 and 16) seems,however,the 
real purpose of this decree.Hence the peculiar title serving as 
a pretext to apply Art.6 and Art.8 of the decree of September 
23,Ш4. 
x see pp.168-170 ante 
xx this state of affairs is still subsisting, 
xxx see p.166 ante 
In the light of legislation reviewed above it can easily be 
seen that the adherence to the Constitution of 1921 was merely 
a weapon of convenience.Efforts to find a legalistic basis for 
the legislation and seizure of power were vain and unnecessary 
since for the purpose of the positive law it matters little 
whether there is a de facto or de jure foundation of the Con-
stitution,if it is enforced in practice by the authority of the 
state. 
These efforts together with the Constitution of 1921 were 
recently repudiated by one of the leading theorists of the 
People's Democracy Professor S.Rozmary&,who,in the quest for 
a raison d'etre of the system fell,however,into another extreme 
by making the K.R.N, the "only legal source of power" and an 
"original creatidS of the will of the working classes,the will 
of the nation and the revolution." 
In tracing the origins and development of the system of the 
People's Democracy in Poland the röle of the Constitution of 1921 
and the legislation of the Communist Group comes to the fore-
ground in the process of the internal imposition of the system. 
x Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.253 
xx contrary to the original official version expressed in the 
Manifesto of July 21,1944,cf p.101 ante 
Chapter 10. Legislation of the Provisional Government. 
We have already emphasised the constitutional importance of 
Point 6 of the Crimea Declaration,which in itself constituted 
something new in international relations,namely the abolition 
of the Constitution of an allied sovereign state by an inter-
national decision without consulting the representatives of 
that state. 
This fact cerainly strengthened the hand of the Communist 
Group in matters of legislative activities touching the Con-
stitution and encouraged their arbitrariness in this field. 
Consequently all laws made by them in their previous -capacity 
of an agency of. the Kremlin became unquestionably binding and 
enforceable by their organs.Though recognised only as a nucleus 
of a provisional Administration,they were in fact a-"Government" 
with a considerable record of legislation.Therefore the era 
of the Provisional Government is of little importance from the 
point of view of legislation bearing on the Constitution,the 
bulk of this work having already been done before. 
Nationalisation of private property and collectivisation of 
land characterize this period as preparatory for the change 
(to use the appropriate Marxist jargon) in the "economic basis" 
of the country to effect adequate alterations.in its "political 
superstructure".Frequent political triafl,liquidation of the 
x private property rights were guaranteed by the Constitution 
of 1921 (Art.99) as well as by the Communist Manifesto, 
xx to quote only most important cases recorded by Western Press; 
Times (8.8.1945) death sentence on 5 men and 1 woman for 
collaboration with emigr£s^;New York Times'(5.3.1946) 5 death, 
11 imprisonment for underground activities;New York Times 
(24.6.1946) 1 death,4 imprisonment for attempting to overthrow 
the government;New York Times (23.8.1946) 23 death,22 imprison-
ment for anti-government activities;New York Times(28.12.1946) 
priest sentenced to death for leadership of underground orga-
nisation; Manchester Guardian (13.1.1947) 4 members of an under-
ground group (WIN) sentenced to death;New York Times(22.1.1947) 
18 members of Mikolajczyk Party sentenced to death. 
Opposition and Home Armj' elements,vigorous activities of the 
Ministries of Propaganda and Culture and Art Reorganisation of 
the Trade Unions,all accomplished in the growing shadow of the 
Security Police,are striking symptoms of the tightening grip 
of the Government over the citizen. 
Criminal Laws. In the legislation affecting the constitutional 
rights of the individual prominence was given to criminal laws 
of political character. 
The law of May 6,194$ introduced the long overdue classifi-
cation of "elements hostile to the nation",supplementing thereby 
the decree of November .By Art.l Polish citizens compul-
sorily put on the German national i ± m of the third and fourth 
groups (Deutsche Volksliste and Leistungs-Polen) were completely 
restored to their public and civic rights,provided,of course, 
xxxx 
their conduct throughout the war had been satisfactory.Full 
rehabilitation was,however,conditional on a declaration of 
allegiance to the "nation and the democratic Polish state"(Art.2) 
which had to be made by every person over 13 years of age. 
Art.9. provided also for the rehabilitation of those who in 
the-territories incorporated into the Reich were put on the 
German national lists.of the second group.Applications for re-
habilitation were heard by the Magistrates' Courts (i.e.ordinary 
courts of first instance),the judge sitting with two assessors 
appointed by the presidium of the local Council (Arts.11 and 12). 
Such a court could restore the public and civic rights of the 
applicant as well as order the restitution of his property.If 
his application was rejected,he was sent to concentration camp 
for an undefined term and his property was forfeited to the 
x D.U.R.P.No.17,sec.96 xx see pp.164 and 165 ante 
xxx see p.42 ante 
xxxx The Supreme Court upheld a sentence where there was no' 
evidence of the accused being actually on the list(Reports, 
op.cit.l948,vol.II,case No.51) and quashed another one where 
the accused was entered on the list by order of the Home 
Army(Reports,op.cit.1945-46,case No.22). 
state (Art.16).There was no appeal from the rejection of an 
application,but the public prosecutor could appeal against the 
rehabilitation decree (Art.17).His appeal would be heard by the 
Special Court (Art.18).The decision of the Magistrate's Court 
was not final since the public prosecutor was allowed to lodge 
his appeal within ten years from the decree (Art.19). 
This procedure raised an important question of the hierarchy 
of courts.In the ordinary course of justice appeals from the 
instance courts went to the Court of Appeal; in matters of re-
habilitation, however, by the lav/ under discussion,appeals were 
directed to the Special Court,which by former decrees sat as an 
instance court.This superiority of the politically tainted 
Special Court reduced the Ordinary Court in this respect virtually 
to a rehabilitation office wherefrom certain case's at the in-
stance of the public prosecutor were sent to the Special Court 
for actual hearing. 
The decree of January 22,19$o on the prosecution of those 
"who were responsible for the defeat in September 1939 and were 
the cause of the state going fascist" is another typical example 
of the legislation of the Peche's Democracy in its early stage 
of development.lt is characteristic of the period for two reasons: 
Firstly,because it is retrospective,that is operating with regard 
to acts and omissions which occured before September 1,1939 and 
were made crimes only by the decree (Art.10).Secondly,because it 
is another sample of a legislative policy designed to pursue 
definite political ends apart from the furtherance of justice. 
By Art.l of this decree the penalty of death or long term 
imprisonment (not less than three years) was to be imposed on 
all those "who co-operating with the fascist or Nazi movement 
publicly or in connection with their official position or the 
x cf Reports,op.cit.1948,vol.I.case No.25 
xx D.U.R.P.No.5,sec.46 
administration of the state,or whilst representing the Polish 
state in dealings with a foreign power,acted to the detriment 
of the Polish nation and state Ъу: 
a) reducing, or weakening the fighting forces of Poland or 
a Polish ally,and by 
b) undermining the morale of the nation". 
It is quite clear that all members of the pre-war Executive, 
conveniently described by the official propaganda as "fascist 
or Nazi adherents",were meant to be prosecuted under Art.l. 
It is,however,not quite clear what was meant by "co-operation 
with the fascist or Nazi movement",those terms themselves requi-
ring to be properly explained for the purpose of a capital crime. 
It would have been helpful if the legislator had specified the 
"foreign power" mentioned in the first clause as well as the 
"dealings" he thought detrimental to the national interests. 
Apparently he had in,mind Germany,since it is rather difficult 
to find a power of this description,in "dealings" with whom 
the pre-war r£gime could, act to the detriment of the country. 
One need not be a champion of the pre-war rägime or an apo-
logist for the mistakes of the past to see that an unidentified 
group of persons was to be put on a capital charge for a certain 
trend of foreign policy,which in effect brought about the stabi-
lisation of normal neighbourly relations with Germany,and with 
the Pact of Non-Aggression of 1934 ended the state of friction 
between the two countries. 
Before the war Poland used to spend on defence far more than 
she could afford.The responsibility for that,of course,rests in 
the first place with the Executive.By the decree of January 22, 
1946; those who overburdened the national budget with military 
expenses were to be put on trial for the"reduction or weakening 
of the Polish fighting forces".In addition to that,they were to 
be made responsible for the same as happened in an unnamed 
country allied to Poland.Was that France or Great Britain -
the allies of Poland - whose lack of preparation for war was to 
be paid with the beads of the Polish pre-war politicians? 
Czechoslovakia,though not an ally in the conventional meaning 
of the term,seems to be the most probable guess,the allusion 
being made to the fact of Poland re-claiming after the fall of 
Czechoslovakia certain tiny strips of land - the bone of conten-
tion between the two Slavonic sister-nations,the trouble dating 
back to January 1919»The Czechoslovak incident cost more than the 
temporary gain was worth,and it proved to be an argument of suqh 
a weight as to overshadow Polish claims to independence,when 
those claims became compromised by international decisionl.(This 
remark seems particularly true with regard to a section of British 
public opinion by the close of the war.) Mindful of the influence 
of international relations on the establishment of the People's 
Democracy in Poland,the post-war rdgime should,therefore, be 
thankful for the errors of their pre-war predecessors. 
Those responsible for the "undermining of national morale" 
were to be tried as well.The question as to who those people were 
seems open.Since the morale before the September defeat was much 
higher than was warranted by the actual position of the country, 
the crime should have been that of the "boosting of national 
morale in face of inadequate preparation to meet the concerted 
German-Soviet aggression". 
Art.2 was slightly clearer.This time "neglect of the development 
of national defence or the economic potential" was made a crime 
entailing life imprisonment (§ l),as well as "international 
political activity which brought advantages to the fascist or 
Nazi movement"( §2 ).But the question of earmarking the culprits 
was again left to the imagination.Comparing the two Articles 
one is bound to be struck by the vagueness of the formulation 
of this criminal statute,and by the similarity of symptoms of 
x cf Sir 7/.Churchill,Memoirs,vol.I.pp.252,253,271,272 
crimes to be prosecuted under its authority.No report of an 
application of these provisions in practice is available,and 
so far none of the widely published political trials seems to 
have dealt with crimes defined ( or rather undefined ) in Arts.l 
and 2. 
The trial of Adam Doboszynski,who upon his return from the 
West was seized in and put before a Military Tribunal in 
the summer of »revealed a faint trace of the application 
of Arts.l and 2 discussed above.The indictment,however,was volu-
minous, embracing not only general charges of "fascism",but also 
charges of espionage (for Germany),anti-government activities, 
treason ("attempts at the independence of the country"), conspi-
racy with the emigr£ circles,agency for the Anglo-American impe-
rialists and the like,so much so that in the speeches for the 
prosecution there was no clear statement of crimes under Arts.l 
and 2 of the decree of January 22,1946)but only a rather vague 
accusation of "fascism" and pro-German activities before the 
war delivered in strong language. 
Art.6 of the decree threatened with.life imprisonment "those 
who by fraud,coercion or corruption : 
a) attempted to impose,or actually imposed on the nation the 
anti-democratic constitution,and those who 
b) attempted to change,or actually changed the legally binding 
political system into a fascist one". 
There is no doubt here that Art.6 meant to authorize prose-
cution of people who in 1935,through the parliamentary machinery, 
effected the change of the Constitution of 1921.For the purpose 
of this crime the enactment of the Constitution had to amount 
x member of the Nationalist Party,leader of the anti-government 
riot in 1936. 
xx New York Times of October 12,1947 
xxx full report of the trial,see Polish Daily of June 20,23,24, 
26,28,430 and July 2,5,11,1949 and also New York Times of 
June 19,1949 
to ал "imposition" as if in a free Parliament a qusüified majo-
rity vote could be regarded a crime by the disappointed minority. 
Clause (b) of Art.6 appears to have an identical purpose to 
clause (a).The former speaks of the "political system",the latter 
of the "constitution".This seems an example of tautology,unless 
the expression "political system" was meant to be disassociated 
from the Constitution proper (i.e.the charted) and to be under-
stood as the "application of the Constitution (charter) in prac-
tice".Even so to make this a crime,two things would be necessary: 
to regard the Constitution as sacrosanct and unchangeable,and 
to consider the legislator impeachable if he happened to touch 
the Constitution.The first proposition seems untenable and surely 
the makers of the decree of January 22,1946 were not prepared 
to accept it.The second proposition must be considered in the 
light of the notorious practice of the Provisional Government, 
who venerated the Constitution of 1921 in their declarations, 
but really hardly honoured its principles. 
Nobody so far seems to have been prosecuted under Art.6 in 
Л 
the show-trials,and the provision,except oeing a deterrent, 
appears to serve no useful purpose.This decree,however,consti-
tuted a dangerous precedent for the future since the words 
"communist" and "sovietisation" may easily be substituted for the 
appropriate terms of the decree. 
The decree of January 22,1946 was a powerful threat hanging 
like the sword of Damocles over the heads of all those who could 
be arraigned under its vague and elastic provisions.Directed 
against the members of the pre-war machinery of state it was 
instrumental in checking their loyalty and ensuring their co-
operation with the new rägime in the rebuilding of the bureau-
cracy shattered by the war.Consequently not only minor officials 
but also persons like Mr.E.KwiatkowSKi and Мг.А.КоОё offered 
x pre-war vice-Premier,Minister of Finance,author of pre-war 
industrialisation schemes, 
xx pre-war vice-Minister of Commerce 
their services,their co-operation being prompted perhaps not so 
much by conviction as by motives of bread winning and fear. 
The decree of June 13,194$ on "Crimes particularly dangerous 
during the reconstruction of the state" was a restatement of 
crimes which could have been prosecuted under other laws,e.g. 
the decree of October 30,194$* and the code of Military Law? 
Certain provisions of the above decree were,however,widened and 
put into a new form. 
Art.l,§ 1 threatened with life imprisonment or prison of not 
less than five years for "assault against Polish or allied mi-
litary persons".The same punishment was provided for assaults 
against the following groups of persons(§2): 
a) members of the K.R.N.and other national Councils, 
b) state and local officials, 
c) members of the Polish and allied army, 
d) members of trade unions and political and social organisations 
of national importance. 
The^  number of persons protected by special criminal legislation 
was in this way increased to include persons other than the ser-
vants of the s£i£e,enhancing thereby the position of the state-
sponsofced trade unions and unnamed organisations of social 
character. Unspecified aliens,meaning probably Soviet citizens 
were to enjoy similar privileges. 
The death penalty or imprisonment for not less than three 
years was provided for sabotage,consisting (Art.3) : 
a), in destruction or damage to public utilities,means of commu-
nication and measures for defence, 
b) in impeding the functioning of the above,and 
c) in delivering articles to the Military below an agreed standard, 
x D.U.R.P.No.30,sec.192 xx see pp.172-4 
xxx see pp.166-172 
xxxx In comparison to this provision one should quote Prof.Roz-
maryn assering that officials in the United Kingdom enjoy 
special privileges,see Nauka 0 Panstwie,Warsaw,1949,p.84 
xxxxxcf Nazi legislation in occupied Poland,p.46 ante 
Industrial sabotage,consisting in "causing a reduction or dete-
rioration of production",was punishable by a long term imprison-
ment (Art.39). 
Manufacturing,possession of,or collecting arms was punishable 
by death or imprisonment for not less than five years (Art.4). 
Espionage (Art.7) and conspiracy with a person acting for a 
foreign power to the detriment of the state (Art.6) - death or 
imprisonment for not less than five years. 
Agrarian reform too,once more received special protection(Art.2) x "Allied unity" wae protected,as before,by Art.11 of the decree, 
xx 
and "illegal organisations" once more subjected to extermination 
(Arts.13,35,36,37). 
The legislator turned against those who "spread false news 
capable of damaging the interests of the state or undermining 
the authority of its organs"(Art.22),and set out to combat 
"undesirable publicl£f$ns" (Arts.23 and 24). 
He did not overlook the fascist bogey*(Art,29) nor those "who 
insult,deface or remove publicly exposed emblems of Poland or the 
allied country,as well as monuments erected to commemorate persons 
orXevefrts"(Art.25). 
As formerly,jurisdiction over those crimes was given to Mili-
tary Courts (Art.51) and everything connected with the preparation 
of trials entrusted to the security police (Art.55). 
It would be indeed very interesting to observe the judicial 
interpretation of the decrees of January 22 and June 13,1946, 
had trials been recorded in the Reports of decisions of the 
Supreme Court. Unfortunately all political trials took place 
x Utterance:"Russians go home",is a crime,see Reports,op.cit.1947, 
vol.Ill,case No.84; xx see p.171 ante 
xxx hence the crime of "whispering propaganda",cf case quot.p.169 
xxxx cf p.169 ante; xxxxx see pp.170 and 178 et seq 
xxxxxx This is an obvious reference to Soviet Russia, 
xxxxxxx This provision seems still necessary due to the large 
ilumber of Russian monuments erected in Poland. 
before Military Tribunals whose records are unavailable.More-
over, indictments as reported by the Press and over the Radio», 
invariably consisted of voluminous charges couched in general 
and rather vague terms resembling speeches of the prosecution 
rather than brief and clear statement of the counts under which 
the given prisoner was arraigned. 
Supreme National Special courts proliferated in the period 
Tribunal. of special criminal legislation.A new insti-
tution of this kind was created by the decree of January 22Д94&. 
This was the "Supreme National Tribunal" to supervise the Special 
Courts and to .act as a "Tribunal of State"(Art.16).The nature 
and purpose of this new tribunal was similar to that of the Spe-
cial Courts,but it was to sit only in cases of exceptional impor-
tance. 
The S.N.T.consisted of three judges anä four assessors,the 
judges being appointed by the Presidium of the K.R.N.and assessors 
drawn from the members of the K.R.N.The President of the Supreme 
Court was ex officio chairman of the S.N.T.(Art.3). 
The procedure before the Special Courts was adopted for the 
S.N.T.including the parts played by the public prosecutor and 
the security police.The sentence was final,and pnly in cases of 
death sentence could the condemned petition the Chairman of the 
K.R.N, for reprieve. 
The puifose of the S.N.T.was twofold (Art.13) : 
a) to try war criminals handed over to the Polish authorities 
according to the Moscow agreement between the United Kingdom, 
the United States and the Soviet Union,and 
b) to try persons liable to prosecution under the decree of 
January 22,lfflf§. 
x D.U.R.P.No.5,sec.45 
xx see p.163 et seq 
xxx see pp.178-182 ante 
The S.N.Т.was a mixture of professional judges and politicians 
delegated from the communist dominated K.R.N. It was,therefore, 
well qualified for political trials.In particular it was quali-
fied to try those "responsible for the September 1939 defeat". 
No records of such trials are available,but one can rest assured 
that the S.N.T.would have disentangled the abstruse provisions 
of the decree of January 22,1946;in conformity with the current 
policy of the regime. 
People's Courts. -By the decree of February 22,194&>a considerable 
portion of the administration of justice was delegated directly 
to the "people".A "People's Court" was created in every commune, 
and for towns over 1000 inhabitants the Minister of Justice was 
to define the number of such courts (Art.l). 
A "People's Court" consisted of a judge,his deputy and six 
assessors chosen for three years by the corresponding national 
Council (Arts.2 and 5).The judge and two assessors made a judi-
cial quorum (Art.33,§1).The Court decided by a majority vote 
(Art.44) and appeals from its decisions lay with the District 
Court (Art.45). 
The rules of procedure obtaining before the "People's Courts" 
were not specifically laid down,but Art.37 constituted in this 
respect a principle of prime importance.The Court was thereby 
allowed to admit and make use of evidence even if not submitted 
by the litigants.In matters of evidence the Court was not bound 
by any laws and was authorised to judge cases according to its 
own discretion based on free assessment of the circumstances of 
the given case. 
The "People's Court" was given both civil and criminal juris-
diction. In civil matters it was competent to adjudicate in dis-
putes- over possession of land,compensation for damage up to a 
specified value (1500 zlo£y)-and payment for agricultural 
produce or work done to the same value (Art.19). 
x D.U.S.P.No.64,sec.113 
xx at the pre-war rate of exchange about % 60 
In criminal matters the "People's Court" was entrusted with 
an extensive jurisdiction (Art.20).In addition to offences under 
the licensing laws and trespasses to land and forest,it was com-
petent to hear prosecutions under the law of non-indictable 
offences and under the code of criminal law of 1932.In particular 
the "People's Court" could inflict the penalty of two years im-
prisonment under the provisions of the code of criminal lav/ and 
three months under the provisions of the law of non-indictable 
offences. 
The prosecutions brought before the "People's Courts" were 
in the hands of the security police and local officials (Art.6). 
The decree set no standard of qualifications for the members 
of the "People's Courts".It must be taken,therefore,that no legal 
qualification was necessary and that the bench was occupied by 
laymen; neither was legal advice (e.g.on the pattern of the 
English Clerk to the Magistrates) provided for.Drawn from the 
local Council the judge and assessors had,by necessity,to possess 
political qualifications,the indispensable condition of being a 
member of the Council.The inevitable inference therefrom is,that 
in most cases the local administration of justice was entrusted 
to the active members of the recognised political parties mar-
king, thereby, the decline of the Magistrates Courts. 
Legal Profession. The legal profession also received close 
attention from the Government.By the decree of January 22,1940, 
applicants for the offices of magistrate and advocate could be 
absolved from the qualification of a University degree by the 
Minister of Justice if they were engaged in "educational,pro-
fessional, social, or political activities" (Art.1).Another decree 
(of February 22,l$*6j_ ordered the compulsory registration of 
persons qualified (that is having a pre-war standard of qualifi-
cation) for the magistracy (Art.l) under pain of a heavy fine 
xD.U.R.P.No.4,sec.33 
xx D.U.R.P.No.9,sec.65 
or three months imprisonment (Art.8).The fiinister of Justice 
could then appoint judges from persons so qualified (Art.5). 
Whilst the former decree was bound to effect a deterioration 
of the professional standard of the legal profession and crowd 
it with persons otherwise 11 Qualified",the latter decree admi-
nistered a heavy blow to the autonomy of the profession.In pre-
war Poland,the first and indispensable condition for one to 
aspire to become a judge or advocate was a University degree 
in lav/. Then followed a five years'practical course and examination 
before appropriate bodies.Advocates enjoyed a professional autono-
my through their "Chambers of Advocates" and judges independence 
and immunity proper to their office,a principle of the Consti-
tution being that judges were appointed by the President of the 
Republic. 
The above decrees suppressed,in effect,the traditional inde-
pendence of the legal profession,and contrary to the Constitu-
tion,made the Minister of Justice its superintendent.As we shall 
xx 
be able to see later, and as one can learn from the reports of 
trials,the judge was to become a servant of the rdgime and the 
official executor of their policy,and the advocate and assistant 
to the public prosecutor,instead of helping the court to arrive 
at the right decision and safeguard the interests of his client. 
Similarly to the decree of January 22,1946,the decree of Decem-
ber gave the Minister powers to absolve the applicants 
for the post of public prosecutor from the standard of educatio-
nal and professional qualification equivalent before the war to 
those required for judges and advocates.The office of the public 
prosecutor,as one can see from a review of criminal legislation, 
became especially important owing to the number of political 
x Constitution of 1921 Art.76; Constitution of 1935 Art.65 
xx see pp.254-5 and 306-9 
xxx D.U.R.P.(1947) No.2,sec.5 
trials,where he had to appear as an efficient champion of the 
^gime.From the rägime's point of view,however,the legal quali-
fications of the prosecutor did not matter at all,provided he 
proved an able interpreter of the legislative policy.This can 
be inferred from the fact,that when the institution of the Chief 
State Prosecutor was created,the Government appointed to this 
post a man who by pre-war standards was not qualified to be a 
member of the legal profession. 
, ihe Control of Publications. Freedom of speech and printed word -
one of the pillars of democracy - was seriously shaken by the 
operation of the laws discussed above,while a stricter control 
by the state was ensured by further decrees. 
The decree of March 23,19$$, created a state owned "Institute 
of Books"»whose function was to print books under the supervision 
of the Minister of Education.The decree had neither any defini-
tion of the word "book",nor specified the kind of "books" to be 
t 
published by the Institute.One may infer,therefore,that this 
master was to be settled by the Minister. 
A further step in this direction was made by the creation of 
a "National Institute of Publications" under the decree of June 
25,l^$o.The two decrees complemented each oxher and left prac-
tically very little room for private publications,especially 
as the question of the allocation of paper was in the hands of 
the Government.They served a dual purpose : monopoly of publi-
cations and nationalisation of the printing industry. 
Final control of the Press,Publications and Theatre became 
established with the creation of the "Central Controlling Office" 
by the decree of ZEuly 5, ш •We may recall on this occasion a 
similar law passed about two years before, yet apparently 
x see pp.228-231 xx D.U.R.P.No.10,sec.71 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.12,sec.78 xxxx D.U.R.P.No.34,sec.210 
insufficient for the particular purpose*The purpose of the new 
decree v/as to tighten the censorship. Art. 2 of the decree of 
July 5,1946,left no publication or theatre exempted from the 
blue pencil,and what is more,made subject to control not only 
creation or production,but also distribution and dissemination. 
In the words of the decree the aim of the censorship was to 
prevent:"attacks on the Constitution,publication of state secrets, 
interference with international relations of the state,trans-
gression of laws "and good morals,and deception of the public by 
incorrect information". 
Since the measures of the decree were of a preventive nature 
purporting to classify in advance the news or other publications, 
the freedom of the Press largely depended on the Government 
officials and the current policy of the state. 
As a result of the system of preventive censorship and state 
monopoly of publications the Press became regimentated and the 
national literary heritage impoverished since only selected author 
writing on approved topics may expect their work to be published. 
Agrarian Reform. The agrarian reform promised by the Manifesto 
of the Committee of Liberation was not a revolutionary innovation, 
except for its methods and ultimate ends.By an early decree of 
the Committee (consolidated by the decree of January 
all landed property of over 50 (and in some areas 100") hectares 
including all buildings and stock were confiscated by the state 
(Art.2).The owners were given three days to quit (Art.7) and 
were forbidden to farm elsewhere in the district (Art.17)•They 
could either obtain a five hectares farm in another district or 
get a pension,which could be increased within the discretion of 
x Though the British system presents a.striking contrast,yet 
according to Prof.Rozmaryn no freedom of Press exists in the 
United Kingdom;see Rozmaryn,Nauka^о Panstwie,op.'cit.p.86 
xx C.Milosz,La Grande Tentation,Collection de la>Revue "Preuves", 
Paris,1952 
xxx cf enthusiastic view of Prof.Betts; Betts,op.cit.p.197-8 
xxxx D.U.R.P.(1944),No.2,sec.4; xxxxx D.U.R.P.No.3,sec.9 
•the Minister of Agriculture for persons who rendered "services 
to a democratic Poland" (Art.17 (2)). 
Land so confiscated was either, to be distributed among the 
smallholders and sold to them by the state,or used for some 
purpose of the state (Art. 14-).The problem of smallholders and 
dwarfish farms (which constituted a real thorn in the national 
economy of all Central European states) could hardly be solved 
by the decree which limited the newly founded farms to five 
hectarfs(Art.l2(2)).On the contrary such small farming units 
burdened with repayment of the price of the land and heavy 
taxation were doomed to a precarious existence,forcing the owners 
to form co-operative farms or join the greatly encouraged co-
— XX 
llective farms. 
The decree did not nationalize agriculture,aliowing private 
property still to exist,though it resembled the Bolshevik decree 
on land of the Second Congress of Soviets (October l^f^) in so 
far as it abolished private ownership of large estates,put the 
distribution of the land into the hands of national Councils, 
and threatened with severe punishment all opposition to the xxxx rexorm. 
Nationalisation of Industry. The nationalisation of Industry 
was a further step in the process of moulding the "economic 
basis" of the country.The law of January in a sweeping 
measure ordered confiscation without any compensation of all 
industrial,mining,communication,banking,insurance and trade 
concerns owned by Germany or German or Banzig citizens as well 
as those controlled by them(Art.2). 
Compensation was provided for the following three groups 
of enterprises ; 
x By the pre-war reform 9 hectares farms were created,yet they 
were still considered too small to be self-sufficient, 
xx see pp.244-7 and 321: xxx G.Alexandrov and Others,The History 
of the Civil War in the U.S.S.R.vol.II,(London,1947),p.317 
xxxx see p.172 ante xxxxx D.U.R.I*.No.3,sec.17 
A. Mining and industrial enterprises,namely: mines,oil and gas, 
electricity, water supply, iron works, armament, aircraft explo-
sives, coke, sugar,distilleries, breweries,yeast factories,flour 
mills,fats refineries,refrigerating stores,textile factories, 
and printing establishments. 
B. All enterprises able to employ more than 50 persons per shift. 
6. 1.All transport and communication, 
2.Telecommunication. 
In principle the industries so nationalised were to be run 
by the state,but could be transferred to recognised co-operati-
ves (Art.5). 
Trade Unions. The traditional Trade Union Movement»inspired 
by socialist ideas,was also reformed.The Movement,hitherto in-
dependent of the state though by no means friendly to the pre-
war ^ginie, was as the result of the decree of February 6,19$^ 
(as amended by the decree of January put under the tu-
telage-of the state. 
•The decree ordered the creation of Employees' Councils in 
all enterprises employing more than twenty persons (Art.l).In 
enterprises employing more than 100 persons,besides the Employees' 
Council,"trustees" were to be chosen to act as liaison officers 
between the employer and the Council (Art.2(2)). 
The aim of the Employees' Council was to represent the inte-
rests of workers vis b. vis the employer and to secure output 
and improvement of the production according to the current eco-
nomic policy of the state (Art.3).The decree determined the nu-
merical strength of the Councils in proportion to the total num-
ber of employees (Art.7) and entrusted the elaboration of their 
internal constitution to the Minister of Labour (Arts.13 and 22). 
x cf p.33 ante 
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A "social control" of the economic side of the management 
was envisaged by Art.4(3bin this respect the Council had to 
co-operate with the state administration and the national Councils. 
Neither "social control",nor "co-operation" was defined by the 
decree. 
Since the bulk of Industry became nationalised the state 
stepped into the shoes of the employer and the struggle of the 
Trade Unions for the personal interests of their members lost 
its actual purpose and chance of success.By the creation of the 
Employees' Councils co-operating with the state authorities under 
the direction of the state the traditional idea of the Trade 
Union Movement became moulded into a new conception of an offi-
cial Organisation of workers for the purpose of carrying out the 
national economic plans and boosting up production. 
The preceding pages serve to trace the legislative preparations 
for a constitutional reform.This reform was only partial in the 
law of February 19,1947,since the old system with minor amendments 
was accepted as a formal Constitution.Material changes,however, 
took place over the poriod of succeeding years and prepared the 
ground for the Constitution of 1952. 
Chapter 11. The Constitution of 1947-
As we have seen in the preceding chapters the formative stage 
in the development of the People's Democracy passed in preparation.« 
of a blueprint for a new Constitution.This Constitution was in-
troduced gradually by way of legislation passed first by the 
Communist Group and then by the same Group acting as the "Provi-
sional Government of National Unity" established under the Yalta 
decisions. 
One may wonder why the Communist Group,certain of seizing 
power upon the victory of the Red Army,did not prepare a com-
plete Constitution to be liintrodueed as soon as they became estab-
lished in Warsaw.The answer seems to be as follows: 
They realised that the country was not prepared for such a 
move and that the opposition to a political system coming from 
the East was too strong to be totally ignored.At the close of the 
war tension in Poland ran high: On the one side there was the 
Underground State and the Home Army,and on the other the new 
ideology backed by Soviet Russia.No open conflict on a national 
scale ensued though judging by the respective strengths of the 
opposing camps at the turn of 1944-45 the Communist Group had no 
chance of success if unaided by the Red Army.On the other hand, 
owing to the fact that civil war would have caused the inter-
vention of the Red Army,a rebellion against the Communist'rule 
was doomed to failure.lt would,however,have made an unfavourable 
impression on the Western protectors of Poland who hoped to es-
tablish a parliamentary system of government able also to satisfy 
Soviet Russia.We must not forget that this was the time of the 
Three Powers Unity,the cordial co-operation of the Grand Alliance 
which Soviet Russia was anxious to maintain.The tactics of the 
Kremlin favoured,therefore,"popular national fronts" representing 
"broad democratic masses" and even tolerated in the coalition 
governments what would otherwise be branded as "reactionary ele-
ments". 
Consequently the founders of the Polish People's Democracy 
had to discard the rigours of total "proletarian revolution", 
appear in the robes of legality with highly democratic slogans 
on their lips and adopt for the time being half-measures nece-
ssitating the reception of certain forms of the ancien regime. 
Those half-measures incidentally fell in with the principles 
of the Marxist philosophy as expounded by Lenin and Stalin. 
Whereas Lenin laid down that the"working class"seizing power 
must not confine itself to taking over the existing state ma-
chinery, but must destroy it completely,Marshal Stalin,used to 
working with the "capitalist" powers of the Grand Alliance,would 
not ,for their sake,insist on immediate application of the doc-
trine. Both Lenin and Stalin were agreed that a communist state 
could not be successfully established on the barren ground of 
the "capitalist" system without a special stage or epoch of 
transition, though in the case of the Baltic States reorgani-
sation took place without any preliminary preparation.Regarding 
the political system as the "superstructure" of the "economic 
and social basis" the doctrine'required the "basis" to be ade-
quately moulded so that the Constitution would be a record of 
facts and achievements.For the time being,therefore,the old 
forms could be used with advantage as long as they served the 
purpose of transition and peaceful revolution. 
Alterations of the "basis" brought about by communist rule 
from 1944 to 1947 enabled the regime to alter the "superstruc-
structure" in order to adapt it to the reality.Their achieve-
ments in this field were recorded in the so called "Little 
x V.Lenin,State and Revolution,London,ed.1937,p.30 
xx Lenin,ibid.p.67 
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Constitution" of February 19,194?. 
This law was enacted by the new legislative assembly elected 
on January,19, 194?? By the fact of the election of the new Sejm 
the K.R.N..ceased to exist by the operation of its own organic 
fiiw.Notwithstanding the dissolution of the K.R.N, by January 19, 
1947,the Presidium of the K.R.N, remained in office until Fe-
bruary 4,1947,the day of the convocation of'the Sejm.This was 
the closing date of the activities of the K.R.N.and the beginning 
of the post-war Parliament; 
The'first statute passed by the new Sejm was the law on the 
election of the President of the Repu&f^c.In this respect the 
Sejm acted technically as a constituent assembly since the ques-
tion of the election of the President was an organie part of the 
Constitution and could be touched only by an appropriate amend-
ment of the Constitution.Though the Sejm was not convened'as a 
constituent assembly (i.e.to pass a new Constitution) it had to 
amend'the Constitution of 1921 (under which it was supposed to 
be elected and sit) because the Senate,instrumental in the elec-
tion of the President,was already abolished. 
By the law of February 4,1947 the President was to be chosen 
by an absolute majority of votes (Art.7(1)) at a special sitting 
of the Sejm,two thirds of the statutory number of deputies being 
present (Art.3(2)).The President was elected for setfen years 
(Art.2),his office extending over the period of time accepted 
for both former Constitutions. 
Mr.Bierut,the Chairman of-the K.R.'N.was duly elected-Presi-
dent, the Communist Bloc having achieved an overwhelming majority 
in the Sejm. 
х-The "Little Constitution" is not a "Constitution" in the tech-
nical meaning of this term,but an ordinary statute on the 
"Organisation and Powers of the Supreme- Authorities of the 
Republic". 
xx see p.121 at seq.xxx law of 11.9.1944,amended by the law of 
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Law of February 19i1947. Though the preparations for the Elec-
tions took almost two years,the new constitutional law was en-
acted within 15 days of the opening of the Sejm,thereby frus-
x 
trating any discussions arising out of the Constitution. 
The above law was meant to be an interim measure (Art.l), 
and as we shall see in the forthcoming pages,an instrument of 
transition,another stage in the prooess of a large-scale poli-
tical reform.It did not supersede the Constitution of 1921,nor 
did it purport to amend it;it was only stated to be made "on the 
basis of the Constitution of 1921 and other laws confirmed by 
the Referendum of 
The relation between this interim measure and the Constitu-
tion of 1921 has so far been explained neither by any political 
writer nor by any theorist of the People's Democracy. 
The law of February 19,1947,however,incorporated certain 
provisions of the Constitution of 
Ш ,and expressly referred 
to others as binding.Thus the Constitution of 1921,though always 
eagerly referred to as binding altogether lost its practical 
validity,being tacitly set aside.The expression "Little Consti-
tution" , may, therefore , be a misnomer as^!ie form and origin of 
the law of February 19,1947 is concerned,but it is correct in 
fact,the Constitution of 1921 never having really been honoured. 
Notwithstanding the criticism by the official wri?e$s of the 
"reactionary form" of the Constitution of 1921,the law of 1947 
adopted its division of powers into Legislative,Executive and 
Judiciary (Art.2),but gave it an imprint of the forthcoming 
changes. 
The formal division of powers cannot be interpreted in the 
traditional way of Montesquieu.In the present version this 
x cf the public discussion on the Constitution of 1952,see p.257 
xx The Referendum-did not confirm expressly any laws,see p.119 
xxx Artsi,2,*3(2),7(1) ; xxxx Arts.11,13,19(1) 
xxx e.g.S.Rozmaryn,Polskie Prawo Panstwowe,Warsaw,1951,p.118 
division tends,in the law of 1947,more towards classification 
of the organs of the state than towards the separation of powers 
advocated by Montesquieu and other classic writers on Constitu-
tional Law. 
The idea of Montesquieu to separate powers and create thereby 
"brakes" to prevent despotism is rejected,since the People's 
Democracy is,in the words of Mr.Bierut,a form of government 
"aiming at the dictatorship of the proletariat".The state of the 
People's Democracy is not a conglomeration of classes,interests 
or economic divergencies,it is a state,where to quote again Mr. 
XXX 
Bierut," a gradual suporession and liquidation of the capitalist 
elements takes place together with the development and consoli-
dation of the basis of the future socialist economy". 
"The authority of the state",as put by Prof.RozmaryS,in the 
People's Democracy "is one and indivisible and it consists in 
the political domination of the working class".(We have already 
met elsewhere a similar theory,which advocated "un"t)Ly and indi-
visibility of the authority of state".This was the theory of 
state expounded by the Constitution of 1935 and condemned in 
post-war Poland as totalitarian.) 
The separation of powers mentioned in Art.2 is thus only 
nominal;it is only a relic of the past and a transitory classi-
fication meaning simply a technical division of competencies or 
main functions of the supreme organs of the state.Since in actual 
practice one political party pervaded the whole machinery of 
state one cannot imagine any conflict between the supreme organs 
of the state,because all of them represent one ideology and work 
under one and the same direction. 
x L'Esprit des Lois 
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Parliament. The institution of Senate fell in abeyance during 
the war and with the Referendum of June 30,1946 lost its claim 
for restitution and so the uni-cameral Parliament became the 
supreme legislative organ. 
In liberal democratic countries a bi-cameral Parliament is 
generally considered an essential part of the system,whereas 
in the People's Democracy the second chamber appears "anti-de-
mocratfc". Liberal democracy regards the second chamber as a 
means of balance and a safeguard of due consideration given to 
measures passed by Parliament,whereas the latter sees in it a 
"means of class oppression and an instrument by which economic 
exploitation of the proletariat receives a mantle of legafHy." 
The representative system,approved by Leffi^ has not been 
rejected by the People's Democracy,yet the character of its 
Parliament has been determined by the mode of uni-
cameral Parliament faces a greater danger of becoming the mouth-
piece of one party than a bi-cameral one.A one party Parliament 
seems to be the ideal solution from the point of view of the 
People's Democracy since only then,to use Lenin's words,will, it 
change from a "talking shop into a workingxoocfy*. 
The Electoral Law of 1946 determined the number of members 
of the uni-cameral Parliament at 444,as it used to be before 
1935.The deputies were guaranteed by the law of 1947 personal 
immunity with regard to political activities,were exempt from 
criminal prosecutions unless given up by the Chamberfand were 
entitled>to remuneration as well as the gratuitous use of means 
of coS^^L^ation.The Sejm would make its own internal constitu-
tion and order expulsion of its members,though the law of 1947 
did not expreMfv^My so. 
x on "democracy" in general,see p. 290 et seq 
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The period for which "the Sejm was elected in 1947 was not 
specified.The law of February 19,1947 made it five years (Art.6), 
but provided for no dissolution before the expiry of this term. 
This was quite new since former Constitutions provided a machi-
nery for that purpose.Consequently the only way of dissolution 
before the statutory term expired would be by statute amending 
the lav/ of February 19,1947,this meaning.that the duration of 
the life of the Sejm was in its own hands. 
The Sejm met twice a year for ordinary sessions (Art.7) con-
vened by the President of the Republic,who similarly to his pre-
war predecessors was given the power to convene,open,prorogue 
and close the session.An extraordinary session could be convened 
by the President on his own initiative,or at a request of one 
third of the statutory number of deputies (Art.7(4)). 
According to Art.3 the functions of the Sejm were threefold: 
to enact the Constitution,to legislate,and to control the Go-
vernment and give directions on general policy of the state. 
As we can see the principal task of the Sejm was to enact a 
new Constitution.In this capacity of a constituent assembly it 
worked for nearly five years,the first draft of the new Consti-
tution being published in April 195^. 
The Sejm was meant to be the principal lav/ making body. It 
could delegate this power to the Government (Art.4) and autho-
rise the latter to legislate by decrees,such decrees ranking 
as Acts of Parliament.Certain subjects were,however,excluded 
from the province of delegated legislation.These were (Art.4): 
Constitution,Electoral Law,control of the Administration,res-
ponsibility of the President or Mini sters,budget,national eco-
nomic plan,monetary system,conscription,local administration 
and ratification of treaties, 
x see p. 257 
An important exception to this general rule was made with 
regard to the enactment of the budget,economic plan,and cons-
cription (Art.8).Accordingly,if no statute on those subjects 
was passed by the Sejm within three months from the Government 
AS 
proposals,those proposals would be promulgated laws by the Pre-
sident in their original wording.This provision strikingly re-
sembled the law of 1926xand Art.58 of the Constitution of 1935 
repudiated by the Communist Group. 
The legislative initiative was in the hands of the Govern-
ment,the Sejm and the Council of State (Art.5).The Council of 
State,a novel institution,also exercised great influence on 
delegated legislation since all decrees had to obtain the assent 
of the Council (Art.4(3)). 
The law of February 19,t?47 recognised the principle of par-
liamentary control of the Government,but failed to define the 
means of doing so.It may be inferred,therefore,that the only 
means of control was by way of interpellations and votes of con-
xx 
fidence.In practice,criticism of the Government '&£ 1947-52 Sejm 
was,however,confined chiefly to the post facto criticism of de-
posed Ministers. 
Wo machinery was created to implement the principle of the 
parliamentary direction of the general policy of the Government. 
It was thus conceivable only by means of legislation.This,how-
ever,would be a further stage,the direction being a preliminary 
stage,or background to the legislation.Budget and economic pla-
nning appear to be the basis questions of general policy in the 
system of the People's Democracy,apart from social and indus-
trial reforms.In this field,however,the Executive plays the 
leading part notwithstanding the claims to constitutional im-XXX 
po'rtance of the budget and economic planning.This is obvious 
x see pp.21 and 29 
xx A possibility of a vote of no confidence is emphatically 
rejected by Prof.Rozmaryn,see Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.396 
xxxH.Minc,0 wlasciwe inetody planowania,Nowe Drogi, 1949,No.8,p.35-6 
because of "the technical nature of these questions and the pro-
vision of Art.8.The actual situation appears,therefore,to have 
been the reverse of that proposed by Art.3(c). 
Executive. The Executive consisted of the President,the Coun-
cil of State and the-Government (Art.2).This rightly gave the 
President as the head of state precedence over other executive 
organs.He was followed in eminence by the Council of State which 
in practice overshadowed the Government.This innovation consti-
tuted a characteristic feature of-the political system where, 
as we shall be able to see,besides the formal Executive (i.e. 
Government) there exists an "äminence grise",either in the form 
of personalities or party political elements. 
President. The presidential office was retained by the law 
under discussion.As shown by the evolution of the pre-1947 pe-
riod the institution of President was gradually restored.The 
revolutionary move by the first resolution of the K.R.N, to 
denounce the Constitution of 1935 and reject the Constitutional 
Authorities gave the Communist Group a free hand in this field 
and bßoke the legalistic continuity of the state.At that stage 
it 
they did not think wise to abolish the presidency,but restored 
it in the meantime,only to suppress it latir.They first gave 
their chairman the powers of the Speaker of the Sejm,as defined 
by the Constitution of 1921,then changed the title of the chair-
man of the K.R.N, into that of the President of the K.R.N.,who 
in turn was de facto President of the Republic until February 4, 
1947.The new legislative assembly (Sejm) at its first sitting 
passed the law on the election of the President and duly lega-
lised the de facto situation. 
The law.of February 19,194$, incorporated the law of February 4, 
1947 (Art.12); with regard to the presidential office and by way 
of reference adopted certain provisions of the Constitution of 
x see p.210 . . .xx by the Constitution of 1952 
1921? The latter defined the powers and attributes of the office 
as follows : 
a) the President is the head of the Executive and acts through 
Ministers responsible to Parliament, 
b) convenes,opens,prorogues and closes the Sejm, 
c) promulgates statutes, 
d) appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and Ministers, 
xx 
e) is the Commander-in-Chi ei of the armed forces in peace and 
appoints a Commander-in-Chief responsible to Parliament for 
the duration of war, 
f) appoints administrative officers, 
g) represents the state and appoints diplomatic officers, 
h) bestows orders and decorations, 
i) has the prerogative of mercy, 
j) concludes international treaties and submits them to the Sejm. 
The office would devolve on the Speaker of the Sejm in case 
the President died,resigned,or was unable to perform his duties. 
If the President failed to attend to his duties for three months 
the Speaker of the Sejm would convene a session to decide whether 
to consider the presidential office vacant. 
The law of February 19,1947, also adopted the provisions of 
the Constitution of 1921 with regard to responsibility of the 
President.lt thus retained the principle of the President being 
not responsible for his official acts,with the consequence of 
every such act requiring the countersignature (assent) of a res-
ponsible Minister.So much for the theory.In practice this prin-
ciple received a new meaning.First of all the principle of-parlia-
mentary responsibility became obsofe^e,secondly,the President, 
on account of his actual powers,ceased to be a mere figurehead 
x Arts.40,42,43,44,45(1),46,47,48,49,50,51,52,53 
xx This function has been emphasised by the new wording of the 
military oath:"to be faithful to the President" (lav/ of 
July 18,1950,D.U.R.P.No.36,sec.328). 
xxx see p.202 ante 
as he was meant to be by the Constitution of 1921. Probably talcing 
this situation into account the Sejm did not pass any law on the 
responsibility of the President or Ministers,though Art.27 pro-
vided for such statute to be passed later. 
The Constitution of 1921 gave the President the duty to "re-
present and officiate" and regarded him more as a symbol than 
the wielder of actual p^er.In this respect his officers incom-
patible with any other function or dignity.In the People's De-
mocracy the President was a powerful political figure being at 
the same time the Chairman of the Central Committee of the "Po-
lish Workers' Party".Though the President under former Consti-
or 
tutions could not hold a mandate in Parliament,be Premier оt 
Minister,the President of the People's Democracy by the law of 
February 19,1947 was ex-officio Chairman of the Council of 
State (Art.l5(l)) and Chairman at the Cabinet meetings (Art.17(2)) 
Whereas the Constitution of 1921 aimed at the isolation of the 
President both from Parliament and Government,this law made him 
a co-ordinator and supervisor of the supreme organs of state on x 
the pattern of the 1935 Constitution.This was only logical be-
cause the Sejm was practically a one-party Parliament,the Go-
vernment was drawn from that party and the President was its 
leader. 
This practice reaeived official confirmation in the resolu-
tion of the Cabinet of May 31,19^0,sanctioning for the President 
a permanent chairmanship over its meetings. 
The law under present discussion rightly made no provision 
for legislative decrees of the President,since the President, 
being a holder of triple power (as the President of the Republic, 
Chairman of the Executive and leader of the omnipotent party) 
Ipractically dominated the supreme organs of the state. 
x see p.27 ante,and cf also the American presidential system, 
xx Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.427 
The fact that the presidency was originally retained only 
in Poland and Czechoslovakia can be explained only by the re-
publican tradition of those countries which had to be respected 
for the transitory period.In Poland,as we saw earlier,the pre-
sidential office was instrumental in the intr-oduction of the 
People's Democracy through the manipulation of the Constitution 
of 1921,whereas Czechoslovakia continued to live under the old 
regime until the coup d'ötat of 1948,this event only bringing 
new people into the old functions. 
Council of State. The institution of a Council of State was 
without precedent in modern.Polish Constitutional Law.As a new 
organ created by the law of February 19,1947)it grew in impor-
tance , securing for itself a prominent place in the system of 
the People's Democracy.lt achieved the peak of its power during 
the forthcoming period (1947-1952) and declined under the Con-
stitution of The origin of the Council of State can be 
traced to the Presidium of the к Ж й . which at the embryonic 
stage of the system acted as a supreme organ of state. 
The Council consisted of the following members: 
a) the President of the Republic as Chairman, 
b) the Speaker of the Sejm and three deputy-Speakers, 
c) Commander in Chief of the Army, 
d) Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of State Control, 
e) members co-opted by the Council with the assent of the Sejm. 
Originally only three members could be co-opted,but by the 
law of November 8,l^f^ihere was no restriction,though the Coun-r 
cil remained in practice a very small body. 
As the law did not determine the period of service on this 
body it must be assumed that the membership of an ex-officio 
x East Germany received her constitution as late as October 1949 
xx see p.234 xxx see p. 264 et seq, 
xxxx see p.154 ante xxxxx see p. 222 
member would be terminated upon his relinquishing his office, 
whereas a co-opted member,not being elected,would be retained 
at the pleasure of ex-officio members. 
The constitutional position of the Council leaves the im-
pression that it was meant to be a permanent body forming an 
inner circle of the dignitaries of state.In this respect the 
Council has nothing in common with the Italian Consiglio di 
Stato or the French Conseil d'Btat. 
Though the Council of State appeared to be a similar body 
to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet under the Stalin Cons-
titution, its personal composition,apart from its functions,con-
siderably differed from its Russian counterpart.Another anomaly 
was the presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army,a posi-
tion without precedence in any other system based on the Soviet 
Constitution.This curiosity of the Polish system may be traced 
to the dualism of the Civil and Military authorities characteris-
tic of the Constitution of 1935 and the tradition of military 
leadership between the two wars. 
The powers of the Council of State were quite extensive and 
not confined to one type of function,but the Council did not at 
this stage assume the position equivalent to that of the Presi-
dium of the Russian Supreme Soviet so far adopted by five other 
People's Democracief.In particular these were the competencies 
of the Council (Art.16) : 
a) general supervision of the national Councils within the powers 
of the original K.R.N, and the Presidium of the K.R.N, as 
defined by the law of September 11, 
b) powers of the Presidium of the K.R.N.as given by other laws, 
c) assent to Government decree's, 
x The Presidium is an elected body,see Art.48 of Soviet ConstiSu*-
xx Albania,Bulgaria,Hungary,Rumania and Yugoslavia,though for 
the changes in the Constitution of Yugoslavia see 
J.Dordevic,Constitutional Reform in Yugoslavia,Review of In-
ternational Affairs,vo}.III,No.24,p.l5 et seq 
xxx see pp.154 and 155 ante 
d) decision on the proclamation of the state of emergency, 
e) legislative initiative, 
f) assent to the budget»national economic plan,and conscription 
in cases provided by Art.8? 
g) examination of the reports of the Supreme Chamber of State 
Control. 
Though the K.R.N.(as the national Council representing all 
lower Councils and acting as the "Temporary Parliament") died 
its natural death through the election of the legislative assembly 
xx 
its Presidium remained until the first session of the Sejm. 
Something had to be done to carry on the functions and exercise 
the extensive and independent powers of the Presidium of the 
late K.R.N.Therefore a new body,the Council of State,was created 
to fill the gap.In other words the Council of State succeeded 
the K.R.N.in its function as the supreme national Council and 
assumed the highest place in the hierarchy of Councils.We have 
here to bear in mind the importance of the Councils acting both 
in a general and political capacity as the ideological framework 
of the Administration.Those Councils were the political and 
ideological agents of the r£gime ranging in a pyramidal fashion 
from the smallest communities to the whole of the territory of 
the state.By the extinction of the K.R.N, they were deprived of 
their common head,which had to be replaced by the Council of 
State.In this capacity the Council of State acted independently 
as a constitutional organ of state and so to speak stood at the 
same hierarchical level as the Sejm. 
In other field the Council acted in conjunction with the re-
maining" supreme organs of the state.In legislative matters the 
Council could propose laws on the same footing as the Government 
or Parliament,and its assent was indispensable for Government 
decrees to receive the authority of statutes, 
x see p.202 ante xx see p.197 ante 
In "the very important question of proclaiming the state of 
emergency,equivalent to a suspension of constitutional freedoms, 
the Council was the supervisory authority confirming a Government 
order? 
The powers of the Council became enlarged by subsequent le-
gislation, its internal constitution remaining as originally un-
defined and ephemeral.Taking into consideration the functions of 
the President of the Republic and the growing importance of the 
Council of State,one can say that the Council"represented a con-
stitutional means of the concentration of powers,and a channel 
for the transition of the former system of parliamentary govern-
ment into a party dictatorship. 
Government. The law of February 19,1947, did not revolutionize 
the traditional conception of the Government,except for the control 
by the Council of State.Much of the Constitution of 1921 was 
adopted in this field and the form of the Government remained 
untouched. 
The Government consisted of the Prime Minister and Ministers. 
No Constitution had so far defined the number of Ministers,but 
before the war they did not exceed twenty.As in pre-war times 
the President appointed the Prime Minister and Ministers on the 
Premier's advice.In the period of the K.R.N, the number of Minis-
ters was fixed at l§*but subsequent laws changed this arrange-
ment. Since the President appointed Ministers for specified de-
partments^ statute would be needed in case it was desirgd to 
increase the number of departments.In practice the number of Mi-
nisters tended to increase,and they were grouped into teams under 
the supervisioneof vice-Premiers.This resulted in quite a large 
Cabinet (all Ministers being of equal rank),consisting in 1951 
of the Premier,four vice-Premiers,28 department Ministers,two 
x Under the pre-war system ultimate decision lay with Parliament, 
xx by the law of December 31,1944,Art.2 (D.U.R.P.No.l9,sec;99) 
Ministers without Portfolio,Chairman of .the Planning Commission, 
his two deputies and an Under Secretary of State attached to the 
Cabinet? 
As a matter of principle most Ministers were members of the 
P.Z.P.ä? and as such subject to party discipline.Art.27 (§3) of 
the constitution of the P.Z.P.R. states that "the Central Commitee 
directs and controls activities of members occupying posts of * 
national importance".This simply means that the party constitutes 
the actual power behind the Government.Since the Central Committee 
has for its chairman Mr. Bierut,the President of the Republic 
under the Constitution of 1947,the Government has been reduced 
to a mere technical team working under the close supervision 
of the inner circle which is composed of a few dignitaries.Those 
people need not necessarily be dignitaries of state,a high po-
sition in the party securing adequate influence on public affairs. 
The Government as a collective body,besides its administrative 
function and making of general policy,was allocated an important 
part in the legislative process.lt could propose laws'.(Art.5) 
and legislated by decrees.The latter power was exercised in two 
ways through delegated legislation,and through executive decrees. 
Owing to its size the Cabinet was rather unwieldy.Practice, 
therefore,confirmed by the above mentioned resolution of the 
Cabinet of May 31,1950,created an inner circle within the Cabi-
net, called the "Presidium of the Government".It consisted of the 
Premier as chairman,vice-Premiers,and its own Under Secretary of 
State.This body must be considered as the actual Government of 
the Republic under the 1947 Constitution,the Ministers being 
assigned to technical departmental duties.The authority of this 
body has been enhanced by'the presence of the President of the 
x by the end of 1952 there were 6 vice'premiers and 32 depart-
ment Ministers. 
xx the party created in 1948 after the fusion of the Workers' 
Party(Communist) with the pro-Communist Socialists. 
Republic v/ho usually attended its meetings and took the chair. 
I The institution of an inner circle within the Government is 
I x / not unusual- in the system of parliamentary democracy,but it is 
uncommon for the head of the state to attend and preside over 
the regular (other than emergency) meetings of such a body.The 
explanation of this practice in Poland seems to lie in the inter-
play of the personalities within the rägime and in the transi-
tory character of the Constitution of 1947.With the abolition 
of the presidency by the Constitution of 1952 Mr.Bierut (hitherto 
President) became Prime Minister and through this metamorphosis 
a continuation of the practice was ensured,the abolition of the 
presidency meaning only a formal amendment of the system. 
Much speculation has grown around the mysterious personality 
XX 
of Mr.Jacob Berman, who though being only an Under Secretary of 
St ate, is also a member of the "Presidium of the Government*. There 
is no doubt that this formally modest post was entrusted to a 
man of great abilities,high standing in the party and enjoying 
the confidence of the Kremlin.Yet it seems that his function is 
rather tecSni^al,which by no means deprives the Presidium of his 
expert advice on the application of the Marxist-Leninist-Stali-
nist doctrine. 
When discussing the Government it is impossible not to men-
tion a newcomer,the Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission 
holding a ministerial rank and being a member of the Cabinet. 
The institution of economic planning came into prominence owing 
to the changes in the economic structure of the country and the 
state taking into its hands all direction and control in this 
field.Created on the Soviet pa?£ern it was new in Poland but ne-
cessary for the development of a "socialist state*.Though taking 
1 x cf the British system xx Gunther,op.cit.pp.256 and 262-3 
xxx see p.133-4 ante xxxx cf Soviet Constitution Art.48 
xxxxx cf Soviet Constitution,Art.11 
the form of an economic dictatorship in the system of the People's 
Democracy,the idea of planning seems sound and consistent with 
the development of modern conception of government. 
Administration The law of February 19,1947, was very concise in 
Q^'i^UStiCe*this matter.It only re-stated the principle of judi-
cial independence (Art.24) which,as we were able to see? was con-
siderably curtailed in practice.A prospect of reorganisation of 
the current system and restoration of the jurisdiction of ordi-
nary courts was expressed by Art.25(1),but this was to become 
subject to later legislation.The status of judges as well as 
the mode of appointment to the bench was also left to be defined 
later (Art.25(2)). 
Thus the constitutional statute did nothing in this important 
field to bring the country back to normal.As before»Military 
Courts were allowed to function,and lesser matters were left in 
the hands of the "People's Courts",whose mounting importance 
gave a characteristic imprint to the administration of justice. 
General Characteristics. The constitutional statute of February 
19,1947, was well adapted to its transitory function.Though for-
mally introducing no revolutionary changes into the former system 
of a "bourgeois-democracy" (as referred to by contemporary writers 
in Poland) it left enough gaps to facilitate infiltration of 
new ideas. 
The form remained,amended only by the institution of a uni-
cameral Parliament and the Council of State,but the matter became 
totally changed. 
The reception of the many provisions of the Constitution of 
1921 had no material significance since most of them remained 
a dead letter,or became transformed in practice into something 
different. 
x see p.318 et seq xx see p.162 et seq 
The statute also adopted the terms and institutions of the 
old system which,when confronted with actual practice,had lost 
their original meaning and purpose (e.g.parliamentary responsi-
bility, presidential office,independence of judges,and so on). 
The formal division of powers became obsolete owing to the 
arrangement of functions and the preponderance of the Executive. 
If one applies the traditional classification of systems of 
government, Poland by the law of February 19,1947, became a 
"presidential'democracy" far .stronger than the system of the 
much abused Constitution of 1935.But the traditional method of 
classification does not apply to the system of the People's 
Democracy and,therefore,it may be described as a transitory 
stage from a "bourgeois state" into a state of party dictatorship. 
Chapter 12. Amendments of the Constitution of 1947. 
A discussion on legislation affecting the Constitution wpuld 
he incomplete without a brief review of the atmosphere in which 
the preparation for a new Constitution took place. 
Parliament and The Elections of January,1947,resulted in 
Government. ^ overwhelming majority for the Government Bloc 
listed as the Workers' Party (P.P.R.),Socialist Party (P.P.S.), 
Peasant Party (S.L.),Democratic Party (S.D.) and several splinter 
parties created ad hoc on the eve of the Elections.Out of the of 
total 444 seats in Parliament,382 were held by the Government 
Bloc,31 by groups of various parties collaborating with the Bloc, 
and 3 so-called "progressive catholics".The Opposition numbered 
28 members,that is 27 deputies of the genuine Peasant Party 
(P.S.L.) led by Mr.Mikolajczyk and one independent socialist 
(Z.Zulawski,a veteran left wing socialist leader who refused to 
submit to the Bloc). 
This tiny Opposition was,however,not immune from attacks by 
the Government supporters (at that time directly transmitted 
over the Radio from the Parliament chamber),those attacks openly 
aiming at its total destruction.A retort, by ZulawsSi and the 
efforts of the Mikolajczyk group to parry the assault ended with 
a threat on the side of the Government BloO to strip them of 
their parliamentary immunity. 
Several mass trials were used to implicate either the Socia-
lists opposing the Government Bloc or the Peasant Party led by 
Mr.Mikolajczyk.Early in 1947,in addition to the pre-Election 
terror,18 members of the Peasant Party were sentenced to del tn 
for underground activities and their leader was named in the 
x in his speech in the Sejm on February 8,1947 xx chief Government's spokesman General 0chab,see p.136 ante 
xxx New York Times of January 22,1947 
•trial of Gol.Iipins^i. 
The summer of 1947 'brought an intensification bft the" anti-
Opposition campaign and in July some 23 Socialists were arrested, 
while in September 9 followers of Mr.Mikolajczyk were sentenced 
to death for "contacts with emigres and passing secrets to the 
American Ambassador*. The latter trial warned Mr.^ikolajczyk of 
the increasing probability of his being put into the dock. 
The Opposition became finally extinct with the escape of Mr. 
Mikolajczyk from Poland in October 1947,and the death of Zygmunt 
Zula'wski.The elimination of the Opposition was officially acc-
laimed as another victory of "democratic thought over the agents 
of Anglo-American imperiaJism". 
b The Government of 1947 headed by Mr. CyraniEiewicz consisted 
of- two vice-Premiers and 23 Ministers,the key positions being 
held by members of the Communist Workers' Mr£y? 
Creation of The destruction of the Opposition was followed 
Single Party. ^ a reorganisation of the party system and a 
purge of unorthodox elements.Whereas the pre-Election tendency 
favoured a multi-party system (organised,however,into the Govern-
ment Bloc with a-pre-arranged distribution of seats) the post-
Election development was directed towards the creation of a 
single party.Fusion was arranged only between the Socialists 
and the Communists,the remaining parties being ignored. 
During this process the Socialist Party had to make radical 
changes in order to toe the communist line,these changes being, 
in the words of Mr.Cyran^fewfcz,"a bitter struggle within the 
party against the right wing elements".The evolution went through 
x The Scotsman,January 9,1947 
xx Manchester Guardian,July 19,1947 
xxx The Times,August 13,1947 and News Chronicle,September,11,1947« 
xxxx Bierut,speech at the Congress of Socialist and Communist 
Parties in December 1948,Nowe Drogi,1948,No.12,p.7 
xxxxx see p.133 ante 
xxxxxx e.g.Defence,Security,Foreign Affairs,Industry and Trade, 
Education,Regained Territories, 
xxxxxxx speech at the Congress,Nowe Drogi,ibid.p.20 et seq 
the following stage!:" the pact of unity of action with the 
Communists of November 1946,wrecked bv the Right during the 
Elections; the resolution of the Central Committee of June 1947 
to adopt a radical policy,sabotaged in practice by the Right; 
the Congress in Wroclaw of June 1948,still registering a great 
influence of the right wing elements; and finally the session 
of the Supreme Council of the Party of Septemebr 1948 which 
marked the. elimination of the Right". 
This internal evolution of the Socialist Party was conside-
rably stimulated by external pressure exerted by the Government 
by means of propaganda and political trials.Socialist,particularly 
those associated with the war-time WvR.Jf?, were from the beginning 
of the regime repressed as being among those vrtio opposed the 
communist rule and were supposed'to have "betrayed the" socialist 
cause by their right wing leanings".The mortal blow was delive-
red a few days before the fusion Congress when veteran socialist 
leaders Puzak,Szturm de Szterm,Dziegielewski,Misiorowski,Kohn 
and Krawczyk were tried and convicted for "anti-state activities. 
Similar in effect,though different in methods,was the puri-
fication of the Communist Workers' Party.Here the chief scape-
goat ^Ladislas GoüSffiEa, was made to recant his errors and,as be-
comes a good party man,to purge himself in self-critical speeches 
at the meeting of the party's Central Committee (August 31 -
September 8).Gomulka (who was Secretary-General of the party 
and Secretary to the Cominform) fell into disgrace with the 
Kremlin for alleged association with the Titoist schism.His 
main guilt,however,was "deviation from the Marxist philosophy, 
opportunism,nationalism,distrust of Soviet Russia,opposition to 
x Cyrankiewich,op.cit.p.32 xx see p.58 ante 
xxx The trial took place from November 5,to November 19,1948, 
see D.Healey and Others,The Curtain Falls,London,1951,p.50-51 
xxxx see p.132 ante 
xxxxx recorded in Nowe Drogi,1948,No.11,pp.40-50 and 135-145 
immediate collectivisation,and misrepresentation of the process 
of development towards socialist". 
The fusion of the two parties into one "United Polish Workers' 
Party" (P.Z.P.R.) in December 1948 crowned the five years evo-
lution since the creation of the Communist K.R.N.in December 
1943«Mr.Bierut,in his speech on that occasion, after paying the 
customary tribute to Soviet Russia and the Red Army,considered 
the amalgamation of the parties "a big step towards socialism, 
an act strengthening the authority of the united party,consoli-
dating the power of the state and facilitating the struggle 
against the opposition".The united party,could,in his opinion, 
more easily and better utilise the experience achieved in Soviet 
Russia,improve the eultural and ideological development of the 
country,assimilate the precepts of Marxism and bring about ideo-
logical education of the nation". 
Another leader of• the People's Democracy,General Marian Spy-
chalüci (now deposed for "deviationism and association with 
Gomulka and emigrä circles"),thought the fusion to be the prin-
cipal act in the consolidation of the political system and a 
contribution towards a final liquidation of the "capitalist-
imperialist elements",the chief enemy of sociafüm. 
The importance of the fusion has been adequately explained 
by the authorities quoted above.In recapitulation we may add 
that this meant submission to Communism of the Socialist Party -
the only party of standing in the coalition with the regime -
and the final defeat of those who dreamed of a separate path 
towards "socialism" and of an independence of Soviet Russia in 
that venture. 
x In 'particular Gomulka dared to maintain that "there is now 
no dictatorship of the proletariat in Soviet Riissia,but a 
Soviet democracy",cf E.Ochab,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.5,p.29 
xx Nowe Drogi,1948,No.12,p.4 et seq; txxx see-p.132 ante 
xxxx 0 Jednosci Tradycji Zjednoczonej Partii,Nowe Drogi,1948, 
No.12,p.37 
After the fusion the United Party had 1,4 million members, 
930.000 of whom were the former P.P.R. and only 470.000 the 
former Socialist Party.The social composition of the United 
Party was in March 1949 as follow!: 787.000 industrial workers, 
282.000 Army and Security Police,238.000 peasants,62.000 agri-
cultural, workers, 28. 000 artisans and 3.000 shopkeepers.Taking 
into account the fact that before the war about 65% of the whole 
population lived by agriculture the proportion of peasants and 
agricultural workers as against the Army and Security Police 
speaks for itself. 
Marshall Aid. A final integration of the Polish People's De-
mocracy into the Soviet Bloc was marked by two events : the re-
fusal of Marshall Aid and the arrival of the Russian Marshal Ro-
kossovsky. 
The news of the European Recovery Programme announced by the 
American Secretary of State George Marshall in the summer of 1947 
was warmly received in countries devastated by war.Both Czecho-
slovakia and Poland accepted in principle participation in the 
Plan,but after a Moscow rebuke,hastily withdrew and failed to 
appear at the Paris Conference.There is no secret about this So-
viet intervention,though the Plan was subsequently condemned 
throughout the Central and Eastern Europe as an "imperialist 
xx 
assault against the sovereignty" of those countries.As an alter-
native to the Marshall Plan Russia presented them with a Council 
for Economic Mutual Assistance,whose principal aim was an eco-
nomic conglomeration of the Soviet Bioc,incomparaofe,however, 
with the benefits of the Marshall Aid. 
x figures by R.Zambrowski,Stalinowska Nauka о Sojuszu Robotniczo-
Chlopskim,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.6,p.114 et seq 
xx cf Cominform's Manifesto,quot.in The Strategy and Tactics of 
World Communism,Rep.No.5,80th Congress,2nd session,Washington, 
1948,pp.209-211 
xxx On exploitation of the vassal states see Y.Gluckstein, 
Stalin's Satellites in Europe,London,1952,(on Poland,p.61-2) 
Marshal Rokossovsky. Marshal Tito's rift with the Kremlin un-
doubtedly precipitated the sending to Warsaw of a pro-consul 
in the person of the Marshal of the Red Army Konstantin Roito-
ssovsky.This officer was in command of the Soviet Armies which 
stopped at the gates of Warsaw during the rising in autumn 1944 
and marched into the ruins of the capital in January 1945.In 
autumn 1949 he was "given as a gift to the Polish nation in 
token of the Soviet-Polish friendsÜfp", was made Marshal of 
Poland,Commander in Chief of the Polish Army,Minister of Defence 
and a member of the Council of State. 
Apart from the political significance the arrival of Marshal 
Rokossovsky echoed a military interest of the Kremlin in the 
position of Poland,the largest vassal state situated in a stra-
tegically important area.In the post-war reorganisation of the 
Polish Army,the nucleus of which were the troops formed during 
the 
war under Soviet command,an important röle was assigned to 
high ranking'Red Army officers put in 'actual command of Polish 
units.Such for instance was the Chief of General Staff General 
Korczyc,one of his deputies Gen.Rolid.ewicz,the officer comman-
ding the Ground PorcestGen.PoplawMi,Air Force: Gen.Turkiel, 
Navy: Admiral Czerokow,Armoured Forces:Gen.Suchow,Artillery: 
Gen.Bewziuk,Technical Units:Gen.Bardzillowski,Signals:Gen.Ma-
linowski,and several regional commanders as well as the chief 
of Intelligence Gen.Kasznikow,not to count minor offfMrs,espe-
cially in the Intelligence Service and Political Education Corps. 
A natural rivalry between the alien newcomers and the native 
officers was put to an end when Marshal Rokossovsky took command. 
The deposition of Marshal "Rola"-Zymierski,Gen.Spy^Sifski and 
the purge of the senior officers' corps in the trial of Generals 
x Usually referred to in British Press as "Polish born". /1949 
xx Mr.Bierut in his speech greeting the Marshal,Polish Daily,8.11. 
xxx Over 3.000 Soviet citizens were given Polish citizenship. 
Most of them assumed Polish sounding surnames, 
xxxx Now one of the viee-Ministers of Defence. 
xxxxx Officers named here were in command in spring 1953. 
xxxxxx One of the vice-Ministers of Defence after the death of 
Gen.Swierczewski,believed to have been killed by partisans, 
Mossor,Tatar,Herman and Hirchmayer together with five other 
senior officers was the second stage of the reorganisation of 
the Army and an aftermath of Marshal Rokossovsky1s appearance 
in the röle of a Pole. 
Struggle for Power. On the political scene the rivälryybetween 
the "native" and "foreign" leaders had also come to a head,but 
no real struggle for power ensued.A distinction between the two 
groups was pretty clear from the very beginning of the system, 
the "foreigners" occupying key positions. 
Already during the Gomulka crisis it was mainly the "natives" 
who found themselves on the proscription list,and of the fifteen 
members of the Politbureau chosen in December 1948 (during the 
fusion Congress) nine prominent places were taken by the "foreign-
ers".In 1949 General Jozwiak-Witofcf ("native),the vice-Minister 
of Public Security was deposed but reappeared in 1950 as a member 
of the State Control Chamber,and the place of General Spychalski 
(native),who was accused of attempting to remove "excellent Soviet 
commanders given t^us'^was taken by General Ochab ("foreigner"). 
In April 1949^Mr.Mine ("foreigner") became the economic dictator 
as a'vice-Premier and Chairman of the Planning Commission,his 
two deputies (Mr.Szyr and Mr.Jedrychowski) being o"f the same 
group.The purge of 1948-49 brought do'wn also several junior mem-
bers of the Government such as the Minister of Food Lecnowicz, 
vice-Ministers J.Dubiel (deputy of Gomulka),S.Коwalewski (Agri-
culture ) ,R, Boro wy (Forestry),T.Kochanowicz (Social Service) and 
Widy-Wirski(Shipping),all of whom belonged to the "native" group. 
The leadership of the Central Council of Trade Unions was 
entrusted to Gen.Zawacf^i, a defender of Stalingrad and political 
officer in the Polish Army under Soviet command. 
x Daily Telegraph,31.7.1951 and The Times,3.8.1951 
xx Former Chief of Staff of the "People's Guards",see p.94 ante 
xxx M.Naszkowski,Nauki Procesu Bandy Szpiegowsko-Dywersyjnej, 
Nowe Drogi,1951,No.4,p.33 
xxxx Replaced by Mr.W.Klosiewicz on becoming vice-Premier in 1950. 
Mr.Zawadzki is at the present Chairman of the Council of State 
The list of the Government posts by the end of 1949 clearly 
showed the domination of the "foreign gx*oup", which for obvious 
reasons enjoyed a wider confidence of the Kremlin than did their 
indigeneous colleagues,This victory of the more radical,more 
indoctrinated and certainly pro Russian element meant,in fact, 
a more determined application of the doctrine and a more vigo-
rous pursuance of the "socialisation programme",the year of 1950 
being the corner-stone of the development. 
Amendments of the Five years of political planning and action 
1947 Constitution. w e r e c o n s u m ed in the moulding of the remainder 
of the "bourgeois-democratic" state of 1947 into a more advanced 
form of the People's Democracy.Similar to the preceding period 
the process did not evolve through sweeping general reforms,but 
took the shape of gradual reorganisation.lt is not surprising, 
therefore,that the lav/ of February 19,1947,though at its very 
inception in most parts a dead'letter,suffered only three direct 
amendments. 
The formal aspect of the Constitution remained thus unchanged, 
the material reforms being effected by means of specific legis-
lation and practice.The latter especially made the apparent 
accord between the form and the matter of the Constitution illu-
sory, so much so that.it became fictitious by 1952,the practice 
having outgrown the formal boundaries of the Constitution.Though 
this phenomenon would be considered anomalous in Western Demo-
cracies,the People's Democracy accepts it as inevitable,seeing 
in the Constitution (charter) an official record of past achie-
vements. Furthermore, the system of the People's Democracy being 
xx a transitory form of government,by its very nature embodies a 
discrepancy between the form and the matter,though the theorists, 
Y X X following Stalinist dialectics,assume that "there is no conflict 
x see p. 196 xx see p. 302 
xxxv J. Stalin,"Works,Warsaw, 1949, vol. I.pp.327 and 329 
between the form and the matter,but only a conflict between the 
old form and a new matter,the latter being in quest for a new 
form." 
The formal amendments we are about to discuss dealt mainly 
with the position of the Council of State which in this period 
achieved the peak of its power. 
The law of February 19,1947, was first amended by the law of 
November 8, which abolished the provision of Art.l5(3) 
limiting the number of co-opted members of the Council of state. 
As a result of this amendment the Sejm,as well as the Council, 
became free of constitutional restrictions in forming the per-
sonal composition of the Council,but the Council still remained 
a small body. 
With the reform of the system of National Councils by the 
law of March 20,f§f$ the powers of the Council of State also 
had to be adjusted,bringing about another amendment of the law 
of Х Ш 
.The Council of State assumed-thereby the "supreme control" 
over the reorganised national Councils",which in their turn 
became "regional organs of the uniform authority of the state". 
It is important to note this evolution because it changed the 
formal aspect of the system of Councils and finally registered 
the actual situation.Originally the pyramid of national Councils, 
as announced by the decree of Septe"mber?3[$f§44,gave the impression 
that the lower Councils constituted the source of power of the 
higher Councils,the K.R.N, being thus an emanation of the popular 
representation of the masses.This was,of course,only a theory 
since the K.R.N, was not an elected body,the existence of the 
Councils and their activities were rather ephemeral and the 
K.R.N, (or strictly speaking its Presidium) was the actual ruler. 
x Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.300 xx D.U.R.P.No.57,sec.447 
xxx see p.206 ante xxxx D.U.R.P.No.14,sec.130 
xxxxx D.U.R.P.No.14,sec.129 xxxxxx see p.152 et seq 
By the amendment of March 20,1950 the theoretical situation 
became reversed and the existing practice was sanctioned.Instead 
of being the source of power the lower Councils became "organs" 
of the Administration and the Council of State the personifi-
cation of the "uniform authority of the state". 
System of Councils. National Council^, the product of the 
early legislation of the People's Democracy,appeared in 1950 
in a new,finished form and replaced the dual system of regional 
administration that had hitherto obtained.This dual system,adop-
ted for the transitory period,consisted in the local self-go-
vernment authorities (Councils) co-operating with the organs 
of central administration (District and Provincial Governors). 
It survived until the reform of 1950 which created a unitary 
system of the administration of the state by the abolition of 
the governorship!. 
The genesis, of the present system goes back to the theoreti-
cal foundations of the -^eo^le's Democracy and the experience 
of the Soviet Union.The Paris Commune hailed by Marx as the 
"finally discovered political form able to bring about the econo-
mic liberation of the working cfals",is supposed to be the pro-
totype of the system.The Soviet State,on the other hand,trans-
lated this idea into actual practice by creating a Republic of 
Councils,imitated by the founders of-the People's Democracies. 
This tradition was well summarised by one of the leaders of 
the Polish People's Democracy:" These popular councils,developed 
in the two revolutions of 1917,regarded by the genius of Lenin 
and Stalin as the most effective weapon of the working class 
in the struggle for socialism,became an inspiration of the inter-
national proletariat.They are now created whenever the working 
x see Diagram,Appendix,No.2 
xx Several governors,however,have been installed as chairmen of 
their respective Councils,see Polish Daily of 26.5.L950 and 
7.6.1950. 
xxx Lenin,State and Revolution,op.cit.p.79 
class in a revolutionary struggle fights for power,and they be-
come established on the victory of the working cla^s". 
Though this "revolutionary struggle" took in Poland the pe-
culiar form of the conquest by the Red Army and the establishment 
of the "rule of the working class" was ensured by international 
decisions,the above quoted writer frankly admitted the actual 
source of the inspiration and traced the technique to two stages 
corresponding to the progress of the development of the politi-
cal system. 
The system of Councils was brought to Poland as early as 1944, 
but the experiment apparently failed.True,the nature of the ori-
ginal Councils indicated their "class" character and a copy of 
of the development during the Bolshevik revolution,but to perform 
their function they had first to pass a test of political relia-
bility, be purged from "reactionary" elements and educated in the 
""progressive spfrft". Apparently their röle was not appreciated 
and even a section of the leadership represented by the deposed 
G-omulka failed to understand the importance of the Councifs? 
The defeat of the deviationists and the consolidation of the 
party through the fusion of 1948 were thus important and nece-
ssary steps towards the creation of ideological conditions,pro-
pitious for the reform.The reform,in the words of Mr. Bier«?** 
meant a "transition to a higher stage of the social and politi-
cal organisation of the state". 
The law of 1950 scored a considerable success in advancing 
the cause of the People's Democracy along the proven theoretical 
lines of the Marxist-Leninist ideology.Furthermore it was an im-
portant step towards assimilation to the Soviet system which was 
x A.Zawadzki,Istota i Rola Rad Narodowych jako Jednolitych Orga-
now Wladzy,Nowe Drogi,1950,No.2,p.110 
xx K.Morawski,Uwagi do Zagadnienia Rad Narodowych w Polsce Lu-
dowe j ,Panstwo i Prawo,Warsaw,1950,No.7,p.15 
xxx Zawadzki,ibid.pp.113 and 115;xxxx Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.480 
xxxxx B.Bierut,Zadania Partii w Walce о Nowe Kadry,Nowe Drogi, 
1950,No.2,p.37 
regarded as a superior stage in the development towards socialism. 
Art.l of the law of March 20,1950 »stating that the Councils 
"are the territorial organs of the uniform authority of the state" 
was a direct translation of Art.94 of the Soviet Constitution 
of 19^6. 
The new Councils were to be elected by the people (Art.2), 
the electoral law to be.defined by special legislation.Electors 
could revoke the mandate of their representatives (Art.3),the 
circumstances of such action being also left to future legisla-
XX 
tionBv those provisions a member of the Council would have to 
be in constant contact with the electors whose displeasure might 
deprive him of his mandate.This principle of representation 
(incidently taken from the Soviet Constitution,Art.142) did not XXX 
apply to parliamentary eleccion.In practice the existing Councils 
retained their position and remained in office.So far ne fresh 
election took place,except for individual changes in particular 
Councils. 
The Councils,concentrating in their hands the uniform autho-
rity of the state with regard to local affairs, were given consi-
derable powers.In particular they were authorised to : "direct 
all economic,social and cultural activities within their bounda-
ries, safeguard public order and supervise execution of laws, 
protect public property and civic rights of the citizen,co-ope-
rate in the improvement of the defence of the state,legislate 
in matters delegated to them by statute,make economic plans for 
the given territory within the national economic plan,enact 
budgets within the national budget and decide upon local„taxa-
.From this list of extensive functions and powers one can 
x.hailed by Prof.Rozmaryn as the "document of greatest historical 
importance",Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.488 
xx no such legislation appeared as yet. 
xxx see present Electoral Law,p. 281 
xxxx cf similar provisions,Soviet Constitution,Arts.97 and 98 
see that each Council within its boundaries acted as a legis-
lative, executive and controlling body corresponding to the idea 
of a "uniform authority of the state". 
The threefold hierarchy of regional Councils (communal,dist-
rict and provincial Councils) left much room for overlapping of 
competencies and it became necesary to adjust the planning of 
lower Councils to the plans of the higher ones.Conflicts were, 
however»excluded by the hierarchical organisation and by the 
overall supervision of the whole system by the Council of State. 
A higher Council could set aside a resolution of a lower Council 
if such resolution was inconsistent with the law or the policy 
of the state (Art.29).The Council of State could do the same 
with regard to resolutions of all other Councils. 
Whereas the communal,district and provincial Councils were 
primarily organs of local (or regional) administration,the Coun-
cil of State was the supreme organ of the central administration. 
In this capacity the Council of State ordained elections of mem-
bers of the lower Councils,gave advice,directed the Councils in 
the field of social policy,examined reports of "the lower Councils 
and their activities (Art.26).The Council of State was competent 
to dissolve any lower Council and order new elections,if such 
Council "neglected its duties or acted contrary to laws and ge-
neral policy of the state"(Art.27). 
The system of Councils is a system of centralised adminis-
tration based more on party allegiance than the civil service 
x 
apparatus.This kind of centralism involves a twofold subordination 
consisting in the subordination of the given Council to the 
electors as well as to the hierarchical authority of the higher 
organs of the state.We can note,however,that in the method of 
appointing the Councils the citizen (even if he was an elector) 
x Zawadzki,op.cit.p.123 xx Delegation, and co-option in Poland,election in Soviet Russia. 
had actually little influence on the choice of members of the 
given Council,this influence diminishing gradually with the 
higher hierarchical status.of Council!.As far as the highest 
Council was concerned (i.e.the Council of State) this body had 
a constitutional status of its own and can hardly be deemed to 
be dependent on the will of the peopte. 
Besides the Council of State the Government and Ministers 
were also authorised to direct and instruct the Councils (Art.5). 
In this respect the authority of the Government and Ministers 
was lower than that of the Council of State since the former 
were to act only in a technical capacity and in conjunction with 
the latter.This is well illustrated by the provision of Art.30 
which allowed the Government only to suspend resolutions of pro-
vincial Councils and submit their decision to the Council of 
State for approval. 
The purpose of the reform of the system of Councils was so 
summarised by Mr.BieMt: 
" l.to link the organs of the state with the masses, 
2.to strengthen the authority of the state through its unifor-
mity, co-ordination and participation of the masses in the 
government, 
3.to improve the machinery of the state by abolition of the 
division of powers into the legislative and Executive,and 
into the central(state) and local (regional) functions, 
4.tcfight bureaucratic deviation in the administration through 
a control of the state apparatus by the masses, 
5.to develop creative initiative and activity of the masses 
in the building of a new socialist system,and to increase 
the strength,welfare and culture of the nation". 
x see p.153 ante 
xx The Council of State consisted of ex officio and co-opted 
members,see p.206 ante, 
xxx B.Bierut,Zadania Partii w Walce. о Nowe Kadry,Nowe Drogi, 
1950,No.2'.p.34 
In short,the idea of the reform was to improve the system on 
the Soviet pattern,to wedge the masses into the machinery of the 
omnipotent state,and to make the individual an ideological partner 
of the rägime under the guise of direct participation in govern-
ment. This view seems to be confirmed by the preamble to the law 
of March 20,1950,which.introducing the new system so stated its 
aims:"...for a further democratisation of the country through a 
more complete sharing of the working masses in the government,for 
full centralisation of the local rule of the people as well as 
for further consolidation of the People's Democracy and speeding 
up of the building of socialism in Poland". 
Further increase In the course of legislation the position 
of Power of the f t h e C o u n c i l became further enhanced.New Council of State. 
institutions (such as the ^hief State Prosecutor, 
the Special Commission for the Prosecution of Corruption,Fraud 
and Economic Sabotage),and reorganised institutions (such as the 
Supreme Chamber of Stale Control) became subordinated to the 
authority of the Council of State.The Council gained,thereby, 
not only control over the Executive,but also participation in the 
legislation and in the shaping of the general policy of the state. 
Office of the The institution of the Chief "State Prosecutor 
Chief State introduced into Poland bv the law of July 20, Prosecutor. " «у > 
195Ö,in order "to consolidate the People's Democracy, 
protect public property,and prosecute crimes"(Art.l).The Chief 
xx 
State Prosecutor v/as to be appointed by the Council of State 
(Art.5(1)),and was bound to act according to the directions of 
the Council (Art.6(1)).One of his deputies was the Chief Military 
Prosecutor appointed by the Chairman of the Council of State at 
the instance of the Minister of Defence (Art.5(3)).The office 
x D.U.R.P.No.38,sec.346 
xxMr.S.Kalinowski,known neither in the legal profession nor in 
politics has been appointed to this post.Before his appointment 
he was a Bar student (enrolled in1 Warsaw on July 18,1950), 
see Polish Daily of October 24,1950. 
was thus under the direot supervision of the Council and closely-
linked with the system of Military Courts still functioning all 
over the country. 
The prosecution of crimes, hitherto in the hands of public 
prosecutors attached to ordinary courts,became centralised and 
put under the control of the Executive.The Chief Prosecutor,his 
deputies,and officers of his department became for all purposes 
servants of the state,and as such,subject to the discipline and 
responsibility pertinent to the Civil Service (Acts.15 and 16). 
The law of July 20,1950 was vague in the definition of the 
status of the apparatus under the authority of the Chief Prose-
cutor. It was confined to an outline of the main functions and 
attributes of the office.The local offices were given indepen-
dence of any other authority of the regional administration 
(Art.11),but were subordinated to the Chief Prosecutor,and through 
him to the Council of State. 
The powers of the Chief Prosecutor extended over three groups 
of subjects (Art.3) : the regional administration,courts,and 
individual citizens.As the chief legal officer of the state he 
was entrusted with the technical supervision of the legal side 
of the administration at all levels with the exception of the 
Government.No machinery was provided,nor means specified,through 
which he would carry out his duties.Presumably he would act 
through prosecutionsjthus ensuring a post facto vindication of 
the law and deterring further breaches as well as purging the 
administration of undesired elements. 
It is interesting to note that no mention was made about the 
relationship between the Chief Prosecutor and the Minister of 
Justice.Since the former was also given authority to order the 
execution of penal sentences and supervise penitentiaries his 
work in this respect would be linked rather with the Ministry 
of Public Security,but this relationship was again undefined. 
The explanation of this silence on the part of the legislator 
seems to lie in the transitory nature of all legislation and in 
the trend of development characterised by the growing importance 
of the Council of State. 
An important function of the Chief State Prosecutor was to 
supervise the Courts in order to see that they "apply the law 
uniformly and correctly"(Art.3).So far the question of the appli-
cation of law was a matter for the courts themselves,the machinery 
of appeal and revision ensuring this objective.In addition,the 
Supreme Court in Warsaw,to which in the pre-war system practi-
cally almost every case could go,was the highest judicial autho-
rity as far as the administration of justice and interpretation 
of the laws was concerned.The Courts were presumed "to know the 
law" and the judge could safely look for guidance to the prece-
dents created by the Supreme Court.By the law of 1950 this fa-
culty was bestowed upon the prosecutor - one of the parties in 
litigation.Apart from affecting the position of judges and defen-
ding counsel and enhancing the r#le of the prosecutor in the or-
dinary course of justice,this provision further increased the 
authority of the Council of State. 
Furthermore,by Art.4(1) the Council of State (a non-judicial 
body) was made "the supreme authority for the interpretation of 
laws and the definition of principles of their application",thus 
assuming the position hitherto enjoyed by the Supreme Court. 
Consequently the Chief State Prosecutor was bidden to turn to 
the Council of State for guidance on cthe interpretation and 
application of the law of the land.This interpretation of,laws 
authoritatively announced by the Council would then become binding 
and enforceable in all Courts including the Supreme Court. 
Though there was no provision in the Constitution for ен inde-
pendent legislation by the Council of State,the Council began to 
legislate by decrees,thus taking into its hands the legislative 
power so far reserved for the Sejm and the Government. 
In this system of increased powers of the -Prosecutor and his 
subordiantion to a political executive body the citizen was pro-
mised the "protection of the Chief State Prosecutor" (Art.3), 
but the.law failed to specify .the means-of such protection or to 
indicate against whom the citizen was to be protected by the Pro-
secutor. 
•The office of the '^nief .State Prosecutor has no equivalent 
in the Western systems of law,the English Director of Public 
Prosecutions acting on quite different principles and within 
strictly defined boundaries.lt can be traced,however,to the So-
viet system,certain.provisions of the Soviet Constitution of 1936 
being expressly adopted.The Polish Chief State Prosecutor received, 
however,wider powers than his Russian counterpart.This phenomenon 
may be explained by the historical fact that the Soviet Consti-
tution of 1936 was enacted at the stage of the "triumphant pro-
£ 
letariat",wheras the Polish People's Democracy laboured under 
the heavy disadvantages of the still subsisting relics of the 
"bourgeois-democratic state". 
Supreme Chamber The third amenment of the constitutional 
of State Control.lay Q f r e b r u a r y 19,1947^reorganised the Supreme 
Chamber of State Controf. In principle t£is collegiate body re-
mained independent of the Government,but became suDordinated to 
the Council of State.Furthermore,through its connection with the 
Chief State Prosecutor,various commissions of the national Councils 
xxxxxx 
and the Special Commission,the Chamber of State Control became 
became wedged into the system of the state administration,and 
instead of being responsible directly to Parliament it was under 
the control of the Council of State.In other words,the supreme 
controlling body was itself put under an authority other than 
x cf decrees of 13.6.194-7 and 12.lo. 1950 
xx see Sir T.Matthew,Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
xxx».Arts. 113,114-, 115,116,117;xxxx law of 9.3-1949(D.U.R.P.No.l3,s74 
xxxxx law of 2o.7.1950,Art.13;xxxxxx law of 9.3.1949,Arts.1 and 26 
Parliament. 
The law of March 8,1949,envisaged a dual responsibility of 
the Supreme Chamber of State Control.Its Chairman was appointed 
by the Sejm and he was responsible directly to the Sejm.His vice-
Charrmen were appointed by the Council of State and that body 
was authorised to issue instructions to the Chamber of Control. 
The Council of State in the first place was to receive the audit 
report of the Chamber,which report could be amended by the Coun-
cil. Only an approved report went to the Sejm as the final result 
of the work of the Supreme Chamber of State Control. 
This decline of the authority of the Supreme Chamber of State 
Control was the harbinger, of tbe future developments, since under 
the Constitution of 1952 this institution completely disappeared 
and re-appeared only in 1953,this time as a "Ministry of Control", 
that is another Government department. 
Special Commission. A Special Commission for Prosecution of 
Corruption,Fraud and Economic Sabotage was contemplated as early 
as Novemebr 16,1945,but that law was consolidated five years later. 
The scope of action.of the Special Commission was quite extensivej 
including inquiries into "crimes against the economic and social 
interests of the state,corruption and speculation to the detriment 
of the working classes"(Art.1). 
The Commission was appointed by the Council of State and had 
its own Delegates with the Presidiums of the Provincial Councils. 
The Commission as well as its Delegates,put into motion at the 
instance of the Public Prosecutor (Art.5),could send an accused 
person to a forced labour camp for two years and impose a heavy 
fine (Art.7).The suspect was not allowed to have a defending 
lawyer (Art.9) and the decision of the Commission or its Delegates 
x see p. 289 
xx by the circular of the Prime Minister of August 31,1950 
(D.U.R.P.No.41,sec.37) and the decree of the Council of State 
of October 12,1952 (D.U.R.P.No.47,sec.429) 
was final (Art.11).Only the Chief State Prosecutor could inter-
fere with such a decision.In particular he could request revision 
of the decision,or could of his own initiative release the con-
demned if he had served one third of his term (Art.11). 
Law on The new law on the acquisition and loss of 
Nationality. n ationality x gave further powers to the Coun-
cil of State.Accordingly the Council became the authority com-
petent to grant naturalisation to aliens and to deprive Polish 
citizens of their citizenship. 
Summary. In summing up the development of the Constitution in 
the 1947-1952 period we can observe that the tendency was to in-
crease the power of the Council of State at the expense of the 
Parliament as well as the Government and Courts.The aegis of the 
Council became thus indisputable among the central authorities, 
whereas the regional self-government gave place to a centralised 
system of administration equally tmder the supervision of the 
Council of State. 
In 1952 the concentration of powers in the Council of State 
reached its peak.The presidential office as well as the Govern-
ment were represented in the person of the Chairman of the Coun-
cil, the Speaker and the deputy-Speakers of the Sejm represented 
Parliament,the Judiciary was represented by the First President 
of the Supreme Court,who was also one of the deputy-Speakers of 
the Sejm.Among the members of the Council was the Chairman of the 
Special Commission for Prosecution of Corruption,Fraud and Eco-
nomic Sabotage (being at the same time a deputy-Speaker of the 
Sejm),the Chairman of the Supreme Chamber of State Control(being 
at the same time the Commandant of the National Militia controlled 
by the Ministry of Public Security).All members of the Council 
were also members of Parliament,and most of them occupied high 
positions in the' Party. 
x law of January 19,, 1951 (D.U.R.P.No.4,sec.25) 
The reforms of 1947-1952 did not abolish the Parliament.Con-
sequently a dual system still remained in force;combining thereby 
the idea of a"state of Councils"(Soviet system) and a parliamen-
tary republic. 
In this respect Poland seems to have been an example unique 
among the People's -Democracies since even Czechoslovakia received 
a "Presidium of the National Assembfy" corresponding in title and 
composition to the Russian Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.This 
institution of the Czechoslovak constitution consisted of a Coun-
cil of 24 members of Parliament and assumed the powers of Parlia-
ment in the periods between parliamentary sessions.lt could le-
gislate (with the exception of amending the constitution and 
electing the president),but had no executive powers as has the 
Soviet Russian Presidium. 
Notwithstanding the reforms a Presidium of the Parliament did 
not exist in Poland,though this function was exercised until 
February 1947 by the Presidium of the K.R.N.,the Polish Council 
of State being a body distinct from Parliament,and the Parliament 
(Sejm) being not the "Supreme Council",as is the case of the 
Russian Supreme Soviet.The Council of State,however,became clothed 
with some legislative,executive and even judicial functions (e.g. 
interpretation of laws),and combining those functions,it was a 
precursor of the idea of the unification and concentration of 
powers. 
x Arts.63-67 of the constitution of 1948 
Chapter 13.Preparation of the Ground for the Constitution of 1952. 
As already mentioned the 1947-1952 period was an important 
stage in the preparations for the enactment of a homogeneous 
Constitution registering the progress of the system and consoli-
dating its achievements.The "basis",to use the technical term 
of the new Constitutional Law,received the special attention of 
the legisiator,who,having in mind the ultimate end of the building 
up of a "socialist state",put all his genius into the realisation 
of an adequate legislative policy. 
Since it is quite impossible to review all legislation made 
to that effect,we have to limit ourselves to fragmentary discussion 
stressing only the most salient points. 
Declaration At the outset of this period we have a solemn 
—— R i^ h" t s > declaration of the Sejm of February 22,1947 on the 
"Realisation of the Rights and Freedoms of the Citizen",in which 
the first post-war Parliament promised to be guided in its work 
by the principles of constitutional freedoms and democratic rights. 
This extensive list of basic rights and freedoms representing noble 
ideas was,however,merely another programme,and so.far unfulfilled. 
In actual practice the citizen found himself facing a totali-
tarian system expanding independently of his volition.The decree 
of October 22,19$? provided a police check on the movements of 
every citizen over sixteen years of age, who was bound to possess 
an identity card under pain of two years imprisonment (Art.19) 
and report to the National Militia any change of his address 
( Art.11 ). By Order of the Minister of Public - Security 
x full text,Peretiatkowicz,op.cit.p.61; cf similar declarations 
of constitutions of Czechoslovakia (Art.37)»Rumania (Art.32), 
Bulgaria (Art.87) 
xx D.U.R.P.No.55,sec.382 
ever;' issue of the identity card was preceded Ъу a scrutiny of 
the past of the citizen (including information on his life under 
the German occupation and whether he served in the army abroad) 
the record of which,together with two photographs was preserved 
in his personal dossier with the Militia? 
Criminal legislation affecting the constitutional position 
of the citizen was rather scanty during the 1947 - 1952 period. 
Two laws,however,must be considered here: 
The decree of July 5,19*§ seriously interfered with freedom 
of conscience and religious beliÜ, whilst the law of December 29', 
Ш ,affecting what has been left of the freedom of expressing 
one's political opinion,purported to harness the citizen into 
the official "propaganda for peace".The latter created the 
"crime against -fcsss peace" (Art.l) and threatened with long-term 
imprisonment any "warmonger" (Art.2),that is whosoever "instiga-
ted or agitated for war",facilitated the "war propaganda",or 
"opposed or insulted" the Movement of the Defenders of Ma&e. 
Another aspect of the totalitarian state was the forced labour 
system. We may recall here the powers of the Special ComuiSH££$n 
in this respect,as well as the earlier legislation, and the 
authorit;' of the Security^oiice* undefined by any published 
laws.It has been estimated that by the middle of 1952 there 
were in Poland 175 Forced Labour Camps containing some 180.000 
З Ж Ш Р 
Administration. Local administration,as we have seen before, 
became reorganised into a system of Councils centralised in a 
x Order of Ministry,March 20,1952 (D.U.R.P.No.13,sec.82) 
xx D.U.R.P.No.45,sec.334 xxx for details see p.346 
xxxx D.U.R.P.No.58,sec.521 
xxxxx A Government-sponsored organisation created to propagate 
the so-called Stockholm Appeal for Peace, 
xxxxxx see p.232 ante xxxxxxx see p.165 ante 
xxxxxxxx see p.159 et seq 
xxxxxxxxx B.Wierzbianski,Polish Affairs,London,1952,No.12,p.4 
pyramidal fashion,the central administration,on the other hand, 
still functioned on the pattern of a parliamentary government 
adopted from the pre-war system,giving way,however to the Council 
of State. 
A general tendency towards bureaucracy found its expression 
in the target of three million persons (including 801.000 white 
collar workers) in employment by the state under the Economic 
Planning Act of 194^. This increase in the Civil Service was 
primarily due to the fact of the nationalisation of industry and 
the state taking control of almost all spheres of life. 
Economic Planning. Economic planning on a government level 
was not alien to the pre-war Polish syste^,but was never consi-
dered to have a political or constitutional importance.lt is 
otherwise in the post-war period.Economic plans drawn up for 
a period of years represent not only a project of industrial 
and agricultural development,but also a programme and targets 
for various government departments.In the technical sense they 
constitute the basis of yearly budgets,but in their actual pur-
pose they embrace a wider 'range of subjects including political 
questions. 
Whereas the purpose of the three-year plan of 1947 was inter 
alia to "consolidate the political system and to rebuild the 
social and economic*structure of the country"(sec.3 a),the six-
year plan of 1950 went much further.A whole chapter in the latter 
was devoted to tributes to Soviet Russia and the enumeration of 
of political achievements (viz."destruction of the capitalist 
system,establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat,li-
beration from capitalist exploitation,creation of single party", 
and the liKe).Envisaging further social and economic refcprm the 
oi- tfce plan of 1950 was to "lay down the foundations of socia-
lism"(sec.3). 
x D.U.R.P.No.19,sec.134,Art.65 
xx cf the industrialisation plan of 1936,see p.140 ante 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.37,sec.344 
An analysis of the budget,that barometer of general policy, 
presents us with an interesting picture of the.actual trend of 
development in this period.Figures below show the percentages 
of the total expenditure allocated for certain Government de-
partments : 
Public Agri- Social Recon-
Year.Defence.Security.Education.с uLture.Services.Health.struction. 
1947 15 10 12 2 3 1 
1948 12 9 10 2 3 2 0,9 
1949 16 11 16 4 3 3 1 
1950 10 5 8 2 0,8 2_ 0j_5 
Average 13,2 9 11,5 2,5 2,4 2,3 0,8 
Since 1951 it has been impossible to apportion expenditure 
for various departments because the budgets published in the 
Journal of Laws no longer allocate expenditure per Ministries , 
but give only general figures for groupsrof items.For the 1951 
budget the group described as "social and cultural" received 
about 30$,defence 7$,and administration (including Ministry of 
Public Security) 13$.The corresponding figures for the 1952 
budget were: 26$,10$,and 12$ respectively,and for 1952: 24$, 
11$ and 10$ respectively. 
Defence,education and public security seem to be the prin-
cipal interests of the regime,whereas expenditure for recon-
struction, health, social services and agriculture added together 
hardly equalled the cost of the Ministry of Public Security in 
the 1947-1950 period. 
Socialisation of Induftry taken from private hands in 
Industry and Trade. p
u r s u a n c e 0f -the nationalisation decrees 
was subjected.to what was termed a "socialisation" process.The 
x worked out of the official figures given in the Journal of Laws, 
xx by the end of 1948 only 6$ of Industry remained in private 
hands, Minist er HJSIinc in his speech to the Party Congress 
in December 1948. 
first step in this direction was a centralisation by means of 
the economic plans and supervision at the Government level by 
several Ministries created for separate branches of industry. 
This centralisation of planning and supervision conformed with 
the idea of the state taking over the means of production on 
behalf of the people,but seems hardly to fall with the ideal 
of a "socialist community",where the state is supposed to have 
"withered away".The process should,therefore,be described as 
"sovietisation" (an expression by no means offensive to the 
leaders of the People's Democracy),since the system of the People's 
Democracy^aiming at "socialism" as its ultimate end,at the present 
stage of development looks to the Soviet system (which is su-
pposed to be at a higher stage of development) for inspiration, 
teaching and example. 
A similar arrangement т/as adopted for Trade and Commerce. 
Separate Ministries for external and internal Commerce sprang 
XXX up and a "Central Purchasing Ofxice", having its agencies all 
xxxx 
over the country,was created.A special Ministry to supervise 
small trade and private industry was instituted and given autho-
rity over all means and sources of production so far untouched 
by the nationalisation decrees.This Ministry,in the words of its 
organic statute,was to "foster the co-operative movement as the 
basis of the future organisation of amall production". 
On the production side the tendency was to enforce a "socia-
list labour discipline".The preamble bo the lav/ of April 
did not define the term "socialist labour discipline",but made 
absenteeism an offence entailing disciplinary action.Accordingly 
x cf Soviet system,Constitution,Arts.77,78,83 
xxN.Farbierow,Q Charakterze Panstwa Demokracji Ludowej(translation 
from 2ussian),Nowe Drogi,1949,No.3,pp.160 and 162 
M.Sobolewski,Systematyka Zasad Konstytucji Pols&iej Rzeczypos-
politej Ludowe j ,Panstwo i Prawo,'Warsaw, 1952,No. 11 ,p.619. 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.30,sec.234(1951) ; xxxx D.U.R.P.(1951),No.32,sec247 
xxxxx Law on .the Enforcement of the Socialist Labour Discipline, 
D.U.R.P.No.30,sec.68 
every manual and white collar worker was liable to proceedings 
(disciplinary and ultimately in court) for absenting himself 
from work without justification (Art.l),whereas'those who for 
three years showed exemplary conduct were to receive awards and 
decorations from the Government(Art.2).The managers of the given 
institution were given powers to decide what constituted justi-
fied absence from work,and to impose disciplinary penalties in 
consultation with the Workers' Councils or Trade Unions (i.e. 
censure,deduction of wages,demotion).The more serious cases 
(absenteeism for four or more days in a year) were dealt with 
by Magistrates' Courts in the ordinary course of justice.Shortly 
after the publication of this law trials of absentees took place 
in all parts of the country,which owing to their wide publicity 
must be regarded as exemplary measures. 
In the system of economic plans,-production targets and slo-
gans advocating a "socialist competition among workers" it v/as 
only natural that the Stakhanov ideology found its way to Poland. 
The Stakhanov movement,as explained by Mr.Stafin,is a "movement 
of working men and women which makes it its own aim to surpass 
the present standards of output,to surpass the existing designed 
capacities,to surpass the existing production plans and estimatesi' 
The adoption of the Stakhanov system was indispensable in the 
process of the "socialisation" of industry both as far as methods 
xxxx 
and education of the working class was concerned.Apart from indi-
vidual competitions rewarded with decorationl and publicity, 
there are team competitions,normal targets and additional tar-
gets for days of special significance.The result of this sjrstem 
x cf Soviet system producing so-called "leaders at work", 
xx see Polish Daily of June 10,1950 and August 1,1950 
xxx Speech at the first Ail-Union Conference of Stakhanovites 
(November 17,1935)»printed in Stalin's Leninism,p.547 
xxxx e.g.compulsory attendance of classes on "Marxism-Leninism", 
xxxxx "Order of Banner of Work" created by law of July 2,1949, 
D.U.R.P.No.41,sec.301 
xxxxxxx e.g.Birthday of Mr.Bierut,Anniversary of the Party, 
and similar 
is an increased output,but,to counteract this one finds the 
complaints of the consumer on the poor quality of commodities, 
and the frequent trials of the management members on charges 
of faked records and juggled figures. 
Another feature of the "socialisation" were the so called 
"planning contracts" imposed by statute.The idea of such con-
tracts seems to have emanated from the principles of economic 
planning,and their purpose was to ensure realisation of targets 
set by the State Planning Commission.The obligation of conclu-
ding such contracts extended over the "socialised production 
institutions" as well as certain Ministries (e.g.Public Security, 
Defence,Post and Telegraphs,Railways),the subject of contracts 
being "mutual rights and duties of the parties with regard to 
supply and demand as v/ell as the transport of the produced со— 
mmodities"(Art.3 of the law of April 19,1950).Responsibility 
for failure to carry out the "planning contracts" was to be 
shouldered by the members of the management of the defaulting 
party,on whom substantial fines could be imposed by Arbitration 
Commissions created to supervise the system and adjudicate upon 
conflicts arising therefrom. 
The law on the "planning contracts" appears rather obscure 
and incomplete in so far as the subject-matter of those contracts 
and sanctions are concerned.In particular the rights and duties 
of the Government departments included in the scheme as well 
as the sanctions to-be enforced on their default remain still 
to be elucidated. 
Trade Unions. The Trade1Union Movement already affected through 
XXX 
the compulsory creation of the "Workers' Councils" became inte-
grated into the machinery of the state by the instrumentality 
x see Polish Daily of July 18,1949,September 13,19*9,April 25, 
1950,May,15,1950. 
xx laws of April 19,1950,October 7,1950,and May 29,1951. 
xxx see pp.193 and 194 ante 
of the law of July 1,1949- Art.l affirmed the right of manual 
and white collar workers to associate in Trade Unions and pro-
mised them participation in the "People's Government".This was 
given in order to : 
"a) secure by statute most beneficial conditions for develop-
ment of Trade Unions created in Poland by the People's Go-
vernment , 
b) consolidate the victory and achievements of the working class, 
c) strengthen the People's Government,and 
d) build socialism','. 
The legislator went further on to define the aims of the 
reformed Trade Unions ; 
"a) to represent and defend the workers, 
b) to improve the material and spiritual welfare of the working 
class, 
c) to mobilise the workers for the execution of the production 
schemes, 
d) to raise output and develop the spirit of competition,and 
e) to raise the standard of the national economy". 
No comment seems necessary,the provisions of the lav/ quoted 
in extenso being the best illustration of the spirit in which 
the reform was carried out. 
Having stated his legal principles the legislator declared 
the abolition root and branch of "all regulations which remained 
in force in succession to the capitalist regimes and which li-
mited the right of workers to form Trade Unions,subjected them 
to the Administration and contributed to the shattering of the 
workers' movement"... 
The law did not define the workers' position in industrial 
disputes nor the conditions in which to use the right to strike, 
this ultimate weapon of the working class.The legislator could 
x D.U.R.P.No.41,sec.293 
not have done it for obvious reasons.Industrial disputes are 
unimaginable in the "socialised" system of industry,and strikes, 
apart from the turpitude of wrecking the economic plans,mean in-
dustrial sabotage threatened with heavy penaltief.The Govern-
ment's ultimate reply to the claims for the right to strike was 
given on behalf of the regime by the security police in Lodz in 
September 1947,when the striking textile workers had to pick up 
xx 
their killed and wounded,after being dispersed by force. 
The new r61e of the Trade Unions was best explained by Mr. 
Bierut and Mr.Zawadiia.Mr.Bierut in his speech to the Trade 
Union Congress on June ,emphasised the political importance 
of the movement through the political purpose of the Trade Unions 
in supporting the system of the People's Democracy,their ideolo-
gical purpose in co-operating with the United Workers' Party, 
and their economic purpose in increasing the production and con-
tributing to the fulfilment of the state economic plans. 
Mr.2awsic[zki,in his speech on the same occasion^ condemned the 
British (and Polish pre-war) type of Trade Unions,scourging the 
movement for "fostering dolely personal interests and being too 
apathetic towards capitalism".Quoting Mr.Stalin that "Trades 
Unionism must be directed by the Party",Mr.Zawadzki advocated 
reorganisation of the movement on party polft^Mf lines to make 
it "an organisation of the ruling class".He called for "politi-
cal and ideological education" and for imitation of Soviet Russia 
"where the movement actively assists the Bolshevik party in the 
struggle against the relics of capitalism". 
The Congress then duly resolved Ш Р Р "a) the Unions should adopt the pattern of Soviet Trade Unions 
as well as their activities, 
x see pp.173 and 184 ante;xx this was the last strike in Poland, 
xxx since November 1952 Chairman of the Council of State, 
xxxx Nowe Drogi,1949,N0.3,p.I et seq;xxxxx ibidem p.XIII et seq 
xxxxxx ,In 1949 for 3,6 million of members 2,5 million were non-
xxxxxxx see Healey,op. cit.p57 / party members-. 
"b) they should pursue their aims under the political and 
ideological guidance of the P.Z.P.R,and 
c) they should aid the authorities in promoting schemes of 
piece-work and bonuses,thus creating "an opportunity for 
just wages" and encouraging "an increase in productivity". 
Collectivisation. The "peasantry",forming together with the 
"workers" the core of the future socialist community,was encou-
raged to organise or join collective farming units created as 
a part of the scheme for "moulding the social and economic basis". 
Already by the post-war agrarian reform,about 45$ (i.e.913-000 
hectares) of the area affected bv the reform,was retained in 
the hands of the Government "for various purposes of the state", 
and 55$ (i.e.127.000 hectares) distributed into dwarfish farms, 
which owing to their size ( five hectares) and general conditions 
could hardly prosper. 
In the regained territories in October 194&Xabout 25$ of the 
total arable land was cultivated by the State Farm Administration, 
about 6$ was under the control of co-operatives and the rest 
(about 69/в) divided into smallholdings, which, however, were larger 
than in the remaining part of the country. 
The collectivisation process was rather sluggish owing to the 
opposition on the part of the peasant and the lack of enthusiasm 
XXX 
on the part of certain Government menioers,who thought that,the 
idea being repulsive to the peasant,time and psychological approacl 
was to be employed instead of drastic measures. 
The six-year plan ofxf§fo gave .a strong impetus to the idea 
and laid down the principles for its realisation.The "agrarian 
front" then received first priority in the ideological warfare 
x see p.191 -192 ante 
xx figures given by Mr.Dubiel, vice J-Minist er of Regained Terri-
tories in a speech at Wroclaw on October 18,1948. 
xxx cf Gomulka schism,see pp.216 and 217 ante 
xxxx H.Kinc,Szescioletni Plan Rozwojp Gospodarczego i Budowy 
Podstaw Socjalizmu w Polsce,Nov/e Drogi,1950,No.4,p.25 
Mindful of the Stalinist strategy and his advice that, collective 
farms cannot be set up by force,but "kulaks"(v;ell-to-do farmers) 
may (and must) be destroyed by any means,the regime,on the oneban 
endeavoured to attract the peasant to join model collectives 
equipped with the best machinery and offered all facilities,and, 
XXX 
on the other hand,declared war on the well-to-do peasant.. 
Apart from the state-managed farms there developed in the 
course of time three types of agricultural collectives: 
a) the so-called agricultural association,where the farmers re-
mained in possession of their land but pooled labour together 
and distributed^harvest pro rata of the land brought into 
the association; 
b) the so-called agricultural co-operative,where 40% of the 
harvest v/as divided pro rata of the land and the rest in 
proportion to the labour; 
c) the so-called agricultural co-operative team,where the har-
vest was divided in proportion to the labour. 
From the very beginningjof the People's Democracy the peasant 
was obliged to surrender to the state a considerable part of the 
produce of his^toil.The legislation of the 1947-1952 period 
went still further. 
The decree of September introduced the principle of 
differentiation in matxers of taxation between the "socialised" 
and private enterprises giving the Cabinet powers to define the 
kind and amount of tax to be imposed on the latter,and to deter-
mine conditions in which the "socialised" enterprises were to 
be free of taxation,and obtain refund or annulment of taxes paid 
An order of the Mnister of Finance,that immediately followed, 
x J.Stalin,Leninism,London,1940,p.334; xx Stalin,ibid.pp.325-6, 
and 328-332. 
xxx A well-to-do farmer would be quite a small farmer by British 
standards since farms over 50 hectares were confiscated, 
xxxx see p.172 ante; xxxxx D.U.R.P.Ко.44,sec.399 
reduced the land tax by 50% in favour of farmers who in 1950 
joined the collectives? 
By the order of the Cabinet of October 28,19^6,on the deva-
luation and exchange of the existing currency the rate of ex-
change for the "socialised" enterprises was 3 to 100,whereas 
for a farmer whose income was assessed above a certain amount 
the rate was 1 to 100.Monies kept in banks were evaluated 
according to the amount of the deposit as 1 to 100,2 to 100, 
or 3 to 100 rate of exchange. 
For the year S b the land tax of the agrarian collectives 
was reduced to 4,5# of the standard rate,whereas the remaining 
farms had to pay in full. 
The lav; of February 26,f^ff»authorising the local authorities 
to impose additional taxation on immovables,dwellings,and mar-
kets was particularly directed against the private landowner 
since the state-owned properties as well as those run as "so-
cialised" enterprises were exempted from this taxation. 
The decree of June ,on the land tax introduced a 
sliding-scale system to be adjusted yearly for the privately 
owned land to be taxed up to 25$ of the basic rate,whereas the 
remaining land was to be taxed only up to 10$ of the basic rate, 
the scale remaining 
Another decree of June 
,imposing public duties to be 
performed in kind ( e.g.at the building of roads,schools,hospi-
tals etc) provided for facilities and exemptions only for the 
state-owned and "socialised" properties. 
By the Cabinet order of ,supplementing the law 
x D.U.R.P.No.48,sec.438; xx D.U.R.P.No.14, sec.110 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.3,sec.17; xxxx D.U.R.P.No.38,sec.283 
xxxxxD.U.R.P.No.38,sec.283; 
xxxxxx by the Cabinet order of June .30,1951 the scale for "so-
cialised" properties was fixed for 3,5$ of the basic rate 
xxxxxxx D.U.R.P.No.38,sec.284;xxxxxxxx D.U.R.P.No.38,sec.287 
on compulsory saving,a sliding scale was adopted,according to 
which private land owners had to contribute to the so called 
"Social Saving Fund" from lO^to 90% of their basic tax rate. 
The law of February 15,1952, authorised the Cabinet to make 
a yearly plan of compulsory surrender of.cattle for slaughter, 
the area of the particular farm being the basis of this obli-
gation. Due to this system the state could allocate the amount 
of meat for internal consumption and at.the same time secure 
performance of export contracts.Apart from the ideological and 
economic aspects of this system the farmer was subjected to- de-
tailed control and inspection and compelled to grow and surrender 
XXX 
his stock in number and at prices.fixed by the Government. 
This lav/ т/as followed by ,a Cabinet orOer which made a dis-
tinction between private and "socialised" farms.The latter had 
to surrender from 50 - 15% (this depending of the area of the 
farm) of V/hat.was taken of the. individual farmer who refused, to 
"socialise" his land.The principle that newly created collectives 
were exempted for two years from this quite burdensome obligation 
v/as another incentive to convince the peasant that private pro-
perty did not pay its way. 
A Similar discrimination obtained with regard to the compul-
sory surrender of milk ordered by the law of April 24, 
Though the ultimate objective is the same the Polish People's 
Democracy refrained thus far from using physical means on the 
Bolshevik pattern to enforce collectivisation of land,but pre-
ferred to'rely on legislation,a legitimate,and -quite effective 
way. 
x laws of 1948 ( D.U.R.P.No.10,sec.74; No.36,sec.256;Wo.52,sec.415 
laws of 1949 ( D.U.R.P.No.7,sec.42; No.21,sec.136) and of 1951 
( D.U.R.P.No.33,sec.258) 
xx D.U.R.P.No.8,sec.46 
xxx-A dual system'of prices obtains: fixed and free market prices, 
xxxx D.U.R.P.No.15,sec.91-
xxxxx D.U.R.P.No.22,sec.142.and Cabinet order of May 24,1952 
D.U.R.P.No.28,sec.193 
Political Education. Every system of government can be reduced 
to a certain political doctrine expressed in the constitution. 
The doctrinal aspect of the polity is of particular significance 
in countries ruled according to the Marxist-Leninist philosophy. 
There the reorganisation of the community strictly follows^the 
theoretical lines and any deviation or disregard of the canons 
entails most severe consequences. 
Co-architects of the Bolshevik revolution such as Trotsky, 
Zinoviev,Kamenev,and many others ibecame "spies and agents of 
fascism" mainly through their failure to toe the orthodox line 
of the interpreters of Marxism,who,at the time of the eclipse 
of the former»physically ruled Soviet Rusafa.Frequent political 
trials and purges in Central and Eastern Europe consuming the 
co-founders of the People's Democracy follow the same pattern. 
Besides the tendency towards the ruthless elimination of devia-
tionism there is a positive stream there aiming at the political 
XXX 
education of the masses. 
Though education representing a spiritual value ,t>elongs in 
principle to the "superstructure", it is a powerful instrument 
in moulding the "basis".In this respect the administration of XXXXX 
the state (especially through the system of Councils),and the 
Trades^nfonsjbesides the official party and the school,had to 
be employed to foster the ideology of the People's Democracy. 
Though the Ministry of Propaganda y/as aoofidued in 1947,its 
work was carried on by the Ministry of Art and Culture under 
the personal supervision of*the Prime Minister.Educational estab-
lishments,from the elementary schools to the university became 
x Stalin's letter'to Ivanov,February 12,1933,quot.in Stalin's 
Kampf,edited by M.Werner,London,1941,p.l40 
xx cf the fate of Mr.Beria arrested in June 1953 
xxx cf expenditure on education,see p.238 ante 
xxxx J.Berman,Baza in Nadbudowa w SvJietle Prac-Stalina-o Je2yko-
znawstwie,Nowe Drogi,1950,No.6,p.17 et seq 
xxxxx-ArZawadzki,op.cit.Nowe'Drogi, 1950,pp. 118 and 123 
xxxxxx see p.242 et seq 
xxxxxxx law of 11.4.1947,D.U.R.P.sec.147 
subject to the new educational policy imbued,of course,with 
Marxism-Leninism.Through syllabuses,choice and rearrangement-of 
textbooks,as well as through popularisation of Soviet political 
literature,Marxist ideas are being instilled into the heads of 
the youth primarily at the expense of religious instruction. 
Older generations are given full facilities through the Press, 
Radio,. and various activities of the Ministry of Art and Culture. 
The new trend of thinking pervades all fields of learningjMar-
xism-Leninism being the starting point of all research and 
teaching. 
In the period under present consideration particular attention 
x 
was paid to the universities, for whom a special Ministry was 
created.•The university staffs were thoroughly purged and su-
pplemented by.the new generation of teachers whose qualifications 
included a compulsory period of study in Marxism-Leninism and XXX 
the Russian language.Chairs of Marxist-Leninist philosophy were 
created and that discipline forms now part of the obligatory 
syllabus for the courses corresponding to studies of law,eco-
nomics,public administration, and education.A curious innovation 
was introduced by the Cabinet order of April 2o*f$52 whereby a 
higher university degree may be obtained by a person who comple-
ted a course in the educational section of che Central Committee 
of the United Workers' Party even though he had no previous uni-
versity studies. 
Ideas of single party were adopted also with regard to the 
multiple youth organisations.Already in December 1947 G-omulka 
(then at the height of his power) called for "unification of all 
x By the law of 15-12.1951(Art.1) the universities were to "edu-
cate and train the future people's intelligentsia in the spirit 
of loyal service to the country,the struggle for peace and 
socialism". 
xx D.U.R.P.(1950),No.51,sec.1SL and D.U.R.P.(1951),No.6,sec.38 
xxx law of 26.4.1952,DiU.R.P.No.24,sec.163 
xxxx D.U.R.P.(1950),No.46,sec.423;D.U.R.P.(1951),No.1,sec.113; 
D.U.R.P. (1951),No. 23, sec. 138;D.U.R.P. (L951=Mo.29,sec. 231 
xxxxx'D.U.R.P.No.24,sec.164 
the youth organisations".After a visit of the delegation of the 
Russian Komsomol in-December 1947 at the conference of the "Po-
lish Fighting Youth Union" a resolution called for the creation 
of a special youth organisation "Service to Poland", to "undertake 
the political and ideological preparation,as well as the physi-
cal and military training,of all youth,whether organised o£ hi-" 
thert-o unorganised". 
"Responding" to this call the Sejm passed the law to-form 
the"Voluntary Service to PolaftO"- a scheme affecting youth of 
both sexes between the ages of 16 and 21,designed to promote 
'^professional,physical,ideological and military training".One 
of the chief aims of this new organisation was to provide unpaid 
labour units to aid the country's reconstruction during the 
summer vacation.Though the service was "voluntary" the evasion 
of the draft would be punished by a heavy fine or three months 
imprisonment." 
A further regimentation of the youth was aimed at oy the 
scheme for the purge-of Scout organisations from what was called 
"Baden-PoweUism" and "reaction bred by the English imperialism 
of international capitalism". 
The Army provided not only a powerful suppo^rt of the regime, 
but in itself it v/as a large political school.We exclude here 
from discussion the "Army of the Interior",that praetorian guard 
of the People's Democracy^because it is obvious that it had to 
be politically indoctrinated. 
The Army proper,organised on the Soviet pattern,brought into 
the country the institution of "political officers",most of whom 
now occupy key positions in the Administration. 
x cf Continental News Service,January "3o,1948 
xx law of 29-1.1948 
xxx Writers, wjio insist that the pre-war Poland was "ruled by a 
clique of colonels" could easily find a replica in the pre-
sent situation. 
The Army played an important röle already during the Elections 
of 194? ,but a real ideological reorganisation started with the 
arrival of Marshal Rokossovsky. 
The law of March 22,19^t gave birth to a "Military-LPolitical 
Academy" organised as a university,whose principal aim was to 
"train and prepare for functions requiring higher military-poli-
tical education and for research in the Marxist-Leninist Military-
Political Science"(Art.3)•Though a conception of a Marxist-Leni-
nist "Military-Political Science" does not appear very clear,it 
seems fair to deduce that the object of the Academy was to pre-
pare officers to take charge of the political and ideological 
education of the Army. 
Political officers form the elite of the Army,their position 
with regard to service officers being enhanced by statute.This 
law emphasised the importance of their work,which,in fact,consists 
not only in "educational functions," but also in the guarding of 
the ideological orthodoxy among officers and other ranks,and goes 
xxxx 
much beyond the usual security service in the army. 
Officers responsible for political education were also put 
on all merchant veüietis and they were given the position of first 
8 Ш h i s point seems rather important in view of the fact that 
many seamen seek asylum in foreign countries and that ships under 
the Polish flag are being used for special taI5I?x 
Administration of Justice. The People's Courts createaxinxf946 
received their internal constitution by an order of the Minister 
ofxJufti$e,which,on the whole,did not affect their jurisdiction 
Nor the powers of the public prosecutor or the security police. 
x see p.126 ante; xx D.U.R.P.No.17,sec.135 
xxx law of 19.411951,D.U.R.P.No.22,sec.172,Art.2 
xxxx by the new Army Regulations those officers are second in 
command to regimental C.O's,see Polish Daily of 19.8.1950. 
xxxxx by order of Minister of Shipping,D.U.R.P.(1950),No.28,sec264 
xxxxxx cf statements of ex-captain of the Batory,Dailv Telegraph, 
June.27,1953; . 
xxxxxxx e.g.transport of Herr Gerhard Eisler from U.S.A.to Europe, 
xxxxxxxx see p.186-7 ; xxxxxxxxx D.U.R.P.(1947),sec.373 
The reorganisation of the ordinary courts by the law of 
April 27,194^ aimed at the introduction of the lay element to 
the bench and a reform of the principles of the administration 
of justice. 
The above mentioned law (Art.2) abolished trial by jury which 
had been proclaimed by the Manifesto of July 21,1944,and restored 
xx 
by the early legislation of the Committee of Liberation.The new 
law brought lay assessors to the bench to assist the judge.They 
sat with the judge both in the court of first instance and courts 
of appeal and their general position was equal to that of the 
judge. 
Assessors were drawn from lists submitted to the President of 
the given court by the Presidiums of the provincial Councils.This 
provision altered,in effect, the structure of the court,though the 
law did not define the status of assessors лог their qualifi-
cations for the office.The rule that the Councils (which embodied 
the political element of the ruling party) were responsible for 
the recruitment of assessors realised the idea of a "popular" 
administration of justice under the guidance of a trained judge , 
whose principal task was to see that the rules of procedure 
were observed.The idea of assessors assisting the bench was 
quite new for the Polish judicial system,the scheme being 
borrowed from Soviet Rulsia. 
The law of April 27,1949,authorised the Supreme Court to de-
termine general principles of the administration of justice and 
issue directions to lower courts.Such directions in the words of 
Art.37 (§3) would "define the policy of the administration of 
justice as well as the methods of applying law according to the 
social,economic and political conditions of the People's Poland". 
Those directions had to be followed by lower courts since their 
disregard might become a cause of appeal (§5). 
x D.U.R.P.No.32,sec.237 xx see p.162-3 ante 
xxx cf Art.103 of the Stalin Constitution 
No comment seems necessary on this quite clear provision, 
which in effect did away with the principles of abstract justice, 
formal objectivity of dispensing laws and the idealistic approach 
to the röle of courts and judges.In the light of the law on the 
x 'the office of Chief State Prosecutor,this provision seems,on one 
hand,to conflict with the principle of the Council of State 
being the supreme authority on the interpretation of law,but on 
the other hand it makes the supervisory function of the Chief 
State Prosecutor over the courts more understandab£e.The actual 
situation presents a curious solution of the problem of an opp-
ortunistic administration of justice.lt is this : whereas the 
ultimate interpretation of laws is entrusted to the Council of 
State (non-judicial body),the Supreme Court (judicial body) is 
called upon to determine the policy of the law,and the Chief 
State Prosecutor (subordinated to the Council of State) is autho-
rised to supervise the "uniform and correct" application of the 
law by courts. 
Certain provisions of the law öf August 16,19Ü>Ö*amending the 
existing law on the organisation of the ordinary courts of jus-
tice well characterise the present system.First of all the aims 
of the administration of justice were made to "protect: the 
People's Democracy and its development towards socialism;public 
property and rights and interests of the state-owned institutions, 
co-operatives and social organisations;the personal and property 
rights of the citizen recognised by the. legal order of the 
People's State" (Art.2). 
xsee pp.228-231 ante 
xx The fact that Mr.W.Barcikowski,the First President of the 
Supreme Court was at one time one of the deputy-»-Speakers of 
the;Sejm and a member of the Council of State explains the 
system under which three quite incompatible offices or func-
tions can be exercised by one person or body of persons;see 
Report of the V th Congress of International Democratic 
Lawvers,Panstwo i Prawo,Warsaw,1951,No.ll 
xxx D.U.R.P.No.39,sec.36 
"The courts",according to the law (Art.3), "through their ac-
tivities ought to educate the citizen in the spirit of loyalty 
to the People's Poland,abiding by the rules of legal order,dis-
cipline of work and care for public property". 
The apparatus of justice v/as further linked with the system 
of Councils since the provincial and district courtl. were ob-
liged to render periodical reports on their activities to the 
respective Councils(Art.13). 
Judges were to be recruited from persons v/ho "inspire confi-
dence in being able to carry out the duties of judge in the 
People's roland and have the required educational and profe-
ssional qualifications" (Art.57).The Minister of Justice could, 
hov/ever,absolve an applicant from the latter requirements. 
B?»- the new judicial oath the judge pledged himself to »"serve 
faithfully the People's Poland,observe the laws of the People's 
Republic,impartially administer justice according to the inte-
rests of the People's State,conscientiously and assiduously dis-
charge his duties,keep the secrets of office and always improve 
his standard of social and professional knowledge"(Art.76). 
This legislation brought about a metamorphosis of the judi-
XX 
cial system according.to Dr.Leon -Chajn's slogan :"we must tear 
the band from Themis' eyes" and Mr.Swiatkowski's (Minister of-
Justice) reminder:' "law is only an instrument of those social 
and economic forces which are in power in various countries". 
Legal Profession. The law of June (Art.2),stating that 
the purpose of the legal profession is to "co-operate with courts 
and other authorities in protecting the legal order of the Peop-
le! s Poland,and to give legal assistance according to law and 
the interests>of the working masses" adequately explained the 
x The new hierarchy of courts was as follows:People's Courts, 
District Courts,Provincial Courts,the Supreme Court in Warsaw, 
xx now Minister of Labour 
xxx in a Press interview on September ЗД948 
xxxx D.U.R.P.No.30,sec.275 
rQle of the advocate in the reformed.system of the administration 
of justice. 
The Minister of Justice was made superintendent of the legal, 
profession,being authorised to supervise its activities (Art.5), 
annul resolutions made by its organs (Art.6),fix the advocate's 
fees (Art.8),absolve an applicant from the standard requirements 
of educational and professional qualifications (Art.46),and to 
determine the place of practice of advocates who were obliged 
to transfer their chambers v/ithin two months of any such minis-
x 
terial order. 
A licence to practise Y/as to be issued only to those ".who 
were certain to perform the duties according to the purpose of 
the legal profession in the People's Poland" (Art.45(1))•The 
practising advocates had. to appear before a special commission 
appointed by xhe Minister to decide whether they were "v/orthy 
to practise in the People's Poland"(Art.119).Having passed that 
test the advocate had,before he received his licence,to таке a 
solemn declaration in which he undertook inter alia "to do all 
in his power to contribute to the protection and consolidation 
of the legal order of the People's State and to remain always 
faithful to the People's State"(Art.49). 
Whereas an advocate was expressly forbidden to give his ad-
vice or assistance in cases -conflicting with the general interest 
of the socialised economy (Art.53(2)),he could decline his service 
only for serious reasons (Art.52). 
Disciplinary action could be taken against advocates who acted 
"inconsistently with the interests of the working masses"(Art.95), 
a disciplinary comniission oeing appointed by the Minister of 
Justice (Arts.101 and 104). XX Teams of advocates (suggestive of co-operative firms) were 
x Decree of October .28,1947(D.*U.R.P.sec.407) amending the decree 
of May 24,1945,see pp.187-190 ante, 
xx One must bear in mind the preference of the Marxist philosophy 
for collective forms of life. 
encouraged (Arts.3 and 71),such teams in the words of the sta-
tute, "paving the way for a higher,socialised form of exercising 
the legal profession" (Art.72).The duty of the teams was to "im-
prove the ideological standard of their members and to exercise 
mutual control over their professional activities"(Art.73). 
Summary. The purpose and aims of the legislation reviewed above 
are quite clear and they distinctly trace the road towards "so-
cialism" as understood by the promoters of the People's Democracy 
in Poland. 
Anti-liberalism and anti-individualism are features peculiar 
to the development of the Constitution proper as well as its re-
lative legislation.The citizen becomes absorbed by the mass and 
must renounce his personality for the alleged benefit of the whole 
The mass itself is subdivided into subjects ("working masses") 
and objects ("bourgeois-capitalist elements!'),the latter being 
doomed to extinction.lt is ironical to observe that as soon as 
the human approach is lost the state becomes Divine,especially 
as the ultimate aim of true socialism is the "withering away of 
the state". 
With regard to legislative technique one can see that various 
laws passed in this period only complete or supplement previous 
legislation,whereas amendments and adjustments of the existing 
legal system are not uncommon.On the whole,most statutes and 
decrees appear in an unfinished form,full of loopholes and vague-
ness. This makes an impression of interim or ad hoc legislation 
comparable to a projection of general ideas to be elaborated and 
consolidated later.This technique perfectly conforms to the tem-
porary character of taost laws and their transitory purpose.The 
g 
sytem of the People's Democracy in this period is in a well-ad-
vanced, though still formative stage,and therefore,one should not 
wonder at the lack of a perennial conception of the legislation. 
Chapter 14. The Constitution of 1952. 
On July 22,1952,the Sejm unanimously passed the project of 
the Constitution submitted by the Constituent Commission. 
The process of the enactment of the Constitution resembled to 
a large extent the introduction of the Stalin Constitution of 19^6; 
First a Constituent Commission was set up by the Sejm in May 1951 
in order to work out the Constitution in accordance with the pri-
xx 
тагу object of the Sejm.A project was submitted to the Party and 
approved by tOem,then an all-national discussion was thrown open 
to the publiс.During the three months discussion (from January 27, 
1952,to April 6,1952) some 20$?6$0 meetings were organised with 
the participation of about eleven million people,and the Commissioi 
received 2822 suggestions in writing.Although all the proposed 
amendments were considered by the Commission a comparison of the 
project with the final draft reveals only grammatical alterations 
touching no essential provision of the original 
Never in the history of Poland had a constitutional scheme 
received such wide publicity,never before was any goverüment so 
anxious to ensure an enthusiastic acceptance of its proposal.Havin£ 
this result in view the whole state apparatus was put into motion 
and the propaganda machinery was tuned to the slogan "let's 
explain it to the peopiiF.The Party,Army,Schools and all government 
controlled bodies were employed in the drive to popularise what 
Mr.Bierut called "the greatest charter of victorious 
x cf A.Vyshinsky,The Law of the Soviet State,New York,1948,p.120-3 
xx law of February 19,1947 (Art.3(1)) 
xxx by resolution of the Central Committee,see Nowe Drogi,1951, 
No.6,p.63 
xxxx Figures given by Mr.Bierut in his speech to the Sejm on July 
18,1952,see Panstwo i Prawo,Warsaw,1952,No.8-9,p.155 
xxxxx Arts.24,25,32,46,51,53,59,61,67(Art.24 excepted) 
xxxxxx cf appeal of Mr.Bierut,quot.by J.Gorski,0 Przebiegu 
Ogolno Narodowej Dyskusji Xonstytucyjnej,Nowe Drogi,1952, 
No.l-2,p.36 et seq 
achievements and everlasting social attainments of the Polish 
working peopte".A curious feature of the propaganda campaign 
v«as the amount of lixerary wo'rk (especially poetry) devoted to 
eulogy of the project of the Constitution which undoubtedly will 
go down in history not so much for literary merits as for being 
an example of utilitarian literature employed in the service of 
the propagation of political ideas. 
Preamble. The preamble introducing the Constitution embodies 
not only the ideological credo of its makers,but also makes a 
valuable contribution towards the elucidation of certain points 
of historical and political interest. 
The Polish Republican the words of the preamble,is a "People 
Republic",that is a "republic of the working people".This being 
so,the state is to continue the "progressive traditions of the 
Polish nation and to realise the idea of liberating the working 
massed. Translated into a more mundane language this precept of 
the preamble simply means adherence to the programme of the 
Communist Party (being officially the only "progressive force"), 
the main point of Y/hich v/as the liberation of the proletariat 
from the power of the capitalist oppression. 
The preamble giving an authoritative version of the genesis 
of ^ the present political system confirms the "theory of imposi-
tion" traced in the historical part of this work and already 
underlined by Professor Seton-Watson."The history-making victory 
of the Soviet Union over fascism",states the preamble,"liberated 
Poland,enabled the Polish v«orking people to seize power and crea-
ted the conditions for national regeneration within new,just 
x speech to Sejm,Jan.23,1952,see Panstwo i Prawo,1952,No.2,p.181 
xx At the Conference of Historians held in November 1951 at 
Otwock a Government spokesman (Gen.E.Ochab) urged the histo-
rians to trace back the development of the"Workers' Party" for 
at least a hundred years and to bring out the progressive ideas 
throughput that period.cf R.Werfel,Poczatek Zasadniczego 
Zwrotu,Nowe Drogi,1952,No.1-2,pp.44 and 45 
xxx H.Setoh-Watson,The East European Revolution,2nd ed.London,У& 
/1952. 
frontiers".Apart from the historical inaccuracy of_ crediting 
Soviet Russia with the sole merit of winning World War if,the 
expression "victory over fascism" must be construed to mean 
not only the defeat of the Axis,but also the destruction of the 
pre-war Polish political system.In this respect»recorded in the 
preamble,the history-making feat of Soviet 'Russia "enabling the 
working class to seize power" finally disposes of the "theory 
of reaction against the 'fascist1 pre-war rei?me"as well as the 
"theory of the fusion of two governments". 
The source of power of the People's Republic lies,according 
to the preamble,in the "alliance of the working class with the 
working peasantry".The "workers and peasants" are,however un-
equal partners since the directing function has been assigned to 
the working class as the "leading class of the community inspired 
by the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international 
workers' movement as well as by the history-making experience of 
the builders of the victorious socialism in the Soviet Union". 
The Constitution is a record of past achievements summarised 
in the preamble as the "shattering of the rule of the capitalists 
and landowners,consolidation of the system of the People's l>e-
mocracy and formation and consolidation of a new social struc-
ture corresponding to the aims and interests of the broad masses". 
The purposes of the Constitution set forth in the preamble 
are: "to strengthen the people's state,accelerate the political, 
economic and cultural progress,fortif3r patriotism,unity and co-
hesion of the nation in the struggle for further betterment of 
social conditions,total abolition of the exploitation of man by 
man and realisation of socialist ideas as well as promotion of 
international friendship and co-operation between the peace 
x theory now^prevailing in Russia,cf Mr.^olotov's speech at the 
XlXth Congress of the Communist Part,Nowe Drogi,1952,No.10,p.8 
and also Marshal Rokossovsky,Nowe Drogi,1953,No2, 
xx Bierut,Podstawy Ideologiczne,op.cit,pp.46,47,52 
xxx see p.138-9 ante; xxxx see 138 ante 
loving nations in the common end of preventing aggression and 
securing world peace." 
Glancing at the preamble one can see a forecast of an etatistic 
constitution fostering at the same time ideas of nationalism and 
international!sm.Etatism appears in the form of eulogy of the 
state as People's Democracy,nationalism in the appeals to patrio-
tic traditions and the love of the fatherland deeply rooted in 
the nation,whereas internationalism recognises Soviet Russia as 
the principal power instrumental in the foundation of the politi-
cal system,the leader of the area and the centre of the efforts 
to secure world peace.The international element pervades the po-
litical and ideological aspects of the Constitution since the 
fruits of the struggle of the international proletariat are appro-
priated to the achievements of the workers' class in Poland and 
the ideology of the movement finds its expression in the legal 
principles of the Constitution. 
The preamble combines a principle of the Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine that the constitution is a "record of past achievements" 
with a "bourgeois-democratic" idea of the constitution- representing 
also a certain political programme.This feature is important since 
it depicts the nature of the polity as being in the form of a 
transitory system of government,"socialism" being the ultimate 
aim of its development.In neither case is a constitution primarily 
a"record of past achievements",but a blueprint of the machinery 
of the state.We must,however,take notice of the actual nature of 
the Constitution of 1952 as well as the doctrine expressed in 
strong terms by the late Joseph Stalin. 
The system of the People's Democracy achieved in its own class 
a finished form in the Constitution of 1952,but being a transito-
ry form of government,ftas still a way to go to reach the Utopian 
world of a socialist reality. 
x cf speech introducing the Soviet Constitution of 1936 
Political Structure. The political system of the Polish People's 
Republic has been defined by Art.l of the Constitution as a 
"People's Democracy",thus elevating this popular expression to 
the authority of a technical term of Constitutional Law.In this 
respect the system should be distinguished from what is termed 
now in Central and Eastern Europe the system of "bourgeois-demo-
cracy',' meaning thereby the traditional form of parliamentary 
government. 
In contrast the Stalin Constitution of 1936 declares the 
Soviet Union to be a "socialist state of workers and peasants" 
(Art.l).A profound difference between the two systems appears 
on the face of the definitions,the stage of develpraent being 
the criterion of'"classifi cation. Whereas Soviet Russia is already 
a "socialist state",Poland has only started "building socialism", 
the system of the People's Democracy being the medium,and only 
a stage in that process. 
Being neither a "bourgeois-democracy" nor a fully estab-
lished "socialist state")the People's Democracy occupies a middle 
position between the two systems,heading,however»towards the 
latter. 
In the Polish People's Republic the "power to rule belongs to 
the working people of towns and villages"(Art.lThe Constitu-
tion offers no definition of the class of the "working people" 
recognised as the source of power and holder of sovereignty,but 
segregates by implication what is scornfully called the "bour-
geoisie", the definition of the latter to be found in the teaching 
of "£he Marxist-Leninist philosophy.The preamble discussed above 
is of no assistance to elucidation this point,and the provision of 
Art.ö^^pffering equal opportunities to all citizens as well as 
x see general discussion,Chapter 15 
xx cf Soviet Constitution Art.3;xxx cf Soviet Constitution Art.123 
Art.8f recognising the electoral fights of'every citizen with-
out distinction of race,nationality,religion,education,social 
origin,profession or means" only obscures it.It is as difficult, 
therefore,to reconcile Art.l with Arts.69 and 81 as to circum-
scribe the "working class".If we,however,exclude the class of 
"capitalist exploiters" and distinguish a sub-class of the 
"working intelligentsia" we may be nearer the mark,though this 
classification amounts to a mere juggling with words.The position 
of others than the "working class",on the other hand,resembles 
that of Cape coloured people who may vote,but are excluded from 
political power. 
The power to rule is carried out on behalf of the working 
people by their representatives elected to the Sejm and the 
national Councils (Art.2).This principle amounts to a recognition 
of the system that resulted in the reform of the national Councils 
and became,in effect,a conglomeration of a parliamentary republic 
with a state of soviets.The marriage of the two systems represen-
ting the western and eastern political philosophy,however,does 
not tend towards harmony,but domination by the latter. 
A principle of the Soviet Constitution (Art.142) that the 
members of the representative bodies (i.e.soviets) are respon-
sible to the electors and may be recalled by them,adopted in the 
reform of 1950 for the system of Councils,has been extended also 
to the Members of Parliament (Art.2(2)),thus bringing the system 
near a "direct democracy'! The principle of co-option,so far app-
licable to the Councils is done away with and the elections of 
members of Councils as well as of Parliament are based now on the 
same idea of "popular representation".The rules of the Electoral 
Law,embodied in the Constitution curtail,however,the appearance 
of a direct rule of the people since only undefined "political 
and social organisations of towns and villages" are authorised 
x cf Art.135 of the Stalin Constitution 
to put forward candidates for election (Art.86),and the power of 
revocation mentioned in Art.2 remains to be defined by special 
legislation .(Art.88). 
Having broken the opposing .political parties,scattered the 
neutral ones and created a single party,the makers of the' Consti-
tution of 1952 now purport to use some undefined "political and 
social organisations" as channels between the formal source of 
power (i.e. the "working people") and the representative bodies. 
The situation resembles to a certain extent the political failure 
of the Polish democracy of 193?>. At that time a constitutional 
experiment to establish a non-party Parliament was attempted,the 
power of political partiff to nominate candidates for election 
feeing transferred to certain defined "social,professional and 
municipal bodies".This experiment utterly failed,and it became 
obviouö within a short time that it led to a decay of parliamen-
tary life and the democratic system of government.Unqualifiedly 
critical of the pre-war system the post-war regime stripped the 
Parliament of its essential powers and authority,and in order to 
convert it into a "working body" filled the Chamber with members 
of the Government's own single party active in the "political 
and social organisations of towns and villages",but conscious 
or unconscious of the lesson of the past did not disband the 
Government party as did the pre-war regime in 
The aims of the Polish People's Republic are as follows(Art.3): 
" l.to guard the achievements of the working people»and secure 
their power and freedom against all hostile forces; 
2.to secure development and growth of productive resources of 
the country through industrialisation and liquidation of the 
economic»technical and cultural reaction; 
x see p.31 ante 
xx the dissolution of the Government party,however,did not affect 
other parties, 
xxx see p.32 ante 
" 3-to organise^planned economy on the basis of nationalised 
enterprises; 
4.to limit,eliminate and liquidate social classes flourishing 
on the exploitation of workers and peasants; 
5. to secure the improvement of the welfare,health and culture 
of the masses; and 
6. to secure universal development of the national culture". 
The aims of the political system enumerated above are typical 
of a "fighting proletariat" (People's Democracy") as distinguished 
from a "triumphant proletariat" (Soviet Russia).At this stage 
the"proletariat" has to preserve the fruits of the class struggle, 
create economic and social conditions for further development 
and fortify its position as the ruling class,liquidating at the 
came time all possible enemies hitherto undestroyed.Contrary to 
pure Stalinist doctrine we have thus a political programme 
expressed in Art.3jemphasising once more a mixed character of the 
system. 
<-—> Administration. Having rejected the theory of bhe division of 
xx 
powers the makers of the Constitution arranged the"organs of the 
state" into three groups : 
a) the supreme organs of the state; 
b) the supreme organs of the central administration; and 
c) the regional organs of the central administration. 
\y In the first group the Sejm alone is formally named as the 
"supreme organ of the authority of state" (Artfß) »whereas the 
the Council of State is included in the group without any classi-
fying description.This omission may be attributed either to a 
fault in the drai?,in which case the Council of State as well as 
b$ • as the Sejm should be both considered "supreme organs",or to a 
deliberate arrangement to make the Sejm appear of greater impor-
x see p.260 ante; xx see p. 199 ante /tance. 
xxx cf Soviet Constitution Art .'30 xxxx the title of the relevant chapter is in plural 
The Sejm is defined as the "supreme expression of the will 
of the working people to represent the sovereign rights of the 
nation" (Art.15(2)).She Council of State,on the other hand,must 
by irtplication be considered the collective head of the state, 
since the presidency was abrogated and the attributes of the 
presidential office transferred to that body. 
The function of the Sejm is to legislate,control other organs 
of state (Art.15(3)),enact the yearly budget and pass economic 
plans (Art.19).The legislative initiative is in the hands of the 
Council of State,Government and the Deputies,all statutes being 
promulgated by the Chairman of the Council of State (Art.20). 
The life of the Sejm extends over four jre§rs,a General Elec-
tion being ordained by the Council of State (Art.23).No dissolu-
tion is provided for before the expiration of this term,either 
by a resolution of the Sejm itself,or a decision of another body. 
The number of Deputies is not fixed,one Deputy being elected to 
represent each 60.000 inhabitants. 
The Council ofState is elected by the Sejm at its first 
sitti?|x(Art.24) •So the elected Council acts during the period 
of four years until a newly elected Sejm appoints a new Council. 
f It consists of the Chairman,four vice-Chairmen,a Secretary and 
nine Members. 
To all intents and purposes the Council acts as a head of the 
state,its competencies incliictirFg (Art. 25) arranging General 
Elections,convocation of a session of the Sejm,authoritative 
interpretation of statutes,legislation by decrees,appointment 
and recall of diplomatic officers,accrediting of diplomatic re-
presentatives of foreign states,ratification and denunciation 
of treaties,appointment of civil and military officers,conferment 
of orders,decorations and honorary titles,prerogative of mercy. 
x five years Before the war; xx cf Soviet Constitution,Arts. 
36 and 54; xxx ibid.Arts.48 and 53;xxxx ibid.Arts.49,53. 
The Sejm whilst in session has the power of deciding in ma-
tters of peace and war,and during its recess this power devolves 
upon the Council (Art.28(1)).The question of mobilisation of the 
armed forces as well as declaration of the state of emergency 
in the whole or part of the territory falls within the exclusive 
function of the Council of State (Art.28(2)). 
We can see now that through the torfbus way of seven years 
development the Council of State became equivalent to the Presi-
dium of the Supreme Soviet under the Stalin Constitution.Those 
two institutions resemble one another as far as their constitu-
tional position and powers are concerned; they differ,however, 
on account of the official title and the arrangement of the re-
presentative bodies,the difference being negligible.Whereas the 
Stalin Constitution represents a model state of counoilsithe Po-
lish Constitution is still labouring under the burden of the rem-
nants of a parliamentary republic.The Polish Sejm functionally 
resembles the Supreme Soviet,but institutionally it is an oddity 
in the present system^hardly fitting into the conception of a 
state of councils. 
The Sejm,similarly to the Supreme Soviet,is the supreme repre-
sentative body and the 3ymbol of sovereignty,but unlike the Su-
preme Soviet it is divorced from the system of councils.As in 
the preceding period the Council of State occupies the top of the 
pyramid of councils (Art.27),the dualism of representation through 
the system of councils and the Parliament still subsists,the 
liaison function being given to the Council of State.Besides that, 
Poland (being a unitary state) has a uni-cameral Parliament,where-
as the Supreme Soviet consists of two chambers representing the 
whole population as well as the federated republics.In this res-
pect the Council of State is an emanation of the uniTcameral Par-
liament ,whereas the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.combines the 
function of representing both the whole population and the sepa-
rate nationalities. 
It is interesting to compare the relationship between the 
Sejm and the Council of State to the corresponding bodies of the 
Soviet system.The Council of State (Art.25(2)) in all its acti-
vities is subordinated to the Sejm,and the Sejm is the supervi-
sory and controlling authority with regard to all organs of state 
(Art.15(3)).So much for nte theory.The Constitution provides for 
no machinery to ascertain the superiority of the Sejm or to exer-
cise its supervisory and controlling function.Once the Council 
has been appointed its members cannot be dismissed by the Sejm, 
and the period of office of the Council outlives that of the Sejm. 
By ordering Elections and arranging for the sessions of the Sejm 
it is the Council,in actual fact,that keeps its hand on the vita-
lity of the Sejm.By exercising legislative initiative and legis-
lating by decrees the Council takes a considerable part in actual 
legislation and by authoritative interpretation of statutes it 
formulates the way of "the application of "the law.Consequently, 
the Council could,in an extreme case,construe a statute even 
against its purpose or contrary to the will of the legislator, 
such interpretation being binding on the courts and other autho-
rities and the Sejm's only recourse would be to repeal, such sta-
tute at a session convened by the Council.In matters of foreign 
policy the Sejm has no say accorded by the Constitution since 
the question of formulating the policy is in the hands of the Go-
vernment (Art.32 (8)),and the treaty making power resides in the 
Council of State (Art. 25 (8)). 
A similar situation arises under che Stalin Constitution.There 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has in principle the same 
powers as the Polish Council of State,but in addition it can dis-
X XX • • solve the Supreme Soviet,organise referenda and annul decisions 
x in conformity with Art.47 in case of disagreement between the 
two 6hambers'(the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationa-
lities). 
xx on its own initiative or on the demand by one of the Union 
Republics. 
and orders of the Council of Ministers of the Union Republics. 
It cannot,however,initiate legislation ,though it may legislate 
by decrees. 
On the whole The Soviet doctrine of "democratic centralism" 
finds its application,in the Polish Constitution,the Council of 
State occupying the topmost position in the hierarchy of the 
organs of state.In both cases the Council (Presidium) acts as a 
body and takes collective decisions.The Chairman has no indivi-
dual (personal) powers except the representation of the body and 
formal attributes of &is position such as honorary precedence 
and signing of statutes along with the Secretary to the Council 
(Presidium). 
The second group comprises the "Supreme Organs of the-Central 
xx 
Administration",namely the Ministers and the Council-'-of Minister 
Hitherto it Has an attribute of the President,as the head of the 
'state, to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister and*on.the la-
tter' s advice the Ministers.According-to the Constitution of 1952 
the whole Cabinet is appointed in toto by the Sejm,no distinction 
being made between the Premier and Ministers (Art.29)•Only during 
the recess of the Sejm may the Council of State appoint and dis-
miss Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister.As a result 
of these provisions the power of appointing the Government has 
been shifted,in principle,from the head of the state to the le-XXX 
gislature ,imitating thereby the Soviet system,where the Council 
of Ministers of the Soviet Union is appointed by the Supreme 
Soviet. 
The Constitution provides for no machinery to implement Art.29 
and it is not quite clear who and on what authority proposes 
x if they do not conform to the law (Art.49) 
xx the term"Government" is used in Art.29 in a descriptive capa-
city the term "Council of Ministers" oeing the technical ex-
pression employed in the charter, 
xxx cf Constitution Arts.49 and 56 
appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister and Ministers. 
No clue can be found even in the change-over in NovemberI1952 
when Mr.Bierut,appointed President in 1947 for seven years,became 
Prime Minister.According to the official communique he was made 
Prime Minister "by the Sejm" on November 20,1952,one AÄ/ould think 
by acclamation,and the Ministers of his Cabinet were appointed 
the next day,some four Ministries being still vacant in March 
1953«This practice,if really executed in the manner stated above, 
would mean a considerable departure from the letter of the Con-
stitution only a few months after' it has been voted. 
In the system of the Constitution of 1952 we have a dual autho-
rity of the Sejm and Council,not conflicting,but supplementing 
one another.The power of the Council seems,however,less extensive, 
because on a strict interpretation of Art.29 it appears xhat the 
Council can remove only Ministers but not the Premier,and these 
decisions must subsequently be approved by the Sejm. 
The Council of Ministers consists of the Premier,-vice-Premiers, 
Ministers and Chairmen of various Committees and Commissions 
appointed by statute (Art.31).The conception of the Government 
is thus quite wide,exceeding the traditional form to include per-
sons who,though not members of the Government in the strict sense, 
hold positions of national importance equal to ministerial rank. 
The Constitution names no such bodies,but is seems fair to infer 
that the Chairman of the Economic Planning Commission ,(if not 
already a head of some Government department) would be included 
in the Council of Ministers.The large number of vice-Premiers 
created on the implementation of the Constitution is indicative 
of the former practice where the vice-Premiers formed a sort of 
inner caoinet .within the Government. 
The Council of Ministers,according to A r t . i s the "highest 
executive and administrative organ of the authority of the state", 
x see p. 289 x x c f Soviet Constitution Arts.64 and 65 
meaning thereby a body instrumental in the formation and execu-
tion of the general policy of the state,subordinated only to the 
Sejm and in its absence to the Council of State. 
The relationship of the Sejm (and the Council of State) to 
the Council of Ministes is that of a body representing the sove-
reign ("working people of towns and villages") to the technical 
team administering the affairs of the state on behalf of the so-
vereign. This team acts within its own sphere of powers and duties 
defined by the Constitution as followfx(Art.32) : 
a) co-ordination and supervision of the work of Ministries and 
other bodies; 
b) preparation of the yearly budget and national economic plan; 
c) supervision of the execution of the budget and economic plan; 
d) supervision of the execution of laws; 
e) care for the public security,interests of the state and rights 
of citizen; 
f) issue' of executive decrees authorised by statute; 
g) formulation of foreign policy; 
h) care for the defence of the country and decision on the yearly 
conscription; 
i) supervision of the work of the Presidiums of national Councils. 
The powers and functions of the Polish Caoinet are,in principle 
identical with those of its Soviet counterpart with the exception 
that the Soviet Council of Minister may set up commissions for 
defence,economic and cultural matters,and that the Polish Council 
of Ministers supervises the system of national Councils.The latter 
x N.B. under the Constitution of 1935 the Government was entrus-
ted with the residue of powers unreserved for other organs of 
state. 
xx cf Soviet Constitution Art.68 
xxx due to a literal translation of the Soviet Constitution 
(Art.68 a) it makes an impression as if Ministries were sepa-
rate institutions besides the Ministers. 
function of the Polish Cabinet is indicative of the lack of 
final development of the system of councils and a confusion 
of the parliamentary system with the system of soviets. 
Ministers are heads of their respective departments and as 
such are authorised to issue executive decrees and orders based 
on statutes (Art.33),the Council of Ministers being able to annux 
xx 
such decrees and orders. 
The relationship of the Council of Ministers to the -Council 
of State,as mentioned above,is that of the Cabinet to the Head 
of the State.The relation to the Sejm is not very clear.True,the 
Sejm appoints and may dismiss the Cabinet,and the budget as well 
as the economic plans must be submitted to the Sejm,but equally 
important business such as foreign policy,defence and conscrip-
tion, by the letter of the Constitution seems to escape the control 
of the Sejm. 
The question of parliamentary and constitutional responsibility 
of the Cabinet and.Ministers is not defined by the Constitution. 
What is more,no machinery is provided to enable the Sejm to dis-
miss the Ministers,and therefore,if the Sejm wanted to exercise 
this power legislation would have to be passed first.Apart from 
the general provision that the Sejm "controls the activities of 
all organs of the state"(Art.15(3)),and the rights of deputies 
to question Ministers in Parliament (Art.22) there is nothing in 
the Constitution to indicate the principles of responsible Govern-
ment and of sanctions to flow in case the responsibility of Go-XXX 
vernment or Ministers is invoked. 
The third group of the organs of state embraces the "regional 
organs of the central administration",in other words,the system 
of national Councils.The Constitution adopted the system as laid 
x cf Soviet Constitution Arts.72 and 73 
xx this power exists under the Soviet system with regard to the 
Council of Ministers of the Union Republics (^rt.69) 
xxx the question of responsibility of Minist er s^oecome obsolete 
already under the Constitution of 1947,see p.202 ante 
down in the reform of 195Ö,hence there seems to be no purpose 
to dwell here on this subject.Though only a summary of the law 
of 1950 this chapter lacKS precision,its provisions containing 
a great deal of phraseology and nebulous generalisations,leaving, 
however,further elaboration of the system to future legislation. 
Art.36 is perhaps the most characteristic illustration of the 
above opinion.lt runs:" The National Councils strengthen the link 
between the authority of the state and the working people of towns 
and villages,absorbing larger and larger masses of the working 
people to a participation in the government of the state". 
Justice. The reform of the Judiciary of 19^6 as well as the 
law of July 20,1950,'on the office of the Chief State Prosecuto? 
have ai^o been incorporated into the Constitution. 
To understand the judicial sjrstem better one must open this 
review with the statement on law in general embodied- in the Con-
stitution (Art.4) :"The expression of the interests and will of 
the working people are the laws of the Polish People's Republic". 
Such being the conception of the law,no surprise should be 
caused by the principles of Art.48 that "courts guard the politi-
cal system of the Polish People's Republic,protect the achieve-
ments of the working people,defend the people's legal order,pub-
lic property and rights of citizen; they punish the offenders". 
More space will be devoted for a discussion on the r61e of 
the law in the system of the People's Democracy;it seems suffi-
cient for the purpose of the present review to observe that the 
conception of law adopted by the Constitution'is subjective and 
opportunistic.lt is a "class law" designed to protect a section 
of the community,it is a "political law"to secure the so called 
"people's legal order",that is to say,to preserve the political 
system and the course of its development.The courts are no longer 
organs of the administration of justice,meaning thereby a func-
tion distinct from other purposes of the state,and whilst dis-
x see pp.223 -228 ante; xx see pp.252-254 ante 
xxx see pp.228-231 ante 
pensing the criminal law,they no longer adjudicate upon prose-
cutions of crimes,but simply "punish the offenders". 
The political purpose of the office of the Chief State Pro-
secutor is more distinctly stressed in the Constitution than in 
its organio law: It is the function of the Chief State Prosecu-
tor to "preserve the people's legal order,and to secure protec-
tion for the public property and respect for the rights of the 
citizen".He has to superintend "prosecution of crimes against 
the constitution,security,and independence of the Polish People's 
Republic" (Art.54)? 
The Constitution affirms the system of judges adjudicating 
cases in the company of laymen (the "people's assessors"),both 
judges and assessors being elected (Art. .The method of elec-
tion, as well as the duration of the office are left to be defined 
by later legislation.The judges of the Supreme Court,however,are 
to be elected by the Council of State for five years 
(Art.51(3??? 
Judicial indepe^er^ce is guaranteed by the Constitution,the 
judges being subject only to JawIx(Art.52).In reality,however, 
this guarantee appears of little value owing to the conception 
of the law,the r61e of the courts designed by this very charter 
and general legislation,in particular the law of 1950 on the 
judicature. 
The Constitution also guarantees the accused a "right of de-
fence "(Art. 53 (2)), but it seems that this "right" is of little 
avail (especially in political trials) owing to the position of 
the legal pro ,the extensive jurisdiction of Military Courts and their superiority over he 0rdina yX5cm$ts,as wel  as the 
rules of procedure which are particularly oppressive in laws on 
x cf Soviet Constitution Art.113; xx cf ibid.Art.108 
xxx cf ibid.Art.105; xxxx cf ibid.Art.112 
xxxxx but quaere whether it applies also to assessors 
xxxxxx see pp.254-256; xxxxxxx see pp.167 and 174 ante 
political crimes. 
Fundamental rights One third of the Constitution accor-
and duties of citizen..,. * u , , . ding to the number of Articles,and about 
one fourth in volume has been dedicated to the enumeration of 
the citizen's fundamental rights and duties. 
Though the Constitution announces that the "Polish People's 
Republic,perpetuating and enlarging the achievements of the wor-
king people,fortifies and extends the rights and freedoms of ci-
tizen" (Art.57),the enumeration of most of them makes an impre-
ssion of platitude hardly appropriate to the solemn nature of a 
constitutional charter. 
The citizen has a right to work,that is to be employed for 
remuneration (Art.58),to resfK(Art.59),to be aided in case of 
XXXX xxxxx 
illness or inability to v.ork (Art.60),to be educated (Art.61), 
to benefit from cultural achievements and participate in the 
development of the national culture*(Art.62). 
The People's Republic,according to the Constitution,issdkllous 
ihe 
for universal development of science (Art.63)»literature and 
art (Art.64) and offers particular protection for the "creative 
intelfigentiia" (Art.65). 
The Women have equal rights to men,and are entitled to equal 
opportunities,equal pay and special maternity protection (Art.66). 
Matrimony and family are under the special protection of the 
People's Republic and illegitimacy is in no way a cause of dis-
crimination (Art.67). 
The Constitution guarantees education to youth (Art.68). 
Art.69 appears of particular interest in the present time of 
x see pp.164,165,167,174,178,185,232 ante 
xx cf Soviet Constitution Art.118; xxx cf ibid.Art.119 
xxxx cf ibid.Art.120; xxxxx cf ibid.Art.121 
xxxxxx cf pp.259 and 264 ante 
xxxxxxx viz."scientific workers,educators,writers and artists, 
technicians and inventors" - Art.65 
xxxxxxxx cf Soviet Constitution Art.122 
purges of Jews and religious unrest in the Soviet area.It runs: 
"All citizens,notwithstanding their nationality,race and religion 
are given equal rights in all spheres of public life,political 
economic,social and cultural.Any interference with this principle 
through establishment of direct or indirect privileges or res-
traint in rights on account of nationality,race or religion is 
liable to punishment.Spreading of hatred or contempt causing 
quarrels or humiliation of man on account of national,racial or 
religious differences is forbidden". 
The wording of this Article is rather curious.At the first 
glance announcing equality,it seems to conflict with the idea 
of the "state of workers and peasants",but a closer consideration 
reveals the lack of protection in case of "social and economic" 
differences.The equality of men is thus realised only to a cer-
tain extent,one might say,for export purposes,whereas the canon 
of the Constitution consisting in the differentiation between 
people for "social and economic" reasons remains in force.Re-
peating three times the causes of forbidden discrimination the 
Constitution threatens with punishment those who break this rule, 
whereas judging by the recent Prague trii£I,arrests in Moscov;, 
XX30C xxxxx East Germany and Hungary no question of "privileges" is involved, 
but simply the elementary right to live which is endangered by 
a definite policy of the ruling groups. 
Freedom of conscience and religious belief is guaranteed by 
Art.70,qualified by the clause that "abuse of that freedom for 
the purposes conflicting with the interests of the People's Re-
public is liable to punishment".We shall return later to this 
question: at the moment it seems sufficient to observe that the 
JÜ el SuvltiL CüflüLItuClon Art. 
x x the trial of Slansky an others in December 1952 xxx arrest and later release of doctors in January 1953 
xxxx arrest of some Jews in January 1953 
xxxxx purge of Jews,see Daily Telegraph of February 11,1953 
qualification of this right is indicative of the state not being 
indifferent to the religious activities of the citizen. 
Art.7i recognises freedom of expression by means of word and 
print»freedom of assembly and meetings,processions and demonstra-
tions.No qualification accompanies this statement»moreover,the 
realisation of those freedoms is secured in the words of § 2 by 
the "handing over to the service of the working people and their 
organisations of all the printing establishments,stocks of paper, 
public buildings and halls,means of communication,radio and other 
necessary means".The nationalisation of printing and distributing 
establishments,control of the buildings,communications and radio, 
the allocation of paper as well as the censorship of the Press 
by the Government officials,must,therefore,for the purpose of 
Art.71,be construed as " handing them over to the service of the 
working people". 
Freedom of assembly (this time considered separately) is gua-
ranteed for the second time in Art.?? for the purpose of the "de-
velopment of political,social,economic and cultural activities 
of the working people".A qualification (already contained in the 
constitutional purpose of the freedom of assembly) contains a 
clause forbidding "creation and membership of organisations whose 
aim or activity threaten the political and social system of the 
legal order of the People's Republic". 
Art.73 guarantees the citizen a right to bririg petitions and 
complaints* to all organs of the state and goes on to sajr that 
such petitions and complaints must be speedily dealt with,those 
responsible for delay ora"callous and bureaucratic attitude" 
incurring liability at law. 
Art. 74- guarantees freedom from arbitrary arrest »inviolability 
of dwellings,secrecy of correspondence and protection of private 
x cf Soviet Constitution Art.125; xx cf ibid.Art.126 
xxx already mentioned in Art.5 of the Constitution 
property.lt is quite a different matter whether this provision 
operates in practice in view of the powers of the police unde-
fined by statute,the physical rule of the Ministry of Public 
Security,marks on letters received abMad,and the "socialisation" 
of property. 
A provision of international range closes this list of fun-
damental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.By Art. W t h e 
Polish People's Republic extends the right of asylum to "citi-
zens of foreign countries persecuted for scientific activity, 
defence of the interests of the working people,striving for so-
cial progress,activities in the defence of peace and struggle 
for national liberation".It is submitted that since the Consti-
tution, being a national charter organising the machinery of the 
state,has a technical character,the provision of Art.75 notwith-
standing its noble inspiration,has no room in the Constitution 
proper,but should be rather relegated to the preamble,the pre-
amble being a more appropriate place for ideological and propa-
ganda declarations. 
The list of fundamental duties is headed by the obligation 
of the citizen to "observe the provisions of the Constitution 
and statutes as well as the socialist labour discipline,respect 
the principles of social relationship and conscientiously perform 
duties with regard to the stite" (Art.76). 
Every citizen must"take care of public property and protect 
it as the fundamental basis of the development of the state and 
source of wealth and power of the fatherland".Persons guilty of 
"sabotage or economic diversion and those who in whatsoever ma-
nner assail the public property incur all the severity of the 
x see pp.159 - 161 ante 
xx sometimes officially stamped,usually with marks indicating 
opening. 
xxxx to a direct translation of Art.129 of the Soviet Constitu-
tion the clause on "social progress" and on the "defence 
of peace" has been added, 
xxxx cf Soviet Constitution Art.130 
law" (Art.77"!f. 
The citizen is obliged to render military service (Art.7§^ 
YYY 
and exert vigilance with regard to "enemies of the nation"(Art79) 
The extensive list of rights surpasses even the Constitution 
of 1921,which for other reasons presented the nation with a 
charter of rights previously denied during the national bondage. 
The dmties,on the other hand,are scarcely enumerated and hardly 
balance the volume of rights. 
Yet it is difficult to see why so much truism and platitude 
had to be incorporated in the chapter on rights and duties,es-
pecially as Marxism-Leninism does not favour (in theory) verba-
lism and declarations being made part of the constitution. 
Economic and Social The Constitution registers the economic 
and social system built up during the pre-
paratory period of 1944-1952.This system being the "basis" of 
the present Constitution and the result of the practical appli-
cation of the Marxist-Leninist philosophy is nothing else but a 
record of achievements in the development parallel to the poli-
tical reform. 
In matters of the economic system envisaged by the Constitu-
tion the principal questions appear to be that of property rights 
and the question of production.These problems are correlated and 
both of them revolve around individual rights and the interests 
of the state in shaping the general policy of the community. 
Since economics is the starting point of Marxism and the animus 
movens of its action it is only natural to find a chapter on 
this subject in a Constitution inspired by that philosophy. 
In the development recorded by the Constitution we can dis-
tinguish three types of property: 
x cf Soviet Constitution Art.131; xx cf ibid.Art.132 
xxx cf ibid. Art.133 
xxxx cf Stalin's speech introducing the Constitution of 1936 
1) public property, 
2) private property in the means of production,and 
3) individual property. 
The first class,of course,embraces the bulk of the material 
wealth of the country controlled by the state "on behalf of the 
peopl£".The second class represents only that fraction of the 
means of production so far unaffected by the nationalisation 
decrees.The third class covers what has been left in the hands 
of the individual for his exclusive enjoyment.Public property 
can be subdivided into state property and the co-operatives 
(including collective farms),both being "socialist" forms of 
property. 
Though the Constitution favours and promotes the system of 
"socialist"property (Art.7(1)),it also purports to protect what 
has been left in private hands: "The People's Republic recognises 
and protects within the existing legislation individual property 
as well as the right of inheritance of land,building and other 
means of production",but limits this concession to "peasants, 
handicraftsmen and farmstead holders" (Art.12).Art.13 repeats 
the same principle without qualifying the subjects of protection 
(the word "citizens" is used instead).This contradiction in terms 
is of little importance since the substance of property rights 
has been reduced to the very minimum.Besides that,further reor-
ganisation is envisaged by Art.7,"socialisation" being the spi-
rit and aim of future development. 
XX The system of the Stalin Constitution appears far more ad-
vanced towards the "socialist" form of economy,allowing only 
x According to official figures of 1951 96,9$ of Industry and 
Trade,97,9% of Building Trade,94,6$ of Transport and Communi-
cation, 98$ of Wholesale Commerce,60$ of Retail Commerce,but 
only 12,2$ of agricultural production were in the hands of the 
state. 
xx Arts.9,10,and Arts.4 - 8 
"small private economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen 
based on their own labour and precluding the exploitation of the 
labour of others"(Art.9)•Furthermore,public property under the 
Stalin Constitution "belongs to the people"(Art.6),whereas the 
Polish Constitution only commends public property to the care 
of the "state and all citizens"(Art.8). 
The heterogeneity of the economic system in the People's 
Poland,as compared with the uniform system of the Stalin Cons-
titution, is explicable by the general nature of the two countries, 
the former being at the stage of "building socialism",the latter 
at the stage of "established socialism by the triumphant prole-
tariat". 
The social structure of the Polish People's Republic is based 
on the "alliance of workers and peasants",which the state under-
takes to strengthen through economic planning,bringing in conse-
quence the fruits of industrial production to the village in 
exchange for agricultural produce (Art.9).The state is to take 
care of the ."individual farm of the working peasant,to protect 
him against capitalist exploitation and assist him in the increase 
of production,improvement of the technical level and general 
standard of living"(Art.10(1)). 
A strong propagandist note is struck in this undertaking to 
protect the "working peasant" against the dangers of capitalist 
exploitation (already abolisned),unless every other peasant v?ho 
employs a man to help in his work is classified as a "capitalist 
exploiter".The unfortunate "kulak" falls under this classification 
and it is he whom the Constitution condemns to extinction as the 
part of the scheme for the reorganisation of the social structure. 
Another feature having both social and economic results in 
view is the protection promised to the collective forms of agri-
cultural production and the co-operatives(Arts.lO(§§2,3) and 11). 
x see p.259 ante 
"Labour is a right,duty and matter of honour of every citizen" 
(Art.14) .Having this general idea,applicable not only to "workers 
and peasants",the Constitution goes on to give credit to "working 
people of towns and villages,who through their work,socialist 
labour discipline,competition at work and betterment of methods 
of work strengthen the might of the fatherland,raise the welfare 
of the nation and speed up the full realisation of the socialist 
system" (Art,14(.)).This provision has a similar though defini-
tely more flowery flavour than the provision of Art.8 of the Con-
stitution of 1935. 
Another familiar sound is the idea of a national elite ,though 
this time it is the "leaders at w§£k",who are entitled to "uni-
versal veneration of the nation" (Art.l4(2)). 
The Constitution Ignores the first maxim of Art.12 of the 
Stalin Constitution :"who does not work neither shall eat",but 
adopts the second one :"from each according to his ability,to 
each according to his'work"(Art.14(3)). 
Electoral Law. Basie principles of the Electoral Lav/ are also 
included in the Constitution.Elections of the national Councils 
are put on the same footing as the election of Members of Parlia-
ment. Every citizen over 18 years of'age is entitled to vote,his 
"social or economic" position entailing no disqualification. 
Everyone over 18 may become a member of a national Council,where-
as the minimum age for the members of the Sejm is 21.Military 
service does not result in temporary abeyance of electoral rights 
lunatics and persons deprived of political rights by court sen-
tence alone being disqualified. 
The candidates for election are put forward by undefined 
x cf Soviet Constitution Art.12; xx see p.27 ante 
xxx this expression embraces all walks of life including ai?t, 
science,theatre,literature and even military training, 
xxxx Arts.80 - 88 copying with small alterations Arts.134,135, 
137,138,141 and 142 of the Soviet Constitution. 
organisations termed as "political and social organisations of 
towns and villages"(Art.86). 
Miscellanea. Following the pattern of the Stalin Constitution 
the question of the symbol of the state,the flag and its capital 
are also dealt with (Arts.8$ and 
The white eagle,stripped without any statutory authority of 
his golden crown,remains the symbol of the Polish People's Re-
public as well as the white and red flag.Warsaw - "the city of 
heroic traditions of the Polish nation" - is recognised as the 
capital. 
The Constitution can be amended only by statute passed by the 
Sejm by a two-thirds majority,at least one-half of the statutory 
number of Deputies being presentxf^rt.91)• No special procedure 
being provided,it may be inferred,therefore,that except for the 
qualified majority,the Constitution may be changed at any time 
by ordinary parliamentary procedure at the instance of the Coun-
cil of State,the Government or Deputies. 
Characteristiсs. The most important general characteristics of 
the Constitution,as already observed in the discussion on the 
preamble,areanti-individualism,anti-liberalism and etatism. 
Anti-individualism appears in the qualified form of the pre-
valence of a part of the community (i.e."the working people of 
towns and villages") over the individual both in the sphere of 
personal rights and economic position. 
Anti-liberalism is to be found in the segregation of the" co-
mmunity and the differentiation between classes as well as the 
overwhelming power of compulsion invested in the machinery of 
state. 
x cf Soviet Constitution Arts.143,144; xx cf ibid.Art.145 
xxx only in the law on National Councils of 11.9.1944 (Art.25) 
can we find a description of the post-war symbol,specifica-
tions being given there for the rubber stamp of the Councils, 
xxxx another example of verbiage; 
xxxxx cf Soviet Constitution Art.146 
Etatism is the inevitable result of the anti-liberal attitude 
towards individuals and the community as a sum aggregate of ci-
tizens. Throughout the charter the terms "state,or Polish People's 
Republic" are most frequently used;indicating the impersonal, 
omnipotent holder of all power,grantor of all rights,and protec-
tor of its own ends. 
By means of the "socialist system of planned economy", and 
throughout the pre-arrangement of social conditions,the state, 
wrapped in the robe of the "people's legal order",acts as the 
sole formulator and protector of the happiness of the individuell 
and the selected part of the community.In the hands of the state 
are monopolised almost all human'interests from the creation 
and enjojnnent of material wealth to the formation and develop-
ment of spiritual values. 
Theory of State. According to the doctrine of the Constitution 
of 1921 the state was an emanation of the sovereign nation and 
an instrument in the hands of the people.This theory emphasised 
the superiority of the conception of a sovereign nation as the 
source and substance of all authority over the agent of that 
authority clothed in the form of" the state. 
The doctrine of the Constitution of 1935"formulated the state 
as a "bonum commune",thus bringing home a social conception of 
state being both the form and substance of sovereignty.Whereas 
the former theory was inspired by a liberal conception of state 
and constitution,the latter tended towards-a totalitarian concep-
tion of state,the doctrine of the "sovereignty of the people" 
being distorted. 
In distinction to the former Constitutions,the principal point 
of the doctrine of the Constitution of 1952 is the conception of 
the community as a conglomeration of antagonistic classes,the 
x this expression has been repeated 59 times,the sum total of 
Articles being 91. 
division being determined by social and economic factors.Since 
the political system (of which the Constitution of 1952 is only 
one of the stages ) is supposed to be born in the conflict of 
classes,it is only logical that the Constitution itself bears 
the stigma of the class struggle.The state has,therefore,the 
features of a "class state",as opposed to the "classless" state 
of the former Constitutions. 
There is ample evidence to support the view that the theory 
of state of the Constitution of 1952 is under the influence of the 
theory of the "antagonism of classes",one of whom emerged victo-
rious from the struggle,though historical testimony proves that 
this theory could only appear as a result of the military con-
quest of Poland by Soviet Russia. 
Advancing the programme of the ruling class the Constitution 
makes the state an instrument of the power of that class.It is 
true to say,therefore,that the state in the Constitution of 1952 
appears in the form of the dictatorship of a class and as such 
remains totalitarian until (in theory) all class antagonism is 
disposed of and the only remaining class achieves final victory 
in the execution of its programme. 
People's Democracy. The expression "People's Democracy",thus 
far used in popular parlance to denote the constitutional process 
during the post-war period in Central and Eastern Europe,became 
finally sanctioned as a technical term of Constitutional Law,and 
of narrow legal significance. As a term of art "People's Democracy" 
is descriptive of the form of government that emerged after the 
war and is by no means confined solely to the letter of the Con-
stitution of 1952 (in Poland),but generally speaking we may define 
it as " a form of dictatorshipi of the proletariat^ in.,the present 
conditions of historical development." 
Arrangement of The general arrangement of the charter isoP 
the Constitution. , , , . , , . , . .. , , . great help m studying the type of constitution. 
The Constitution of 1921,for instance,faithfully applying the 
Rousseau - Montesquieu philosophy, had its chapters arranged into 
subjects indicating the rule of the people and the separation of 
powers. The Constitution of 1935,on the other hand,foilowing the 
doctrine of "unity and indivisibility of the authority of state" 
and treating the question of the separation of powers as obsolete, 
concentrated on the "division of organs and functions of the in-
divisible authority of state",and the position of the president 
as the supreme element co-ordinating the work of the "organs of 
state". 
The Constitution of 1952 unquestionably adopted the idea of 
the unity and indivisibility of the authority of state,the Coun-
cil of State being the chief instrument of the concentration of 
powers.The Executive decisively dominates the Legislative and 
Judiciary,the Sejm being only a representative of the "working 
class" and nominal legislator,the Courts being subordinated to 
the Council.of State,the theory of law itself abandoning the 
idea of supremacy of the rule of lav/ over the machinery of the 
state.But a more salient feature influencing the arrangement of 
the charter is the Marxist-Leninist philosophy,whose overpowering 
force and dominating ideology not only inspired ,but in actual 
fact,formed,the system of the People's Democracy through the 
compulsive instrumentality of the Soviet Union. 
Applying the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the"superstructure" 
and "basis",the Constitution opens with the chapter on the "poli-
litical structure" setting forth the principle of the rule of 
the "working class" in the "people's republic",clothed in the 
legal form of the "People's Democracy". 
Then follows the chapter on "social and economic structure", 
registering the achievements in that field and preparing the 
ground for further development.The political "superstructure" 
thus interlocks with the social-economic "basis" of the system, 
both elements influencing each other in an active,creative manner. 
Subsequent chapters deal with the arrangement of authorities 
and the position of courts and the prosecution machinery.The 
long-winded chapter on "rights and duties" is foiled by the 
principles of the Electoral Law and provisions on the symbol,flag 
and capital of the state as well as the amendment of the Consti-
tution. 
Pattern of the The arrangement follows the pattern of 
Stalin Constitution. ^ s t a l i n C o n s t i t u t i o n o f l g 3 6 w i t h t h e 
exception of a special chapter on the "structure of the state". 
This is so,because being a federation,the Constitution of the 
Soviet Union had to define the relationship between "the Union 
and the member-states. 
Institutions,terminology,even whole paragraphs can be traced 
X XX 
back to the Soviet Constitution,the fact emphasised by Mr.Bierut: 
"...we are proud to^benefit from the experiences and achievements 
of the Soviet Peoples". 
Notwithstanding the similarities there are also differences * 
between the two Constitutions.The principal difference is caused 
by a variance in the stages of the development of the two coun-
tries and their progress in "socialism".The Stalin Constitution 
represents a higher stage of development,whereas the Polish sys-
tem is derivative of the Soviet state and still in a lower stage 
of development.In this respect certain relics of the old system 
(e.g.Parliament) have to be tolerated,whilst the system of Coun-
cils has yet to await perfection. 
x Articles totally or partly translated have been marked by 
reference to corresponding provisions of Soviet Constitution, 
xx-in-speech to the-Constituent Commission on January 23,1952, 
see Panstwo i Prawo,1952,-No.2(52),p.l67 
Though Marxism-Leninism insists on "accord between form and 
substance",that is accord between legislation and the reality, 
only a part of the Constitution of 1952 conforms to this requi-
rement, the chapter on rights and duties dissenting in matters of 
fundamental rights and constitutional freedoms. 
Whereas Marxism-Leninism wants the Constitution to be purely 
and simply a "record of facts and achievements" and scorns pro-
grammes, the Constitution of 1952 is a mixture of the achievements 
of the past and plans for the future,the latter appearing dis-
tinctly in the chapter on social and economic structure. 
Comparing the two documents one must acknowledge the superio-
rity of the Soviet draft,the Polish Constitution being full of 
repetitions and superfluous verbiage.Whereas the Soviet Consti-
tution leaves little to special (or future) legislation,the Polish 
draft is less comprehensive,referring as many as sixteen times 
to separate legislation* most of which is to be made in the 
future.This defect (someone else may consider this to be an asset 
in view of the fact that, following this technique,the charter is 
rather brief and not too bulky)^is emphasised by the inclusion 
of extra-legal matters which,it is submitted,could be either re-
legated to the preamble or totally omitted.One has,however,to 
leave this question to the draftsman,whose judgment on what is » 
essential for the Constitution is of decisive importance. 
One has to concede that the propaganda value of the Polish 
draft is superior to its Soviet pattern,lofty Slogans and nebu-
lous formulations of legal principles being commonplace in the 
former. 
Implementation. The Constitution was voted on, July 22,1952 
and on that date it came into force.A new Sejm was elected on 
October 26,1952 and the change-over then took place. 
x e.g. equality of sexes repeated four times (Arts.66,81,82,83), 
care of the state for development of national culture 
emphasised several times
The Elections of 1952 bore no resemblance to the Elections 
of 1947? This time the United Workers' Party marched under the 
personal leadership of Mr.Bierut to the booths with the banner 
of the "National FroSt"representing the ruling class of "wor-
kers and peasants" (i.e.the rägime) and easily won a victory 
YYY 
on the unprecedented oasis of 99,8$ valid votes cast for it by 
the record poll of 95$ electors,the army units polling as much 
as 99,87$. 
The Election campaign was conducted by the "National Front", 
a Government-sponsored organisation set up to unite all "patrio-
tic forces under the leadership of the United Workers' Ш Щ » 
which has now become a permanent institution.The"National Front" 
mobilised some 800.000 agitators each of whom had a number of 
houses allocated for his personal attention.The Electoral Law 
of 1952 (Art.33) gave to "political and professional organisa-
tions, the co-operatives as well as other organisations of the 
working people",the right to bring forward candidates,which fact 
together with the activities of the "National Front" secured 
complete victory for the Government,no other candidates being 
admissible. 
According to Mr.KlostevoM ,the Chairman of the "Mandate Co-
mmission"^ out of 425 Members of the new Sejm 155 are of peasant, 
and 173 of labour "extraction" whereas 97 came from the ranks of 
the "working intelligentsia".Deputies with University education 
number, as many as 136,secondary schools produced 120 Members 
whilst 169 Members received only elementary education.Some 113 
Members are professionally engaged in industry and 67 of them 
x see p.121 et seq / 
xx Programme of the"National Frontysee Panstwo i PraY/o,lS32,no.lO 
xxx figures given in Panstwo i Prawo,1952,rio,ll,p.581 
xxxx cf poll at Elections:1922-67,7$,1928-78,3$,1930-74,8$; 
1935-46,5$,1938-64,5$. 
xxxxx J.Gorski,Front Narodowy,Nowe Drogi,1952,No.8,p.91 
xxxxxx Biuletyn Krajowy,London,1952,No.11/23,p.2 
are "leaders at work". 
The Sejm chose the Council of State and appointed Mr.Bierut 
to the office of Prime Minister,the presidential office 'having 
withered away.The Chairmanship of the Council of State went to 
Mr.Zawadzki,and among the eight vice-Premiers there are Mr.Cy-
rankiewicz (hitherto Prime Minister),Marshal Rolcossovsky - the 
Russian pro-consul,and Mr.Mine - the economic dictator.Out of 
a total Cabinet of 42,-39 are members of the United Workers' 
Party. 
The Constitution did not touch the question of State Control 
and consequently the Supreme Chamber of State Control became 
tacitly set aside.The gap,however,was filled by»a Ministry of 
State-Control created on the pattern of the Soviet Constitution 
(Arts.78 and 83). 
' I Under the practice of the 1947 Constitution a new institution, 
I XXX 
the so called "presidium of the Government" sprang up.It received 
rra sanction by the Constitution of 1952,but the practice is 
being continued and this body has recently received extensive 
powers with regard to the C?xu^ 0h. 
Though the Constitution of 1952 is a record of seven years 
of change and experience in the People's Democracy it appears 
to have brought the Polish state only to the second stage of 
development from the "revolutionary proletariat" to the "prole-
tariat building socialism",the next stage being the stage of the 
"triumphant proletariat",or a fully assimilated system of the 
Soviet State. 
x see p. 240 
xx law of-November 22,1952^.и^.Р^о.47,зес.316 
xxx see p.210 ante xxxx see p.350 
Part IV. Theorv and Practige of the People' s Бешосгасу. 
Chapter 15.Characteristics of the Polish People's Democracy. 
Meaning of Democracy. Before discussing the doctrine of the 
People's Democracy let us consider briefly the meaning of de-
mocracy in general.Though used in Political Science as a term 
of art,"democracy" is not,strictly speaking,a legal term.In its 
wide meaning it is a way of life,in its narrow sense it denotes 
a system of government. 
"Democratia",or "government by the people",dates back to the 
Athenian community,but it was only as recently as the period 
following World Wäfcl that we can speak of its almost universal 
application.In the meantime centuries have passed in a constant 
struggle for popular rule,realised at times,in various countries, 
to certain degrees.But what seemed almost universal dwindled 
away between the two wars. 
There seems to be no uniform conception of democracy nor any 
strictly definable form in which it must be clothed.lt was, 
therefore,possible throughout those centuries of development 
to achieve various forms of government by the people,the progress 
keeping pace with the general progress of humanity. 
Historically,democracy is a reaction to a tyrannical or arbi-
trary rule by individuals or privileged groups,this reaction 
manifesting itself in the seizure of power by the population. 
In this respect it gained a rather scornful name dtring antiquity 
XX 
denoting a rule of the populace or the mob, as opposed to a 
more 'desirable government by the best men or aristocracy, 
x г^ уи-ог = the people; Kf*'r<bS - rule 
xx Aristotle in his "Politics" and Plato in his "Republic". 
In this form,as witnessed by modern times,especially during the 
French Revolution and the Bolshevik Revolution,the rule of the 
mob instead of realising the ideas of a "government by the people 
degenerated into a reign of terror where a few leaders,exploiting 
the human frailty of the revolting masses,virtually reimposed 
arbitrary government behind the facade of a popular government. 
Aware of this experience democracy to be true and successful 
needs adequate conditions,first to establish a system where the 
sovereign power resides in the people as a whole,then to enforce 
a direct (through the people as a whole) or indirect (represen-
tative) form of government,the ultimate decision and virtual 
control remaining with the population. 
Fascism and Communism. The ideologies of Fascism and Communism 
left an everlasting imprint on the'era of modern democracy.Both 
born in the inherent weakness of human nature,both nurtured in 
dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the democratic system, 
both animated bjr revolutionary ideas,they shook the stability of 
the world and interfered with the natural development of humanity. 
Though essentially totalitarian both systems claim to rest on the 
"rule of the people" and to work "for the people".A full discuss-
ion on those two systems representing two different ways of life 
would exceed the scope of this work,yet it seems necessary to 
mention them as phenomena opposing the historically established 
standards of democracy and quite related to the system of the 
People's Democracy.Communism,the avowed enemy of Fascifm, is the 
parent of the People's Democracy,yet the latter system may be 
linked with Fascism through its professed hatred of Fascism and 
unprofessed imitation of several methods of that regime. 
Principles of Democracy. It seems rather difficult,if not im-
possible to define democracy other than by description.Without 
x possible only in very small communities 
xx except for periods of cordial co-operation in interests of-
common expediency. 
attempting a definition more accurate than "government by the 
people" we can enumerate certain fundamental principles distin-
guishing democracy from autocracy or dictatorship exercised 
either by a group or an individual.Of those the moet important 
ones seem to be : 
1) political independence, 
2) sovereignty of the people, 
3) the state being agent of the people, 
4) rule of law, 
5) freedom and equality of citizens. 
The first condition of a free society is political indepen-
dence, or freedom from compulsion from the outside wortcf.A society 
whose constitution is formed under foreign compulsion can hardly 
call itself a free agent of its own destiny,and no matter how 
tolerant the paramount master may be,the government of such a 
society depends in principle on the will of the master. 
The sovereignty of the peopfe may be defined without entangling 
ourselves with the intricacies of the conception of "sovereignty", 
as the power of ultimate and final decision to shape the destiny 
of the community.The expression "sovereignty of the people" as 
a technical term found in several Constitutions denotes the fact 
that the government (or the power to rule) is vested in the whole 
population of the given community.This being so it is an expression 
of principle since it is obvious that a few months' old child 
or a person of unsound mind is quite incapable of exercising 
the power to rule vested in him as the member of the community. 
What actually matters is the principle and the substance of this 
x autocracy need not necessarily be totalitarian and tyranny 
need not necessarily be oppressive, 
xx a unit of a federation is not deemed for this purpose subject 
to any constraint, 
xxx cf discussion on the sovereignty of the state,pp.51 and 52 
power contained in a positive definition.If negatively defined 
"sovereignty of the people" means,on one hand,the exclusion of 
interference from outside,and on the other,the absence of privi-
leged persons or groups endowed with the prerogative of consti-
a 
tuting the ruling or dominating element/further consequence of 
the principle that the power is vested in the whole population 
is the fact that every member of che community is a subject, not 
object, of political rights. 
The working of this theory depends a great deal on the con-
ception of the state in the given community.If the state is con-
sidered fhe agent of the people and the form of organisation 
(supreme though,but nevertheless a form) the principle of the 
"rule of the people" unquestionably obtains.If,on the other hand, 
the state is considered an "absolute fixed end in itseif" ,or 
xx 
"supreme community" there is little,if any,room for the "rule of 
of the people". 
The question of Administration is allied with the conception 
of state.If the state is merely a form of organisation its appa-
ratus exists for,and serves,the subject of the organisation.If, 
on the other hand,the state stands above the human element its 
apparatus serves the ends of the state irrespective of the needs 
and desires of the community.The authority of the state,necessary 
to fulfil its purpose,is like the sovereign power of the people, 
one and indivisible,but bv no means superior to its source.More-
over, a free society may enlarge or curb the authority of its 
agent,the state,but whenever it renounces for the benefit of the 
state the power of taking final decisions this means the end of 
the sovereignty of the people. 
It does seem necessary to think that in a democratic society 
the authority of the state must be divisible into separate and 
x and xx totalitarian conception of state formulated by Hegel 
and further elaborated by Bosanquet. 
separated powerI,the authority being one though the functions 
of the state are multifarious.Moreover,accumulation of functions 
in one organ of state does not seem to contradict altogether 
the ideas of democracy provided,of course,it does not amount to 
a sole exercise of the whole authority of the state,and the ex-
clusion of any control.If the Administration is to function in 
an efficient manner the means of control must be devised so as 
not to obstruct the work of the organs of state but to assert 
their proper functioning in the service of the community.The 
lack of control is«characteristic of non-responsible,autocratic 
government,and a denial of the rule of the people. 
In matters of local administration a certain measure of self-
rule or independence should be left in the hands of local autho-
rities, thus keeping the central government concentrated on its 
work and entrusting local affairs to the citizens at large. 
The rule of law is indispensable in an orderly community, 
aiming at a balance between authority and freedom.In this respect 
the conception of the law must not be subjective and opportunis-
tic, but it must be absolute and objective,so that the organs of 
state as well as the citizen are under one abstract authoritjr of 
the law.Though it is the function of the state to make laws,this 
function is purely technical,the final decision as to what ought 
to constitute the rules to be obeyed by the citizen and the state 
organs alike remaining with society.Consequently public opinion 
must not be disregarded,not artificially built up by means of 
government propaganda.Appeals to the source of power by means of 
General Elections and Referenda should be made whenever the cen-
tral authorities are doubtful whether their action in grave 
issues would be endorsed by the electorate. 
Freedom of man in the general meaning of this word means one's 
unrestrained faculty to form one's own way of life.In the sense 
x theory of Montesquieu 
of Constitutional Law freedom seems to mean absence of arbitrary-
rule. Originally freedom was conceived as a purely personal sta-
tus opposed to that of slavery.But the abolition of slavery did 
not free man from oppression by rulers or tyranny of the state. 
In the society of free men,therefore,the power vested in the 
organs of state must be adjusted to the freedom of the individual. 
Freedom cannot be exercised unqualified,for such a use by one 
man would mean oppression to his neighbour.Hence it must be res-
tricted by one's own responsibility to his fellow man and the 
society as a whole. 
The democratic form of government implies freedom of the ci-
tizen,for its very foundation rests on the individual's right to 
participate in the government and his responsibility for its 
success or failure.This involves not only freedom from arbitrary 
arrest,freedom of speech and conscience,freedom of assembly,and 
public manifestations,but also facilities to exercise criticism. 
The constitution or the apparatus of the state must not,therefore, 
be immune from criticism,since no state or institution made by 
man for the use of man is sacrosanct.Mere criticism of the poli-
tical system should not be made the subject of criminal prosecu-
te 
tion,still less a crime of treason,though the authority of the 
organs of state äs well as the personal integrity of officials 
can be adequately safeguarded by the ordinary law of defamation xx 
operating to protect persons but not institutions. 
Toleration is the direct consequence of the idea of freedom. 
In a free society it is quite impossible,and it appears,undesi-
rable to achieve total uniformity or unity in all matters.In 
order to avoid totalitarianism and regimentation,difference, 
x cf pp.168 - 172 ante 
xx The law of sedition,entailing no turpitude attached to treason, 
can provide an adequate balance between freedom and authority 
without frustrating the citizen's right (and duty) of criticism, 
whether of political opinion,creed,nationality or race,must he 
respected.Toleration is a rare virtue of human nature yet it is 
a great test of culture and democracy.lt implies existence of 
tke 
free action, of it с o-.vn right of ä political dissent or even oppo-
sition, and lack of discrimination against religious,national,or 
racial minorities.Toleration,however,is conditional upon the 
performance by the minority of its duty to refrain from action 
it would not be prepared to suffer were it itself the majority. 
The politically dissentient party must not,therefore,endeavour 
to impose its opinion by the argument of force or to overthrow 
the existing regime by violence,the minorities must remain loyal 
to the community in which they happen to live. 
Equality of men is another cardinal rule on which rests the 
democratic system.Nobody can pretend to believe in absolute 
equality of men,other than that all belong.to the same species 
of animal and that all are bom,live and have to die.Democracy 
rests on humanity and,therefore,notwithstanding the physical and 
spiritual differences between individuals,it accords to all of 
them-equal political status and equal standing before the law. 
This simply means absence of a privileged class or elite and re-
luctance to idolise men for their merits or qualities.Democracy 
depends on numerical strength rather than individual virtues or 
merits so difficult to define and still more difficult to accept 
äs the absolute criterion of political rights. 
Democracy believes in an equal start and equal opportunities 
in the service of the community,and promises every citizen a 
chance to attain the highest position in the community.Appointing 
its representatives by election,democracy recognises the prin -
ciple of universale suffrage granting each elector one vote,the 
main reasons for temporary disqualification being immature age, 
unsoundness of mind and serious crimes proved in a court of law. 
In a democratic society decisions are taken by the majority,and 
though a majority cannot be always right,it seems safer and more 
within the principle of the popular rule to follow a majority-
rathe r than an arbitrary decision. 
With all its faults and shortcomings democracy represents a 
system where free men,in free society,in a free but orderly way 
are able to exercise (and actually do exercise) the power to 
determine the destiny of the society. 
The above observations are only an attempt to reiterate the 
main principles of a democratic system of government,and it 
appears that they may fairly be taken as a test to determine the 
nature and quality of a polity.Democracy is a challenge and a 
programme inseparable from the progress of civilisation and the 
applicability of its principles depends much on the actual state 
of development of the given community.lt is,therefore,impossible 
to define strictly the code of dogmas which must,without reser-
vation, be accepted whenever a community aspires to be a democracy. 
Switzerland,notwithstanding the fact that universal suffrage 
does not apply to women,the United Kingdom,notwithstanding her 
aristocratic second chamber,the United States of America with 
her racial discrimination in certain states,these do not,there-
fore, cease to be democracies,whilst Soviet Russia does not become 
a democracy solely on account of universal suffrage or the offi-
cial way of addressing her dictators as comrades. 
Meaning of The name People's Democracy suggests a 
People's Democracy. deriva-tive 0r species of the system of which 
"Democracy" is the genus.But if we accept democracy to mean go-
vernment by the people the expression "People's Democracy" or 
"Popular Democracy" becomes a mere figure of speech,the key to 
decipher it being found outside the general science of Constitu-
tional Law.Expressions like Parliamentary,Presidential or Judi-
cial Democracy found in books on Political Science do not thereby 
denote any particular species of democracy,but describe the sys-
tem of popular government with a characteristic feature given 
by the arrangement of the constitution assigning the leading 
röle to one of the organs of the state.By analogy "People's De-
mocracy' should, therefore, indicate the stress on the sovereignty 
of the people - if the classification of the western doctrine 
is applicable to this eastern reality. 
Since it appears not to be the сазе assistance must be sought 
in the Marxist-Leninist philosophy.As far as the tautology of 
the term "People's Democracy" is concerned it is explicable and 
reconciliable with logic only through the ingenious method of 
Marxist-Leninist dialectics. 
The expression "People's Democracy" was not coined by theo-
rists of Constitutional Law,but it emerged in the course of the 
actual development of the constitutional process.To serve ori-
ginally as a political weapon of convenience it appeared at the 
close of the last war against the Axis which developed into an 
ideological war of "Democracy v Fascism".Since Soviet Russia 
found herself in the camp of the Western Democracies it was easy 
for her,especially with the success of her armies,to reorganise 
the political systems in her sphere of influence under the guise 
of fighting the fascist phantom even in places where it had made 
no appearance.The Soviet Union in fulfilling her primary mission 
of "spreading the revolution" successfully used the fascist 
bogey,and since "democratisation" was at that time the most fa-
shionable slogan she set forth to found "new democracies" in the 
countries overrun by her armies.The People's Democracy,therefore, 
as far as its origin and historical development can testify,has 
nothing in common with the accepted conception of "Democracy". 
It simply means a concealed imposition of Marxism-Leninism on the 
nations under Soviet domination and the conversion of the formerly 
independent states into vassal states of the Russian overlord. 
The People's Democracy being a creation of the Soviet Russian 
political expansion has its roots in the Marxist-Leninist philo-
sophy,but feeds upon organisms of the states where it was made 
to grow and flourish.lt has,consequently,elements of what passes 
for democracy in the Soviet Union painted on the constitutional 
background of the former systems of government.This had to be 
so in the absence of genuine proletarian revolutions in Central 
and Eastern Europe,and because of the cordial war co-operation 
between members of the Grand Alliance.What the Central and East -
ern Eurppean proletariat did not do had to be done by the country 
of the "triumphant proletariat" in the face of the Western De-
mocracies' striving for the restoration of democratic governments 
but conveniently blind to the actual meaning of the political 
process arranged in the Soviet sphere of influence. 
In a recent publication the origin of the expression "People's 
Democracy" has been attributed to Marshal Tito,who in 1945 ad-
vocated this form of government in preference to a monarchy.As 
far as the theory.is concerned a distinguished Hungarian Marxist^ 
Joseph Revai emphasised in 1949 that there was no difference 
between the "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the "People's 
Democracy",thus disposing of the propaganda claims (which in 
Poland died down with the fall of Gomulka) that "People's Demo-
cracy" meant a path towards "socialism" distinct from communism, 
separate from Russia,and genuinely national. 
This confirms our view that both historically and as a matter 
of the theory of the constitution the expression "People's De-
mocracy" has no scientific background and means practically no-
thing. The fact that by the provision of Art.l of the Polish Con-
stitution of 1952 this expression has been elevated to a techni-
cal term of Constitutional Law in order to conceal the "dicta-
torship of the proletariat" in the transitory period from Capi-
talism to Socialism only depicts the flimsy foundation of the 
constitutional doctrine of the People's Democracy,which,was it 
x F.Borkenau,Der Europäische Kommunismus,Bern,1953,p.454 
not for Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism,could not exist of itself. 
The expression "People's Republic" is not entirely new to 
Poland since this was the form of the state proclaimed by the 
Provisional Government of In 1918 this description was uti-
lised to emphasise the distinction between the reborn and the 
pre-partition Poland,the ancient commonwealth being a "Royal 
xx 
Republic" and ruled by the gentry. 
Expressions "People's Republic","People1s State" and "People's 
Poland" have been frequently used and are still being usfüEfthough 
the "People's Democracy" is now the constitutional definition of 
the polity,but the description "People's" has not the same mea-
ning as it had in 1918.Moreover it seems not without piquancy 
to point out that Lenfri ridiculed the idea of a "People's State" 
and that Marx speaking on the ultimate dissolution of the state 
said:"however many thousands of times,the word "people" is com-
bined with the word state,this will not bring us one iota nearer 
its solution". 
Aims. Whereas no one can predict the development of democracy 
it is easy to see the aims headed at by the People's Democracy. 
The final end is indicated not only by the present development 
of that system,but also by programmes and authoritative announ-
cements. 
Whereas the principal concern of the liberal democratic system 
appears to be to secure means and opportunities for the indivi-
dual development of citizens and to protect the чау of life of 
the community,the primary concern'pf the People's Democracy re-
volves around the aims laid down in its doctrine.The aim is clear 
x see p.15 ante 
xx "Rzeczpospolita Szlachecka" until partitions,and "Rzeczpospo-
lita Ludowa" proclaimed in 1918. 
xxx see Chapter 14 on the Constitution of 1952 
xxxx V.Lenin,The State and Revolution,London,1919,p.69 
xxxxx Lenin ibidem p.88 
and definite: it has to bring the community towards a "higher 
form of development",namely "socialism".This is the official 
direction,but "socialism" as the ultimate end is hardly defined 
by pointing out merely a general march-route.After all socialism 
is a way of life thought of by philosophers and reformers.So-
cialism is a reaction against injustice,but represents by no 
means a unique and coherent-doctrine.Moreover,there have already 
been several views,several schools of thought all propagating 
"socialism",but each devising its own way and its own means to 
reach the end. 
From the types of socialism the only one available for the 
People's Democracy is the Marxist-Leninist type as practised in 
the Soviet Union.There seems to be no other way owing to the 
arrangement of the Soviet area,loyalty to-the Kremlin of the 
leaders of the People's Democracies,their training and discipline 
and the firm determination of their Soviet supervisors to enforce 
orthodoxy."There is only one socialism in spite of the lying 
social-democratic legend about western and eastern socialism. 
Therefore the experience of the Soviet Union,the first country 
of the victorious socialism,is of enormous importance for all 
countries.Consequently the essential and fundamental principles 
of the victorious socialism in the U.S.S.R.are applicable to all 
countries struggling for socialism". 
The task of building socialism,however,appears to surpass 
nowadays the capacities of one sole country,and in the opinion 
of a Soviet write? " no country is able to organise the revolu-
tion without the effective assistance of the Soviet Union!' 
x H.Mine,speech at the United Workers' Party Congress,December, 
1948. 
xx N.Farbierow,0 Charakterze Panstwa Demokracji Ludowejtrans-
lation from Russian,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.3,p.159; cf also 
A. Bur da, XIX Zjazd Partii Lenina-Stalina,Panstwo i Prav/o, 
1952,No.11(81),p.600 
Since the Soviet state is supposed to be now in the more advanced 
stage of socialist the aim of the People's Democracy is first 
of all to reach that stage.Mr.Stalin,in his theory of "super-
structure and basis" gives a support to this supposition hitherto 
confirmed by the present development of the system."The super-
structure "»according to his teaching,"lives and develops only 
in the period of a given economic basis.Hence the short life 
of the superstructure is wound up and disappears together with 
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the fact of the liquidation and disappearance of the given basis? 
Transitoriness A direct consequence of the above theory is 
9.^ ..the System. -transi-tory character of the People's Democracy. 
Striving for still more advanced forms the system does not aim 
at stabilisation but remains fluid and flexible,ready for a far-
ther moulding process."The People's Democracy",said Mr.BÜrut", 
"is not a form of a synthesis or permanent co-existence of two 
different social systems,but a form of elimination and gradual 
liquidation of capitalist elements,developing and consolidating 
at the same time the foundations of the future socialist economy!1 
Depending upon the progress of economic development the growth 
of the People's Democracy seems conditional upon the eradication 
of private enterprise,socialisation of industry,and collectivi-
sation of land.By 1952 the two former conditions appear to have 
been fulfilled,the third was,after 1950 vigorously driven towards 
completion,but since 1953 the collectivisation drive appears to 
be slowing down.Though collectivisation is the slowest and most 
painful operation,judging by the present progress,it may be com-
pleted by the termination of the Six-Year Plan of 1950,provided 
the Plan is not interrupted.Another constitutional reform will 
then,in all probability.be necessitated, 
x Vvshinsky,op.cit.p.77 
xx J.Berman,Baza i Nadbudowa w Swietle Prac Towarzysza Stalina 
о Jezykoznawstwie,Nowe Drogi,1950,No.6,p.20 
xxx Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R.op.cit.p.50 
State. The state of the People's Democracy is adapted to this 
transitory character of the system.It is the state, of the prole-
tariat since the "working class" is the ruling class.It is also 
a "socialist" state judging by the aims and purposes of the sys-
tem. We have already discussed the conception of the state adop-
ted by the letter of the Polish Constitution of 1952.Let us re-
capitulate now the position of the state in the general doctrine 
and practice. 
Marx regarded the state as an organ of capitalism,an instru-
ment in the class struggle and a means of keeping the exploited 
classes in subjection.In a classless society,he concluded there-
fore, there would be no state,the state losing its raison d'Stre. 
Both Marx and Engels envisaged in the period of transition a 
situation where the proletariat destroys by revolution the exis-
ting political bureaucracy,establishes the dictatorship of the 
people,and in converting the means of production into public 
property produces,a classless society.The state,according to 
Engels,would "wither away" in that process. 
Lenin,moving socialism to revolutionary action,also believed 
in the "withering away" of the state and proletarian dictator-
ship as soon as capitalism has tieen completely eradicated.This 
has happened in Soviet Russia,but the state did not wither away. 
Moreover in the person of Mr.Stalin the state received a power-
ful champion,so much so that it became well established as a 
"socialist state" .The state,said Mr.Stalin,is a "machine in the 
hands of the ruling class for suppressing the resistance of its 
xxxx 
class enemies"."It cannot wither away in a single socialist coun-
try before the world revolution,because of the necessities impo-
sed by capitalist encircüment". In Mr. Stalin's teaching the 
x see pp.283 and 284- ante 
xx The State and Revolution,op.cit.p.86 et seq 
xxx Constitution of 1936,Art.1. 
xxxx J.Stalin,Lenini sm,London,1940,p.3 2 
xxxxx Stalin,ibid.p658-9 
withering away of the state will come not through the "weakening 
of the state authority but through its maximum intensification, 
which is necessary to finish off the remnants of the dying 
classes and to organise defence against capitalist encirclement". 
Modifying this important canon of Marxism-Leninism Mr.Stalin 
further elaborated his own authoritative interpretation by adding 
a theory on the functions of the state.In his view there are 
two functions of the capitalist state: the internal function 
consisting in keeping in subjection the exploited majority,and 
the external function consisting either in the defence of the 
territory against other countries or enlargement of the dominium 
at the expense of other states,both functions being identical 
with defence or extension of the power of the ruling class.Though 
the socialist revolution has defeated the bourgeoisie,expropria-
ted capitalists and created a new machinery of state in the place 
of the old one,there is no reason,in Mr.Stalin's opinion,why the 
hew proletarian state should not retain some of the functions 
of the capitalist state,adjusted,of course,to the needs and pur-
poses of the proletarian state.Moreover it does not follow that 
the forms of the socialist state must subsist unchanged or that 
all functions of the state ought to be kept unaltered.On the 
contrary,the forms of the socialist state change and will be 
changed according to the development of the country and changes 
XX 
that occur in the external situation. 
In the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism there is a strong 
trace of a belief in the longevity of the state and its perennial 
purpose.Since the class struggle is likely to go on for ever 
(even in the "socialist state") postponing the advent of the 
Utopian classless society,the state must be on guard like a 
mighty robot always ready to smash class reaction either within 
or outside its political boundaries. 
x Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.62 xx Stalin,Leninism,op.cit.p.660 
The Stalinist conception of state equally applies to the 
People's Democracy in its difficult period of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and the reshaping of the traditional way of 
life.Hence the worship of the state and the etatism of the Polish 
Constitution of 1952. 
Law. Since the "dictatorship of the proletariat is the do-
mination over the bourgeoisie,untrammelled by law and based on 
violence and enjoying the sympathy and support of the toiling 
and exploited massei" the conception of the law peculiar to this 
stage of development of the "socialist state" must be devoid of 
the idealism and romanticism characteristic of the Utopian spe-
culations on the state and society in its advances stage of de-
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velopment.For the time being the law means the use of power,and 
the power is law,or as put by a Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs 
"law is an instrument of politics,any other theory being f f f i e " . 
In his definition of law Mr.VysSinsky,however,includes besides 
the "will of the dominant class" the "customs and rules of co-
mmunity life", thus impliedly admitting elements not necessarily 
created by the ruling class,but limits these latter rules of 
conduct and legal order to those principles which are "advanta-
geous and agreeable to the dominant class". 
There is a definite relationship between the type of the 
state and its laws : a "democratic" state is ruled by and makes 
laws according to the standard of principles on which it rests 
and the general will of the population.A "socialist" state,on 
the other hand,being based on a doctrine,and pursuing a fixed 
course of development,is governed by the canons of its doctrine 
and must realise adequate legislation to suit its aims and pur-
poses. 
x Stalin,op.cit.p.32-33 
xx at the last stage the law is supposed also to wither away, 
Lenin,The State and Revolution,op.cit.p.101 
xxx Mr.Vyshinsky,quot.in The Economist of July 21,1948 
xxxx Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.50• 
The theory of the rule of law obtaining in democratic coun-
tries uplifts the law to the pedestal of an abstract force go-
verning not only individuals but also the organs of the state 
and indeed the state itself,and explains and justifies the ne-
cessity of compulsion on moral,ethical and practical grounds. 
This theory does not obtain in the eastern type of "socialist" 
states.Instead we have the theory of the "socialist legal order", 
or the "people's legal orde?". 
The Marxist theory of state and law,as mentioned above,ema-
nates from the conception of an antagonistic class society,where 
by necessity one of the classes constitutes the dominating,and 
consequently oppressing,class.The theory of the "socialist legal 
order",according to a Soviet writer,is "one of the methods of 
protecting and consolidating the dictatorship of the working 
class and the rule of the socialist law".The same writer informs 
us that the "socialist legal order" is the result of the policy 
of the working class, aiming at the perpetuation of its rule and 
the development of"such social conditions as are convenient and 
favourable to the dominant class". 
A further development and elucidation of the theory of the 
"socialist legal order" comes from a Polish vice-minister of 
J u S t J c e : "The socialist legal order requires behaviour consistent 
with statutes and other legislative acts made by the people's 
xxxxx 
authorities and embodying the policy of the Party and Government. 
It consists in the adherence to the political line fixed by the 
Party and Government,it means an understanding and execution of 
the policy of the Party and Government". 
x as opposed to the arbitrary rule of class or dictator. 
xx cf Polish Constitution of 1952,see pp.272 and 273-ante 
xxx B;Mankowski,Zasady Radzieckiej Praworzadnosci Socjalistycznej, 
Panstwo i Prawo,1950,No.l.p.25 
xxxx T.Rek,0 Roli i Zadaniach Sadow Powszechnych w Walce о Utrwa-
lenie Socjalistjrczne j Praworzadnosci, Nowe Prawo, War saw, 1951, 
No.9,p.3-4 
xxxxx N.B.the precedence given to the Party. 
Mr.Rek's interpretation of the theory goes deeper into the 
practical considerations than the academic opinion of his Soviet 
colleague.lt is,however,the first time that we hear from the 
vice-Minister of Justice of the Party taking precedence before 
the Government in formulating the policy and influencing the 
enactment of laws.This frank admission of what is commonplace 
but quite unbelievable for one unfamiliar with the system,drives 
home the apprehension that the Party constitutes the actual back-
bone of the political system and the driving force behind the 
machinery of the state.The r51e of the law has thereby been re-
duced to an instrument of policy,a mere weapon of convenience 
and a technical set of .compulsive rules expressing the changing 
policy of the Government as dictated by the Headquarters of the 
Party.In the general arrangement of authorities the law is no 
longer above the Government, fors gone is the power of moral 
and legal restraint upon attempts at official arbitrariness. 
Since the law had to descend to obscurity the administration 
of justice had to follow the same fatd.The reform of the Polish 
Judiciary in 1950 constituted in the words of a Director of De-
partment in the Ministry of Justice, "repudiation once and for 
all of the legend of the classless,independent and non-political 
court".This utterance is grounded,of course,in the belief that 
the"function of courts was never and cannot ever be independent 
XX 
of the will of the ruling class". 
The theory of the "socialist legal order" applied to the Ju-
diciary means,in the opinion of Mr?Sek,"an administration of 
justice from the standpoint of class,from standpoint of the class •the. struggle and interests of the working masses".On the role of 
courts Mr.Rek passed the following comment: "The principal re-
x H.Chmielewski,Po Reorganizacji Sadow,Nowe Prawo,1951,No.l,p.ll 
XX-* T.Rek,0rgany Wymiaru Sprav/iedliwosci w-Walce о Praworzadriasc 
Rewolucyjöa,Nowe Prawo,1951,No.6,p# 3 
xxx Rek,ibid.p.7 
quirement and yardstick of an adequate administration of justice 
is the appreciation by courts of the task imposed on them by 
the struggle.for socialism and absolute participation by the 
courts in the building up of the basis for socialism.This means 
that the courts must follow the directives of the Party,they 
must act in accordance with the policy of the Government,they 
must obey the law,and study and learn from the achievements of 
progressive legal science". 
Any comment on this clearly stated position of the law in 
the system of the People's Democracy seems quite superfluous. 
From reading the Reports of the Supreme Court one learns 
that the courts have adopted the official attitude in as much 
a. 
as the former, instead of quoting precedents, quotes now Marx, 
Engels,and Bierut to support its decisions.Cases are decided 
on the principles of "proletarian internationalism","dictator-
ship of the«proletariat", and the considerations of a "political 
and class co&iüct" determine the verdict in each individual 
case. 
There is,however, a considerable discrepancy between the doc-
trine and practice on the-one hand,and the formulation of the 
constitutional principle on the other.A confusion ;of ideas is 
particularly apparent in the provisions of Art.4 of the Polish 
Constitution of 1952.In alinea 1 of the said Article the prin-
ciple of the "socialist legal order" is clearly stated,the law 
being "an emanation of the interests and will of the working 
people".Alineas 2 and 3 constitute a considerable departure from 
the doctrine as explained above in so far as they state the 
"bourgeois-democratic" principle of the law being above "all 
organs of the state". 
x Reports,1950,vol.1.case No.l ; xx Reports,1950,vol.II,case 16 
xxx Reports,1951,vol.1.case No.12;xxxx Reports,1951,v.II,case 19 
One must note the absence of such provisions in the Stalin 
Constitution as well as the difference in the official position 
of the Party.Under the Stalin Constitution (Art.126) the Bol-
shevik Party enjoys a constitutional standing as the "vanguard 
of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and deve-
lop the. socialist system" and "the leading element of all orga-
nisations of the working people,both public and state".The-Polish 
Constitution is silent on the position of the Party,though in 
actual fact the Party plays the decisive röle in the present 
x 
system of government.In other words what the Polish Constitution 
did not state exists in practice,the practice faithfully, follo-
wing the doctrine and Soviet experience,and what it did state 
in Art.4 is a confusion of the traditional conception of the 
"rule of law1' with the present doctrine of the "socialist legal 
order". 
Prom this fact one can infer that the doctrine of the People's 
Democracy grows with the practice,that is to say,it is being 
formulated"ex post facto,and that the formulation stumbles occa-
sionally on'the»remnants of the old trend of thinking. 
Constitution. The theory of Constitution in the system of 
People's Democracy is under a threefold influence: the theory 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat; the theorv^ ofaithelie i 
"superstructure and basis"; and the theory of law. 
In the Marxist-Leninist philosophy the Constitution is a 
formal registration of the rule of the dominant class.The Con-
stitution is,therefore,formed for the benefit of the ruling class 
and to the detriment of the ruled classes.In this respect it is 
not a charter of law but a statute to further the interests of 
the privileged class.In Lenin's opinion the Constitution ought 
to illustrate the "relationship of the forces engaged in the 
class struggle",and if it does not comply with this requirement 
x see p.325 et seq 
it is a fictitious Constitution characteristic of the "capitalist-
x 
bourgeois" system.The inference therefrom is that a proletarian 
Constitution must register the fact of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat - which was done by the Polish Constitution of 1952. 
The doctrine of the "superstructure and basis" requires the 
Constitution to be a true expression of the state of the society 
in the given stage of development.lt cannot be,therefore,as re-XX 
marked Mr.Stalin,"a code of law but only a fundamental statute", 
thus on the one hand picturing the actual progress,and on the 
other giving a general framework for the institutions of the 
state and society.A further consequence of the doctrine is the 
principle that the Constitution must reflect the given stage of 
development and cannot by means of programmes or declarations 
further theories or claims belonging to a more advanced stage 
of the development of the society which it has not as yet as a 
state achieved.Hence the insistence and emphasis on the diffe-
rentiation that Soviet Russia is-not yet a communist country, XXX 
but "building communism",and that the People's Democracies are 
not yet socialist states but in the stage of "building socialism". 
Belonging to the superstructure of the social and economic 
system the Constitution remains under the influence of the chan-
ges occuring within the society and dies with the advancement 
of the society to a higher stage of development.In this respect 
the Constitution is flexible (to a certain extent) not because 
it is adaptable to the living and changing "basis",but because 
it may be authoritatively interpMied,the limit of such inter-
pretation (and life of the Constitution) being fixed by the stage 
of the development of the society. 
x Lenin,Works(lVth Russian ed),v.XV,p.308,see Rozmaryn,op.cit.p288 
xx Stalin,Leninism,op.cit.p.580; xxx Stalin,ibid.p.569-70 
xxxx Bierut,Podstawv Ideologiczne,op.cit.p.60 
xxxxx by the Presidium in Russia and the Council of State in 
Poland 
As far as the machinery of amendment is concerned the Con-
stitution is flexible enough to allow speedy actioS,though 
discrepancy between the letter of the Constitution and the 
actuäl practice is of little importance. 
Owing to the conception of the law the doctrine of the hie-
rarchy of statutes does not seem to be applicable and in actual 
fact neither the Stalin Constitution nor the Polish Constitution 
provides for any machinery to decide in case of doubt whether 
an Act of Parliament or an executive decree is constitutional 
or not.Moreover the system under which courts have the power 
to decide upon the validity of legislation is considered "anti-
democratic and only serving the interests of the possessing 
clashes".The institution of a special Tribunal created for that 
purpose is condemned as well for the same reaions.There is, 
therefore,no constitutional restraint on the law making bodies 
to enact laws inconsistent with the Constitution and public 
opinion cannot be voiced to iha'fc effect owing to the Government 
control of the Press and the Government monopoly in the prin-
ting business. 
A further consequence is the confusion between the consti-
tuent and legislative power,which we could observe from the 
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very beginning of the system. In theory the "working class" is 
the master of the situation and no legal restraint can limit 
its rule.It is logical,therefore,that the "people's represen-
tatives" (i.e. Parliament and executive bodies elected of appoin-
ted from the only candidates submitted by the ruling "Workers' 
Party") are entitled to take whatever measures they think ne-
cessary for the benefit of the "working people". 
x Soviet Constitution Art.146;Polish Constitution Art.91 
xxЛоzmaryn,op.cit.p.302; xxx'Rozmaryn,ibid.p.303 
xxxx N.B. the controversy over the Constitution of. 1935 
see pp.96 and 150 ante 
In such conditions constitutionalism is unthinkable and the 
authority of the Constitution together with the respect it used 
to command in the past,for better or worse,is bound to wither 
away. 
Popular Element, The People's Democracy,as far as theory runs, 
is a political system where the democratic government is carried 
out by the "people" in contradistinction to the western "pluto-
cracy" or "bourgeois-democracy" where the government is supposed 
to be performed by the privileged class for the benefit of that 
class.Since "people" mean a definite class of "workers and pea-
sants" the People's Democracy is as much a class system as is 
supposed to be the western "plutocracy".The theory of the sove-
reignty of the people is,therefore,at least as much distorted as 
is the opinion of the critics in the case of western democracies, 
the twist only turning the other way round.The difference,of 
course,lies in the fact of the People's Democracy actually pro-
fessing and practising the distortion,whereas the distortion of 
the western democracies exists chiefly in those critical minds 
animated by the reformatory zeal of the Marxist-Leninist philoso-
phy which assumes that the "proletarian government" represents 
the overwhelming majority of the population whilst the "capita-
list" countries are ruled by a small minority. 
When the Soviet armies swept across Eastern and Central Europe 
in the later part of the last war new governments sprang up in 
the shadow of their tanks.They professed to represent the "broad 
masses",being composed of members of various political parties 
which rallied to fill the constitutional vacuum.The Communist 
Party did not at that time claim the monopoly of leadership but 
other movements in coalition vyith it were encouraged.In Poland, 
for instance,there was ( and still is ) no official Communist 
Party at all since what was created in 1942 as the agency 
of the Kremlin called itself a Workers' Party,and in Hungary 
the Smallholders' Party,was built up practically from nothing 
only to be smashed later when the "Smallholders" proved not 
to be "revolutionary peasantry".The "broad national fronts" 
trading under the name of "all-democratic parties", included, 
indeed,members of various parties but hardly distinguished 
leaders.Men of authority were later either dispofed of or had 
to turn into ardent worshippers of Marxism-beninism.In the 
course of time popular fronts disappeared and a single party 
system took their place.Opposition,of course,ceased to exist. 
The popular element,being in theory the core of the system, 
dwindled away or shrank into a distinguishable,but quite a 
minute body - the ruling party. 
Similarly to the development in Soviet Russia where the 
dictatorship of the proletariat devolved into a party aristo-
XXX 
cracy,the popular element constitutionally embodied in "wor-
kers and peasants"'as>the-holders of sovereignty in People's 
Democracy remains largely a theory,the actual potentiality 
to rule being vested in the party as the sole medium of forming 
the government and representative bodies. 
Democratic Element. Communism professes to be a democratic 
movement of the "highes?x?ype" and so does the People's Demo-
xxxxx 
cracy.One has,however,to bear in mind that in this context 
the word "democracy" could have a double and probably contra-
dictory meaning if in the wording of the definition of demo-
cracy stress be laid on the word THE people suggesting a go-
vernment by a chosen class «of people. 
x cf F.Nagy,The Struggle behind the Iron Curtain,New York,1948 
xx cf trials of Maniu. in Rumania and Petkov in Bulgaria,but 
a similar fate met many genuine communists as well, 
xxx for the population of about 200 million the Party member-
ship amounts now to about 6 million, 
xxxx Vyshinsky,op.cit.pp.172-6 
xxxxx Bierut,Podstawy,op.cit.p.7 
The rögime of the People's Democracy was imposed on the 
pre-war political systems and in this respect it is a reform 
of those systems,but a reform aiming at a definite form of 
government and a way of life to be attained gradually.In what-
ever stage of development it has a certain amount of the tra-
ditional democratic element left as a hereditary residue and 
at the same time a certain amount of the acquired democratic 
element of the Soviet type.Being rival currents those elements 
do not form a synthesis,but resemble a reflux of the former 
under a forcible influx of the latter. 
Owing to the fact that the doctrine of democracy does not 
rest on a catechism of fixed dogmas it is rather'difficult to 
put the People's Democracy to a "democratic test".It must oe 
regarded as a way of life inseparable from Marxism-Leninism-
Stalinism and a form of government modelled upon the Soviet-
Russian pattern. 
The primary conditions indispensable for democracy as 
stated above hardly exist or at least are questionable in the 
countries of the Soviet Bloc,hence their claims to democracy 
must be considered in the light of reality peculiar to their 
position as members of the Soviet Bloc.We have singled out the 
questions of : political independence,sovereignty of the people, 
the position of the state,the rule of law and freedom and equa-
lity of citizens,to be the outstanding principles on which 
democracy is founded.Those principles are denied in the system 
of People's Democracy,if we test it by standards of western 
civilisation.If,on the other hand,we applied the Marxist-Leni-
nist-Stalinist dialectics and read the meaning of words as 
taught by them our conclusion would probably be reversed. 
In their version political independence means close co-ope-
ration and "brotherly alliance" with Soviet Russia,since 
x see pp.291-297 ante 
"loosening that co-operation endangers the independence of 
the country".The sovereignty of Poland is secured Ъу "isolation 
from the American and British imperialism which tramples the 
sovereignty of nations,incites the German anti-Polish chauvi-
nism and endeavours to restore German imperialism^."Democracy", 
XXX 
Mr.VyshinsKy tells us,"signifies literally the authority of the 
people,hence only the Soviet authority can be considered truly 
democratic".Applied to the system of People's Democracy this 
precept orders imitation of the system of soviets and the "de-
mocratic centralism" characterised by the concentration of 
functions in the hands of one organ of state and the absence 
of constitutional control.The state is the agent of the people xxxx 
because it is an instrument in the hands of the ruling class. 
The rule of law is strictly enforced,meaning the "socialist 
lega^Porder".Freedom of the individual means absence of "capi-
talist exploitation and refutation of the influence of Anglo-
American imperiaftsts".Equality signifies "liquidation of 
cfasses" and realisation of the principle: "from everyone 
according to his abilities,to everj^ one according to ^sPwor*". 
The verdict on the People's Democracy must»therefore,be 
left to the individual standards of reasoning and only by way 
of challenge it may be said that the system is as much "demo-
cratic" as is its parent system - Soviet Russia. 
x-Ideological Declaration of the Polish United Workers' Party, 
see Bierut^odstawyjop.cit.p.134 
xx ibid.p.141 xxx Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.168 
xxxx see pp.303-5 ante ;xx xxx see pp.306-9 ante 
xxxxxx J.Cyrankiewiez,speech at the Congress of the Socialist 
Workers' Party,recorded in Podstawy,op.cit.p.120 
xxxxxxx Stalin,Leninism,op.cit.p.521 
xxxxxxxx Soviet Constitution Art.12,Polish Constitution Art.14 
Chapter 16. Some practical Aspects of the Polish People's 
Democracy. 
The People's Democracy is a totalitarian form of government 
and on account of this fact the Law of the Constitution covers 
a wider range of state activities than is the case with liberal 
systems.Bearing this in mind we have to devote some space to 
questions which in the system of Western Democracy ?/ould be 
probably only remotely relevant tot he Constitution.In consi-
dering the practical aspects of the People's Democracy we have 
selected only a few of the many subjects regarded there as 
directly bearing upon the Constitution,and propose to discuss 
them in detail because they are closely connected with the 
study of this particular political system.It is also thought 
that a section on Education and Nationalism would not be out 
of place here since the former is regarded as one of the prin-
cipal functions of the state in the period of "building so-
cialism", and the latter question further explains why.the sys-
tem of the People's Democracy is being modelled upon the Soviet 
pattern. 
Constitutional Practice. In presenting the development of 
Constitutional Law in post-war Poland we endeavoured to illu-
strate some features of the Law in actual practice,accompanying 
this with a discussion on the letter of the Constitution.Con-
stitutional practice seems to consist of two elements: inter-
pretation of the law,and its application by the supreme autho-
rities of the state. 
Atoharacteristic phenomenon of the system of People's Demo-
cracy (at any rate in the later stage of development) is the 
lack of authoritative judicial interpretation typical of the 
x in Poland since the reorganisation of the Judiciary in 1950. 
Western Democracies.This may be accounted for by the decline 
of the Judiciary and the vesting of the Executive authorities 
with the power of interpreting laws,their interpretation being 
binding on the courts.Consequently this task is being dischar-
ged by^active politicians,whose utterances we have, frequently 
quoted.In matters of doctrine,so important for the system,final 
pronouncements have been reserved for the Party leaders.lt is 
have to 
not surprising,therefore,tojrecord frequently Mr.Bierut's voice, 
whose pronouncements ex cathedra contribute immensely to the 
authentic explanation of the system. 
In the system of the People's Democracy there is no room 
for conventions of the Constitution or constitutional usages, XX 
the theory of conventions in the opinion of Prof.Rozmaryn 
constituting in the British system "an ideological support 
for the arbitrary rule of the bourgeois-dictatorship".Kotwith-
standing this condemnation of conventions,practices developed 
in the course of the application of the Constitutional Law, 
and those have not been reprobated by Prof.Rozmaryn,because, XXX 
as he says in another work,"they illustrate the actual will 
of the ruling class,that is to say,the binding system of the 
Constitutional Law".Par from antagonising the learned ProÜMor, 
it appears that what is objectionable to him in the "bourgeois-
democracy" is perfectly acceptable under another name in the 
system of the People's Democracy. 
The constitutional practice in the latter system has,however, 
a different purpose from the conventions.Whereas conventions 
are dictated by the necessities of changing life and serve to 
x see p.230 ante 
xx S.Rozmaryn,Nauka о Panstwie,Warsaw,1949,p.21 
xxx S.Rozmaryn,Polskie Prawo Panstwowe,Warsaw,1951,p.312 
xxxx He was invested with the State Award of Distinction for 
the year of 1952,see Panstwo i Prawo,1952,No.8-9,p.193 
complete or fill the gaps in the political system within the 
existing constitution,constitutional practice follows in the 
People's Democracy the course of social and economic changes 
and paves the way for the anticipated reforms of the consti-
tution. In other words,constitutional practice develops irres-
pective of the letter of the Constitution but follows the pre-
arranged line of future progress.The best illustration of this 
view is the practice of the President of the Polish People's 
Republic presiding at the Cabinet meetings during the period 
preceding the enactment of the Constitution of 1952.This quite 
unprecedented action of a head of state was a"practical device 
to prepare Mr.Bierut for the office of Prime Minister,which 
office he assumed on the abolition of the presidency by the 
Constitution of 1952. 
Political and A study of a Constitution should be concerned 
Economic Power,.na^ n^ y -t^ g, legal and political aspects of 
the organisation of the community,yet it is not always possible 
to draw a.clear line of distinction'between the political and 
the economic. 
Critics of "capitalist democracy" maintain that it tends 
to condone, social injustice by leaving capital to dictate the 
course of development of society.Critics of "proletarian de-
mocracy", on. the other hand,can easily point out that the state 
taking.into its hands exclusive control.and management of eco-
nomic, proolems is apt to degenerate into, tyranny. 
There is no doubt about the social role of property and 
the fact that society and individuals contribute to the creation 
of wealth.He т/ho holds political power can alter the course 
of the economic, development of society,and vice versa,whoever 
commands the resources and wealth of the society can influence 
the political set-up of the state.In a "capitalist" state the 
economic power is (at least as the theory runs) separated from 
the state and freely apportioned according to the fluctuations 
Dof ;the- economic forces.In a "proletarian" state,on the con-
trary, the entire economic power is vested in the society as 
a whole (the society consists of the"proletariat"),and actually 
accumulated in the hands of the state. 
The state,owing to its purpose and function,is made to in-
terfere with property.This interference in a "capitalist" so-
ciety takes the shape of controls and redistribution of wealth 
chiefly by means of fiscal policy,that is to say taxation on 
the one hand,and subsidy on the other,the latter taking various 
forms such as family allowance,free social service,free schoo-
ling, food subsidies and the like.In a "socialist" society the 
state controls,first of all,the sources of wealth,that is pri-
mary resources and means of production.3y means of nationali-
sation (with or without compensation),the state eliminating 
free competition,and(in theory) the employment of man by man, 
steps into the shoes of the owner and employer.This involves 
interference with the rights of private property (guaranteed 
by "capitalist" constitutions) and,of course,influence of the 
position of the individual.The immediate effect thereof is the 
equation of the social level and the elimination of extreme 
differences in wealth between individuals. 
The People's Democracy in realising the "socialisation 
programme" concentrated political and economic power in the 
state,leaving to individuals only very limited rights of private 
property.In doing so the state acquired almost absolute control 
over the individual and the community.The individual and the 
community are then at the mercy of economic planners."Social 
planning is possible only by the rigid circumscription and 
total abolition of the rights of property.lt is implicitly 
assumed that modem society fails to plan it's economic processes 
through lack of intelligence.The fact is that the interests of 
powerful and dominant groups,v.ho profit from the present system 
of society are the real hindrance to the establishment of a 
national and just society"...Once the hindrance has been re-
moved the planning process can smoothly proceed,but the "road 
• XX 
to serfdom" appears to be another equally dangerous extreme. 
Planning is a matter of degree,the communist system meaning 
a 100$ planning of whatever is accessible to the. organs of 
state.The People's Democracy at present'is nearest this mark, 
as the study of yearly and periodical economic plans reveals. 
Without going into the merits and demerits of a planned society 
one has to be aware of the danger (or advantage ?) of the con-
centration of political and economic powers,and their being 
entirely deposed in the hands-of the state.On the.one hand the 
ensuing result is the totalitarian type of-state on the fascist 
pattern and,on the other,the totalitarian type of state on the 
communist pattern.The third type may be an egalitarian type of 
state with a great deal of centralisation,and distinctly autho-
ritarian. Whichever type of state is reached the position of 
the individual suffers for the benefit of the community or 
state,the loss or gain of the citizen being measurable by me-
thods employed by the state and by the final end,that is whether 
it aims at justice or mere efficiency.The People's Democracy 
has chosen its path and definitely goes towards communism, 
through socialism of its own interpretation. 
Chiefly because of the concentration of political and eco-
nomic power,the Government of the Polish People's Democracy 
was able to alter considerably the face of the country.Recon-
struction work and development of new industrial areas (initiated 
already before the war) could be operated on a large national 
scale according to central plans and schemes for Government 
investments. 
x R.Nieouhr,The Nature and Destiny of Kan,1946,p.213 
xxF.Hayek,The Road to Serfdom,London,1946 
The conservative peasants,always reluctant to leave the 
overpopulated rural areas,had to be brought practically by 
the scruff of their necks to the new industrial centres.The 
rural population toiling upon the ever-dwindling farmsteads 
of their ancestors and amounting to about 65$ of the pre-war 
population,was reduced,by the end of 1952,to about 50$ of the 
nation.The exodus from crowded land to undermanned factory 
provides a gloss the fallacy of the post-war agrarian re-
form. The slogan: "give land to the peasant" operated in prac-
tice as a scheme to create dwarfish and therefore hardly 
economically sound farms and satisfied neither the land-thirsty 
peasant nor the marxist reformer loathing the very idea of 
private ownership.Though the reform broke up landed estates 
and dispossessed their owners in accordance with the designs 
of a proletarian revolution,it nevertheless retarded the prog-
ress of collectivisation.A Government offer to sell a piece 
of confiscated land to each small-holder was at the initial 
stage of the People's Bemocracy the indispensable bait to con-
vince the peasant that the ^gime was on his side.Once the 
regime was established and consolidated,collectivisation.had 
to commence in the face of stubborn opposition by the peasant. 
Notwithstanding the various incentives and propaganda,collective 
farms are still rather unpopular and the Government drive had 
reached by 1951 only a meagre jäeld of 12,2$ of the agricul-
tural production brought by the "socialised land". 
The thinning down of the density of the rural population 
resulted on one hand in an increase of the "industrial prole-
tariat" at the expense of peasantry,and on the other in the 
decrease of the population enjoying the security (precarious 
though.it may be) of the possession of land.An agricultural 
country,where for centuries land was the chief economic factor, 
x see pp.244-7 ante 
is being turned into an industrial state and consequently 
the remnants of a tradition of dashing cavaliers of the past, 
peculiar particularly to eastern Poland,are rapidly fading 
av,ay; making place.for a cult of "leaders at v;ork" - the heroes 
of the "socialist economy". 
The growth of the state-owned and managed industry and 
agriculture breeds a new bureaucracy and fashions a novel class 
of servants of the state.Totally depending on the policy of 
the state and economic planning they constitute a social and 
political element of considerable importance whose significance 
as yet remains to be evaluated. 
Position of The People's Democracy being a form of the 
Individualdictatorship of the proletariat is predestined to 
put into practice Lenin's-maxim that the "dictatorship of the 
proletariat must be a state that embodies a new kind of demo-
cracy for the proletarians and the dispossessed and a new kind 
of dictatorship against the bourgeoisie".At the very foundation 
of the system,therefore,lies a segregation of the population 
into the privileged class invested in theory with the plenitude 
of rights,and the capitalist class doomed to extinction as g. 
class. 
Lenin's theory would work perfectly 'well if that segregation 
could be effectively concluded and if the individual "prole-
tarian" was in a position to assume the political röle assigned 
to him by the doctrine.As that is quite not the case he has 
to endure the dictatorship along with the bourgeoisie until 
XX 
reorganisation of the society finally takes shape.Trots£y 
summarised the actual position in cruelly realistic words: 
"No organisation except the army has ever controlled man with 
such severe compulsion as does the state organisation of the 
x-quot.by Stalin,Leninism,op.cit.p33 xx L.Trotsky,Dictatorship v Democracy,New York,1922,p.170 
working class in the most difficult period of transition". 
The social doctrine of the People's Democracy is not quite 
clearly formulated in the Polish Constitution of 1952.Since, 
however,the system is transitory from a "capitalist to socia-
list society" one may assume that the Marxist-Leninist social 
doctrine is being gradually introduced."Socialism",says Mr. 
Stalin,"does not deny individual interests,it amalgamates them 
with those of the collective".It appears that the quintessence 
of this terse statement is the preference given to the society 
over the individual.No conflict is,therefore,imaginable between 
the individual and the society since what the society wants 
is supposed to be his own desire.A collective life being the 
ideal of socialism,the individual sphere must be narrow and 
subordinated to the common good. 
The fact of the,concentration of political and economic 
power,as mentioned above,not only influences the economic 
doctrine but also determines,to a large extent,the position 
of the individual.The arrangement of. economic control gives 
the state tremendous power over the individual,which power 
can effectively be used for the benefit of the society.As a 
result of the socialisation of industry and considerable co-
llectivisation of land,unemployment,which between the wars 
was the curse, of the "capitalist" state,has been, liquidated. 
Whether in actual fact the unemployed drav;ing benefit in a 
"capitalist" country was worse off than the employed worker 
under the "socialist" system of Soviet Russia or the People's 
Democracy is immaterial,the disappearance of unemploj-ment 
being the common phenomenon in systems where effective use 
is made of the individual for the benefit of the state, 
x quot.by Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.497 
xx The lack of unemployment usually follows a war even in a 
"capitalist" state,whilst ?/ar destruction provides plenty 
of work. 
Representing a new way of life the People's Democracy is 
in quest of a new man.The new man must be a collective-minded 
man,an enthusiast of the development of the political,social, 
and economic progress in the spirit of the Marxist-Leninist-
Stalinist doctrine; he must become a model of the "socialist 
discipline" at work.The evaluation of the man does not entail 
probing into his individual quality,but into his usefulness 
to tke society.The constitutional principle: "from everyone 
according to his abilities,to everyone according to his work" 
reflects the general trend of thinking,where the state exacts 
from every citizen the share of effort the citizen is deemed 
to be able to provide,and offers him in exchange the equivalent 
of his actual merit. 
Adoption of "socialist competition at work",as well as the 
Stakhanov movement,together with its incidents (publicity, 
civic honours,state rewaras and the like) not only signifies 
a tendency to exploit to the maximum human strength but also 
strives to attain a fully conscious attitude towards sacrifice 
for the benefit of the society.The state,through the medium 
of economic plans setting targets for the individual and co-
mmunal effort,acts in this respect as an arbiter both of the 
needs of the society for its development,and the contribution 
the individual must bring to satisfy these needs. 
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A new duty recorded in the Constitution considerably burdens 
the position of the individual.The duty of vigilance against 
internal and external enemies requires the citizen to be on 
the alert and also to participate actively in all schemes ad-
vanced to this effect by the Party and Government.Pirst of all 
x Mr.RadkieV/icz,the Minister of Public Security,also received 
the first class "order of work" for his merits,see Polish 
Daily of January 21,1953 
xx Polish Constitution of 1952,Art..79 
"revolutionary vigilance" is required to help the authorities 
in the liquidation of the remnants of capitalist elements.Se-
condly "patriotic vigilance" is urged in order to combat the 
internal diversion bred by the "Titoist provocati^S".Thirdly 
"peace vigilance" is imposed to defend the achievements of the 
People's Democracy against "Anglo-American imperiaft^ts".The 
citizen must search his own conscience and watch his neighbour, 
since vigilance means constant attention and the expectation 
of danger striking from any quarter. 
Party and State. The Party fulfils two principal functions: 
as an ideological and political school bringing the citizen 
mp for his duties and share in the government,and as an appa-
ratus providing the framework of the political system.The edi-
fice of the state thus rests on the Party,which rears potential 
members of the Administration and supplies the best means of 
selection for leadership.At the bottom the Party acts as an 
agent of the r£gime and guardian of all. rightousness. 
"The Party",in Mr.Staff's words,"must be first of all,the 
vanguard of the working class".In this respect it must embody 
the best elements of the working class,and being armed with 
revolutionary theory,lead the proletariat in its political 
struggle.The Stalinist conception of the Partjr goes far beyond 
the rigid limits of one political organisation.Since the pro-
letariat needs several organisations it is the function of the 
Party to rally them into one stream under its own direction. 
Non-party organisations,such as Trade Unions,Co-operatives,and 
xxxxx such like,must,therefore,be subordinated to the Party leaaersnip. 
x cf Ideological Declaration of the P.Z.P.R.op.cit.pp.136-7,138 
xx B.Bierut,Zadania Partii w V/alce о Czujnosc Revolucyjna, 
Nowe Drogi,(separate publication),1949,p.13-4 
xxx Bierut,Podstawy Ideologiczne,op.cit.p57' and Cyrankiewicz, 
ibid.p.120 
xxxx Leninism,op.cit.p.73; xxxxx ibid.p78-9 
The Party being the "highest form of organisation of the 
proletariat",is the instrument of the proletariat.lt is through 
the Party that the proletariat,according to the doctrine,can 
seize power and organise a state organisation of its own.The 
Party is necessary to maintain the dictatorship and lead the 
society towards socialism.Having fulfilled its mission,viz. 
having brought the society to a classless stage,the Party is 
due to disappear when the dictatorship of the proletariat 
xx 
withers away. 
The Marxist-Leninist Party,no matter what is its official 
name,greatly contributed towards the introduction of the sj^ stem 
of the People's Democracy in various countries,earning probably 
the highest merit in Czechoslovakia through the operation of 
the coup d'ätat of 1948.The appearance of a multi-party system 
is a characteristic feature of the People's Democracy,expli-
cable first of all by its growth out of the former system and 
the lack of genuine revolution.The historical cbnditions in 
which the system was formed were quite different from those 
which gave birth to the Soviet b'nion.The direct consequence 
thereof was the fact that the Bolshevik Party achieved a mono-
poly through its being the party which organised,fought and 
won the revolution,whereas in the case of People's Democracies 
the Marxist-Leninist parties were minute,practically in swadd-
ling-bands, and what may pass for revolutions in those countries 
was actually achieved with the effective assistance of Soviet 
Russia. 
In the course of time the conception of a political party 
completely changed, so much so that onljr names -remained of the 
traditional parties,no programme or action separate from the 
ruling Party being conceivable.The Polish "broad democratic 
x Stalin,Leninism,op.cit.p.79 
xx Stalin,ibid.p.80 
front-of national unity" (fostered by the Grand Alliance by 
the close of the war) had shrunk by 1952 to four parliamentary 
groupl representing the United Workers' Party,United Peasants' 
Party,Democratic Party and an entirely new creation,the Catholic-
Social Club,consisting of three person!.The United Workers' 
Party absolutely dominated the political scene and at the Elec-
tions of 1952 led the National Unity Pront on the same footing 
as in Soviet Russia the Bolshevik Party leads the National Bloc 
xxx 
in alliance with non-party candidates supporting the regime. 
Before this stage was achieved (roughly by 1950) the Workers" 
Party had not only to secure absolute domination,but also to 
put itself into the position of its parent party in Soviet 
Russia.This development accompanied the process of merger with xxxx 
the Socialist Party described eisernere and had severe reper-
cussions within the Party.The root of the trouble lay in a 
conception of the röle of the Party termed "Gomulka'ism",which 
happened to differ from the Stalinist teaching.Gomulka,the 
leading schismatic,seems to have believed in a multi-party 
system and did not think a single party was desirable.This is 
what he wrote when at the summit of his career:. I'We have chosen 
our own Polish way of development which we call People's De-
mocracy. In that way and in our conditions the dictatorship 
of the working class and still less the dictatorship of one 
party is neither necessary nor appropriate.Our democracy and 
the social system built and perpetuated by us are without pre-
cedent in history.Our experience proves that they pass their 
test well.Poland can go and goes its own way,approved aldo by 
our party"... And iEaterf.. "both parties aim at independence -
x There were originally seven Groups in the Government Bloc, 
see p.214 ante 
xx see p.214 ante xxx Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.160 
xxxx see pp.215-8 ante 
xxxxx Jednoscia Silni,Nowe Drogi,1947,No.1.p.4,and 14 
xxxxxx Na Nowym Etapie,Nowe Drogi,1948,No.8,p.v 
for the Socialist Party as well as the Workers' Party the 
independence of Poland represents the supreme end to which all 
other questions are subordinated'1... 
Gomulka's schism lived a short life.Expounding a theory 
inconsistent with Marxism-Leninism,that is discarding the or-
thodox doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat as well 
as the Stalinist conception of the Party having one leadership 
and monopoly in government,he sealed his doom.The first rebuke 
came from his Party chief,who declared:.."the view of comrade 
Wieslaw (Gomulka's Party name) undoubtedly constituted an open 
and premeditated revision of the Leninist evaluation of the 
history of our movement"...After Jupiter had thrown his thunder 
at Gomulka's attempt at a "right-wing nationalist deviation" 
the theory of the "separate way" had to be abandoned.In the 
plenary session of the Party's Central Committee in July 1948 
other leaders (MM.Berman,Zawadzki and Spychalski) condemned 
Gomulka ism,he was made to resign his post in the Party and 
the Cominform,was expelled from the Party (third plenary session 
in November 1949) and later imprisoned ironically enough together 
xx with General Spychalski,one of his most bitter critics in 1949. 
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Gomulka repented and in his expiatory speech he declared: 
"My attitude towards the Soviet Union and the T7KP(b) must have 
been the core of my rightish-nationalistic complex.In practice, 
however,my attitude can be reduced rather to the relationship 
between the state of Poland and the Soviet Union than to the 
relationship between the parties WKP$b) and PPR.I have never 
conceived a thought that Poland might go towards socialism 
without' the support of the Soviet Union.I have realised those 
things,but it was difficult for me in practice,though I have 
x B.Bierut,0 Odchyleniu Prawicowym i. Nacjonalistycznym 
w Kierownictwie Partii,Nowe Drogi,1948,No.11,p.13 
xx M.Spychalski,Lenin i Masy,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.l,p.l26 
xxx recorded in Nowe Drogi,1948,No.11,p.144 
frequently appreciated it in my mind,to bring my attitude 
towards the Soviet Union to the ideological Party level"... 
Orthodoxy was restored in the Ideological Declaration of 
the United Workers' Party proclaimed in December 1948.The De-
claration restated that:"the Party is the instrument of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat",thus finally disposing of 
the schism.It stated further that the "People's Democracy 
realised co-operation of democratic parties under the leader-
ship of the United Workers' Party",accepted the "Lenin-Stalin 
theory of state",and confirmed the doctrine that the "People's 
Democracy meant a way torards socialism and consisted in a 
form of the dictatorship of the proletariat". 
The brief story of the plight of the Gomulka schism confirms 
the former opinion that only in the early stage of the develop-
ment of the People's Democracy a multi-party system was tole-
rated as the "National Front".By 1952 the "National Front" 
meant consequently the "Front of the working class with the 
masses of peasantry and working intelligentsia against capita-
list elements".The United Workers' Party led the National Front 
to the polls in the October Elections of 1952,the Front con-
sisting, of representatives,"united and unanimous in the appre-
ciation of the principal needs of the fatheriand",of numerous 
organisations as well as groups of the community (e.g.writers, 
artists,leaders at work) among whom were also mentioned repre-
sentatives of the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party. 
There is,however,a difference in the position of the Party 
in Soviet Russia and the People's Democracy.Under the Stalin 
Constitution (Art.126) the Party has been formally accorded 
x full text printed in Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R.op.cit. 
pp.129-143 
xx S.Rozmaryn,Ustawa Wyborcza Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej 
Ludowej,Nowe Drogi,1952,No.8,p.94 
xxx cf the Electoral Programme,Panstwo i Prawo,1952,No.10,p.403 
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a constitutional standing,thus embodying the doctrine and 
registering the actual fact of the Party being the backbone 
of the system.Being an organic part of the Soviet system the 
Party"must develop its decisions through Soviet organs v,ithin 
the framework of the Constitution: the Party seeks to guide, 
not to replace,the activity of the Soviets". 
The organisation of the Marxist-Leninist Party rims on the 
pattern of the Bolshevik Party.Its intrinsic strength consists 
in centralisation,discipline,strict adherence to doctrine and 
frequent purges,its external power in the fact of having its 
H.Q.in the Kremlin and oeing able to count on actual support 
from the Soviet Union.It is truly international owing to its 
direct dependence on Moscow and contacts with the Cominform 
countries.Though as yet it has not attained the constitutional 
position of the Bolshevik Party,in actual practice it enjoys 
the authority and performs the function of the former. 
A study of the constitution and activities of the Polish 
United Workers' Party reveals both imitation of the organisa-
tion of the Bolshevik Party and its r61e in the Soviet system. 
It claims in its Ideological Declaration mentioned above to be 
xx 
"the brains,honour and conscience of the working class" and, 
therefore,considers itself the only legitimate directive force 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat.In fact it fulfils this 
latter function. 
The Party selects its own members,full membership being 
granted after a yearly waiting period,and membership is coveted 
owing to the practical benefits it brings.Not only does the 
Party form a sort of proletarian aristocracy of brains and po-
litical potentialities,but Party membership is required for 
x from the Resolution of the VHIth Congress of the WKP(b), 
see Vyshinsky,op.cit.p.159-160 
xx Podstawy Ideologiczne P.Z.P.R.op.cit.p.143 
important posts in the state administration arid managerial 
positions in the socialised industry and agriculture. 
The structure of the Party is based on what is termed 
"democratic centraliim".The features of "democratic centralism" 
(which also applies to the hierarchy of constitutional insti-
tutions as well as the Trade Unioni)are : 
a) the principle of the electionjof the executive at every 
level of the Party; 
b) observance of Party discipline and absolute subordination 
of the minority to resolutions carried by the majority; 
c) strict performance by the lower organs of directives and 
resolutions coming from above; 
d) periodical report's of the executives of all levels to 
their rank and file. 
A peculiar feature of*the organisation is the right of every 
member to comiiiunicate directly with the Central Öommittee of 
the Party,whereas all branches must observe the hierarchical 
ladder of authorities. 
The regional organisation of.the Party is centralised and 
arranged on certain planes.At the bottom there are the primary 
organs,that is to say the smallest cells e.g.in a factory or 
agricultural collective; then comes the organisation of a vi-
llage, small town,and a sector in a bigger town.At a higher 
level are the district,town,and sectors of Warsaw and Lodz 
organisations.Above those again is the provincial organisation 
and that of Warsaw and Lodz.Finally we come to the central 
autnority of the Party. 
x Art.14 of the Constitution of the Party 
xx see p.268 ante xxx Rozmaryn,op.cit.p.214 
xxxx cf Gomulka in his expiatorjr speech; "It would be immoral to 
assume that I was right when the К.C.resolved that I was 
wrong"; Nowe Drogi,1948,No.11,p.58 
The supreme authority is vested in the all-Party Congress. 
The Congress elects the Central Committee of the Party (K.C.), 
whilst at all the lower organisational levels enumerated above 
assemblies of members elect their executive committees.The 
committees can appoint commissions to investigate particular 
are 
questions and convene what ±-tr called "consultations of the 
active members" to deliberate on the work of the Party. 
In the period between the all-Party Congresses the supreme 
authority of the Party is exercised by the Central Committee. 
What is more,according to Art.27 of the constitution of the 
Party,the Central Committee not only directs the work of the 
Party,but also "directs and controls the activities of the mem-
bers of the Party occupying leading positions of national im-
portance". This provision is in fact an unofficial substitute 
for Art.126 of the Stalin Constitution since it brings the Party 
to the level of a constitutional organ of tremendous power and 
importance.The Central Committee of the Party thus constitutes 
a shadow government Y/hose position is stronger than that of 
the Government of the country. 
The Central Committee appoints the following three highest 
organs of the Party: Politbureau,Secretariat,and 0rgbureau.lt 
has the power to expel its members and co-opt others in their 
place up to one fifth of the whole. 
Of the three highest organs of the Party tue Politbureau is 
the most important since it provides the lim: \.ith the parent 
Party and a channel through which comes the so called "precious 
advice of the WKP(b) and personal, directives of comrade Stafxri"-
v/hilst he was alive. 
The controlling organ of the Party consists of two sections, 
the Central Commission of Control and the Central Audit Commissior 
x cf R.Zambrowski,Stalinowska Nauka о Sojuszu Robotniczo-
Chlopskim,Nowe Drogi,1949,No.6,p.158 
The former is concerned chiefly with the enforcement of the 
ideological orthodox;',Party discipline,and matters of organi-
sation, the latter controls the finances of the Party. 
The Party pervades the national life in all spheres,its 
members holding jcey positions in all walks of life,whereas all 
organisations allowed by law have to look to the Party as-a 
senior and leading element of the proletariat,and seek from it 
guidance and example. This must be so since the Party is supposed 
to be "the supreme form of organisation of the proletariat" and 
has the monopoly of expounding the doctrine upon which the po-
litical system is being formed and the reorganisation of society 
conducted.The prestige of the Party must be Kept very high 
because it is the primary instrument of forming the general po-
licy of the state,the guide to the interpretation and application 
XXX xxxx 
of the law,the body vetting the national economic plans,the.in-
spector of national education and controller of professional 
.. xxxxxx activities. 
XXXXXXX 
Mr. Zamorowsia.,writing on the position of the Party, asserted i 
that "building up the Party we have secured for. it the leading 
position in the state apparatus".His statistics for 1949 reveal 
that Party members were: 176 out of 269 Chairmen of the District 
National Councils; 62 out of 66 Chairmen of Town National Coun-
cils (big towns); 192 out of 269 District Governors; 63 out of 
69 Mayors of medium-size4towns; 2516 out of 3822 managing di-
rectors of state-run enterprises; 143 out of 274 Chairmen of 
the Committees managing xhe 'Co-operatives and 554 out of 975 
managers of the estates administered by the state.If in 1949 
x cf Art.51 of the constitution of the Party 
xx see pp.210 and 332 ante; xxx see pp.306-8 
xxxx E.Szyr,Wezlowe Zadania Gospodarcze,Nowe Drogi',1951,No.6,p. 60 
xxxxx see pP'335 and 337; xxxxxx see p.243-4 ante 
xxxxxxx R.Zambrowski and H.Swiatkowski,0 Statucie i Zadaniach 
Organizacyjnych P.Z.P.R.Warsaw,1949,p.9,statistics p.12 
the hold of the Party was so strong,one can safely assume that 
by to-day it has become still stronger. 
The Party takes,thus a considerable 3hare in the Adminis-
xx 
tration,and as shown in diagram No.3 A,it is synchronised with 
the system of national Councils (equivalent to the Soviete). 
The organisation of the Party runs,so to speak,parallel with 
the Administration,both having a common head.If we,however, 
compare the Soviet system during the Stalinist era with the 
Polish system of 1953 we shall see in the latter a missing link 
between the Parliament and the system of Councils,this being 
accountable,it appears,to the historical heritage of the system 
and the lack of genuine revolution in the genesis of the Polish 
People's Democracy. 
Though Mr.Malenkov,as Mr.Stalin's successor,had to relinquish 
his position as Secretary General of the Party,the system of 
the Polish People's Democracy survived this important change 
in the Soviet constitution.So did the system of Bulgaria and 
Hungary where Mr.Tchervenkov and Mr.Rakosi (until his retirement 
from premiership in June 
В5з> respectively occupied the same 
position as Mr.Bierut in Poland. 
State and Education. The search for a new man and the necessity 
of a wholesale reorganisation of society lays heavy responsibi-
lities on education.Education in the People's Democracy means 
consequently re-education of older generations and bringing up xxxx the younger ones in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism. 
x cf M.Rybicki,Rady Narodowe w Walce о Realizacje Aktualnych 
Zadan na Wsi,Nowe Drogi,1951,No.4,p.65 
xx see App.No.3 A,p.365 
xxx The post of Secretary General (so far held by Mr.Rakosi) 
has been abolished and the powers of the Hungarian Prime 
Minister made similar to that of Mr.Malenkov in Russia, 
see Daily Telegraph of July 1,1953. 
xxxx Education in Western Democracies,though considered a vital 
function of the state,is far from being conducted on purely 
political lines. 
Education,according to the doctrine,is one of the principal 
functions of the state in the advanced stage of development 
towards socialism,out owing to the regimentation of life and 
state control of all spheres of human interest,;vhat may be 
termed "general education" is hardly separable from tiie poli-
tical indoctrination.Education is in the hands of the state 
to the exclusion of such powerful elements as religious or 
denominational ,trade or professional private teaching 
establishments,and the state is a Marxist-Leninist instrument 
of class domination. 
The Constitution of 1952 frequently refers to the duty and 
care of the state to foster development of education and national 
culture,promises facilities for the schooling of youth (Art.61) 
and protection of the "creative intelligentsia"(Art.65).Though 
intelligentsia is not considered a separate class it is mentioned 
in the Constitution in that particular sense,the conception of 
"creative" worker being,of course,applicable to all walks of 
life. 
In matters-of Education a great part is assigned to the 
Party.The Polish United Workers' Party has its own research 
establishments f^ -om which the new cadres graduate,a successful 
accomplishment of the Party course being equivalent to a univer-
xx 
sity degree.The Party publishes intellectual periodicals of 
which the "Nowe Drogi" is the most important (and has been 
frequently referred to in this work),and maintains general super-
vision over the process of remodelling the society. 
The central event during the post-war "educational revolution" 
was the Congress of Science of 1951 attended by a large dele-
gation of Soviet intellectuals."The Congre!§xhad an epoch-making 
significance for the development of Polish Science.lt created 
x S.Hozmaryn,Poskie Prawo Panstwowe,op.cit.p.52 
xx see p.249 ante 
xxx quot.from "Tygodnik Powszechny"(Cracow) of July,29,1951 
new foundations for Science, viz. rrzs dialectical materialism, 
centralisation and schematisation,team work,assimilation of 
science to the needs of the People's Poland,and made it a part 
of the Six Year Plan". 
The Six year Economic Plan of 195Ö unfolds quite an ambitious 
general programme for furthering education by "raising the level 
of all schools,enlarging the amount of educational publications 
and increasing the number of qualified persons to supply the 
Administration and socialised economy." 
XX 
Commenting on the Plan br.Ozga writes in Poland that the 
purpose of the Plan is to "bring up the young generation to be 
conscious fighters and builders of socialism in their own country 
and fully aware participants in the struggle against injustice, 
exploitation and oppression of the workers in the whole world". XXX 
The teachers,in his opinion,in order to live up to the aims of 
the Plan must be absolutely free from the "narrow pseudo-moral, 
class and educational superstitions of the past as well as the 
inhibixions of a bourgeois society".Marxism-Leninism,fully assi-
milated by the new educators,seems,consequently,the only substi-
tute for the above. 
The PfSPlays particular stress on the need of technical 
education and utilisation of the "Soviet experience in the field 
of schooling and raising the working qualifications'".The Plan 
advocates further reception of the Soviet forms of organisation 
and methods as well as the "foundation of all studies and re-
search upon Marxism-Leninsm and the achievements of the Soviet 
science". 
The new school must be "practical and brought near the work-
shop;it must be allied to the working class and peasant masses; 
x Chapter l,sec.l,§§ 12 and 13 of the Plan 
xx W.Ozga,Rozbudowa Szkolnictwa w Planie Szescioletnim, 
Warsaw,1951,p.14 
xxx Ozga,ibid.p.59 
xxxx see Chapter 3,sec.10,11,12,13 and 14 of the Plan 
it must bring up children in the democratic spirityin the 
spirit of new tasks entrusted to the youth during the building 
x 
of socialism". Having such purposes the new school is under 
what the:' call "social control" exercised by Educational Co-
mmittees of the National Councils and Parents' Committees,and 
a prominence in this field has been achieved by the "School 
Welfare Committees sponsored by political and social organi-
sation!". 
The reorganisation of the educational system embraced all 
establishments from elementary schools to-the universities, 
the pattern being provided by the "country of-victorious so-
cialism". Particular attention was given to universities,where, XXX 
as we have mentioned elsewnere,Marxism-Leninism was formally 
introduced as "the basis of all teaching and research". A good 
illustration of this trend of development is the fact that 
economic and administrative studies have been abolüiUid and 
their place taken by "studies of the history of materialistic 
cufiure". The number of schools of the university type was in-
creased from 28 before the war,to 79 in 1951,catering for 
121.000 students (48.000 bexore the war) and the state aid 
by way of scholarships became intensified and centralised.By 
the law of MarciP^jF^f^O, the so called "state scholarship system" 
was established in order to "speed up the growth of the people's 
intelligentsia especially among the youth of the wording class 
and small peasant origin".The said law forbade scholarships 
other than those state-sponsored,and ordered a selection of 
assisted students according to their social extraction and 
progress in studies. 
x S.Bialas,Organizacja Szkolnictwa a Polsce,Cracow,1950,pp.61-3 
xx Bialas,ibid.p.61 xxx see p.249 ante , 
xxxx Order of Minister of Education(2,11,1949),D.U.R.P.No<§6, ^ 
xxxxx Orders of Minister for Academic Schools(9.1.1951) D.U.R.P. 
No.5,sec.48 and 49; and(of 7.5.1951) D^U.R.P.No.29,sec.230 
xxxxxx D.U.R.P.No.10,sec.106 
Nationalism. Before the war the Central and East European 
states had the reputation of being extremely nationalistic. 
Whatever the accuracy of this opinion we are faced now with 
the fact of nationalism being officially banished from the 
People's Democracies.The explanation of this phenomenon,it 
appears,.must be sought in the nature of the general arrangement 
of the area,the extraordinary flexibility of Marxism-Leninism, 
and the ingenious capacity of its interpreters to reconcile 
the irreconcilable.Such are the ideas of nationalism and inter-
nationalism which found their way into the Polish Constitution 
of 1952?and became reconciled,at least on paper. 
Marxism realised that nationalism is born of oppression,but 
regarded the struggle for political independence merely as a 
struggle between the ruling classes of the "dominated and domi-
xx 
nating nations",in which struggle the "bourgeoisie" played the 
leading part.Mr.Stalin in his early writings advocated a right 
of self-determination of nations,maintaining that all nations XXX are equal and sovereign. His slogan of self-determination,lived, 
however,only for a short time arid he modified it into the "right 
xxxx 
of nations to -political secession". Curiously enough this right 
appears to apply only to the peoples of colonial empires,since 
the peoples of Soviet Russia,irrespective of their diversity 
of race and nationality,"have willed to stay toge?ner",so much 
so that it seems unthinkable -that they would ever part,though 
each Soviet Republic retains in theory the "right to leave the 
We say 'in theory',because the rift between Marshal 
Tito and the Kremlin did not result in a peaceful secession of-
Yugoslavia from the Cominform,nor did it save her from hostile 
x see p.260 ante 
xx J.Stalin,Marxism and National and Colonial Question,p.14 
XXX"Stalin,ibid.p.19 xxxx Stalin,ibid.p.106 
xxxxx Stalin,ibid.p.106 xxxxxx Stalin,ibid.p.152 
ostracism of the Soviet Bloc.The example given to us by the 
case of Yugoslavia does not suggest that the right of secession 
could be freely?,and without, serious consequences,exercised by 
any of the countries in the Soviet Bloc.On the contrary such 
a situation is incredible. 
Mr.Stalin's great service to All-Russia lies in the liqui-
dation of separatist movements within that colossus of natio-
nalities, and the promotion of the Federation,amalgamating 
various Republics.His great disservice to Marxism lies in the 
revival of Russian nationalism.What he fiercely combatted between 
the wars as the "departure from Lenin's internationalem" was 
the "deviation towards nationalism"; what he promoted during 
the last war and consolidated afterwards was Russian nationalism 
clothed in the form of Russian leadership in Central and Eastern 
Europe,and,indeed the whole world of the proletariat.In this.re-
volutionary reversal only the interpretation of the words 
"nationalism" and "internationalism" have changed,their sentiment 
remaining the same. 
The revival of Russian nationalism knocked the skeleton of 
Panslavism out of the cupboard,in which the leading röle is 
assigned to the Russian people.The theory of the leadership of 
the Russian people can be reconciled with the Stalinist maxims 
XXX 
urging the proletariat to "fight under its own banner" and ad-
vocating an international type of organisation which "serves Sr€ 
as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous agita-
tional factor on behalf of international sm!'. Since the fight 
against capitalism must be concerted and organised on an inter-
national scale an overall leadership is needed,the natural leader 
being the country of "victorious socialism" which had already 
inspired the "oppressed peoples from Ireland toxf^SFa" to fight 
x Stalin,ibid.pp.l49 and 164; According to his figures in 1921, 
of 140 mil.of the total population of Soviet Russia 65 mil. 
were non-Russian peoples. xx Stalin,ibid.p.267 
xxx Stalin,ibid.p. 16;хяяас Stalin,ibid.p.60;xxxxx Stalin,p.102 
imperialism.Furthermore,since it is"impossible for small eman-
cipated countries (referring here to the Hungary of Bela Kun) 
to survive unaided against the capitalist assault",and "impo-
ssible to build up socialism in an isolated country without 
XX 
Soviet assistance",Russian leadership becomes a matter of tac-
tics of Marxism—eninism and an indispensable instrument of 
promoting proletarian revolutions.Communism had,therefore,to 
cease to be international and had to become' a monopoly of Soviet 
Russian policy. 
Discussing the Gomulka schism in Poland weiwere able to 
quote Gomulka's corrected view on thd relationship between 
Soviet Russia and the countries of her Bloc.It is determined, 
according to GomufiEa,by the relationship of the Bolshevik Party 
to the Marxist Parties in particular countries.The Party indeed 
is the primary factor politically and ideologically cementing 
the Soviet Bloc,and it is through the instrumentality of the 
Party that regional nationalism must be stamped out,and the 
notion of patriotism revised.In other words,we have the Stali-
nist thesis restated in application to nations other than the 
peoples of the Soviet Union. 
Nationalism in the subjected countries signifies "not only 
defiance of the Soviet leadership but even any direct action 
against her mission."Nationalism",teaches Mr.Bierut,"is the 
antithesis of sincere and real patriotism".This rather start-
ling statement is understandable when read together with the 
conception of patriotism devised by the same gentleman.He dis-
tinguishes between "patriotism" and "proletarian patriotism". 
The former includes elements like love of one's country,pride 
in the national cultural and progressive traditions,social 
conscience and a feeling of responsibility for one's own 
x Stalin,ibid.p.103 xx see p.142 ante xxx see p.328 ante 
xxxx Podstawy Ideologiczne P.2.P.R.op.cit.p.58 
country's participation in the progress of humanity.The latter 
means a struggle for a better and juster social system,care for 
one's own country's leading röle in the international revolu-
tionary movement,sacrifice for the building of socialism in 
one's own country and the extension of socialism into other 
countries.The proletarian patriotism equals the"deepest revo-
ke 
lutionary internationalism".In short»patriotism,in Mr.Bierut's 
view,equals loyalty to the international movement of the pro-
letariat led by Soviet Russia.Stigmatising nationalism as a 
symbol of "narrow-mindedness,selfishness,savagery,and the cause 
of the loss of national sovereignty")Mr.Bierut appeals for the 
combatting of "national sectarianism" and entrusts to the Party 
the task of educating the working masses in the spirit of "pro-
letarian internationalism". 
Mr.Cyrankiewicz,seconding Mr.Bierut,condemns the traditional 
Polish Socialist Party (i.e.as it was before 1948) for its XXX 
struggles against Russia which were inspired by nationalism, 
and for its separation of the struggle for independence from 
the class struggle. 
Those leaders of the Polish People's Democracy,reading 
Marxism in the.Stalinist Gospel-like interpretation,appear to 
have substituted 103'alty to Soviet Russia for patriotism,and 
internationalism for the interest of the country as a whole. 
Nationalism in the People's Democracy signifies deviation from 
Marxism-leninism-Stalinism and,is therefore,wrong; patriotism, 
on the other hand,means the glorification of Soviet Russia and 
is,therefore,right and commendable.Transplanted into the field 
of^onstitution these ideas bring, the builders of People's 
Democracies into one category,that of enthusiastic imitators 
x Podstawy Ideologiczne,op.cit.p.58; xx ibid.p.59 
xxx ibid.p.-87 xxxx ibid.p.88 
and plagiarists of the Soviet system in the service of "building 
socialism" in the spirit of the international solidarity of 
the proletariat. 
x 
State and Church. Engels regarded religion as the "opium of 
the people" and Marx predicted the disappearance of every trace 
of religion with the transformation of society.This uncompro-
mising attitude of the fathers of the modern communist doctrine 
was put into operation in Soviet Russia in two forms: through 
the combatting of any appearance of organised religion (parti-
cularly the Orthodox Church,an integral part of Tsardom),and 
the eradication of the notion of a "religious man". 
The methods of struggle belong to the story of the Bolshevik 
Revolution and the exploits of the "League of the Godless" 
combining ruthlessness with ingenuity. Yet the Russian '^religious 
man" v.as not completely wiped out,and Marxism had to be revised 
in this field.Since 1936 one can observe a gradual return to 
religion,the Constitution (Art.124) guaranteeing "freedom of 
religion and freedom of anti-religious propaganda",and Soviet 
historians began acknowledging a "progressive influence of 
Christianity upon the history of Rusdta". During the patriotic 
war of 1941-45 the use of appeals to religion in order to bolster 
up patriotism and fortify resistance,proved not only effective 
as a propaganda weapon but almost a salutary necessity.God was 
thus allowed to return from exile and the Orthodox Church resumed 
a servile co-operation with the state. 
The position of post-war Poland seems entirely different. 
First of all Poland strongly resisted communist infiltration 
before the war,moreover,being predominantly catholic,she repre-
sented throughout centuries an Ecclesia Militans proclaiming a 
historical mission on the eastern border of Europe, 
x quot.in Strategy and Tactics of World Communism,op.cit.p. 14 
xx K.Mehnert,Weltrevolution durch Weltgeschichte,1951,p.10 
The authority of the Church was always high and certainly 
increased during the German occupation owing to the defiant 
stand of the clergy,and their suffering together with their 
flock? The loyalty to the Vatican of "Polonia semper fidelis" 
was unquestionable.The struggle between the Marxist-ruled state, 
a newcomer,and the Church,an institution established in the 
early history of the Polish.state,ensued from the very beginning 
of the People's Democracy,and no early conclusion could be pre-
dicted. In the struggle for the rule over souls the Church could 
rely on her authority and tradition,the state had to fall back 
on its political power.The state's ordre de bataille revealed 
two main aims: to sever the Church from the Vatican,and to 
create a "National Church" on the pattern of the Orthodox Church 
in Soviet Russia. 
The relationship between the Vatican and the Polish state 
was formally defined by the Concordat entered into by Poland 
and the Holy See on February 2,1925.According to that treaty 
as 
the Church was .recognised independent in matters pertaining to 
religion and internal organisation of the Church.Archbishops 
and Bishops were appointed by the Holy See,the President of the 
Republic having the absolute veto on a persona non grata.The 
Bishops had to take on their appointment an oath of loyalty to 
the Republic,the ceremony taking place in the presence,of the 
President.In.matters of territorial organisation the Concordat 
recognised the principle that no part of the territory of Poland 
could be administered by a Bishop having his see outside the 
political boundaries of the state. 
In 1945 the Concordat was.repudiated by the Warsaw Government 
which charged the Holy See with the violation of the treaty by 
authorising,in 1940,German Bishops to administer Polish terri-
x 3«Bishops and 1263 priests died in concentration camps in 
addition to 584 priests shot by the Germans,see Szuldrzynski, 
Polo'zenie Kosciola'w Polsce,Kultura,Paris,No.5(special edition) 
1953,p.8 
tory annexed by Germany.In actual fact Mgr.Spl et? ,the Bishop 
of Danzig,was in 1940 given administration over the Chelm dio-
cese, but this seems in conformity with Art.3 of the Concordat 
since the territory of Danzig was considered in Poland part of 
XX 
Polish territory.The German priest Breitinger,on the other hand, 
was not appointed administrator of the Gniezno diocese,as alleged, 
but was given jurisdiction over the German population living in 
Poland during the wfr.In no way was the jurisdiction of Polish 
Bishops curtailed by these arrangements,and there seems to be 
hardly a case for violation by the Vatican of the Concordat on 
this account. 
The real reason for the repudiation of the Concordat seems 
the fact that the Holy See has not as yet recognised de jure 
the post-war Government and did not revoke the authority of 
Polish Bishops in the territory annexed by Russia and still 
inhabited by Polish catholics. 
Having severed relations with the Holy See the Government 
at first adopted a friendly policy with regard to the Church, 
the most generous gesture of which was a temporary exemption 
of the Church from the axe of the Agrarian Reform.The activities 
of the Church were,however,carefully invigilated,the first light 
of danger being the suppression of the Primate's Pastoral Letter 
of September 1946 on the subject of General Elections.From the 
exiraüts published after censorship we learn that the Primate 
warned his flock that: "Catholics may not belong to organisations 
or parties,the principles of which contradict christian teaching, 
oraeeds and activities of which aim,in reality,at the under-
mining of christian ethicks".He told them that: "Catholics 
x sentenced to imprisonment for "collaboration" with Nazi, 
see Daily Herald of January 31,1946. 
xx S.Wawryn,Sprawy Kosciola,Przeglad Powszechny,Cracow,June,1948, 
No.8; xxx ibidem 
xxxx cf The Tablet,November 16,1946 
may vote only for such persons,lists of candidates,and electoral 
programmes,as are not opposed to catholic teaching and morality, 
and that catholics majr neither vote,nor put themselves forward 
as candidates for electoral lists,the programmes or principles 
of which are repugnant to common-sense,the well being of the 
nation and the state,to christian morality,and to the catholic 
outlook". 
After the Elections another Pastoral Letter appeared in 
which Cardinal KLond openly denounced the "modern heathendom" 
and declared that "no truce was possible between Christendom 
and Atheism". 
In conjunction with the general question of christian ethics 
the problem of education presented a more acute issue owing to 
the secularisation of schools and the hampering of the teaching 
of religion.The Church felt obliged to protest against the in-
stillation of Marxism which became an obligatory part of the 
educational programme.The Pastoral Letter signed by all Arch-
bishops and Bishops of 1948,and addressed to Youth told them 
that?" 
the Church cannot accept the education of catholic youth 
without God,without mentioning His teaching,without following 
His commandments.You should preserve special calm in the face 
of the onslaught of the Press,and the propaganda of the apostles 
of.materialism". 
The position of the Church,especially in the light of the 
laws of August ?v?949,and March 20,l555^became more and more 
precarious. 
The former law,purporting to guarantee freedom of all religious beliefs recognised,at the same time,the right of 
x quot.by T.Beamish,Must Night Fall ?,London,1950,p.23 
xx quot.ibid.p.242 
xxx B.U.R.P.No.45,sec.334 
xxxx D.U.R.P.No.9,sec.87 
anti-religious propaganda and granted the authorities extensive 
powers,such as the imposition of heavy penalties on clergy 
manifesting dislike of the regime. 
The statute,notwithstanding penalties ranging from three 
years imprisonment to the death sentence,is quite elastic and 
admits a wide scope of interpretations.To give a few examples 
of the above opinion,Art.2 threatens with five years imprison-
ment "whosoever limits the rights of the citizen on account 
of his religious belief or irreligiousness".Art.3 makes it a 
crime "to hinder another from participation in religion or to 
force one to participate in religious practice".Art.7(§1) pro-
vides the punishment of five years imprisonment for "insult 
or abuse in public of a social group or single person because 
of their religion or irreligiousness",while Art.8 maices liable 
for imprisonment,for not less than three years,anyone who 
"misuses the freedom of conscience and religion for purposes 
hostile to the system of the People's Republic". 
Art.4 constitutes a reprisal for the papal decree of July 
1948 forbidding administration of sacraments to militant co-
mmunists, and a direct interference with the purely internal 
power of the Church in the distribution of her spiritual wealth. 
It authorised five years imprisonment for anyone "who misuses 
the freedom of religion by refusing access to religious cere-
monies and sacraments because of political,social,or scientific 
views".By this provision the faculty of the Church to decide 
upon one's worthiness to share in the spiritual welfare of the 
Church was taken over by the state and the clergy put into a 
serious dilemma,either to obey the law of the state and parti-
cipate in what,by the Church law would amount to sacrilege,or 
to obey the law of the Church and the commands of the office 
and incur the severity of the law of August 5,1949-
The Minister of Justicefcommenting on the above statute. 
bitterly resented "the negative attitude of the hierarchy to-
wards the People's Democracy,who within the five years of the 
existence of the rägime,showed not a single appreciation of 
the achievements of the regime".In his opinion the Church failed 
in her duties since she "declined to combat capitalism,and 
endeavoured to undermine the enthusiasm for socialem".Assailing 
personally the present Primate Cardinal Y/yszynski he reproached 
him for sending his blessing to the emigre Pofes. 
The law of March 20,1950,mentioned above,struck at the 
material resources of the Church,declaring confiscate all 
landed property of the Church (Arts.l and 2); places and buil-
dings of worship as well as the dwellings of the clergy were 
excepted.This law,however,by way of exception,left in the hands 
of the parish priest farms of a size not exceeding the limits 
set by the Agrarian Reform decrees (fifty hectares,and one 
hundred hectares in certain areas) to be their personal source 
of support (Art.4,§2).The Minister of Public Administration 
was authorised to decide whether such farms constituted "farms 
of the parish priest".The property so confiscated came under 
the administration of the state (Art.8),which would set aside 
a Church Fund for the purpose of the "upkeep and reconstruction 
of churches,salaries,and pensions of the clergy,and for chari-
ties"(Art.9). 
These measures were accompanied by attacks against the 
clergy which were particularly acute during certain political 
trials.In 1949,as far as it was possible to ascertain from the 
scanty records available,catholic clergy were implicated in 
eight such tri ffifin which nine priests were sentenced to death 
x H.Swiatkowslci,Wolnosc Sumienia i Wyznania w Polsce Lüdowej, 
Warsaw,1949,p.31 
xx Swiatkowski,ibid.p.32 xxx Swiatkowski,ibid.p.30 
xxxx see Polish Daily of: 19-2.1949; 5-3.1949; 16.3-1949; 
15-8.1949; 19-8.1949; 7.9-1949; 9-9-1949; 30-12.1949 
and several to imprisonment,the main charges being co-operation 
with the Germa£s(one trial,two death sentences),collaboration 
with the Underground,activities designed to overthrow the 
regime,and sabotage (charge:"industrial wastfcage"). The year 
1950 opened with a trial of members of the Bonifratres Order 
who were directly accused of "Hitlerfsm",and a big trial of the 
xxxx 
Caritas,a charitable organisation of the Catholic Church embra-
cing the whole country,as a result of which the charitable work 
of che Church was forbidden and the property of the Caritas 
put under the direct control of a body appointed by the Govern-
ment. 
In this atmosphere negotiations began between the Hierarchy 
and the Government with a view of settling the differences 
between the Church and State.An agreement was reached in April 
f^ü>$?under which the State recognised the authority of the Pope 
as supreme in matters of the Church.This pact,however,proved 
to be only a truce in the struggle which continued,the Church 
always being on the defensive. 
The 1951 Cracow trials of members of an Underground organi-
sation "Armia Polska" ^Polish Army") in which two priests were 
convicted provided ammunition for wholesale attacks against 
the clergy,and a background for the Government action in expe-
lling five apostolic administrators in the regained territories, 
and ordering election by the chapters,of capitular vicars to 
act in their place.Though this arbitrary action of the Govern-
ment,under the pretext that no interim administration was ne-
cessary, was a breach of the truce of April 1950 and an assault 
x Polish Daily of 9-9.1949; xx Polish Daily of 16.3.1949 
xxx Polish Daily of 26.1.1950; xxxx Polish Daily of 16.2.1950 
xxxxx Tygodnik Powszechny,Cracow,April 1950,No.4 
xxxxxx Polish Daily of January 18,19,and 20,1951 
on the papal authority,it caused no serious dissension among 
the Hierarchy since the election of the vicars was recognised 
by the clergy and the Primate formally invested them with the 
necessary canonical jurisdiction. 
The short-lived- harmony that ensued was disturbed by the 
so-called "Stockholm Peace Appeal" which received great publi-
city and Government support.The clergy were pressed to join 
and promote it among the faithful,but at first refused co-
operation, arguing that the Peace Appeal had purely political 
aims.Intimidated,they gave in and in May 1951 the Episcopate 
and the clergy signed the so-called "National Charter of Peace 
Plebiscite" as required by the Government.This,however,brought 
no peace for the Church.Among the subsequent trials the most 
у 
outstanding ones were against the members of the Jesuits Order 
and the St.Bernard Oräir,the latter yielding two death senten-
ces. 
During 1952 the Government particularly concentrated on the 
fostering of the activities of the so-called "patriotic priests", 
that is to say clergymen who during the seven years struggle 
have been won to the side of the State.The "patriotic priests", 
representing a negligible minority of iine clergy^ enjoy material 
and propagandist support,the Government hoping they will become 
a nucleus of a church independent of Rome and subservient to 
the State.In Poland the throughout catholic country the last XXX ^^ s 
independent catholic paper "Tygodnik Powszecuny" tori oern sus-
pended and its editor imprisoned in March 1953,whereas several 
papers (daily and periodical) in the hands of the "patriotic 
priests" and the "progressive catholics"(a pro-Government orga-
nisation) still circulate.The "Tygodnik Powszechny" reappeared, 
x Polish Daily of 20.9.1951; xx Polish Daily of Oct.12,13,18,1951 
xxx weekly paper controlled bjr ecclesiastical authorities 
xxxx Most important periodicals:"Ksiadz-Obywatel";"Dzis i Jutro"; 
"Zycie i Mysl";and daily papers:"Slowo Powszechne" and 
"Trybuna Ludu". 
however,on July 12,1953 in its original form,but no longer 
under the auspices of the Cracow Church authorities and with 
a new editorial board,the articles in this new edition indicating 
a complete change of the character of this pape?. 
The close of 1952 brought news of the disappearance of three 
xx 
Silesian Bishops who for quite a time were under heavy propa-
gandist fire,and the arrest of several priests in Cracow on 
charges of espionage and sabotage.In January 1953 five digni-
taries of the Church including one Archbishop were reported 
under arrest,the seizure of Archbishop Baziak causing a public 
demonstration in-Cracow suppressed with violence by the Security 
Р * Ш е . 
In February 1953 a trial of four priests and three laymen 
charged with espionage for the United States of America,took 
place and Mr.Bierut announced that the Government,under the 
pressure of public opinion aroused by the said trial,had taken 
xxxxx 
control of the Cnurсл.Consequently,in future all appointments 
to the Church Hierarchy will be subject to Government approval 
and all prelates occupying official position in the Church 
must swear loyalty to the regime. 
The decree of February 9,1953,under the authority of which 
the State-assumed control over the Church contains a curious 
anomaly if viewed purely from the angle of Constitutional Lav/. 
It purports to put Bishops under the control of the "Presidium 
of the Government" ( Art.4 ),a non-existing body under the 
letter of the present Constitution.We may recall here that such 
a body was created under the practice of the Constitution 
x see-Polish Daily of July 20,1953 
xx Polish Daily of 28.11.1952;xxx Polish Daily of 2.12.1952 
xxxx Polish Daily of 6.1.1953 
xxxxx Daily Telegraph of 14.2.1952,Polish Daily of 16.2.1955 
xxxxxx Arts.3 and 5, of the decree of February 9,1953, 
D.U.R.P.No.10,sec.32 
of 19?7,but discarded by the Constitution of 1952.The position 
is,therefore,similar to that obtaining under the Soviet Constitu-
tion where although no "Presidium of the Government" is mentioned 
in the Stalin Constitution,yet such body exists and functions. 
In reply to the decree the Bishops addressed a letter to Mr. 
Bierut on May 8,1953,pointing to the "tragic position of the 
Church" and charging the Government with a premeditated action 
aiming at the destruction of the Church and religion.They stated 
that the decree was illegal because the Council of State (which 
issued the decree) had no authority to make it,and that it was 
contrary to the Constitution of 1952 as well as the law of 1949 
on freedom of religion.Arguing that the Government policy was 
bound to cause irreparable damage to the national interest! the 
Bishops appealed to the "leaders of the Marxist camp for revision 
of the principles of hatred and ostracism with regard to religion, 
Church and God". 
The letter was suppressed by the Government,but its contents 
reached the West by October .During those few months,however, 
the Church suffered severe blows.First a trial of the Bishop of 
Kielce Mgr.Kaczmarek (arrested in 1951) was staged before the 
Military Tribunal in Warsaw much on the lines of the trial of the 
Hungarian Primate Cardinal Mindszenty.Then the Primate of Poland 
Cardinal Wyszynski was seized and co£ff?ied,his fate resembling 
so far that of the Archbishop of Prague Mgr.Beran.With the arrest 
xxxxxx 
of Mgr.Bernacid. the Suffragan Bishop of Gniezno in October 1953 
and the difficulty of appointing new Bishops the number of the 
Episcopate became seriously reduced,and it appears that by October 
1953 there were only nine Bishops Ordinary in office for a total 
of thirty £Ше£ез. 
This state of affairs together with Government support for 
the "patriotic priests" indicates an important development towards 
the creation of a "National Church" on the pattern of the Soviet 
351 A. 
Orthodox Church. 
The struggle between the Church and State affecting more 
than 90$ of the population of Poland has not only direct 
repercussions on individual rights and freedoms,but is also 
a great test-case for the democratic claims of the People's 
Democracy. 
Footnotes from p.351 
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xx e.g.the Government prevented the Episcopate from installing 
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Conclusions. 
1. The historical development of the Polish state,as far 
as it v/as possible to ascertain,reveals no elements indicating 
that the system of the People's Democracy might be a result of 
national evolution.No case can be made either for the idea 
(mentioned without serious attempt at substantiation in some 
writings) that the People's Democracy is a natural reaction to 
the failures of the Polish Democracy during the twenty years 
of the independent republic.This period of independence is of 
a special significance in as much as perhaps three systems of 
government were' tried,and undoubtedly,new and valuable expe-
riences were made.That which took other nations centuries to 
achieve,Poles were expected to do within those two decades 
and were severely criticised for failing in "Deriiocracy". 
The overwhelming historical evidence points to the creation 
of the system by imposition by Soviet Russia,acquiesced in by 
her partners in the Grand Alliance.Whatever the motives of the 
Soviet diplomacy the fruit borne by the Stalinist era amounts 
to a reversal of the "cordon sanitaire" and the seizure of 
power by the Communists in Central and Eastern Europe without 
"proletarian revolutions".The proletariat indeed was presented 
with a fait accompli and it is only a matter of highly dubious 
speculation whether the "workers and peasants" would have gone 
to the barricades to fight for a Russian type of "socialist 
state" had not that institution been imported in the baggage 
train of the Red Army.The opportunity that arose on the defeat, 
of Germany was not so much a chance for the working masses as 
it was for the Moscow-trained professional revolutionaries, 
and their colleagues of the home Communist Party. 
To achieve povrer in Poland they had to destroy the Under-
ground State and vith it both the Socialist and the Peasant 
Party,the pillars of the Underground State and genuine repre-
sentatives of the world.ng masses. The ruling faction of Poland 
today is a classless body of men and their connection with the 
Polish proletariat (if any) is very remote.Studying the personal 
background and career of the dignitaries of the present regime 
one can say without exaggeration,and without offence,that those 
self-styled tribuni plebis only emerged on the tide of events 
either from the ranks of frustrated intelligentsia or from the 
classrooms and the conspiratory cadres of the Bolsheviic Party. 
» x The native element of the "willing Poles" became mingled with 
the foreign experts "functioning as Poles",whose predominance 
at the present time cannot be questioned.Consequently the system 
of government that ensued bears a threefold characteristic : 
native elements,imported ideas,and a predictable course of 
development. 
2. Contrary to the practice of the Tsarist Ochrana and the 
brutal attempts at Russianisation in the past,the present domi-
nation tends to conceal its physical features and to remain 
limited to ideological guidance and overall protection.What-
ever happens,therefore,is being done in the name of the Polish 
nation,and announced as another national attainment,tributes 
at the same time being richly paid to Soviet Russia without 
whose aid and assistance nothing could be achieved.As a matter 
of tactics the Russians did not come this time as conquerors 
but as liberators and helpful friends,guides in the reconstruc-
tion and building of their way of life on Polish soil. 
3. The system of the People's Democracy is a result of the 
Soviet control of the area and the application of Marxism in 
x expression coined by Prof.H.Seton-Watson,The East European 
Revolution,London,2nd edition,1952,p.168-9 
all spheres of life.When we speak of the Marxism of today we 
must bear in mind the modifications this philosophy was subjected 
to under the reformatory influence of the powerful personality 
of Joseph Stalin.Without attempting to evaluate his merits in 
this field it seems more appropriate to speak of Stalinism 
instead of Marxism,thus giving due credit both to the diplomatic 
skill and the ability to adapt the doctrine to the machinery 
of government displayed in such a powerful and dynamic way by 
the Red Tsar of both Russia and the vassal states.The Stalinist 
era is not likely to come to an abrupt end with the death of its 
creator,on the contrary,the legend will probably continue for 
some time and Joseph Stalin will remain,together with Marx 
and Lenin on the pedestal of "great teachers and leaders of 
world proletariat".This,of course,means a lot,signifying prima 
facie the acceptance of Stalinist modifications of the doctrine. 
How long this will hold it is quite a different matter, 
As a matter of genesis and development the People's Democracy 
emerged,formed,and set forth on its course under the auspices 
of Stalinism and consequently bears the stigma of Stalin's 
practical politics and his modifications of the doctrine.Therein 
as well as in the diversity of historical conditions lies perhaps 
the most important difference between the birth of the Soviet 
State and the People's Democracy.Whereas the Soviet State,from 
the beginning was reared under the rigour of the Bolshevik 
Revolution and Lenin's guidance,the People's Democracy received 
ready-made forms of the authoritarian state modelled under 
Stalin's dictatorship. 
The Soviet State is an original creation whereas the People's 
x The idea of "collective leadership" propounded so far by 
Stalin's successors,and the recent tendency of discarding 
the worhhip of individuals does not seem to aim at disowning 
the Stalinist version of Marxism. 
Democracy is not.The Soviet State is a product of national 
revolution,an edifice built over the mass-graves of the massac-
red "bourgeoisie" and a monument to the defunct idea of a 
"proletarian democracy".The People's Democracy,on the other 
hand,is a result of the ideological and political expansion 
of the Soviet Union mingled with the revolutionary elements 
of the countries concerned.Whereas,therefore,the leadership 
in the Soviet Union is Russian (certain non-Russian nations 
forming part of the former tsarist empire having their members 
in the Kremlin) the leadership of the People's Democracy is 
composed of partly native,partly foreign extraction. 
4. Due chiefly to the mode of the seizure of power and lack 
of genuine revolution the People's Democracy showed in the 
first phase of its existence certain signs of originality which, 
however,disappeared with the-consolidation of the rägime.At 
any rate there was never any serious deviation from the prin-
cipal aims and purposes for which the Soviet State stood.In 
other words,the countries of the People's Democracies pursued 
the course traced by the development of the Soviet State,though 
as a matter of tactics this had to be adapted to the particular 
conditions and circumstances in which the regimes started to 
work. 
The method adopted by the People's Democracy strictly 
followed the pattern of the Bolshevik Revolution in so far as 
the seizure of power was linked with schemes for economic re-
volution and social transformation of the community.Though the 
measures were definitely less drastic (but by no means mild) 
the effeßt they aimed at was identical : 
a) destruction of "bourgeoisie" and capitalism; 
b) nationalisation and "socialisation" of industry 
and collectivisation of land; 
c) awakening of a class-consciousness among the wage-
earners and mounting of the so-called "workers' and 
peasants' alliance" ; 
d) assigning of the monopoly of leadership in all matters 
to the Communist Party. 
The People's Democracies are now,broadly speaking,at the 
stage of development corresponding to that of the New Ecbnomic 
Policy ( N.E.P. ) of the Soviet Union,that is to say,in the 
transitory period from "Capitalism to Socialism",This manifests 
itself by the presence of certain remnants of "Capitalism" 
(e.g.private property),the lagging behind of the collectivisation 
scheme,and the necessity of wiping out certain signs of oppo-
sition to the regime.To use the technical Marxist jargon,the 
"economic and social basis has not. yet been adequately prepared 
for the superstructure of the state of triumphant socialism". 
5. If we accept as a criterion of comparison the Soviet theory 
of state,distinguishing two stages of development (viz. a) 
stage of building socialism; and b) stage of triumphant 
socialism ) the People's Democracy is still in the first stage 
of development, whereas Soviet Russia is already in the second 
stage. Yet the form of the Soviet State in the first stage 
was not identical to the constitutional form of the People's 
Democracy. 
The characteristic feature of the Soviet State in the 
first stage was the "Soviet Republic" or a state of councils 
consisting of delegates of assemblies of workers,peasants and 
soldiers,the class of "workers" having distinct electoral pri-
vileges as compared with the class of "peasants". 
The characteristic feature of the People's Democracy is 
the "People's Republic",or a state of a predominantly "bourgeois" 
character ruled in an arbitrary fashion by the so-called 
"Dictatorship of the Proletariat".Only in the later part of 
the first stage did the People's Democracy adopt the fully 
developed system of soviets and carry out constitutional reforms 
corresponding to the predestined trend of development. 
The dictatorship of the Bolshevik Party is supposed to be, 
according to the doctrine,a result of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and a form of the "alliance of workers and peasants". 
No Marxist Party (whatever its official name) could claim this 
position at the first stage of development of the People's 
Democracy.Consequently the so called "National Front of Demo-
cratic Parties" - an organisation unknown to the Soviet State -
had to be devised,first to marshal the electorate under the 
leadership of the Marxist Party,then to pave the way for a 
single party system. 
The position may be summarised thus : though the People's 
Democracy differs in form from the Soviet State>both represent 
the same tendency and the same system of the "Dictatorship of 
the Proletariat".Since the form of government matters little 
as compared with the system,the People's Democracy is nothing 
else but a derivative and imitation of the Soviet system of 
government. 
6. Turning now to the Polish People's Democracy one can 
easily trace its stages of development as well as a certain 
analogj'- to the history of the Soviet State. 
Poland is still in the period of "building socialism", 
though by her nevf constitution the system of government only 
slightly differs from that obtaining in the Soviet Union.As far 
as the social and economic transformation of the country is 
concerned Poland has yet quite a way to go. 
The first stage,or preparatory period;extends from the 
crossing of the Polish frontier by the Red Army to the Consfci-
tution of 194-7.In that period the Underground State was des-
troyed and the Government in Exile ousted.The ensuing consti-
tutional vacuum was filled with the "Provisional Government of 
National Unity" which subsequently established its dictatorship 
and liquidated opposition.Nationalisation of industry and 
expropriation of the private property in land were the chief 
features causing revolutionary changes both in national economy 
and social structure.Draconian measures coupled with practically 
unrestricted powers of the Ministry of Public Security and 
jurisdiction of Military Courts kept the Govex-nment in power 
and facilitated the performance of its programme.This period 
bears a certain analogy to the Bolshevik Revolution,particularly 
in that it resulted in the establishment of the "Dictatorship 
of the Proletariat" in the form of the "People's Republic", 
the only difference being that the Bolshevik dictatorship was 
sovereign and the dictatorship in Poland devoid of sovereignty. 
The Constitution of 1947 was principally a "bourgeois" 
constitution,its only purpose being to serve as an interim 
measure and channel of transition from a "Capitalist" to a 
"Socialist State".It initiated the formulatory period where 
the foundations were laid for the state of People's Democracy 
and the Constitution of 1952 defining its principles.Whereas 
the Constitution of 1947 (not so much in form as in function) 
corresponds to the Bolshevik Constitution of 1918,the Consti-
tution of 1952 corresponds to the Soviet Constitution of 1924. 
Though the Polish Constitution of 1952 was faithfully modelled 
upon the Stalin Constitution of 1936 and only to a negligible 
degree differs from the latter,as a matter of marxist classi-
fication Poland was not yet promoted to the stage of "trium-
phant socialism", mainly,it appears,owing to the inadequate 
progress she made in the field of economic and social Achievemtnt. 
x see A. Sobolev,-(Russian writer),Democracja Ludowa jako Forma 
Politycznej Organizacji Spoleczenstwa,Nowe Drogi,1951,No.5, 
/ P-90 
In 1947 the real power situation in Poland was very similar 
to that of Soviet Russia in 1924,but the formal text of the Con-
stitution differed.In 1952 no change in power was apparent,but 
the formal text of the Polish Constitution was brought closer 
to the Stalin Constitution,though social and economic factors 
resembled,rather,the situation of Russia in 1924«This discrepancy 
between the formal and the actual aspect of the polity seems to 
be explicable by the insistence of Marxists on a rigid appli-
cation of the doctrine which requires the state to go gradually 
through stages of development without skipping over any one of 
them. 
The Constitution of 1952 being the closing chapter of the 
prior development,there begins the period of modifications which, 
one can anticipate,will,if uninterrupted,bring the system closer 
to the ideal of "socialism" as understood and practised in Russia. 
The theoretical line of progress will follow Stalinism unless 
another myth becomes clothed in practical directives and Stalinist 
is shelved in the same manner as Leninism was within the last 
two decades. 
7« Besides the strict doctrinaire attitude of the leaders of 
the People's Democracy one can notice their affection for forma-
lities and zeal in search of a legalistic facade even in cases of 
action in violation of what passes for the law.This was well ma-
nifested at the initial stage of the system during the "battle of 
the constitutions" when they endeavoured to prove by all means 
that in the defunct Constitution of 1921 they had a legal title 
for seizing power. 
Another feature of the leadership is the importance of semi-
official bodies,such as the Party or institutions unmentioned in 
the Constitution,such as the Presidium of the Government.This 
gives an impression of secrecy and preference for behind-the-
seense activities characteristic of the Stalin regime. 
In such conditions there is a great discrepancy between the 
I theory and the practice of Constitutional Law.Whereas the theory 
addicts itself to formalism,rigidity of conceptions,dogmatic 
teaching and fear of deviation from the political line adopted 
by the Government,the practice aims at expediency and exhibitio-
nist, frequently at the expense of the letter of the law.The Law 
of the Constitution,as far as its substance is concerned,is being 
made and interpreted by active politicians,only the question of 
systemisation being left to scholars.Consequently a standard 
text-book on the subject consists primarily of an exposition of 
the doctrine and quotations from writings and speeches of the 
leading personalities,less space being devoted to a discussion 
of the actual working of the constitution and none to criticism. 
8. The classification into stages: "building socialism" and 
"triumphant socialism" seems artificial and devoid of any fun-
damental value from the point of view of Constitutional Law. 
The machinery of the Soviet State has achieved its utmost 
intensification but there is,as yet,no sign of any transformation 
towards the utopian stage of communism.What one can observe at 
present is,on one hand,a tremendous drive towards economic de-
velopment and, on the other, a tendency to consolidate the po-
litical power within the framework of the existing constitution. 
The immediate result of this situation appears to be a general 
increase of production but no sign of the fulfilment of the 
dream of the fathers of communism that "state and law wither 
away". 
The Polish People's Democracy,as far as the Constitution 
of 1952 reveals,represents an almost complete assimilation to 
the Soviet Russian political machine,whilst the economic programme 
notably collectivisation,is still unfulfilled.Both states are 
distinctly totalitarian,but as a matter of history,Russia 
x e.g.the amount of political propaganda in ordinary legislation. 
became a totalitarian state after the nationalisation of 
industry and collectivisation of land,whereas the totalitarian 
system v/as imposed upon Poland immediately upon the seizure 
of power by the present regime and before collectivisation 
achieved its present stage. 
9. Poland together with other countries quite inaccurately 
termed "satellites" by certain writers forms part of the Bloc 
of states under Soviet control.Formerly sovereign states, 
enjoying their sovereignty in a rather ebullient manner between 
the two wars,they endure now the same fate and head towards 
the same destiny.A certain uniformity and levelling can be 
observed today in those countries which in the past could hardly 
afford cordial neighbourly relations,conveniently (and convin-
cingly) blaming each other as well as the interference of big 
powers for the lack of co-Operation among themselves. 
Though their governments are in a position to declare at 
any time their incorporation into the Soviet Union this is not 
likely to happen,continuation of the separate status being 
more convenient. 
The area under Soviet control represents now a homogeneous 
Bloc,the differences in political set-p,economic conditions 
and social structure being gradually eliminated.What is interes-
ting,is not the domination by a country in many respects less 
developed than the area dominated,but the fact that Communism 
has been planted (or is being planted) on states of by no means 
low cultural standing,of neither primitive economy nor social 
organisation. 
As far as Constitutional Law is concerned this particular 
state of affairs considerably weakens the theory of "super-
structure and basis" (already modified by Mr.Stalin),one of 
the canons of the Marxist political philosophy.lt is not, 
therefore,the "social and economic basis" of the country,as 
propounded by the said theory,that models the "superstructure"; 
on the contrary,in order to build up the desired "social and 
economic basis" it is necessary to have political power,the 
manifestation of which is the Constitution.In other words, 
although the actual charter of the Constitution may contain 
a record of" past achievements,the constitution itself (meaning 
the aggregate of written or unwritten rules by which the given 
community is governed) is partly elaborated structure of the 
organisation of the community,and partly a programme of future 
development expressed in relevant statutes. 
10. It seems futile to speculate on the possibility of 
future modifications of the system of the People's Democracy 
other than those indicated by the doctrine or development of 
the Soviet Constitution.The system stands or falls with the 
principal force that created it,and is only as firm as the 
hold of Soviet Russia over the peoples under her control. 
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Supreme State Authorities under the Constitution of 1935< 
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Diagram No.2 
Administration during the period 1947 - 1952. 
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Appendix No. 3 
Diagram N0.3 A 
State and Party Authorities under the Constitution of 1952? 
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State and Party Authorities under Stalin Rule. 
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